

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY *of*

COLD WAR INTELLIGENCE

NIGEL WEST

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY

The historical dictionaries present essential information on a broad range of subjects, including American and world history, art, business, cities, countries, cultures, customs, film, global conflicts, international relations, literature, music, philosophy, religion, sports, and theater. Written by experts, all contain highly informative introductory essays on the topic and detailed chronologies that, in some cases, cover vast historical time periods but still manage to heavily feature more recent events.

Brief A–Z entries describe the main people, events, politics, social issues, institutions, and policies that make the topic unique, and entries are cross-referenced for ease of browsing. Extensive bibliographies are divided into several general subject areas, providing excellent access points for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more. Additionally, maps, photographs, and appendixes of supplemental information aid high school and college students doing term papers or introductory research projects. In short, the historical dictionaries are the perfect starting point for anyone looking to research in these fields.

HISTORICAL DICTIONARIES OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Jon Woronoff, Series Editor

- Israeli Intelligence*, by Ephraim Kahana, 2006.
Cold War Counterintelligence, by Nigel West, 2007.
World War II Intelligence, by Nigel West, 2008.
Sexspionage, by Nigel West, 2009.
Air Intelligence, by Glenmore S. Trenear-Harvey, 2009.
Middle Eastern Intelligence, by Ephraim Kahana and Muhammad Suwaed,
2009.
German Intelligence, by Jefferson Adams, 2009.
Ian Fleming's World of Intelligence: Fact and Fiction, by Nigel West,
2009.
Naval Intelligence, by Nigel West, 2010.
Atomic Espionage, by Glenmore S. Trenear-Harvey, 2011.
Chinese Intelligence, by I. C. Smith and Nigel West, 2012.
Signals Intelligence, by Nigel West, 2012.
British Intelligence, Second Edition, by Nigel West, 2014.
World War I Intelligence, by Nigel West, 2014.
United States Intelligence, Second Edition by Michael A. Turner, 2014.
Intelligence Failures, by Glenmore S. Trenear-Harvey, 2015.
International Intelligence, Second Edition by Nigel West, 2015.
Russian and Soviet Intelligence, Second Edition by Robert W. Pringle,
2015.
Cold War Intelligence, by Nigel West, 2021.

Historical Dictionary of Cold War Intelligence

Nigel West

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Rowman & Littlefield
An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
www.rowman.com

6 Tinworth Street, London, SE11 5AL, United Kingdom

Copyright © 2021 by Nigel West

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: West, Nigel, author.

Title: Historical dictionary of Cold War intelligence / Nigel West.

Description: Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield, [2021] | Series: Historical dictionaries of intelligence and counterintelligence | Includes bibliographical references. |

Summary: "This Historical Dictionary of Cold War Intelligence contains a chronology, an introduction, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has hundreds of cross-referenced dictionary entries on crucial operations spies, defectors, moles, double and triple agents, and the tradecraft they apply"—Provided by publisher.

Identifiers: LCCN 2020045795 (print) | LCCN 2020045796 (ebook) |

ISBN 9781538120316 (cloth) | ISBN 9781538120323 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Intelligence service—History—Dictionaries. | Espionage—History—Dictionaries. | Cold War—History—Dictionaries.

Classification: LCC JF1525.I6 W475 2021 (print) | LCC JF1525.I6 (ebook) |

DDC 327.1209/045—dc23

LC record available at <https://lccn.loc.gov/2020045795>

LC ebook record available at <https://lccn.loc.gov/2020045796>

∞™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

A number of myths now surround the history of the Cold War; the assumption that the Soviet Union posed no real threat to the West; the belief that détente would have worked; the idea that the West prevailed because America was strong, its people united, and its allies supportive; that the Soviet collapse has nothing to do with outside pressure; and that the real lesson of the Cold War is that victory was achieved by Reagan's toughness, with Gorbachev's contribution being of far less significance.

Gordon Barrass, SIS officer 1964–1993
Chief of the JIC Assessments Staff 1991–1993
The Great Cold War

How thin the thread of peace was during the Cold War.

Vasili Mitrokhin
KGB Archivist 1957–1984
The Sword and the Shield

The invisible front—that is what it was in the Cold War, and for us it was war. The soldiers may have been alert but for us and others who went out into the cold, it was actual war.

Markus Wolf
Chief of the HVA 1953–1986

Contents

Editor's Foreword (Jon Woronoff)	ix
Acronyms and Abbreviations	xi
Chronology	xvii
Introduction	1
The Dictionary	7
<i>Appendix 1: Soviet Antisubmarine Warfare: Current Capabilities and Priorities</i>	337
Appendix 2: CIA Country Plan for Albania	375
Appendix 3: The Berlin Tunnel	391
Appendix 4: MI5 Study of Soviet Defectors, August 1948	413
Appendix 5: BfV Annual Report, 1963	427
Appendix 6: CIA Clandestine Service Primer on HUMINT	475
Appendix 7: CIA Report on the 1956 Hungarian Uprising	499
Appendix 8: CIA Report into Operations in Lithuania	513
Appendix 9: CIA Report on Penkovsky's Legacy, 1971	535
Appendix 10: NATO Threat Assessment, April 1983	549
Bibliography	565
Index	575
About the Author	601

Editor's Foreword

In this long series of historical dictionaries of intelligence and counterintelligence, it is not as hard as it would seem to pick the one which was most important, namely this volume on Cold War intelligence. Not only is it the last in the series but it is the one which would historically have spelled the end of intelligence and, indeed, even the end of the world, if things had worked out differently. The two main opponents had never been closer to unleashing a war which, given the weapons available to both of them, could have put an end to the world as we know it. Both East and West were armed to the teeth, both were psychologically primed for action, and both had enough weapons to destroy one another—and everyone else—just by pressing a few buttons. Yet, this did not happen, and although not actually friends at present, the various parties on both sides appear content to get along with one another on a fairly normal basis. It is hard to tell why the worst did not take place, maybe because their intelligence was good enough to dissuade them from going too far.

This end of the world scenario is not just make-believe or a product of our imaginations, just think back if you can to the Berlin Wall, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Gulf of Tonkin, or the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Afghan War, to say nothing of star wars. And if you tend to forget many of the details, no worry, they are all provided here in this latest volume on Cold War intelligence with entries on the many and often malicious events of the period from 1947 to 1991 covered neatly from A to Z. It shows that not only were there sensible cooler heads in both East and West but that they had to contend not only with the "enemy" but friends and allies on both sides of the divide. That the powder keg did not blow up was not only a result of wisdom winning out but pure luck. So, a refresher on this crucial period of world history is certainly welcome.

And we are fortunate that it was written by one of the best authorities on espionage, not only of that period but more broadly, Nigel West. This is far from his first book, since he has already written the volumes on British Intelligence, World War II Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, and the core volume on International Intelligence but more particularly the

companion volume on Cold War Counterintelligence. All in all, he has written over 30 books and numerous articles on various aspects of the field and also lectured at the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies as well as serving as European editor of the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*. More recently, he has received the first Lifetime Literature Achievement Award of the U.S. Association of Former Intelligence Officers. So this volume fills the remaining gap in his work with this series, for which we are all grateful.

Jon Woronoff
Series Editor

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABM	Antiballistic missile
ACRP	Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Program
AFSA	U.S. Armed Forces Security Agency
AFSS	Air Force Security Service
AGER	Auxiliary General Environmental Research
AGI	Auxiliary General Intelligence
ASA	U.S. Army Signal Agency
ASIO	Australian Security Intelligence Organization
ASW	Anti-Submarine warfare
AVH	Allami Vedélmi Hatosag (Hungarian Intelligence Service)
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BCCA	British Control Commission for Austria
BCCG	British Control Commission for Germany
BDPS	Lithuanian General Democratic Resistance Movement
BfV	Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal German Security Service)
BKI	National Independent Bloc (Albania)
BND	Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal German Intelligence Service)
BOB	CIA Berlin Operations Base
BRUSA	British-United States SIGINT agreement
BVD	Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (Netherlands)
C	Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service
CAP	Combat Air Patrol
CAZAB	Canadian, American, New Zealand, Australian & British counterintelligence liaison
CCF	Congress for Cultural Freedom
CCP	Consolidated Cryptologic Program
CE	Counterespionage
CI	Counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (United States)

CIG	Current Intelligence Group
CIG	U.S. Central Intelligence Group
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CPA	Communist Party of Australia
CPGB	Communist Party of Great Britain
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPUSA	Communist Party of the United States of America
CRITIC	Critical Intelligence Communications Network
CW	Continuous Wave
D/F	Direction-Finding
DDO	Deputy Director for Operations
DGI	Dirección General de Inteligencia (Cuban Intelligence Service)
DGSE	Direction Générale de Sécurité Extérieure (French intelligence Service)
DGSS	Director-General of the Security Service
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAS	Defence Intelligence Analysis Staff
DIE	Departamentul de Informatii Externe (Romanian Security Service)
DIMSM	Direcția de Informatii a Marelui Stat Major (Romanian military intelligence)
DIS	Defence Intelligence Staff
DMI	Director of Military Intelligence
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DO	Directorate of Operations
DP	Displaced Person
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DS	Darzhavna Sigarnost (Bulgarian Intelligence Service)
DSO	Defence Security Officer
DST	Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (French Security Service)
ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
ELF	Extra Low Frequency
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
F/C	Fire Control
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (United States)
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FCA	U.S. Army Foreign Counterintelligence Activity
FCD	First Chief Directorate

FRA	Forsvarets Radioanstalt (Swedish Signals Intelligence Agency)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GRU	Glavnoe Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenie (Soviet Military Intelligence Service)
GSFG	Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
HF	High Frequency
HVA	Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (East German Foreign Intelligence Service)
Hz	Hertz (cycles per second)
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
Il-28	Ilyushin medium-range bomber designated <i>Beagle</i>
Il-38	Ilyushin maritime patrol aircraft designated <i>May</i>
Il-76	anti-submarine warfare aircraft designated <i>Mainstay</i>
INR	U.S. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
IR	Infrared
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
IRD	Information Research Department
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
KGB	Komitei Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Soviet Intelligence Service)
KHAD	Khadamete Artia-ate Dawlati (Afghan intelligence service)
KOS	Kontraobveščevalna Služba (Yugoslav intelligence service)
LLKS	Lithuanian Fighters for Freedom
LORAN	Long Range Navigation
MAD	Magnetic Anomaly Detector
MBU	Rocket-propelled charges
MFA	Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MfS	Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (East Germany)
MGB	Soviet Ministry of the Interior
MI5	British Security Service
MI6	British Secret Intelligence Service
MNVK/2	Hungarian Military Intelligence Service
MOB	CIA Munich Operations Base
MRBM	Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
MVD	Soviet Interior Ministry
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCFA	National Council for Free Albania

NFIP	National Foreign Intelligence Program
NIO	National Intelligence Officer
NIS	National Intelligence Service (South Africa)
NIS	Naval Investigative Service
NKAF	North Korean Air Force
NKVD	Narodni Kommisariat Vnutrennih Dei (Soviet Intelligence Service)
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
NSCID	National Security Council Intelligence Decision
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
OPC	Office of Policy Coordination
OSO	Office of Special Operations
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OTP	One-Time Pad
P/A	Principal Agent
PET	Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (Danish Security Service)
PGM	Precision Guided Missile
PGU	First Main Directorate (Bulgaria)
PIDE	Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado (Portugal)
PVO	Soviet anti-aircraft defense organisation
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RFE	Radio Free Europe
RUMNO	Razuznavatelno Uptavlenie na Ministerstvoto na
S/W	Secret Writing
SA-2	Surface-to-air missile designated <i>Guideline</i>
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAPO	Sakerhetspolisen (Swedish Security Police)
SB	Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa (Polish Intelligence Service)
SCA	Service Cryptologic Agencies
SCD	Second Chief Directorate
SCI	Secret Compartmented Intelligence
SDECE	Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage (French Intelligence Service)
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIDE	Secretariat Inteligencia del Estado (Argentine Intelligence Service)
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan

SIS	Secret Intelligence Service (Great Britain)
SLO	Security Liaison Officer
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOKS	Obnarujenia Kilvatemovo Sleda (Soviet non-sonar technology)
SOSUS	Sound Surveillance System under the Sea
SRF	Strategic Rocket Forces
SSBN	Strategic Submarine Ballistic Nuclear
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
Stasi	Staatssicherheit (East Germany)
StB	Statni Bezpecnost (Czech Intelligence Service)
SUKLO	Special United Kingdom Liaison Officer
SUSLO	Special United States Liaison Officer
TICOM	Target Intelligence Committee
Tu-142	Tupolev long-range bomber, designated <i>Bear</i>
Tu-16	Tupolev long-range bomber, designated <i>Badger</i>
Tu-4	Tupolev long-range bomber, designated <i>Bull</i>
UB	Urząd Bezpieczeństwa (Polish Intelligence Service)
UGV	Border Troops Directorate (Bulgaria)
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFSS	U.S. Air Force Security Service
USIB	United States Intelligence Board
VDS	Variable Depth Sonar
VGU	Second Main Directorate (Bulgaria)
VHF	Very High Frequency
X-2	Counterintelligence branch, Office of Strategic Services

Chronology

1945 Soviet embassy cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko defects in Ottawa. Rolls-Royce licenses the Nene jet engine to the Soviets. The U.S. Army Signal Security Agency is renamed the Army Security Agency.

1946 The British physicist Dr Alan Nunn May arrested. A Royal Commission is empaneled in Ottawa to investigate Soviet espionage. A VENONA decrypt reveals leakage in Australia. The Office of Special Operations is established by the U.S. Central Intelligence Group.

1947 President Harry S. Truman pledges to contain Communism. The Cominform is established. The U.S. National Security Act creates the Central Intelligence Agency. The Soviet aeronautical engineer Grigori Tokaev defects to London; Communists take over the government in Hungary, The USAF commence B-29 PASSIONATE flights from Alaska and BIOGRAPH ferret missions in the Baltic with B-17s.

1948 A Communist coup seizes power in Czechoslovakia; The CIA influences the Italian general election. The Soviets blockade Berlin. The Soviets introduce new Black Friday security measures to frustrate the BOURBON intercept program. The Office of Special Operations becomes the Office of Policy Coordination.

1949 The Tu-4 bomber, copied from the B-29 Superfortress, goes into service; The Soviet Union successfully tests a plutonium bomb, JOE-1, at Semipalatinsk; NATO is established. The U.S. Army Security Agency becomes the Armed Forces Security Agency.

1950 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are arrested. South Korea is invaded, and Seoul is occupied. The Information Research Department commences operations. William Weisband is suspended from the AFSA.

1951 Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean defect from London. Vladimir Petrov is posted to Canberra; A P2V-3W Neptune is shot down by a pair of Soviet La-11 *Fagots* near Vladivostock, with the loss of all 10 crew.

1952 Gamal Abdel Nasser deposes King Farouk of Egypt. Great Britain tests an independent plutonium bomb off Trimouille Island in Australia. Fritof Enbom's spy-ring is imprisoned in Sweden.

1953 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are executed. Work begins on GOLD, the Berlin tunnel. Josef Stalin dies. Mohammed Mossadeh is deposed as Iran's prime minister.

1954 Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov defect in Australia. Yuri Rastvorov defects to the CIA in Tokyo; A U.S. Navy P2V-5 is shot down by two MIG-15s off Siberia; An RB-29 is shot down by Soviet fighters off Hokkaido.

1955 William Whalen begins to sell information to the Soviets in Washington, D.C. The Berlin Tunnel, PBJOINTLY, becomes operational. The Warsaw Pact is established; The Royal Commission on Espionage report is published in Australia; Two MiG-15s shoot down an RB-47E near Kamchatka.

1956 Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech is leaked. Buster Crabb disappears under the *Ordzhonikidze* in Portsmouth. The Berlin Tunnel is closed down. The first U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union is completed. Gunter Guillaume emigrates to West Germany. The Hungarian uprising is crushed by the Soviet 38th Army.

1957 Harry Houghton betrays the advanced Type-2001 sonar designed for HMS *Dreadnought*. The Soviets successfully test the R-7 ICBM. The first *Sputnik* is placed in orbit.

1958 The KGB's illegal *rezident* Willie Fisher is arrested in New York; AQUATONE overflights of the Soviet Union begin. The first American ICBM, the B Atlas, is tested successfully.

1959 Fidel Castro seizes control of Cuba. The Sino-Soviet split terminates Moscow's support for the Chinese nuclear weapons program. The Atlas ICBM becomes operational. Nikolai Artamonov defects in Sweden.

1960 The Berlin Wall is erected. F. Gary Powers is shot down over the Soviet Union. HMS *Dreadnought* is launched. The first CORONA reconnaissance satellite is placed into orbit. The U.S. National Reconnaissance Office is established.

1961 Patrice Lumumba is assassinated after his arrest at Elizabethville. Cuban rebels invade at the Bay of Pigs. The UN General-Secretary, Dag Hammarskjöld is killed in an air crash in the Congo. William Whalen retires from the U.S. Army following his heart attack. The Polaris ICBM becomes

operational aboard the USS *Washington*. Francois Saar-Demichel is honey-trapped in Moscow. Anatoli Golitsyn defects in Helsinki.

1962 Willie Fisher is swapped for F. Gary Powers. The first ZENIT satellite is launched successfully. The CIA's Project COLDFEET loots an abandoned Soviet research station in the Arctic. Dmitri Polyakov is recruited by the FBI in New York. Oleg Penkovsky is arrested in Moscow; IRBMs are installed in Cuba. John Vassall is arrested in London.

1963 Kim Philby defects from Beirut. Joseph Helmich sells KW-7 data to the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C. President John F. Kennedy is assassinated in Dallas. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty eliminates atmospheric detonations and impedes Allied monitoring of Soviet progress.

1964 The KGB's Yuri Nosenko defects to the CIA in Geneva. Anthony Blunt accepts an immunity from prosecution. The Gulf of Tonkin incident escalates the conflict in Vietnam.

1965 China conducts its first successful nuclear test; A U.S. Air Force RB-57f reconnaissance aircraft is lost over the Black Sea; Robert Lipka volunteers to spy for the KGB. Robert G. Thomson is imprisoned.

1966 George Blake escapes from Wormwood Scrubs. France withdraws from NATO. The Soviet mole William Whalen is arrested. *Encounter's* CIA subsidy is exposed

1967 The Six Day War is fought in the Middle East. The nuclear-powered Soviet Victor submarine enters service with the Red Banner Northern Fleet. John Walker begins spying for the Soviets.

1968 The North Vietnamese launch the Tet Offensive. Warsaw Pact troops occupy Czechoslovakia. The *K-129* disappears in the Pacific. The USS *Pueblo* is seized off Wonsan.

1969 Colonel Muammar Ghadaffi deposes King Idris in Libya. A U.S. Navy EC-121M reconnaissance aircraft is shot down by a North Korean MiG-21. The HVA agent Rainer Rupp joins NATO in Brussels. Ion Iacobescu defects in Paris; Charles de la Salle commits suicide to avoid arrest. NATO spy Roberto van de Wiele is arrested.

1970 Anwar Sadat succeeds Gamal Abdel Nasser as president of Egypt. Work begins on Project AZORIAN, to lift the *K-129* in the Pacific.

1971 Oleg Lyalin's defection in London prompts Operation FOOT and the mass expulsion of Soviet personnel. U.S. Sergeant Zoltan Szabo is recruited by the Hungarians.

1972 President Richard Nixon visits China. Anwar Sadat expels Soviet advisers from Egypt. Leonid Brezhnev signs the SALT 1 Agreement which bans the encryption of telemetry. Ryszard Kuklinski makes contact with the CIA.

1973 President Salvador Allende takes his own life during a military coup in Chile; Israel is attacked over the Yom Kippur weekend. Aleksandr Ogorodnik is recruited in Bogota.

1974 Portugal's government is overthrown by a military coup. The KGB's Oleg Gordievsky is recruited in Copenhagen. The *Glomar Explorer* sails to salvage the *K-129*. Christopher Boyce compromises the RHYOLITE satellite system. Robert Lipka terminates contact with the KGB. James Angleton is dismissed from the CIA.

1975 Saigon falls to North Vietnamese troops. Gunter Guillaume's arrest as a mole brings down Willi Brandt's government in Bonn. The CIA's operation AZORIAN is exposed by the media.

1976 Viktor Belenko flies his MiG-25 fighter to Japan. Christopher Boyce and Andrew Lee are arrested. Adolf Tolkachev passes classified material to the CIA station in Moscow.

1977 Towed arrays are deployed by the Royal Navy to detect Soviet submarines. Aleksandr Ogorodnik commits suicide as he is arrested in Moscow; CONSTANT PEG tests of Soviet combat aircraft begins in Nevada.

1978 Georgi Markov is assassinated in London. A Communist government is established in Kabul; Adolf Tolkachev contacts the CIA in Moscow; Ion Pacepa defects in Bonn. Hugh Hambleton is placed under surveillance in Ottawa.

1979 Mrs Thatcher is elected Great Britain's prime minister. Anthony Blunt is publicly exposed as a Soviet spy; Analytical work by the U.S. National Security Agency on the VENONA traffic is terminated; State Department analyst Kendall Myers is recruited by the Cuban DGI; Soviet troops invade Afghanistan.

1980 President Tito dies in Yugoslavia; Martial law declared in Poland. CIA contractor David Barnett is arrested; Theresa Squillacote is recruited by her husband, Kurt Stand; Viktor Sheymov is exfiltrated from the Soviet Union; Robert Hanssen betrays Dmitri Polyakov who is recalled to Moscow from Delhi.

1981 Pope John Paul II is shot and wounded by a Turkish gunman, Ali Agha. A Soviet *Whiskey*-class submarine S-363 runs aground in Sweden. Vladimir Vetrov volunteers to spy for the French.

1982 Vladimir Kuzichkin defects from Tehran. Argentina invades and occupies the Falkland Islands. Oleg Gordievsky is posted to the KGB's London *rezdientura*. Vladimir Vetrov is arrested in Moscow.

1983 President Ronald Reagan signs NSDD 75. Korean Airlines flight 007 is shot down over Kamchatka by a Soviet Su-15 interceptor. Grenada is invaded by U.S. troops. NATO's annual ABLE ARCHER exercise is misinterpreted by the Kremlin. Mathias Rust lands a plane in Red Square.

1984 MI5 officer Michael Bettaney is arrested in London. Ana Montes is recruited by the Cuban DGI in Washington, D.C. Arne Treholt is arrested in Oslo. Robert Hanssen resumes contact with the Soviets.

1985 Oleg Gordievsky is exfiltrated from Moscow in Operation PIMLICO. John Walker's spy-ring is arrested. Adolf Tolkachev is betrayed by Aldrich Ames. President Ronald Reagan meets Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva. Ana Montes joins the Defense Intelligence Agency as an intelligence analyst. SIS acquires a Chinese Silkworm missile.

1986 An arms control agreement is reached by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Iceland. Boris Yuzhin is arrested in Moscow; Markus Wolf retires from the HVA. The GRU's Colonel Vladimir Vasilev is arrested.

1987 Bill Casey resigns from the CIA. President Reagan visits the Berlin Wall; Gennadi Varenik is executed in Moscow. Viktor Makarov is released from Perm-35.

1988 The GRU's General Dmitri Polyakov is executed in Moscow; Clyde Conrad is arrested in Germany and sentenced to life imprisonment; NATO procurement officer Guy Binet is arrested in Belgium.

1989 The Red Army withdraws from Afghanistan. The Berlin Wall collapses. James Hall is arrested in Georgia. Craig Kunkle is arrested in Virginia.

1990 Iraq invades Kuwait; Germany is unified. The BND analyst Gabrielle Gast is arrested. A SHAPE secretary, Margarete Lubig, is arrested.

1991 Vladimir Kryuchkov leads unsuccessful coup in Moscow. The Warsaw Pact is dissolved. All Soviet institutions are abolished.

Introduction

With the benefit of more than a quarter of a century since the end of the Cold War and the release of declassified documents, together with the publication of personal memoirs that would have been considered unthinkable in an earlier, different era, there is now the opportunity to look back and reassess the events that mark this extraordinary period of history when the superpowers were in conflict without ever descending into actual warfare. The scale of the declassification process is immense, with the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence having made available more than 57,000 pages and 2,000 individual reports, on the subject of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, while the Directorate of Operations lodged a further 11 million at the National Archive II at College Park, Suitland. The driver of this information tsunami was President Bill Clinton's Executive Order 13526 issued in April 1995, which required the automatic declassification of all records after 25 years and imposed an initial deadline for compliance at the end of October 2006. To assist in the management of this material, the Agency's Declassification Center developed the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) and, in January 2017, made the entire repository available online.

Nor is the CIA alone in this exercise. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency, and even MI5 and GCHQ have embraced the principles of freedom of information, thus supplying the raw material for scholars and the public at large.

Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, historians have been able to access a veritable treasure trove of material that has helped shed light on the relative value of individual sources of intelligence, the impact of specific intelligence on international relations, and the extent to which policymakers came to rely on secret channels. The newly opened archives, which enable us to solve more than a few lingering mysteries, carry a particular weight and authority, because the files they contain were never written for wider publications, and were drafted at a time when the terms "declassification" and "freedom of information" were completely unknown. The fact that the authors had no expectation of their documents ever being released for public scrutiny is itself a measure of their value, authenticity, and candor.

The Cold War was waged under the threat of a nuclear conflagration, so intelligence agencies on all sides were tasked with continually assessing the potency of the threat from adversaries. Another priority was the need to identify and neutralize technological breakthroughs that could alter the balance of power. In the early days of the Cold War, when the West's atomic weapons were to be delivered to their targets by aircraft, assessing the state of Soviet air defenses was a significant preoccupation. To test their scope and efficiency, aerial incursions, known as "ferret flights," were made regularly, and played a major intelligence collection role, but also heightened tension.

The focus would shift when the first inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) became operational, a development which transformed the principles underlying the concept of nuclear deterrence but created new intelligence requirements: What was the opponent's missile strength? What was the potency and accuracy of their warheads? Where were the weapons deployed and in what numbers? Could they be eliminated in a surprise, first-strike attack?

With the advent of the Polaris submarine-launched missile, the emphasis switched to underwater detection systems. With what can now be seen to have been a clear disparity between the relative strengths of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Kremlin resorted to bluff, concealed by the Soviet concepts of deception (*maskirova*) and disinformation (*dezinformatsiya*). Instead of developing its own atomic warheads, Soviet physicists relied on the theft of designs from Los Alamos; to compensate for the lack of viable ICBMs, Moscow strategists simply adopted the expedient of moving shorter-range missiles to Cuba, within range of the eastern seaboard of the United States.

Such tactics were of high risk, so the KGB, as the Communist Party's sword and shield, protected itself by acquiring well-placed moles who could warn if NATO planned a surprise attack. This was the role adopted by William Whalen, Hugh Hambleton, and George Paques, who collectively spent decades devoted to this undertaking. In the naval sphere, Harry Houghton and John Walker were in a position to compromise sonar, SOSUS hydrophones, towed arrays, and the latest techniques developed for monitoring Red Banner submarine transits into the open seas.

While the Kremlin indulged in strategic deception, Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration was obliged to address a fundamental problem underlying the very flawed "missile gap" analysis. Initially, the U.S. ICBM arsenal consisted of just 11 *Atlas* missiles, a system that tests had demonstrated to be unreliable and anyway, being liquid-fueled, required lengthy preparation before launch. Theoretically, the Pentagon's strategy was enhanced by the *Thor* intermediate range missiles based in Great Britain and the *Jupiter* medium-range missiles based in Turkey and Italy, but secret assessments had found these sites to be

extremely vulnerable to sabotage and surprise air attack, and therefore to be virtually worthless. This perceived disadvantage was an added incentive to learn more about Soviet capabilities and intentions.

A second major requirement, just as important as capabilities, was the demand for political intelligence, and this was supplied by Arne Treholt in Norway; Gunter Guillaume and Gabriele Gast in the Federal Republic of Germany; Georg Branting in Sweden; Urho Kekkonen in Finland; Rainer Rupp and Guy Binet in Belgium; Allan Dalziel, Jim Hill, and Ian Milner in Australia; and André Labarthe, Pierre Cot, and Francois Saar-Demichel in France. All of these well-informed Soviet sources occupied key posts and were willing agents, albeit driven by a wide variety of motives, but Moscow enjoyed the distinct advantage of simply responding to offers of information from within Western society, usually through the local Communist Party, without the need to engage in the hazardous pursuit of active recruitments. The Communist Party of the United States and its British counterpart, CPGB, provided a fertile field in which to harvest the secrets of Harwell and Los Alamos, and financial considerations compelled various disloyal military personnel to build a lucrative business selling classified data to the local *rezidentura*.

This intrinsic benefit had been exploited by the Soviets ever since the 1917 revolution, and the KGB and GRU were skilled at manipulating the ideological commitment of Party adherents who, before World War II, had been willing to steal industrial secrets for the NKVD, and during the war, betray information about uranium and plutonium weapons from inside the Manhattan project. During the postwar era, both MI5 and the FBI attempted to identify members of underground Communist cells who had concealed their true allegiances in an effort to penetrate their respective governments, climb to influential positions, and undertake the Kremlin's bidding. Just nine months after the first successful test of a Soviet plutonium bomb, North Korea invaded its neighbor. Stalin confident of the United States, robbed of its monopoly in atomic weapons, would not choose a nuclear option in the embattled peninsula. Scientific spies had made the Soviet detonation possible, and NKVD moles had disclosed President Harry Truman's reluctance to make a nuclear threat.

The West did not enjoy reciprocity in the HUMINT field but occasionally received vital information from an unexpected donor, often a defector, as it did in 1945 when the GRU cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko fled his embassy; in 1947, when Grigori Tokaev disclosed the existence of Smersh and details of the Red Army's rocket development program; in 1954, when the Petrovs were granted asylum in Australia; in 1971, with the defection in London of Oleg Lyalin; and in 1985, upon the exfiltration from Russia of Oleg Gordievsky. Also self-recruited were a handful of disaffected individuals who

chose not to defect, having been given the opportunity but remained in place to compromise crucial secrets with an impact on the Cold War's balance of power. Among them were Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, who made illicit copies of the SS-4 and SS-5 ICBM manuals in 1961; Aleksandr Ogorodnik, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who spied for three years from 1973; Adolf Tolkachev, who passed valuable aeronautical data to the CIA from 1978; and Vladimír Vetrov the KGB Line X scientific intelligence officer, who was run by the French DST between 1981 and 1982.

There were, of course, many other significant defectors from the Soviet Bloc, but few had quite the same effect on the governments who were the beneficiaries of their "meal-tickets." This book is intended to explain the roles of these participants, and others, in the Cold War, and to offer a new perspective on the events that shaped the era, beginning in September 1945 with the defection of Igor Gouzenko and ending in August 1991 and the collapse of Vladimir Kryuchkov's coup in Moscow. In between, through the intelligence prism, was a series of events, either significant or representative of the Cold War; among them were the disappearance of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean in May 1951; the construction of the Berlin tunnel in April 1956; the shootdown of the U-2 in May 1960; the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961; the defection of Yuri Nosenko in February 1964; the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962; the salvage of the *K-219* in 1970; and the reunification of Germany in October 1990.

These are some of the principal milestones of the confrontation that was acknowledged by Winston Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, in May 1946 when he introduced publicly the concept of an "iron curtain" stretching "from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic" and referred to the Anglo-American "special relationship." In fact Churchill had mentioned an "iron curtain" to President Harry Truman in a telegram sent 10 months earlier, warning him of the Soviet threat.

In March 1947, soon after Churchill's speech, Truman announced to Congress that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," and thereby initiated what became known as the Truman Doctrine. This was the justification for financial intervention in Greece and Turkey, the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency and a historic involvement in the 1948 general election in Italy.

At the time of Truman's declaration, Greece was enduring a civil war in which the Communists seemed likely to prevail, and Turkey had come under pressure from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet which appeared determined to control the straits giving access to the Aegean. Massive financial and economic aid to the Greek government, and a demonstration of force by the carrier USS

Franklin D. Roosevelt, served as proof of American resolve in the region, and the experience gained by Gerry Miller's CIA station in Rome during the election campaign would provide a template for future influence operations to keep the Communists out of power. Emboldened, the CIA sponsored a dozen of clandestine insurgency campaigns across central and eastern Europe, joining British and Swedish intelligence agencies to infiltrate partisans into Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Other guerrilla bands were supported in Belorus, Ukraine, and Albania, and some remained active until as late as 1959.

The intelligence dimension to the Cold War existed at several levels. In the military arena, collectors concentrated on the adversary's capabilities and intentions; politically, the need was to accurately appreciate future plans, decisions, and strategy; in the cultural field, intelligence could engage in clandestine activities, known in Washington, D.C. as "covert action" and in Moscow as "active measures" which were designed to undermine morale, peddle particular viewpoints and mislead policymakers. Thus, as the Cold War progressed, the practitioners plied their trade to gain, or retain, a particular advantage that ultimately might allow one side or the other to prevail. The operations ranged from the theft by the British Secret Intelligence Service of a T-72 main battle tank from the Warsaw Pact, and its acquisition of a Chinese *Silkworm* anti-ship missile through the Iranian arms dealer Jamshid Hashemi in 1986, to the provision by the CIA of printing equipment to the Solidarity trade union in Gdansk.

In this volume in the *Intelligence and Counterintelligence* series, the Cold War is taken to have begun with the defection of Igor Gouzenko in September 1945 and to have concluded with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1991. In the intervening 46 years, intelligence agencies played a key role on both sides, and access to the hitherto secret archives makes a timely and comprehensive reassessment of their performance possible for the very first time.

A

ACOUSTIC INTELLIGENCE. A high intelligence priority for NATO throughout the Cold War was the requirement to collect information about Soviet Red Banner Northern Fleet submarine movements. The task was to identify individual deployments into the Atlantic, by trailing arrivals and departures from bases in the Murmansk area, to monitor transits through the Greenland–Iceland–Faroes gap, and to maintain surveillance on each mission through the employment of the SOSUS passive acoustic arrays. Once a target had been located by SOSUS, maritime patrol aircraft, attack submarines, anti-submarine warfare helicopters, and frigates equipped with towed arrays were vectored to the Soviet intruders' position with the objective of maintaining covert contact through passive sonar. Ideally, Soviet submarines were tracked to their patrol boxes and then followed back to their bases, leaving them unaware that their entire voyage had been compromised, thus rendering them instantly vulnerable in any wartime scenario.

The innovative towed-array passive sonar trailed a thousand feet behind surface vessels and submarines, introduced into the Royal Navy in 1977, was capable of detecting an adversary at very long ranges. The disadvantage of the towed array was the requirement to uncouple the device before entering a port, which meant deploying a special tug for the purpose, which greatly limited the number of harbors with the required facilities.

NATO submarine operations in the Norwegian Sea consisted of ALPHA, being the discreet shadowing of Soviet targets, and BRAVO, which were clandestine surveillance patrols intended to collect electronic traffic close to the Soviet territorial limit using specialist equipment and intercept operators. These two operational intelligence categories represented the Cold War's frontline, with NATO's limited resources pitched against a formidable opponent. Although, in the early days of the Cold War, the Soviets were reliant on obsolete Kriegsmarine Type-XXI U-boat designs, which were noisy and gave NATO an advantage, the sheer scale of the threat was daunting. On January 1, 1960, the Joint Intelligence Committee assessed the Northern Fleet's submarine strength as 427, including five capable of firing nuclear missiles,

three nuclear-powered, and 109 long-range conventionally armed boats, figures expected to rise within five years to 22 nuclear-powered, of which eight would be nuclear-armed. By 1985, the Soviets were estimated to possess 320 submarines, of which 210 were nuclear-propelled, and completing a new vessel every six weeks. In contrast, the Royal Navy's entire submarine fleet amounted to four ballistic missile boats, 12 nuclear attack submarines, and just 16 diesel-electrics. In the face of these overwhelming odds, the West's defense strategy depended on first-rate intelligence to redress the balance.

Originally developed to defend the United States' eastern seaboard, SOSUS hydrophones went operational in 1960, covering Nova Scotia and Cape Hatteras down to Puerto Rico. In the Pacific, shore terminals were constructed at Adak in Alaska down to Monterey, although the eastern Atlantic's sector did not come online at RAF Brawdy in Wales until April 1974.

Soviet submarine designers lagged behind their Western counterparts partly because in the immediate postwar era the Kremlin's strategists had seen little point in planning, in the absence of any aircraft carriers, for naval warfare beyond the reach of air cover. When the strategy changed, the marine architects were caught unawares and, as in so many other fields, came to rely on foreign technology to plug the gap. When KGB spies penetrated the Admiralty Underwater Weapons Research Establishment at Portland in 1957, the advanced Type-2001 sonar destined for HMS *Dreadnought* was one of many sophisticated components betrayed, and a version duly appeared on the distinctive bows of the Victor-class nuclear attack submarine, which entered service in 1967.

Given the delicate balance between the opposing underwater forces, even the ostensibly insignificant developments could have a quite disproportionate impact on the protagonists, and the retrofitting of anechoic tiles to reduce noise and absorb sonar signals achieved the desired effect. The Soviets also invested in non-sonar technology, categorized as *Obnarujenia Kilvatemovo Sleda* (SOKS), designed to detect the wake of an enemy submarine and first spotted in 1969 aboard the *K-14*, a November-class submarine. The sensors, codenamed COLOSSUS, TOUCAN, and BULLFINCH were intended to detect minute chemical traces found in coolants and radioactive elements associated with nuclear reactors, and the hydrogen by-product of oxygen converters, although no absolute proof has been declassified. Laser measurement devices, deflected radiation, and activation radionuclides have been among several technologies applied to this research field. In September 1972, the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence circulated a report on *Soviet Antisubmarine Warfare: Current Capabilities and Priorities* (See appendix 1) to describe the threat.

In November 1974, the CIA compiled a report, *Prospects for Soviet Success in Improving Detection of Submarines in Open Ocean Areas*, which expressed skepticism about what had been accomplished.

The principal continuing weakness in Soviet ASW is the lack of a capability to detect submarines at long ranges within the broad expanse of open oceans. Soviet systems for detecting submarines using passive acoustic arrays which are permanently emplaced in the water have a limited range. [XXXXXXXXXXXXX] Geographic and technical considerations generally militate against the use of a long-range passive, acoustic system similar to the U.S. Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS).

There are indications the Soviets believe that nonacoustic techniques have potential for improving their capabilities in the open ocean. We know that their R&D in nonacoustic detection primarily involves mobile sensors, but we lack information on many aspects of these programs. There is no evidence that the Soviets are investigating detectable submarine effects which have not already been considered in the United States; however, U.S. investigation of these effects has not, in all cases, conclusively ruled out their potential in ASW. Available information, both U.S. and Soviet, concerning nonacoustic detection methods indicates that none offers a capability for detecting submarines at long ranges comparable to that of SOSUS, although some could improve the potential of mobile units.

Over the next 10 years, we expect improvements in Soviet ASW capabilities which may permit detection of U.S. SSBNs during limited, area searches of the open ocean or in confined areas the SSBNs must transit. We do not believe Soviet advances in either acoustic or nonacoustic techniques will provide them with an effective capability to detect U.S. submarines at long ranges, although we do not rule out the possibility that they may be able to detect a few.

The Director of Naval Intelligence believes that the potential for the development of even short-range [XXXXXXX] sensors, when deployed on multiple platforms, may provide a partial solution to the Soviets' open-ocean detection problem, and consequently could constitute a threat in at least some portions of the U.S. SSBM force.

Summary

There are several conventional methods for detecting submerged submarines. Historically, *acoustic* systems have been predominant; these can be active or passive, fixed in the water or carried by ships and aircraft. Current *nonacoustic* techniques include the use of radar, visual observations, intercept of electronic emissions, magnetic anomaly detection, and detection of the wakes made by the movement of submarines. [XXXXXXXXXXXXX]

Present Capabilities

The Soviet Navy's submarine detection capabilities lag those of the United States by a wide margin. The principal weakness lies in the lack of a capability to detect submarines at long ranges within the broad expanse of open-ocean areas.

Geographic considerations in most instances inhibit Soviet deployment of an acoustic system comparable to the U.S. SOSUS arrays, which require sound channels found generally in water greater than 2 kilometers in depth. Moreover, the effectiveness of SOSUS depends on the high-radiated noise levels made by the movement of Soviet nuclear submarines; U.S. submarines are relatively quiet.

The Soviet effort in acoustic systems, which are fixed in the water, is concentrated on moored sensors. These are now primarily in coastal waters and are effective only at short ranges. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

The VICTOR and UNIFORM classes of attack submarines now are the Soviets' most effective Soviet ASW platforms. They have the latest Soviet sonar systems. VICTOR-Class submarines have tried to trail U.S. SSBNs leaving their bases. None of these activities has resulted in a known trail. The Soviets have employed their active sonar in this type of operation. This technique would facilitate overt trail once contact is established.

Most surface combatants in the Soviet Navy have some type of sonar. Combined ship and aircraft exercises, involving both helicopters and land-based patrol aircraft, are increasing. New construction and fitting of some older ships with modern sonars will generally improve the capabilities of the surface ASW force, although this force will not solve the open-ocean detection problem.

Present R&D

Despite improvements in ASW capabilities, the Soviets still lack a solution to the fundamental problem of detecting U.S. SSBNs in the open ocean. Recognizing this, they continue extensive R&D efforts in both acoustic and nonacoustic methods of submarine detection. This R&D activity appears to have high priority.

Acoustic systems which operate passively—i.e., as “listeners”—are sharply limited because of the quietness of U.S. nuclear submarines. This limitation will become even more severe when noise levels are reduced even further in new U.S. SSBNs and when larger operating areas, permitted by future longer-range missiles in present and new SSBNs, are used.

Present Soviet R&D efforts should produce improvements in passive acoustic systems to include lower frequencies, some reduction of submarine

self-noise, and advanced signal processing techniques, but these improvements are likely to be offset by U.S. developments. Improvements are expected in Soviet platform-mounted active sonars also; however, power requirements for long-range active sonar systems apparently preclude their use in long-range open-ocean detection.

Nonacoustic R&D efforts on *microwave radar* are aimed at detecting the effects on the water's surface caused by the passage of a submerged submarine. This method of detection is less susceptible to degradation from weather condition, although less so than most other nonacoustic methods. [XXXXXXXXXXXXX] If the Soviets succeed in developing an operational radar system for the detection of surface effects, it could significantly improve aircraft search rates.

There is evidence of Soviet R&D involving *infrared detection* by an aircraft of the heat in a submarine's wake. The Soviets have the technical competence to deploy equipment for this purpose within the next 10 years. [XXXXXXXXXX]

Lasers carried by aircraft have a potential application in submarine detection. There is no evidence that the Soviets are developing a laser as an ASW sensor, but Soviet competence in laser technology is sufficient to initiate such research. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

The Soviets are investigating the detection of the *turbulence in the wakes* produced by a submarine [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] It is unlikely that any of these methods will enable detection of submarines at long ranges.

A detection program under way in the USSR [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] relies on the detection of *electromagnetic fields* generated by a submarine in the extremely low frequencies (ELF)[XXXXXX] indicate that it probably is limited to short ranges [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] system could be deployed in the late 1970s.

Prospects

There are many uncertainties regarding Soviet R&D efforts in ASW, but there appears to be a considerable investment devoted to the development of both acoustic and nonacoustic means of submarine detection.

Technical limitations make it unlikely that the Soviets will achieve a long-range capability in the open oceans through *acoustic* methods. However, these efforts should result in improved capabilities of their ASW forces. Development of towed linear arrays using narrowband signal processing, for example, is well within Soviet capabilities. We can also expect to see continued improvements of sonobuoys, low-frequency, high-power sonars, moored acoustic sensors, and signal processing.

Some of the improved acoustic detection systems could be effective in choke points such as the Greenland–Iceland–UK gap. This has implications in terms of possible Soviet attempts to trail transiting U.S. SSBNs. Data obtained by fixed systems in these restricted areas might be relayed to attack submarines in the area which might then attempt to trail transiting U.S. SSBNs using passive sonar. However, because U.S. SSBNs will probably continue to be quieter than Soviet nuclear submarines, a covert trail would be unlikely. Active sonar might be required to establish contact in any trailing operations. If contact were gained, evasive maneuvers by a U.S. SSBN would probably preclude an overt trail for more than a few hours.

The Soviets' R&D in *nonacoustic* detection offers some prospect of improving their ASW capabilities, including trailing, but none of the known methods will solve the problem of detection in the open oceans. The most promising nonacoustic method is detection of surface effects by radar in aircraft. Despite the improved search rates that could result, substantially more aircraft than are now available would still be needed for sustained coverage, even in a limited area such as the Norwegian Sea. Coverage of U.S. SSBNs in the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Pacific would be still more difficult because of the lack of bases and the size of the areas.

We do not expect that Soviet detection capabilities in the Pacific, Atlantic, or Indian Oceans will improve significantly during the next decade, because they will still lack a system capable of monitoring broad expanses. The advent of longer range U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and expansion of SSBN operating areas will further complicate Soviet detection problems.

The Soviets are continuing to search for a solution to their open-ocean detection problem, and some of the nonacoustic sensors we see in their extensive R&D effort may have potential for development into an operational short-range mobile system. While we can foresee an overall improvement in Soviet ASW capabilities, the available evidence does not suggest that the Soviets will achieve an effective open-ocean submarine detection capability within the next ten years—that is, there is a low probability that they will be able to detect patrolling U.S. SSBNs, although we do not rule out the possibility that they will develop a capability to detect a few.

These two (redacted) CIA reports illustrate the importance attached to studying Soviet anti-submarine warfare capabilities and the need to maintain vigilance for any signs of Soviet innovation in this sensitive field of research. Although the U.S. Navy was unaware of the security breach at the time, **John Walker** had been hemorrhaging American submarine secrets to his KGB contacts since 1968.

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. During the Cold War, both the Soviet Bloc and NATO collected electronic intelligence and imagery by deploying dedicated aircraft equipped with specialist apparatus close to territorial airspace. Missions that deliberately penetrated sovereign airspace, known as **ferret flights**, were intended to provoke the local air defenses into reaction so their communications and other transmissions could be monitored. Most missions, such as RIVET JOINT, were routine flights, often on a predictable racetrack course, well within international airspace. However, from November 1951 onward, the Soviets adopted an increasingly aggressive policy of intercepting, harassing, and occasionally attacking these unarmed aircraft.

On November 6, 1951, a P2V-3W Neptune was shot down by a pair of Soviet La-11 *Fagots* near Vladivostock, with the loss of all 10 crew. On June 11, 1952, a RB-29A assigned to the 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron was destroyed by MiG-15s over the Sea of Japan, with the loss of all 12 crew. Two days later, a Swedish C-47 on a SIGINT mission was attacked by a MiG-15 in the Baltic, killing the crew and five radio intercept operators. On October 7, 1952, two La-11 *Fangs* shot down an RB-29 of the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron over the Kurile Islands, killing all eight of the crew. On July 29, 1953, an RB-50G was shot down by a MiG-17 near Vladivostock. The only survivor of the crew of 18 was the co-pilot.

AFGHANISTAN. Operation AGAT, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan began in December 1979 and was led by GRU *Spetsnaz* special forces who targeted the president's Duralamin Palace in Kabul and ended in February 1989 when General Boris Gromov saluted his last troops to cross Friendship Bridge into Uzbekistan. In the intervening period, the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) established the Afghan Task Force, headed by the Chief of Station in Islamabad Alan Fiers and then Milt Beardon, trained funded and armed the Mujahadeen, and supplied them with Stinger missiles to defend themselves against the Red Army's lethal Mil-24 *Hind-D* helicopter gunships.

As the last **proxy war**, the Afghan conflict was especially significant as the director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in President Ronald Reagan's administration was the influential Bill Casey who, very unusually, was a member of the Cabinet. He perceived the quagmire in which 90,000 troops were embroiled as an opportunity to undermine the Kremlin, and acknowledged that in recent years, the Soviets had made gains virtually unopposed in Africa, Central America, and the Middle East, either directly or by using the Cubans as surrogates, as had happened in Nicaragua and Angola. In Casey's controversial analysis, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, **Grenada**, and Jamaica were now at risk, and he wanted to roll back the tide. As he explained

to the U.S. National Security Planning Group meeting in March 1981, he proposed active support for opposition groups in Libya, Laos, Iran, and Grenada. Instead of just taking a stand in El Salvador, and seeking Congressional approval for \$19 million to defend democracy against Nicaraguan-backed insurgents using Argentine camps and personnel in Honduras, Casey planned the harassment of Soviet military advisers in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Somalia. The costs would reach \$20 billion from \$6 billion within five years, but the president was undeterred. As Casey reported to him after his Middle East tour in April 1981, “In the past eight years the Soviets and their proxies have promoted insurgencies in over a dozen countries, five of them successful and seven now underway.”

The lynchpin of Casey’s strategy, which included unprecedented economic pressure on the Soviet Union’s spiraling budget crisis, was to orchestrate a humiliating defeat in Afghanistan while simultaneously challenging the Soviets across the globe. Despite a huge investment by the KGB in its Afghan counterpart, the Khadamate Artia-ate Dawlati (KHAD), as revealed by the 1992 defector Vasili Mitrokhin, the Soviets were forced to withdraw, a retreat that acted as a catalyst for the final collapse.

AGEE, PHILLIP. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer formerly based in Mexico, Agee resigned in 1968 and later volunteered his services to the KGB in Mexico City following his divorce but was turned away by a Soviet security officer who did not believe such a scruffy individual could really be an authentic CIA officer. Allegedly he was also rejected by Colonel Krepkogorsky, a KGB officer in the United States who suspected a provocation. Agee subsequently flew to Cuba where his offer was accepted with alacrity, and he was handled by Directorate K’s Oleg Nichiporenko. Under his guidance, Agee wrote *Inside the Company: A CIA Diary* in 1976 and contributed to the *Covert Action Information Bulletin*. Having compromised the careers of dozens of his CIA contemporaries, and many of their agents, Agee settled in Havana where he ran a travel business and died in January 2008.

AGENT OPERATIONS. An enduring characteristic of the Cold War is the prevalence of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and a very substantial investment made on all sides in the acquisition, recruitment, and management of individuals, together with an accompanying counterintelligence capability. However, close analysis suggests that only a relative handful of agents ever achieved really impressive results. For the West, there were probably no more than seven who made a significant impact, and they probably included Oleg Penkovsky, Piotr Popov, Dmitri Polyakov, Aleksandr Ogorodnik, Aldolf Tolkachev, Oleg Gordievsky, and Vladmimir Vetrov.

Of these six cases, only Popov, Ogorodnik, and Tolkachev were run by the CIA exclusively. Penkovsky was handled jointly with the British, Gordievsky by the British alone (with some early Danish involvement), and Vetrov entirely by the French. All had been self-selected and had made known their wish to be recruited,

Much the same can be said for the other side, with the Soviets receiving approaches from John Walker, Ronald Pelton, Edward Lee Howard, David Boone, Harold Nicholson, Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hanssen. All seven had an immense, lasting, effect but had been “walk-ins” who for various motives had sold huge quantities of highly classified material to their contacts.

AIRBORNE INTERCEPTION. The U.S. Air Force Security Service (AFSS), created in October 1948, was one of the Cold War’s principal protagonists, responsible for providing airborne platforms to perform the task of collecting and analyzing Soviet Bloc communications. The National Security Agency’s declassified history explains the background to the AFSS’s operations:

The Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Program (ACRP) of the AFSS began in the early 1950s in an attempt to deal with changes in the communications practices of the Soviet Union. The Soviets, shortly after the end of World War II, converted their voice communications from high frequency (HF) to very high frequency (VHF) line-of-sight communications. Since these line-of-sight communications could be copied only within 50–70 miles of a transmitter, many could not be intercepted by existing U.S. fixed field sites.

On August 28, 1950, General Sam W. Agee at Headquarters USAF gave permission to the USAFSS to develop an airborne intercept program. The potential value of airborne collection was soon shown during the Korean conflict when one VHF intercept position was installed on a Fifth Air Force C-47 aircraft. This effort, known as Project BLUE SKY, was only moderately successful due to poor VHF intercept conditions in the operation area. However, this venture and the testing of RB-29 aircraft in Europe and the Far East convinced Air Force officials of the feasibility of airborne intercept. The RB-29 was assigned to the 6091st Reconnaissance Squadron, Yokota AB, Japan, and flew its first mission in April 1954.

In 1956, budgeting for this airborne reconnaissance activity was increased through the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), by which the National Security Agency managed all Sigint resources in the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIB). The USAFSS dubbed its new program the ACRP in the same year and finalized plans for the use of 10 RB-50 aircraft (five each in both Europe and the Far East), as well as the establishment of ACRP

detachments in the two theaters to operate the program. The planes were equipped primarily to record voice transmissions in the VHF/UHF range but also included HF, DF (Direction-Finding), and CW (continuous wave or manual Morse) capabilities.

Officials of the National Security Agency quickly recognized the vast potential of this collection system. As the result of successes in the ACRP program in quantity, quality, and uniqueness of the intercept take, NSA officials requested in July 1957 that mission identification data be added to the transcripts of intercepted traffic. The Far East missions were so successful that NSA then requested special missions. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

By the early 1960s, NSA's interest in the ACRP program increased further. The [XXXX] now possessed the knowledge and equipment to use communication systems as sophisticated as those used by the United States. With the trend [XXXXX] toward using low-powered, directional, and more complex VHF/UHF/microwave transmission, NSA experts saw the need to develop an airborne intercept system capable of monitoring these new communication systems. Through NSA sponsored research and development efforts, the C-130s that replaced the RB-50s in the early 1960s were outfitted with updated equipment that greatly increased the ACRP effort against the new [XXXX] communications systems. This naturally led to an ever-increasing interest at both theater and national level in the use of airborne intercept. Airborne collection became increasingly important in meeting demands for intelligence for prior warning of impending military attack on the United States or U.S. forces overseas. As part of its containment policy, the United States government desired timely intelligence to keep up with Soviet, Chinese Communist North Korean, and Cuban capabilities, intentions, and efforts.

In November 1964, Lieutenant General Gordon A. Blake, director of NSA, outlined to the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, the results of a joint study with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) which addressed the minimum requirements to accomplish the necessary airborne Sigint tasks. A further stimulant to this NSA/DIA study was the problem of United States tenure at some of its base facilities in foreign countries. This threatened to eliminate ground-based collection sites [XXXXXXXX]. Blake argued that to fill the void, additional airborne resources would be needed. The joint NSA/DIA study concluded that the then current resources of the ACRP fleet (eight C-130A, eleven C-130B, and three RC-135B aircraft) could satisfy [XXX] percent of the [XXXXX] that were deemed necessary to accomplish the Sigint tasks. Airborne collection, the report concluded, was absolutely indispensable in providing unique intelligence on [XXXX] activities. The NSA/DIA study group recommended that [XXX] RC-135Bs be transferred into the ACRP fleet to satisfy most of the stated requirement. As an interim measure,

the NSA/DIA team also suggested that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, continue using EC-121 aircraft. This aircraft, however, because of its altitude restriction of 9,000 to 16,000 feet (restricting its target penetration capability for peripheral reconnaissance), was not considered as good as the RC-135B for reconnaissance purposes.

In its study of ACRP needs, NSA continued its role as operational and technical director of the AFSS program. The USAFSS and the other Service Cryptologic Agencies (SCAs) came under the authority of National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 6. First promulgated in 1952, NSCID No. 6 tasked NSA with producing intelligence as required by the DCI and the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). NSA provided the collection (targets and choice of collection facility, including airborne) and technical (time, duration, location, equipment mix, and personnel skills) requirements. The USAFSS managed the collection resources (manpower, aircraft, and equipment) and developed ACRP tracks in coordination with the Air Force theater commands. Theater commands (e.g., CINCPAC, commander in chief, Pacific) drew up monthly reconnaissance schedule proposals and forwarded them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for approval and to NSA and USAFSS for information. USAFSS kept NSA advised of its capability to fulfill proposed Sigint collection requirements.

By April 1969, the mission requirements totaled over [XXXXXXXXXXXXX]. The large number in the Far East was due to the growing needs from the Vietnamese conflict. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

To meet the requirements in the Far East, the USAFSS ACRP fleet in the Pacific area consisted of ten C-130B and six RC-135M platforms. The 6988th Security Squadron [XXXXXXXXXXXXX] manned the 10 C-130s [XXXXXXXXXXXXX] Eight of the 10, until January 1968, staged out of Yokota AB and Kadena, Okinawa. They flew [XXXXXXXXXX] orbits as Operation [XXXXXXXXXXXXX]. Following the seizure of the *Pueblo*, two of these planes were reassigned to Osan Air Base, Korea, in response to increased requirements for a predawn/past-dusk early warning service to Fifth Advanced Squadron (Fifth ADVON). 314th Air Division of the Fifth Air Force. This increased collection [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] was still in effect at the time of the EC-121 shutdown.

The C-130s in the USAFSS ACRP program were solely dedicated to Comint collection, with tasking provided by the National Security Agency. [XXXXXXXXXX] much of this effort by the early part of 1969 was directed. The USIB desired increased collection activity [XXXXXXXXXX] in order to evaluate [XXXXXXXXXXXXX] strength and capabilities.

In contrast to the Air Force ACRP program, in which NSA played a large role in collection requirements and tasking, the Navy program was dedicated

largely to fleet support. NSA played only a secondary role in these flights. Two Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadrons (VQ-1 in the Pacific and VQ-2 in Europe) performed the missions. In 1969, the VQ-1 missions (EC-121M Comint/Elint and EA-3B Elint aircraft) operated from Atsugi, Japan. They were under the direct operational control of the commander, Seventh Fleet, Admiral William F. Bringle. NSA designated USN-39, the Naval Security Group at [XXXX] as the responsible staff on within the cryptologic community for reporting on the [XXX]. Because of this responsibility and its close proximity to VQ-1, USN-39 manned the Comint positions on the VQ-1 flights.

The NSA tasking role on the VQ-1 flights was a very tenuous one. The Navy jealously guarded its own resources, fearful of any type of NSA control on these flights. The planes were looked upon as Navy assets to be used for carrying out Navy missions. 33 The Navy did permit NSA [XXX] tasking on the EC-121 Comint/Elint flights (**BEGGAR SHADOW**).

This [XXX] tasking was at the discretion of USN-39 on a “not-to-interfere” basis with the primary requirements of line-of-sight communications [XXXXXXXXXXXXX] The NSA tasking was updated on March 10, 1969, to avoid duplication with the primary tasking [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] Trying to avoid duplication, Eugene Sheck, Chief of K17, the Mobile Collection organization of NSA, faced major difficulties in dealing with the Navy and its reconnaissance missions. He viewed the problem primarily in terms of the Navy’s lack of communication with his NSA office. Despite providing this “national tasking” on the two or three flights per month made available by the Navy for that purpose, the Navy usually failed to tell him if and when it was used. Sheck concluded that the Navy often used the NSA tasking as its own. Because of the Navy’s failure to communicate, NSA had virtually no voice in the number.

The Navy, according to Sheck, was also a [XXXXXXXXXX] “over” in the [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] was the unclassified nickname assigned to JCS procedures and criteria for providing [XXXXX] information to the PARPRO aircraft operating near the periphery of target countries. When aircraft were beyond the range of friendly radar, Sigint sites monitoring [XXXXXXX] radar networks provided warnings to the aircraft if potentially dangerous conditions (such as approaching enemy fighter aircraft) existed. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

For [X] response to the JCS [X], Warning program was also evidenced by its failure to equip its planes with a ground communications system. The JCS approved this system for [XXXXXXX] warning purposes in March 1968. By 1969, it was used extensively in the Air Force ACRP program. Sheck cited cost considerations and the failure of the Navy to appreciate the need for the system as reasons for its non-inclusion on Navy flights.

Since November 1968, the Navy had directed its BEGGAR SHADOW missions primarily [XXXXX]. In response to Seventh Fleet requirements, VQ-1 scheduled two or three EC-121 missions per month [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]. After the *Pueblo* incident and until August 1968, the JCS [XXXXX] restricted the flights to at least 80 miles off the [XXX] coast.) The Navy flew these new tracks 14 times from November 1968 to April 1969; the 15th was the ill-fated mission of April 15, 1969. Elint tasking was provided by fleet or theater sources, and final schedules were approved by theater Elint planning conferences. The schedule, after final approval by the Theater Command (CINCPAC), was forwarded to DIA for review, before being finally presented to the JCS/JRC. At that time the NSA role in the Elint flights under [XXXXXXXXXXXXX] was limited to a technical review conducted by the K4 element. NSA's only responsibility was to ensure that specific mission aircraft possessed the technical collection capability to meet requirements. NSA issued no supplemental Elint tasking applicable to these BEGGAR SHADOW missions.

Since the BEGGAR SHADOW flights were primarily Elint oriented [XXXXX], NSA (B Group) provided no Sigint tasking on these missions. The VQ-1 flights, therefore, provided only a small amount of intelligence to the Agency and this was usually duplicative in nature. The main value of the flights was in providing information on the [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX].

The minimal NSA role on these Navy missions, its limitation to a "technical review" status, was closely related to the overall fragmented management of U.S. Elint resources. NSA officials viewed the Elint program as the one lacking coordination, thus causing gross duplication and waste. In theory, NSA's authority (as specified in NSCID No. 6) in Elint was almost identical to its authority in Comint. However, a serious loophole existed in Department of Defense Directive No. 3115-2. This directive gave military commanders the responsibility to collect and process Elint determined necessary for direct support activities in conducting electronic measures and countermeasures (such as radar jamming, the use of chaff, and other deceptive devices) in military operations,

Using this loophole, the services, including the Navy, interpreted electronic countermeasures to cover almost any kind of Elint activity. In contrast, Directive No. 3115-4, dealing with Comint, was much more precise in defining activities exempted from NSA control. NSA officials, such as Arthur J. Levenson, Chief of A Group, viewed the establishment of Comint-like rules as necessary to combat the current fragmented state of Elint. As satellite reconnaissance played a more important role in intercept, and with NSA heavily involved in the planning and operation of such systems, Levenson

saw the need for a more active role in reviewing this expensive airborne Elint program to reduce duplication of effort. Pressure for this review mounted as the EC-121 continued its mission.

The EC-121 flight of April 15 characterized the Navy autonomy. Although the Navy called it a BEGGAR SHADOW mission, thus implying a primary Comint role (with national tasking), its role on that flight was virtually limited to that of an Elint-only operation. (While this EC-121 flight was always referred to as a BEGGAR SHADOW mission, a SAC message of April 25, 1969, referred to it as the [XXXXXX] which was more appropriate as it was the nickname referring to direct support Elint flights.). In fact, even the makeup of the large crew on this flight reflected this. Ten members of the crew held the title of Aviation Electronic Technician, signifying them as electronic countermeasures personnel, and thus outside of NSA's Sigint authority. On the ill-fated flight, they outnumbered the communications technicians, Sigint personnel assigned to Naval Security Group at [XXXXXXXXXXXXX] NSA's passive role relating to these flights added to the confusion at Fort Meade on the morning of the shootdown as questions arose over who controlled the aircraft, who tasked the mission, and what it was trying to collect. Even CINCPACFLT, which was in the immediate chain of command of the aircraft, issued seemingly conflicting statements regarding the primary mission of the flight. A CINCPACFLT message of April 1, 1969, for example, gave the proposed VQ-1 EC-121 schedule for April. This message listed Comint as the primary task of the EC-121 missions, Elint as a secondary task. However, on April 16 (the day after the shootdown), CINCPACFLT described BEGGAR SHADOW Track 8263 (the track of the ill-fated mission) as designed to optimize Elint collection [XXXXXX] DIA memorandum of April 18 further described four EC-121 tracks (including 8263) flown since November 1968 as meeting theater requirements under the [XXXXXXXXXX] Elint program. Track 8263 had been flown four times earlier in 1969 as had a similar track, 8261. These tracks were designed primarily to provide intelligence on North Korean radar activities. NSA levied no special supplemental Elint tasking that was applicable to the mission.

The deadly attack on the EC-121, which was the greatest loss of life experienced in any Cold War intelligence operation, resulted in the creation by the National Security Agency of a National SIGINT Watch Center to supervise sensitive collection operations. Effectively a dedicated facility monitoring all the NSA's current activities, the Center's name was changed in 1973 to the National SIGINT Operations Center, and then again in 1996 to the National Security Operations Center.

AIR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE. Codenamed CONSTANT PEG, the 4477th Test and Evaluation Squadron was created in April 1977 to assess Soviet fighter aircraft, specifically the MiG-17 *Fresco*, the MiG-21 *Fishbed*, MiG-23 *Flogger*, MiG-29 *Fulcrum*, Su-22 *Fitter*, and Su-27 *Flanker*. Based at the Tonopah Test Range in a remote corner of Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, the project, initially codenamed HAVE DOUGHNUT and HAVE DRILL, was intended to develop tactics that would support American aircrew engaging enemy interceptors over Vietnam. Most of the MiGs were supplied by Israel, which captured Syrian and Iraqi versions in the 1967 and 1973 conflicts, and some additional planes acquired from Egypt and Indonesia. The unit, with a permanent staff of 16 pilots, was disbanded in July 1990 by which time it had accumulated 26 aircraft.

Study of Soviet aircraft designs began in earnest in August 1966 when the Israelis persuaded an Iraqi pilot, Munir Redfa, to defect with his MiG-21, a supersonic fighter that was later lent to the U.S. Air Force from January to April 1968. The opportunity to scrutinize the *Fishbed*, which had come into service in 1950, was considered a coup as some 2,299 of the Mach 2 interceptors had been distributed across the globe to Soviet client states, of which 556 were in Hungary, Poland, and the **German Democratic Republic**.

American analysts concentrated on all aspects of the aircraft's capabilities, and extended their study to Identification Friend or Foe systems, radar, and stealth technology. Altogether 102 flights were undertaken between the beginning of February and the end of March 1969 by experienced test pilots to evaluate the aircraft's relative strengths and weaknesses.

The resulting DIA's Foreign Technology Division's assessment of the MiG-21F variant described its inherent weakness at altitudes below 15,000 when the two-seater F-4 Phantom enjoyed a significant advantage. The *Fishbed* also suffered from severe buffeting and vibration at high speeds, and the cannon magazine had a capacity of only 60 rounds which would allow for just 4.2 seconds of fire. However, the smaller fighter was highly maneuverable, exceptionally agile, and had been designed simply with a minimal servicing requirement, making it easy to maintain. It also had a low radar profile, so was difficult to detect beyond a range of 15 kilometers. However, the airframe also proved extremely vulnerable, and the antiquated cockpit had poor visibility with a wide rear blind spot.

The intelligence gleaned from the Nevada facility provided U.S. pilots with an edge over their adversaries and enabled technicians to improve electronic countermeasures designed to defeat Soviet radar systems.

ALBANIA. Initially part of the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, Albania was the recipient of intelligence aid from the KGB to train the feared Sigurimi secret police, and participated in the **Cominform** by hosting a radio station in Vlore which broadcast propaganda to the Middle East, Africa, **Italy**, and **France**.

Enver Hoxha's regime became an early target for the U.S. **Office of Policy Coordination** and between 1947 and 1951 a large group of Albanian émigrés, recruited through the National Independent Bloc (BKI) and the New York-based National Committee for Free Albania (NCFA), were trained in Libya and Malta to be infiltrated back into their country in an operation code named VALUABLE by the British and BG/FIEND by the Americans. However, almost all of the "pixies" were arrested by the ubiquitous Sigurimi.

In August 1949, several Albanian anticommunists completed their training and were parachuted into the Mati Mountains northeast of Tirana with instructions to foment subversion and sabotage the Kukova oilfields and the Rubik copper mines, but they received no support from the locals.

The first group of nine émigré agents, all graduates of the course held at the Ben Jima fortress on Malta, who were infiltrated by yacht into Albania, reached their destination south of Vlora in early October 1949 when four were killed in a Sigurimi ambush within a few days. The survivors escaped to Greece, and on October 10 a second team composed of 10 guerillas was dropped on the Albanian coast but, after the failure of their transmitter's generator and the capture of one of their number, the remainder trekked over the Greek frontier.

Consequently, the VALUABLE site in Malta was considered compromised, and the **CIA** persevered through **Germany**, in a project codenamed OB/OPUS, involving volunteers with a background of support for Balli Kombetar from an Albanian labor battalion, Company 4000, camped outside Munich, and training them to be parachuted into Albania as guerrillas. The first mission, with two C-54 cargo aircraft flown by Polish pilots, was undertaken on November 19, but the first group was surrounded by the Sigurimi and either killed or captured. The second group, which landed 12 miles from the designated drop zone, escaped to **Yugoslavia** and reported their experience. A further 43 agents were dropped in January 1951, of whom 29 were killed and 14 taken prisoner, so the method of insertion was changed and in the beginning of 1952 another group of volunteers, this time all members of ex-King Zog's royal guard, slipped over the frontier from Greece and established radio contact with a CIA station on Corfu. The team signaled a successful reception, a further drop was made near Elbasan, but on December 31, 1953, Radio Tirana announced that five spies, who had been in radio contact with their CIA controllers for the past 18 months, were to be put

on trial. The broadcast effectively terminated the campaign and left Hoxha unchallenged.

A subsequent CIA report gave an account of what happened to the last four missions:

1. CIA's intelligence operations in Albania, using personnel of the BKI, were initiated in February 1949 and continued until August 1951. During this period, 17 agents organized into four teams were dropped into the country. One team operated there for approximately seven months, while two others remained for 19 months, maintaining radio contact with the base almost continuously during their stay. A fourth team, intended for operations in the central area, was dropped in the north, made its way overland to the target area, and remained there for several months. We were unable to resupply it, however, because of its w/t set having been lost in a skirmish with the security forces; and four of its five members were eventually killed by the security forces, while the fifth was captured after being badly wounded.
2. A total of nine air drops were made during the two-and-a-half years of operations. These were for the most part supply drops to provide the teams with money and replace radio equipment lost or damaged. Food was obtained from the local population.
3. In all, six team members were killed in action and at least 15 locally recruited supporters died in action while directly helping the teams, which were afforded such aid as the local population had in its power to give. The support of the population continued despite drastic repressive measures of the security authorities. It is significant that this support was forthcoming despite the fact that the population knew the teams' mission was an informational and not a revolutionary one; although the teams reported that it was difficult to interest the population in intelligence activity, they were trusted and aided as representatives of traditional north Albanian leaders.
4. A brief resume follows of the activities of three north Albanian teams and the problems which they faced.
5. After being dropped just south of Mirdita in February 1949, Team One proceeded to contact resistance leaders throughout north Albania, including the areas Beshkash, Lura, Kruja, Puka, Dukagjin, Malsis se Madhe, and among leaders contacted were Gjergj Vata (Dukagjin), Martin Sheldija (Shkoder), Ndoc Mirakaj (Puka), Mark Bajraktari (Kashnjet), Ndue Bajraktari (Kushneni), Mark Bib Vokri (Fandi), Zef Preka (Zadrima), Bilal Kola (Mati), and Nik Sokoli (Nikaj). All were willing to cooperate with the team to the fullest extent, although the team

leader expressed distrust of Bilal Kola and Nik Sokoli, who were acting on behalf of the Yugoslavs.

6. The arrival of Team One had a widespread effect in stimulating resistance to the regime, and a large number of young men, called up for military service, fled to the mountains to join the team. Team One eventually acquired a group of about 320 armed supporters. Its leader reported however that little could be done in the way of active resistance unless the population were provided arms, ammunition, and food. Because of the unwieldy group which had collected around it, Team One took refuge in Yugoslavia after approximately eight months in Albania.
7. Teams Two and Three also received consistent local support following their arrival in Albania in December 1949. No member of these teams was captured alive by the security forces, although the leader of Team Three was critically wounded on two occasions, and once had to go into hiding for a prolonged period while recovering. Numerous arrests of persons suspected of associating with or giving shelter to the teams did not result in their betrayal to the security forces.
8. A continuous flow of information was obtained from the teams regarding the potentialities for resistance in north Albania. Although the anti-communist forces were largely inactive and were steadily depleted by widespread escapes to Yugoslavia or death at the hands of the security forces, all reports indicated that the desire to resist remained overwhelming. As had been previously reported by the leader of Team One, resistance was limited in large measure by the lack of weapons, ammunition, and food.
9. In February 1950, reports based on information provided by some 35 influential anticommunists indicated the existence of some 2,000 men in the Puka, Zadrima, and Mnella areas prepared for armed resistance if the means were afforded them. In March 1950, a delegation headed by Mark Melyshi Bajraktari contacted one of the teams to request arms for an estimated 1,000 men in Kthella ready for active revolt. Three months later, in June 1950, a personal tribe-by-tribe survey was made by Pal Bib Mirakaj revied the following estimated numbers of men in the Puka region willing and able to bear arms against the government:
 Kabashi – 600 men
 Thaci – 1,000 men
 Iballja – 300 men
 Puka – 500 men
 Qerreti – 400 men
 Berisha – 300 men
 Mali i zi – 500 men

10. A severe test of the teams' discipline and of their local support was provided by the NCFA leaflet drops, which were the first source of information the teams had of the existence of the Committee. The team leaders requested clarification of the relationship of themselves and the BKI to it, stating "it is essential that we answer the questions of those who have supported us, since these individuals regard NCFA as the principal authority in exile." The BKI leaders at the base station were forced to answer these queries with obviously evasive answers; depending on the temper of the population, it appeared that any clear answer would result in one of two alternatives, both equally undesirable from our point of view; either a diminution of support for the BKI teams, when it was learned that their leaders had been omitted from NCFA or a refusal of the population to support NCFA missions which might be sent into the same areas. This evasion of the issue by the base continued until the teams left Albania, and undoubtedly had a serious, though not fatal, effect on team morale.
11. Another problem for the teams was posed by steadily increasing Yugoslav operations into Albania. Yugoslav efforts impinged very directly upon them, since the UDB on several occasions in 1950 sent missions into Albania to contact our teams and as early as October 1950 made an attempt to recruit them. An equally important effect of the Yugoslav activities was the confusion sown in the minds of the population. In November 1950, one team leader signaled: "Continuous entry into Albania of Yugoslav agents to distribute pro-Slav propaganda greatly damaging our position. Mountain population no longer knows which said to ask for guidance as to whether to place faith in voluminous Yugoslav propaganda, harken to beautiful phrases of NCFA," or continue resisting and providing information requested by us. Prestige of our teams greatly damaged by this influx of propaganda from all sides and our own concentration on gathering intelligence, since many persons are spreading the rumor we are at odds with NCFA." Nevertheless, a fortnight later, following an extensive campaign by the security forces which took a heavy toll of the mountain resistance, he was able to report that "the population has steadfastly supported us during this search."
12. Indications of support for revolutionary action continued to be reported by the teams until the time of their exfiltration, and several resistance groups contacted them to ask for aid. Pursuant to instructions, the teams confined themselves to reporting on these groups. Their reports gave evidence of an honest effort to report objectively; one group, for example, they reported to be penetrated by the security forces, while of

another the team leader reported “They live on nostalgia, though full of good will.”

13. Concurrent with increased Yugoslav activity, the teams reported a large-scale exodus of north Albanians to Yugoslavia. They stated that this exodus was accelerated by NCFA drops, which resulted in repressive action and arrests by the security forces.
14. In the summer of 1951, the teams themselves were forced to consider exfiltrating to Yugoslavia. Although their presence had long been well-known to the security forces, their departure was made more necessary by the physical exhaustion of many of their members and the increasing difficulty of obtaining food than by the actions of government troops. The withdrawal of the two teams, completed in mid-August 1951, was carried out in an orderly manner after receipt of instructions from the base.
15. Since the arrival of the teams in Yugoslavia, their members and the locally recruited supporters who accompanied them have been treated with the greatest solicitude by the Yugoslavs in the hope of gaining their adherence to the Yugoslav-sponsored League of Albanian Refugees.
16. The final communication from the leader of Team Two in Yugoslavia gave the following estimate of the present potentialities for resistance within Albania;

“The Albanian people are extremely demoralized because of difficult living conditions, constant police persecution, imprisonment of popular figures and the indescribable sufferings of thousands of innocent persons . . . confined in the State’s concentration camps. Nevertheless, their hope of rebirth is strong The best thing for morale would be the foundation of a true mass organization for the country’s liberation.”

“Such an organization could be founded even at this point, and would be especially effective in the northern regions where the population mass is homogeneous and where insuperable difficulties of ambition and political diversity do not exist. In the southern regions, dissensions do exist, and a large part of the population would approve stabilization of the present regime or even establishment of Greek hegemony over their territory.”

“Considerable possibility for penetration of the army and police by an anticommunist organization exists, but such a step would be extremely dangerous.”

“Unfortunately, we missed an excellent opportunity to proceed along such lines. During the first days after our arrival in Albania, public opinion was completely in our favor and the population was willing to follow us in any undertaking We could not of course (organize such an undertaking) because of restrictions imposed upon us by you. Nevertheless, possibilities for action still exist.”

Although only considered a Soviet satellite until 1962, when the Communist regime led by Enver Hoxha fell out with the Kremlin, Albania acquired a strategic significance when the Red Banner Fleet began to develop naval facilities at the Pashaliman base, located at the entrance to the Adriatic.

On July 18, 1961, the CIA drafted a report on Soviet military activity in Albania:

1. Steep and mountainous Albania has become a "Red Gibraltar" in the middle of the Mediterranean. Since the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, Albania has been accorded great importance by the USSR. The USSR has armed Albania with the most modern weapons and has established submarine bases and missile sites in Albania.
2. Soviet engineers and technicians have worked for years in Albania and have completely modernized the Soviet bases which have been established in Albania. The Soviets control seven air bases and five submarine bases in Albania.
 1. Air Bases: The air bases are located at Binae (near Tirana), Devoli, and Tilranova in the vicinity of Berat, Ergiri (Gjinokaster), Delvino Avlomra (Vione), and Isma (a village near Tirana). [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX][
 2. Naval Bases: There are four naval bases in the vicinity of Avlonya. One of these bases is located on Cape Zdngaetta on the north-west side of the Bay of Avlonya. The second is at the head of the bay, the third is in Avlonya, the fifth base is located [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] south of Avlonya. It is believed that the Soviet submarines are distributed among these five bases.
 3. Underground (submarine) Pens
 - a) Saseno Island was [XXXXXXXXXX] given to Albania after World War II. The Soviets/who understood the strategic importance of Saseno Island began constructing large establishments here [XXXXXX]. The Soviet strategy has been to use submarines in large numbers, and underground pens have been constructed for their submarines on Saseno Island. Twelve underground pens have been constructed, and after the Suez crisis, it was decided to build five more pens. Much effort is being expended to finish these pens. On the completion of these pens, Saseno Island will be a "Red Gibraltar." Underground fuel depots have been constructed in four different places. Approximately 12 submarines are based here. The last three of the submarines came to Saseno Island at the time of the visit of a Soviet fleet

to the Adriatic, [XXXXXXXXXX]. The bottom (presumably the southern end) of Saseno Island is used as a submarine base by the Soviets and (here) submarine pens, tunnels which have been hollowed out and perfected, are being used. There exist on Saseno Island tunnels and hiding places in which up to 100 submarines can be hidden. Saseno Island is fortified with mobile long-range artillery mounted on rails. No civilians are allowed on Saseno Island, and the island is tightly controlled by the Soviets. Shipping mostly do not pass close by Saseno Island. Oil which is produced in Kireova (sic) is transported to Avloya via a pipeline. A petroleum refinery has been constructed in Avlonya. This refinery is underground. Oil transported to Saseno Island via underground pipeline from Avlonya. The mountains around Avlonya are “filled” with the latest model Soviet anti-aircraft batteries. The Soviets have gradually built up the provisions and supplies on Saseno Island.

4. Target: The Sixth Fleet

- a) The main target of the submarines based on Saseno Island is the Sixth Fleet and its supply ships. Six submarines from the 12 based in Saseno Island continuously “tail” the Sixth Fleet and its supply ships. These submarines which are “W” class have a range of 5,000 miles without refueling or reprovisioning. Thus, these submarines can cruise to the African or Aegean shores of the Mediterranean Sea, stay in the area for a period, and then return to their bases without refueling or reprovisioning.
- b) The Soviets are able to send disassembled “W” class submarines aboard Soviet freights from the USSR to Avlonya where they are assembled.
- c) The Soviets sent three big and small floating drydocks to Avionym [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] More than 400 Albanians worked with the Soviet experts and technicians in assembling the Soviet “W” class submarines.
- d) Within the past few years, it has been observed that some submarines are being constructed under strict secrecy in the navy base in Avlonya. It is understood that there are more than 200 submarines distributed between the navy bases and that the majority of these are hidden in the tunnels and cave submarine pens on Saseno Island. (The presence of the 200 submarines mentioned here obviously conflicts with the twelve submarines mentioned in paragraph 1a.)

5. Soviet Air Forces

- a) The Soviets have at least six air bases in Albania, and at least 75 MiG-21s in Albania. The seventh Soviet Air Force base is being constructed at Ismi, between Tiran (Tirana) and Drao (Durrës). It is believed that the 4,000 Soviets who are stationed at these bases and in their vicinity are supplied partially by large air transport craft and partially by freighters from Burgas and Constanta.
- b) It is said that MiG-21 aircraft makes a continuous 24-hour patrol called the "Otranto Patrol." Two aircraft together from a group of twelve aircraft are in the air constantly; this means the Soviets maintain twenty-four-hour air security. These aircraft concentrate their patrol activity along the coast of Albania and against known air and sea targets.

The Soviets have finished the installations for two new type ballistic missiles which they have sent to Tiran, and they have finished the foundations of the installations for a third ballistic missile.

These launchers are for medium-range missiles (2,500 Km). The launching pads which are located in the mountains in the vicinity of Tiran are guarded very closely, and their existence is a most closely guarded secret.

The Soviets have started to equip the Albanian army with modern weapons. The Albanian army is composed of three composite divisions, and recently the number of MiG-19 aircraft assigned to the Albanians has been increased to a total of 100.

6. Albanian Navy

The Albanian Navy has been strengthened by the addition of two destroyers which were received from the USSR. The Soviet personnel on these destroyers have not been replaced for the present. The Soviets have promised to hand over three additional destroyers to the Albanian

- a) Soviet fishing ships equipped with radars and electronic antennas which carry Soviet "engineers" are making hydrographic soundings and observations in various places in the Mediterranean. At the same time, these fishing ships are patrolling the shores of the Mediterranean and following the Sixth Fleet. The fishing ships are giving a great deal of attention to following and observing the Sixth Fleet, and they are doing much secret work outside of chart correcting.

- b) Soviets are reinforcing the Albanian Army (65,000 men) with the latest heavy weapons and with military electronic equipment. A great amount of activity is being undertaken by the Soviet Military Mission, the Soviet technicians, and the Soviet engineers.
- 7. The goal of the Soviets and the reason that they are expending all these efforts in Albania is to be able to control all the European military forces which are along the shores of North Africa, in the middle Atlantic region and in Western Europe.

The ideological dispute between Tirana and Moscow was already well underway when the CIA circulated this appreciation, but Albania did not formally leave the Warsaw Pact in September 1968. Military cooperation effectively ceased in 1962, when the Red Banner Navy withdrew, leaving behind two Whiskey-class submarines.

AMES, ALDRICH. A **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) officer arrested in 1994 and sentenced to life imprisonment, Aldrich Ames approached the KGB in Washington D.C. in April 1985 and received \$50,000 for his information. He established his credentials by revealing that the KGB *resident*, Stanislav Androsey, was known internally within the KGB by his codename CRONIN.

When he heard of the arrest of **John Walker**, he feared his own betrayal was likely and held a further meeting to identify all the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and CIA assets he knew of inside the KGB.

Fluent in Mandarin, and the son of a CIA officer, Rick Ames had joined the CIA in 1967 and had turned in mediocre performances as a Directorate of Operations (DO) officer in Ankara and Mexico City. Nevertheless, he had participated in some significant cases, including those of the Foreign Ministry spy **Aleksandr Ogorodnik**, and two members of the United Nations, Arkadi Shevchenko and Sergei Fedorenko. In September 1983, Ames, by now fluent in Russian, had been appointed chief of the counterintelligence branch in the Soviet/Eastern Europe Division which had given him complete access to the DO's most closely guarded files on its most successful assets. Heavily in debt and convinced that his talents had gone unrecognized, Ames offered to sell the names of several CIA spies for \$50,000. At a meeting on May 16, Ames supplied three names, and at a further rendezvous on June 13, he provided an almost complete roster of the CIA's most valued agents in the Soviet Union.

Precisely which names supplied Ames, and on what date, remains a matter of speculation, although it is now generally acknowledged that he was

probably not responsible for **Adolf Tolkachev**'s arrest, which had taken place in Moscow on June 9, four days *before* Ames sold his notorious long list. If Ames betrayed Tolkachev in his April letter, it is likely that his identity had been disclosed already by Edward Lee Howard, a disaffected CIA officer. If Ames was contributed anything to the disaster, it was probably the arrest of Tolkachev's wife, a communications expert whom her husband recruited and with whom he probably shared the astonishing fortune of 400,000 rubles found in their apartment by KGB investigators. She was to be imprisoned, and to die of cancer a year after her release.

In any event, the damage caused by the Ames list was immense and severely compromised. AE/TICKLE, Britain's star agent inside the KGB's London *rezidentura*. As a direct consequence of the tip from Ames, **Oleg Gordievsky** was unexpectedly recalled to Moscow on May 17, 1985, supposedly for urgent top-level consultations three days later, but actually for a lengthy, hostile interrogation which included the use of drugs.

Another lucky escape was made by Sergei Bokhan, the CIA's GRU source in Athens. He had defected at the end of May, a fortnight before Ames had delivered his list. Other agents, working for the CIA, suffered a rather dissimilar experience. Major Sergei M. Motorin and Colonel Valeri F. Martynov, both KGB officers who had been recruited by the FBI in Washington D.C., were arrested and later executed. Although Ames never acknowledged precisely whom he fingered in his first letter, it is highly likely that he included the names of Motorin, Martynov, and Gordievsky, the KGB trio in the best position to warn the CIA of the existence of a well-placed traitor within its own ranks. As a matter of self-preservation, Ames would have been bound to warn the *rezident* that some of his colleagues were really working for the West. In his list of June 13, he mentioned Tolkachev, who had just been arrested and was to be executed, and a group of other Soviet intelligence officers who had been recruited while under diplomatic cover in the United States: Leonid Poleschuk, recruited in Katmandu in the 1970s; a GRU officer, Gennadi Smetanin and his wife Svetlana, who had been recruited in 1983; Gennadi Varenik, the son of a senior KGB officer, was under TASS cover when he had been recruited in March 1985 in Bonn, was arrested in November, and shot in February 1987.

In addition, GT/BACKBEND, GT/GLAZING, GT/TAME, and GT/VEST showed signs that they had come under the KGB's intensive scrutiny, a development that indicated the SE Division had suffered a very comprehensive calamity. The scale of the catastrophe was not lost on Burton Gerber nor his deputy, Milton Bearden, who instituted a major review of each case so as to establish whether operational blunders were to blame or if there was something altogether more sinister afoot. Gus Hathaway, who had returned from

Bonn in January 1985 to run the Counterintelligence Staff, estimated that up to 45 separate cases had been placed in jeopardy. As the losses mounted from May 1985, Hathaway became increasingly convinced that SE had been penetrated at a high level.

The DCI was briefed on the SE Division's losses for the first time in January 1986 by the deputy director for Operations (DDO) Clair George, Gerber, Hathaway, and Bearden, and the director of Central Intelligence Bill Casey promptly instructed the former DDO, John Stein, who was then the CIA's Inspector-General, to conduct an urgent investigation. As Stein reviewed each case, the DO suffered more inexplicable losses. On March 10, Sergei Vorontsov, codenamed GT/COWL, who had spied since late 1984 was caught, and his CIA contact, Michael Sellers, was detained while on his way to a rendezvous in Moscow and expelled. Also in March, GT/VILLAGE was recalled from the Soviet consulate in Surabaya, Indonesia, and vanished. Two months later, on 7 May, another member of the Moscow station, Erik Sites, was ambushed while attempting to meet GT/EASTBOUND. On July 1, Vladimir V. Potashov (GT/MEDIAN), an arms control negotiator at the Soviet Institute for USA and Canada Studies who had spied since 1981, was taken into custody, and three days later **Dmitri Polyakov** was summoned unexpectedly to the Lubianka and arrested. Soon afterward, Colonel Vladimir M. Piguzov (GT/JOGGER) who had been recruited in Djakarta and had been assigned to the KGB's Andropov Institute training academy, dropped from sight. This was an especially mysterious and sinister loss for Piguzov had not been in contact with the CIA since 1979 when he had returned to Moscow and had proved himself to be an exceptionally useful source by identifying David H. Barnett, a CIA retiree working on a training program on contract, and turncoat who was arrested in April 1980 and had been sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment. It was almost as if, having exhausted the current hot cases, someone was rifling the DO's dormant files to find less valuable spies to betray. Almost as confirmation, Boris Yuzhin (TG/TWINE) who had been the TASS correspondent in San Francisco in the 1970s, and had returned to Moscow in 1982, was arrested on December 23, 1986. Almost simultaneously Colonel Vladimir M. Vasilev (GT/ACCORD), a GRU officer recruited in Budapest in 1983, who had identified a GRU network in which U.S. Army sergeant, Clyde L. Conrad, had been active in West Germany, was also caught. Vasilev's loss was significant, for he also enabled the Swedish security police to arrest Conrad's controllers, Dr. Sandor Kercsik and his younger brother Imre, and roll up a large Hungarian military intelligence network headed by a retired warrant officer, Zoltan Szabo. Originally a refugee from Hungary in the 1956 exodus, Szabo had joined the U.S. Army and had

been decorated for gallantry in Vietnam. According to his confession, he had been recruited by the Hungarians in 1971, when he took his German wife and children on holiday to Lake Balaton. Although Vasilev had tipped off the CIA to the existence of Szabo's huge Hungarian spy-ring in 1985, which extended into Italy, his role had been skillfully concealed, so it was a surprise when he was suddenly taken into the KGB's custody in 1986 and executed the following year. Conrad was allowed his liberty until August 1988 and was sentenced to life imprisonment in June 1990, but Szabo escaped to Budapest.

Although the CIA undertook an elaborate charade, involving a team of analysts, led by Sandy Grimes and Jeanne Vertefeuille, to conceal the source of the key information that led to Ames's arrest in February 1994, the vital evidence was obtained by the FBI's Mike Rochford who recruited a senior KGB officer, Colonel Aleksandr Zaphorovsky, and the CIA who used Gen-nadi Vassilenko to reach another asset, Aleksei Shcherbakov, who was in dire financial trouble. Once Shcherbakov had been put on the payroll, during a period of cultivation in New York, the vital evidence against Ames became available to the molehunters, and he was arrested. *See also* COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

ARTAMONOV, NIKOLAI. The commander of a Skory-class destroyer in the Baltic, Nikolai F. Artamonov defected to **Sweden** in June 1959 with his Polish girlfriend, Ewa Gora, and offered himself to the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA). He was flown to the CIA station at Frankfurt where he was administered a polygraph by an experienced examiner, Paul Bellin, who became convinced he was a fraud. However, an initial debriefing conducted by George Kisevalter had shown his knowledge of Soviet intelligence to be "good but limited."

Artamonov was subsequently granted political asylum in the United States and provided the Office of Naval Intelligence with valuable information about Soviet naval doctrine and strategy and gave evidence to the House Committee on Un-American Activities in September 1960.

Born in 1922, Artamonov graduated from the Frunze naval academy in 1949, joined the Communist Party, received specialist training in nuclear missiles and at the age of 27 was appointed the navy's youngest destroyer captain (third rank). Following his posting to the *Stremitelniy* in Gdynia to assist the Polish Navy in training Indonesian naval personnel in anticipation of the imminent sale of four Polish destroyers to the Indonesian navy, and his wish to marry, he decided to flee to Sweden in a stolen motorboat, a feat he accomplished undetected. He later obtained a divorce to marry his girlfriend and in 1972 received a doctorate from George Washington University.

As an expert on the Baltic Fleet, he was employed as a consultant to the DIA under the alias Nikolai Shadrin until he was abducted in Vienna in December 1975.

AUSTRALIA. Until MI5 produced documentary proof in February 1948 that the Australian government had been penetrated by a Soviet spy-ring, based on incontrovertible **VENONA** evidence, the continent had felt somewhat semi-detached from the Cold War. However, the arrival in Sydney of the director-general of MI5, Sir Percy Sillitoe, and his counter-subversion expert Roger Hollis, marked a significant milestone in the Cold War development of VENONA. Hollis carried with him a briefing paper which summarized the intelligence gleaned from VENONA intercepts dating back to August 1943, just five months after the Soviets had opened its first diplomatic mission in Australia. As VENONA had demonstrated to the few British and American analysts who had studied there, the new legation had contained a GRU *resident*, Colonel Viktor S. Zaitsev, operating under second secretary cover, and his NKVD counterpart, Semen I. Makarov, ostensibly working as the first secretary. The evidence of their illicit activities, presented by Sillitoe, was intended to prove to their Australian hosts that a special organization was required to counter Soviet espionage. According to VENONA, from almost the moment they had arrived, the Soviets had emphasized the need to create illegal *residents*, and investigation of this threat, codenamed BOOMERANG, would require considerable skill and commitment, of the kind the Australian government had never considered necessary, and had little experience.

Hitherto, counter-subversion in Australia had been the responsibility of the Commonwealth Investigation Branch, with local Special Branches dealing with other related security issues. Extremism of the left and right had dogged the fringes of Australian politics, but there had never been external interference on the scale Sillitoe claimed. Publication of the Royal Commission's report on Soviet espionage in Canada in 1946 had proved a shock right across the English-speaking world, but the Australian Labor administration had rejected proposals for a federal security agency, but when eventually in May 1948 the U.S. State Department imposed a ban on sharing classified data with Australia, on the grounds that there was a complete absence of an acceptable local security apparatus, Canberra was obliged to reconsider. In fact the leakage, alleged by Sillitoe, was more like a hemorrhage, and a VENONA decrypt dated March 16, 1946, had provided the proof that at least one highly sensitive British classified report had been copied and sent to Moscow, and doubtless others had too:

As (6 groups unrecovered) to KLOD to get the document (the original) on “Security of INDIA and the INDIAN Ocean” through his friends in the NOOK (Foreign Ministry). Recently KLOD [6 groups unrecovered] copy of the documents (originals): “Security of INDIA and the INDIAN ocean,” Copy No. 78, 14 pages, and “Security in the Western MEDITERRANEAN and the Eastern ATLANTIC,” copy No. 109, 10 pages. Both documents were prepared by the English Post-Hostilities Planning Staff [7 groups unrecovered] for the War Cabinet. The documents are dated May 19, 1945, and signed by three people: C.C.A. Allen; F.C. Curtis; and P. Warburton. At the same time, there is a note on the documents to the effect that their texts are final and that their circulation has been strictly limited. [2 groups unrecovered] there is an additional handwritten note to the effect that this copy of the documents is issued for the personal use of Colonel ROMKE. Appropriate operational maps are appended to the documents. The operation of handing over the documents was organized by KLOD in Canberra, where he recently arrived by car (one of the cars he uses to carry out his illegal work) the latter does not belong to the FRATERNAL [Communist Party]. The documents were handed over to us for 35 minutes. During this time, we photographed them and returned them to KLOD.

The document that had been photographed was of immense significance and set out the future of British defense policy toward Spain and Italy, emphasizing the strategic value of the Azores, Sardinia, and Sicily. As well as discussing the need to develop radar and air defense in the region and to cooperate closely with France, Spain, and the United States, the paper drafted by the director of Post-Hostilities Plans, Brigadier Francis Curtis, effectively presaged the creation of the NATO alliance. To have fallen into Soviet hands at such an early stage was quite devastating, not to mention the likelihood that dozens of other sensitive items had gone the same way.

This VENONA decrypt was the hardest evidence of a particular classified document being compromised, and obviously was the cause of much embarrassment, although Sillitoe was discreet about the precise origin of his own information, implying that MI5 had acquired a highly placed source in Moscow, leaving it to the partially indoctrinated to guess that the British had successfully recruited a superspy in the Kremlin. There was no room for doubt that a numbered, top secret paper had been removed by an individual codenamed KLOD, lent to Semen Makarov at the Soviet legation for copying and replaced before it could be missed. It was an appalling lapse in security and apparently just one example of how the administration had been comprehensively penetrated.

The Australian government’s relative naiveté in matters of espionage was demonstrated in another VENONA decrypt, dated June 1, 1945, addressed to the centre:

The other day ZAITSEV visited MINTER, the American Chargé d'Affaires in CANBERRA, on consular business. The latter in the conversation with him under the guise of a joke began to speculate upon the representative of the 'mystical' Chief Political Directorate abroad. "Only two countries in the world have a secret service abroad—Germany and Russia," said MINTER. Of, all are convinced and here in CANBERRA all they had to do was to pin down who exactly on the staff of the Soviet Legation is the representative of the Chief Political Directorate. At first they supposed that ALEXANDROV was the said worker, but after his rapid departure it seems they became convinced that they had made a mistake and in the end apparently [1 group unrecovered] certain that SOLDATOV is the secret worker.

In effect, this was an example of the Soviets celebrating the naiveté of their American and Australian adversaries who had demonstrably failed to correctly identify the NKVD *rezident* at the embassy and had erroneously latched on to Aleksandr M. Aleksandrov, who had worked at the legation with the rank of counselor from May 1943 until his departure in April 1944.

Exploiting VENONA in Australia proved difficult, for Sillitoe could only confide in Sir Frederick Shedden, who had served as Permanent secretary at the Defense Department since 1937, and had been secretary to the War Cabinet throughout the recent hostilities. Together Shedden and Sillitoe briefed the Labour prime minister, Ben Chifley, on the existence of a high-level leak in his government, and it was agreed that the head of the Joint Intelligence Organisation, Brigadier Frederick Chilton, should undertake a discreet investigation to see who might have passed the Curtis memorandum to KLOD. By the time Chifley had returned from a further meeting with Sillitoe in London in July, when the prime minister had visited his counterpart Clement Attlee in Downing Street, Chilton had narrowed the field of suspects to just four military members of the Joint Planning Committee, and to a single External Affairs official, but he was convinced of the need to create an Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) run on the British model and agreed that Hollis should fly out to begin the necessary work the following month.

Hollis stayed in Australia until September but made a second visit to Sydney the following year, accompanied by Robert Hemblys-Scales, who had recently completed a lengthy analysis of GRU operations and by MI5's Japanese-speaking Far East expert, Courtenay Young, who was to act as the first Security Liaison Officer to be attached to the British High Commission in Canberra. By now, Ben Chifley was persuaded of the scale of Soviet penetration, and he announced the creation of ASIO in March 1949, appointing a respected judge, (Sir) Geoffrey Reed, as its head, a post he was to hold for 15 months. By skillful use of the Curtis memorandum, MI5 had persuaded a reluctant Australian Labor administration into reversing its policy on measures to protect internal security.

ASIO's first priority was to stem the flow of secrets to Russia, and a VENONA decrypt dated September 1, 1945, from Semen Makarov, signed with his codename EFIM, illustrated how easy it had been for the *resident* to operate in an environment that the NKVD had considered far from hostile:

KLOD has communicated fairly detailed information received by him from BEN concerning the Australian Security Service. According to these data, there existed before the war a counterintelligence department, the so-called Commonwealth Investigation Branch. [1 group garbled] during the war a Security Service of police and military [two groups unrecovered]— although subordinate to EVATT as minister of justice. The director of the Federal Department of Security is [60 groups unrecoverable]

By reason of this subordination, the police have very big rights and powers. It deals also with the investigator of the FRATERNAL [Communist Party] and carries out counterespionage work. It has qualified permanent staff workers, a better disciplinary setup and secret [9 groups unrecovered] with the Security Service while the police [4 groups unrecovered] experience of the latter. The Federal police is comparatively unimportant. Both the above-mentioned services have departments in each state. The departments are subdivided into a number of sections. Thus, for example, in the state of New South Wales, the Security Service Department consists of the following sections:

1. Investigation of the subversive activities of various organizations.
3. Investigation of anti-state activities of Germans [2 groups unrecovered] Indonesians.
4. Chinese Section.
5. [2 groups unrecovered] and Navy and [4 groups unrecovered]; the investigation of the diplomatic and consular corps is dealt with evidently by the Investigation Branch. Each operational worker has his own agency about which no one knows except him. There are both paid and unpaid agents. For the investigation of organizations, agents are recruited within these organizations. Sometimes directors of sections carry out joint action on urgent questions of information. According to BEN's account, the Security Service has no special [1 group unrecovered] surveillance but constant external surveillance. EVATT has a special worker in each State Department whose job it is to carry out his special tasks. Thus in the State of New South Wales, the centre's deputy is Sergeant WILKE. Soon after the end of the war in the Pacific, SIMPSON prepared an order (7 groups unrecovered he did not succeed; as EVATT [2 groups unrecovered]) about the service, said that they would still have need of it. Instead of liquidating it, it was decided to cut down its establishment. BEN has remained at work for the time being. He is considered there an expert on left-wing organizations, in particular on the FRATERNAL.

Apart from the above-mentioned material, BEN handed over to KLOD a copy of information on a number of organizations which are being investigated:

1. Political Research Society Ltd., a reactionary organization set up by the Liberal Party to combat left-wing organizations.
2. The Australian Legion of Ex-Servicemen. The enormous influence of the first is emphasized by the FRATERNAL.
3. The Association of Greek Orthodox Christians—a reactionary organization uniting right-wing Greeks in Australia.

The documents are of operational value, as they give exact data on political personalities in these organizations. The Ministry of Home Security, which was set up for the duration of the war, was responsible for carrying out camouflage work, all defense [1 group unrecovered], guarding aerodromes and petroleum storage places, protecting the lives and property of the civilian population in wartime, blackout, and other tasks. This is reported for your orientation; the materials we are sending by post.

Just this VENONA alone was enough for Hollis and Hemblys-Scales to identify two serious breaches of security, KLOD and BEN. KLOD was instantly identified as **Walter S. Clayton**, a New Zealander with a long record of Communist activism, and his source BEN as Alfred T. Hughes, a police sergeant in the Vice Squad who had been attached to the Security Service during the war and who was also known to be a leading left-winger. While Hughes had kept Clayton informed of what was happening within Australia's embryonic security apparatus, the former salesman and political hard-liner was revealed by VENONA to be the central figure in a very extensive, and hitherto undisturbed, Soviet espionage network based on the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) and its sympathizers. Clayton's precise role within the CPA was hard to fathom, but papers seized during a police raid on his office showed that he was a member of a shadowy entity known as the Control Commission, which enforced discipline and prevented ideological deviation within the Party ranks. The close working relationship between Clayton and Hughes seemed, from a VENONA text dated March 17, 1945, to have been a quite recent development, considering that Clayton's identity had not been concealed with a cryptonym and was to some degree a reflection of the ambition of the TASS correspondent, Fedor A. Nosov, codenamed TECHNICIAN, to play the hazardous game of penetrating the opponent's security apparatus.

TECHNICIAN at the regular meeting on 15th March this year received from CLAYTON a reply to our indirect question on the possibility of using a worker of the counterintelligence. In principle, CLAYTON did not object to

[2 groups unrecovered] TECHNICIAN with the said worker. He expressed the sole fear that this worker is being used by the police [6 groups unrecovered] insufficient preparation and tampering of him, in certain circumstances, may play [9 groups unrecovered] Alfred HUGHES, 45 years. Before the war served as a police con [54 groups unrecovered].

ASIO deduced from these VENONA texts that KLOD had quickly gained the trust of the *rezidentura*, for he was soon a major talent-spotter, recruiter and agent handler, and was supposedly, ideologically motivated. This, of course, did not prevent Makarov from indulging in the common expedient of sealing the relationship with Clayton with money, as he reported to Moscow on May 5, 1945:

At the regular meeting with KLOD on 4th May, the latter was given 15 pounds for the first time on the plausible pretext of compensating him for his personal efforts and the expenditure which he incurs when he meets people on assignments of ours. At first KLOD was somewhat taken aback and he declared that he didn't know how to proceed in such a situation, for he had always considered it his duty to help our country. As (2 groups unrecovered) quickly recovered himself, became noticeably more cheerful and expressed a desire to dine with him sometime.

The money was handed over at the end of the conversation. KLOD was also told that the money was intended for him personally and no one should know of it. KLOD explained that he [missing verb] an assignment to BEN (2 groups unrecovered) he is working secretly on carrying out the latter. He promised also to give a reliable personal report on SISTER in the near future.

By early October, VENONA proved that Clayton had been inducted into the organization and put onto the payroll, although Moscow had reservations about the quality of Makarov's supervision:

1. KLOD is a rather well-known figure. In view of this his activities in attracting new sources of information for us are dangerous. Recommend to KLOD not to burden himself with obtaining information of little importance to us but to concentrate his attention on essential materials of an operational and intelligence nature.
2. Once more we remind you that information similar to that contained in your No. 73 should only be sent by post in view of its minor importance.
3. We draw your attention to the inadequacy of the translation and the style of the text to be transmitted by telegraph.
4. Pay all KLOD's operational expenses. Inform us by how much your next quarter's telegraph expenses will go up.

Later that same month, on 21 October, the centre demanded caution and spelled out exactly how Nosov was to handle Clayton in the future:

For specially important reasons, tell **TECHNICIAN** not to receive any documentary written materials from **KLOD** until special orders are received from us canceling these instructions. Cut down meetings between **TECHNICIAN** and **KLOD** to one a month. Pass word to **KLOD** that during this period he should maintain only organizational liaison with **BEN** and the workers of the Australian **NOOK** [Department of External Affairs] and indoctrinate them in the direction which we require. Try to check to see whether **TECHNICIAN** is being watched. Help him to proceed with secrecy in this matter. If it should be noticed that he or our representatives are being made the subject of more intensive investigation, temporarily discontinue the liaisons of [20 groups unrecoverable]

The **VENONA** material served to establish **ASIO** and provide it with dozens of espionage leads, some of which were almost contemporaneous as some of the Canberra traffic was being read within a few weeks of interception. That supply would end later in 1949 when the source was compromised and the Soviets revised their communications procedures, but the defection of Vladimir Petrov in April 1954 offered a very convenient cover for a vigorous pursuit of the suspects identified in **VENONA** but attributed to the fortuitous defector. Mistakenly, the hapless but volatile leader of the Labour Party, Dr. **Herbert Evatt**, unaware that the CPA had penetrated his own private office, sensed a political conspiracy, and his ill-judged attacks on **ASIO**, and Petrov had the effect of splitting his party and keeping it from gaining power. Evatt's almost predictable reaction saved **ASIO's** chief, Sir Charles Spry, and the prime minister, Sir Robert Menzies, from wondering how they could prevent such a security risk from ever taking up the role of premier.

For the remainder of the Cold War most of Australia's successive governments were fully supportive of the Western alliance, although the election of Gough Whitlam in 1972 created a constitutional crisis and threatened the future of Pine Gap, the U.S. National Security Agency's principal **satellite** ground-station in the southern hemisphere.

AZORIAN. The **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) codename for the operation, known to the U.S. Navy as **JENNIFER**, to salvage the *K-129*, a Soviet Golf-II diesel-electric **submarine** which sank in an accident 300 miles south-west of Hawaii on March 11, 1968. The site of the loss was identified by American **SOSUS** bearings taken at Point Sur, near Monterey, California, although the Soviet surface search was conducted in entirely the wrong area, and the apparent absence in the acoustic recordings of a series of noises associated with watertight compartments imploding sequentially as the pressure hull descended suggested the boat's integrity had been compromised on the surface or at a low depth, which in turn left the possibility that the submarine

had reached the ocean floor intact. A lengthy seabed search, codenamed SAND DOLLAR, conducted by the USS *Halibut* located the wreckage at a depth of three miles, and the imagery suggested that the *K-129* was indeed in good condition.

Curiously, the lid to one of the *K-129*'s three missile silos appeared to be open, and the body of a crewman, wearing bad weather gear, was spotted some distance from the main wreck. This discovery tended to confirm the opinion of some analysts that the original accident had occurred on the surface, perhaps when one of the missiles was being prepared for launch. This possible explanation acted to encourage further investigation and accordingly, after negotiations conducted by the director of Central Intelligence Bill Colby in late 1970 with William Hollisday, the Summa Corporation, owned by the billionaire Howard Hughes, was contracted in November 1972 to build a ship, the *Glomar Explorer*, capable of lifting the hull to the surface within a budget of \$350 million. The cover story was that the vessel, constructed by Sun Shipbuilding of Chester, Pennsylvania, was to conduct mining operations on the sea floor for manganese nodules using special equipment designed by the Hughes Tool Company and the Global Marine Corporation.

The *Glomar Explorer* sailed from Long Beach, California, in June 1974 and commenced its survey of the site in early July, having encountered two Soviet ships, the tug *SB-10* and the *Chazma*, a missile recovery vessel. Precisely what was salvaged from the wreck remains classified, and some reports suggest that only two nuclear-tipped torpedoes and six bodies were recovered, the main part of the hull having slipped out of the clutch of the huge steel claw guiding it up, through underwater doors, into the ship's hold.

Following a burglary at the Summa Corporation's offices in Los Angeles, details of the salvage operation leaked to the *Los Angeles Times* and the *New York Times* in February 1975, the recovered, contaminated material having been examined at a specially constructed facility at Redwood City.

B

BAY OF PIGS. The invasion of Cuba's south coast by a force of **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA)-backed rebels in April 1960 proved a military disaster which ended in the capture of all the participants. The project had been planned by the CIA, on the authority of the White House, but when details of the fiasco emerged, the director of Central Intelligence Dick Helms and his deputy director for Plans Richard Bissell were required to resign. The debacle had a lasting impact on the CIA although it appeared that there was no evidence that the project had been compromised by hostile penetration. On the contrary, the failure was largely a consequence of a last-minute withdrawal of air support, a decision taken by President John F. Kennedy. Nevertheless, the Soviets later claimed to have acquired advance notice of the plan through Maria Dubrova, a GRU illegal based in New York who would be betrayed to the FBI by **Dmitri Polyakov**. Dubrova, who had been posing as a beautician, was abducted by the FBI and persuaded to cooperate until she committed suicide by throwing herself out of a window.

The Bay of Pigs debacle was a manifestation of the Eisenhower administration's determination to exercise control over the Caribbean, a policy subsequently inherited by the Kennedy brothers. In Cold War terms, the success of Fidel Castro, given his acknowledged links to Moscow, could not go unchallenged but paradoxically the failed CIA-backed operation actually served to reinforce the Communist regime. Indeed, Cuba would become a key player in extending Soviet Bloc intervention in Central and South America and acted as a Soviet proxy in the Angolan civil war. Cuba also provided facilities to the KGB, including an intercept site at Lourdes targeted against U.S. communications and allowed the Direction General de Inteligencia (DGI) to develop into a surrogate or satellite organization largely subordinate to the Kremlin. In particular, the DGI acted as an intermediary with the CIA renegade **Philip Agee** through the provision of case officers and a safe-haven.

Consequently, Cuba became an intelligence collection priority for the U.S. intelligence community but the DGI proved to be a skilled adversary, recruiting and running a large number of double agents against the CIA and accomplishing high-level penetration of the DIA through the well-placed analyst

Ana Montes, who would be exposed and arrested in September 2001, and the State Department through Kendall Myers who was convicted of espionage in July 2010. In her confession, Montes admitted having passed classified material to her DGI handlers since her recruitment in 1984 while employed in the U.S. Department of Justice. Separately, Myers acknowledged having been recruited by the DGI in 1979 when he worked at the Foreign Service Institute, Arlington Hall. He was later transferred to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and supplied secret documents to the Cubans until his retirement in October 2007 when he was a senior intelligence analyst handling European issues.

Driven by political ideology, both Montes at the DIA and Myers at INR served Havana over a period of decades, well beyond the end of the Cold War, and were later assessed as having compromised every secret they had gained access to, thereby substantially handicapping U.S. foreign policy across the region and ensuring the failure of numerous intelligence operations mounted by other agencies.

BEGGAR SHADOW. The U.S. Navy codename for a routine **signals intelligence** interception mission flown to collect North Korean communications, BEGGAR SHADOW left Atsugi for Osan on April 14, 1969, but was attacked and destroyed by a MiG-21F *Fishbed* armed with Atoll AA -2 infrared missiles. The unarmed EC-121M reconnaissance aircraft, a variant of the Lockheed 749 Constellation operated by the U.S. Navy's Reconnaissance Squadron VQ-1, was shot down over the Sea of Japan, 80 miles from the North Korean coast, with the loss of the crew of 31. The plane was carrying double its usual complement and included 10 electronic countermeasures technicians.

The lumbering, propeller-driven intercept platform was flying at 200 knots when it was approached by the MiG interceptor. The incident was not entirely unexpected as another MiG-21 had tried, and failed, to attack a faster, jet-powered RB-47 on an ELINT mission four years earlier, 70 miles from North Korean airspace. On that occasion the aircraft had evaded and outrun its adversary, but the pilot, James H. Overstreet had no opportunity to manoeuvre.

The MiG-21 had been one of a pair that a fortnight earlier had been transferred to the Hoemun airbase, a site which usually trained MiG-15 and MiG-17 aircrew, from their usual airfield, at Pukch'ang-ni Airfield on the east coast. The move had been unusual, and had been noted, but Overstreet had not received any special warning apart from a briefing which suggested tensions were high, and the instruction to turn for home if anything untoward occurred, such as sighting an interceptor. Surprisingly, the National Security Agency (NSA) noted afterward that there had not been any general

military alert from Pyongyang, as might have been expected if the attack had been planned. The NSA's secret account of the attack, *The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown*, completed in 1989, has been declassified:

The BEGGAR SHADOW mission, assigned [XXXXXX] and [XXXXXX] took off from Atsugi Naval Air Station, Japan, at 0700 local time (2200Z), with 31 men on board. The scheduled flight duration was eight-and-a-half hours. From Atsugi, the EC-121 was to fly to a point off the northeastern coastal city of Ch'ongjin, near North Korea's border with Manchuria. The plane was then to fly two-and-a-half orbits along a 120-mile elliptical path parallel to the coast of North Korea before continuing to Osan AB, near Seoul, with a projected arrival time of 0630Z. Except for the beginning and ending legs over Japan and South Korea, the entire flight was to be over international waters. It was to fly no closer than 50 miles to the North Korean coast. The North Koreans claimed territorial waters and airspace 12 miles from their coast.

EC-121, "slow and lumbering," was a modification of a plane that was once a familiar sight to transatlantic air travelers; the Lockheed Super Constellation, a major commercial plane before the jet age. The plane's four propeller-driven engines provided a maximum speed of 220 knots with a maximum altitude of 10,000–20,000 feet. The unarmed aircraft carried nearly six tons of electronic equipment with a bulbous radome on top to pick up radar signals and antennas under the plane's belly to monitor radio communications. The plane contained [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] communications position included secure voice (KY-8) and secure teletype (KW-7) equipment. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] Friendly radar coverage would be available during part of the flight from Japan and South Korea. [XXXXXX] part of the flight the plane would be dependent upon [XXXXXX]. Before each flight the Navy provided complete flight path and times to [XXXXXX]. Specific areas of responsibility for warning were designated [XXXXXXXXXX] the airborne collector proceeded along its flight path.

One of the Sigint sites that provided support on the EC-121 flight was [XXXX] the designator for the [XXXXXXXXXX]. Its role in the flight of the EC-121 was to cover [XXXXXXXXXX] trackings of the flight and to coordinate via circuitry with USA-68 operational communications (OPSCOMM) circuitry with USA-68.

USA-58, the Sigint designator for the 6918th Security Squadron of the USAFSS, was a cotenant at the U.S. Army Security Station at Iwakata. Kyushu, Japan. [XXXXXXXXXX] For the EC-121 flight, it was to provide coverage [XXXXXX] and to act as a relay [XXXXXXXXXX]

The key role in the entire episode was played by [XXXXX]. This unit's primary responsibility was collecting information [XXXXXXXXXX]. Since most of the EC-121 flight [XXXXXXXXXX] information was also to be passed to appropriate command-and-control facilities for possible action, such as a fighter launch. In the case of such a launch [XXXX] was to contact units of the Fifth Air Force, the Fifth ADVON, and the 314th Air Division [XXXX] located at Osan, through secure voice and teletype.

USN-39, the Naval Security Group facility at Kamiseya, Japan, was to serve as another relay point in the Sigint network, but communications problems would put it out of the picture until well after the shoot-down occurred. [XXXXXXXXXX] Because of its proximity to VQ-1, it had control over manning the onboard positions of the EC-121 flight.

Following its 0700 (2200Z 14 April) takeoff from the Atsugi Naval Air Station near Tokyo, the crew of the EC-121 was in direct contact with [XXXX] Kamiseya, during the early hours of the flight. At the very beginning of the mission (2217Z) Commander Overstreet called Kamiseya for a ground check. This was receipted by USN-39 several minutes later. An hour and a half later (2347Z), chatter took place between the plane and USN-39 in an attempt to correct some minor communications difficulties. These problems were cleared up by 0025Z. Twenty minutes later, the last direct contact occurred between the plane and Kamiseya. At that time (0045Z), the crew had some activity on a radiotelephone position and informed USN-39 that no further transmissions would be forthcoming while this took place. The reason for this action was to prevent the loss of intercept which sometimes occurred during KW-7 transmissions. The plane would simply acknowledge any transmissions from the ground by sending three short sync pulses on the K W-7 circuit.

[XXX] Osan, via OPSCOMM from USA-58, Hakata, was made aware at 0008Z of the departure of the Navy mission. The initial reflection of the flight—BEGGAR SHADOW [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] The plane [XXXXXX] initially reflected over the Sea of Japan at Q1Q5Z approximately 150 nm southeast of Vladivostok. [XXXX] informed [XXXX] of this Soviet reaction at 0117Z. The EC-121 continued on a northwesterly path to a point about 90 nm southeast of Vladivostok (also representing the closest point to Soviet territory at 60 nm) [XXX] A few minutes prior to this (0125Z), the aircraft receipted with sync pulses in response to USN-39 communications [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

Shortly after 0300Z, as the EC-121 again routinely acknowledged [XXX] an hourly [XXX] communications check, [XXXXXX] later carefully studied at NSA headquarters, occurred as the plane made its

closest approach to the North Korean landmass. Later used by NSA to repudiate claims of the North Koreans that the plane had violated its airspace [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] USA-58, were unable to assist at this critical point. USA-58, Hakata, informed Osan that it was reflecting an Air Force ACRP mission in the Vladivostok Bay area but not the EC- 121. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] In [XXX] tracking was extremely sparse after its initial information from these other sites [XXX] decided against issuing a warning to the EC-121 at the time. At 0315Z, it informed [XXXX]

Shortly thereafter, the plane began its long elliptical orbit to the southwest. At 031 9Z, USA-58 informed Osan that [XXX] had no [XXXXX] reflections of the plane. At that point, [XXXXX] lost contact with USA-68 when its OPSCOMM circuit went out for about 19 minutes [XXXXXXXXXX]. However [XXX] continued to redirect the plane throughout the next crucial hour. The [XXX] tracking was now more compatible with the expected path of the EC-121. The OPSCOMM circuit with Hakata was restored at 0334Z. Osan now seemed convinced that it was reflecting the “Navy Bird,” Track 8263. While reflecting the EC-121 at the beginning of this elliptical orbit, [XXX] also reported to Hakata that it had tracked fighters over the water at 0329Z. The fighter reflections, however, were far to the southwest, over the Tongjo-son Bay, and seemed nonthreatening. USA-68 still had no reflections of the aircraft or any indication of possible hostile activity. By 0344Z, [XXX] reported the fighters as heading back toward the Kiprean landmass. For the next half-hour, the U.S. reconnaissance plane continued on its southwest leg, reaching the southernmost point of the orbit area at about 0400Z. The [XXX] USA-58 OPSCOMM circuit was quiet.

As the EC-121 approached the southern limit of its elliptical track, the final transmission from the plane occurred. Shortly after 0400Z, it responded to the hourly communications check by Kamiseya. It was still being tracked by [XXXX] radar and still reflected a course compatible with the planned flight route. The [XXXXXXXXXXXXX] Communications between [XXX] USA-58 were reestablished at 042GZ. At the same time, [XXX] reported it had picked up fighter reactions again, this time over the Sea of Japan, over 100 miles east of Hoemun. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

As the EC-121 approached the northern part of the elliptical orbit at 0430Z, the two MiG-21s that had appeared at the Hoemun Air School in late March took off across the waters of the Sea of Japan in what appeared to be a carefully calculated maneuver. In retrospect, the planes were scrambled at a time that allowed minimum flight time over water for intercept of a plane that was flying on a previously known

reconnaissance track. During the next several minutes, [XXX] had to take decisive action. There was no time to coordinate information with the other sites. The Korean fighters were moving rapidly across the Sea of Japan. The/initial reflections of the MiG-21s were picked up at 0435Z at [XXXX] supervisor decided to wait for a second plotting to determine the validity of the tracking before taking any action. Within two minutes, he determined that the fighters were reflected within 51 to 55 nm of the EC-121 which itself was reflected as heading away from the fighters on an easterly turn across the Sea of Japan.

At 0438Z, the [XXX] supervisor at [XXXX]. The [XXX] system was standard equipment in aircraft of the Air Force ACRP fleet. In the Air Force planes, advisory warnings were automatically receipted for in the form of a data burst transmission that set off a light on the ground console. In the Navy plane [XXX] a series of numbers which was done in a remarkably fast manner, but was still slower than in the automatic [XXX] system. [XXXXXXXX]

Within the next 10 minutes [XXXXXXXX] at 0440Z, just two minutes after the [XXX] followed at 0448Z [XXXXXXXX] due to the possibility that there was an additional fighter reaction. [XXX]

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] By that time the MiG-21 had reached the EC-121.[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] One of the jets from Hoemun Air Field performed a defensive patrol over the Sea of Japan, with a position 65 nm west of the EC-121 at the closest approach. The other jet continued on an eastward track and [XXX] noted the merging of its track and that of the EC-121 at 0444Z. The time of the shootdown was probably 0447Z, approximately 80 miles west of the North Korean coast (41-12N, 131-4 8E). The [XXXX] noted the separation of the tracks at 0449 Z, and by 0451Z [XXXX] ceased to reflect the EC-121. However, [X] continued to reflect the fighters until 0507Z as they headed west over the Sea of Japan back toward Hoemun.

In addition to passing [XX] information to the aircraft [XXX] also [XXX] from the time of the [XXXX] with the Fifth AF ADVON Osan, [XXXXX] Warning Center, Osan via OPSCOMM. This was to permit operational actions to be taken by the commanders concerned. [XXXXXX] by OPSCOMM to USA-58 for relay to the Fifth Air Force. At 0442Z an OPSCOMM direct service tip-off was sent to the 314th Air Division Warning Center, and several minutes later [XXXX] issued an initial SPOT report that two KORCOM fighters. [XXXXXXXX] were probably reacting to the BEGGAR SHADOW mission. [XXXX] directed this SPOT report to 43 addressees (Hotel Six/Foxtrot was the distribution designator) but not VQ-1 or USN-39, the commands directly responsible for operation and Comint manning of the aircraft. This

oversight would later be cited in Congressional hearings as an example of the Command Control breakdown that existed during the shutdown. Although the specific cause for this lapse was never revealed, it certainly represented a lack of communication between the Navy units directly responsible for the plane (VQ-1, USN-39) and the USAFSS field site responsible for Sigint information [XXXXXX] At 0451Z, [XXX] sent a follow-up to the direct service tip-off to the 314th Air Division citing the merged positions of the EC-121 and a fighter aircraft at 0447Z, the probable shutdown time.

When Brigadier General Arthur W. Holdeme, commander of the 314th Air Division at Osan, became aware of the tip-off [XXX] of tighter reaction to the flight at 0445Z, he immediately ordered the launch of two F-102s to be placed on a CAP (Combat Air Patrol) orbit 140 nm off the South Korean coastal city of Kangnung, around 100 nm south of the incident area. This was in the vicinity of the planned flight path of the EC-121 as it headed on its final leg to Osan. The F-102s were to proceed to this area to search for the EC-121 and to rescue it from harassment or attack if it was still in flight.

Unfortunately, the launch time of 0504Z occurred about 17 minutes after the 0447Z assumed shutdown time of the EC-121. The Fifth Air Force Headquarters in Japan was still unaware of the seriousness of the situation. It asked [XXX] to query [XXXX] why the commander of 314th Air Division (General Holderness) scrambled two fighters in Combat Air Patrol.

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

While the F-102s looked for the reconnaissance mission off the South Korean coast, the U.S. Sigint field sites spent a hectic hour trying to determine the fate of the EC-121. At 0500Z, USN-39 made its usual hourly communications check with the aircraft. This time there was no response. From 0505Z to 0612Z, USN-39 made nine more unsuccessful attempts to contact the plane. Despite the lack of a response, there was no unusual concern as USN-39 personnel were not aware of the warnings and reports initiated by [XXX] due to being left off the distribution. The failure of the plane to respond was not considered unusual due to the distance involved and the fact that communications between aircraft and Kamiseya were often mediocre at best. At VQ-1, Atsugi, an Air Plot Duty Officer had copied the [XXX] warning messages sent from the station at Fuchu. Aware that the possibility of a problem existed. VQ-1 made a number of calls to Fuchu over the next half-hour for any communications from the mission aircraft and requested that all sources be checked for a possible abort message. At 0558Z, VQ-1 sent a FLASH message to [XXX] USA-58 requesting any information on reflections of the flight.

After issuing its initial SPOT report at 0445Z, [XXX] spent the next hour in an intensified effort to locate the mission aircraft. This included replotting of tracking information [XXX] and extensive coordination with other sites (Fifth ADVON, 314th Air Division). USA-58 [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] requested USA-58, Hakata, at 0500Z to check with [XXXX] and the Fifth Air Force to see if they had anything on the aircraft, stating “Mate, has anyone had any tracking on that BEGGAR SHADOW since 0447Z?” By 05, 15ZI I had confirmed that tracking of the fighters had ceased about 0504Z. Captain [XXXX] the commanding officer of [XXX] then queried the Special Security, Officer of the nearby 314th Air Division to see if it had any communications with the plane and whether the plane was still to land at Osan. The 314th Air Division advised that it was probable that the plane had received the warnings [XXXXX] taken evasive action on its eastward turn and could have “hit the deck” (dropped below radar cover). As the plane returned south, however, it should have been reflected by friendly radar and communications reestablished. At 0520Z, [XXXX] issued a second follow-up to its SPOT report, advising that there had been no further reflections of the BEGGAR SHADOW mission since 0447Z. Again, the Hotel Six/Foxtrot address eliminated receipt of this information by [XXXX] or VQ-1.

[XXX]

While still trying to determine the mearilng, [XXX] decided to go ahead with the issuance of a CRITIC. During the contact with [XXXX] regarding the [XXX] had been advised that it was probably best to issue a CRITIC. All was not well. In addition, in replotting, [XXXX] confirmed that the Korean fighter tracks did indeed merge with that of the EC-121. At 0544Z, [XXXX] issued a CRITIC to DIRNSA stating that [XXXX] reflected the possible shootdown of the BEGGAR SHADOW over the Sea of Japan at approximately 0447Z. The original CRITIC was addressed only to NSA. It overrode all other material in the Critical Intelligence Communications Network (CRITICOMM). Immediately upon its arrival at NSA, it was retransmitted to the White House and to a number of other high-level Washington addressees. In addition, after the originator issued the CRITIC, the same text was addressed in a Lateral CRITIC to a special worldwide distribution.

This Lateral CRITIC was addressed to a Hotel Six/Zulu distribution. USN-39, Kamiseya, was included as an addressee in this distribution and received the CRITIC via OPSCOMM at 0558Z. This was the first indication USN-39 had of a possible shootdown. Kamiseya quickly passed the item to VQ-1 which had just minutes before sent out its FLASH message requesting information on reflections of the mission. Fifty-seven minutes elapsed between the shootdown (0447Z) and the CRITIC issuance

(0544Z). (This time gap became a controversial point in the days ahead. NSA played a major role in coming to the defense of the intelligence community, specifically in defending the actions of [XXXX].)

As the expected arrival time of the EC- 121 at Osan (0630Z) came, and passed, U.S. officials became convinced that the plane was lost. Within the hour, reports of a radio broadcast from Pyongyang further substantiated these fears. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) reported that at 06SSZ a North Korean language broadcast from the Pyongyang Domestic Service announced, the shootdown of a U.S. reconnaissance plane at 0450Z when it “intruded” into Korean airspace. Shortly after, at 0800Z, the FBIS monitored a North Korean Central News Agency report in English. The shootdown was further described as a “brilliant achievement” by the North Korean Air Force in downing “with one stroke at a high altitude” a reconnaissance plane of the “U.S. imperialist aggressor troops.” Any retaliation, it was further announced, would be met with “hundredfold revenge.”

When protesting the attack, President Richard Nixon complained that the aircraft had been operating in international airspace and disclosed that the North Koreans had known this because it had been possible to monitor the data on their radar displays.

President Nixon was infuriated by the loss of the EC-121, having been critical of his predecessor’s failure to respond with force when the North Koreans had seized the *Pueblo* in January 1968. Only two bodies were recovered from the sea by the USS *Tucker*, although the Soviet destroyer, the *Vdokhnovenie*, found some debris.

The NSA’s 1989 classified study of the shootdown did not apportion blame for the loss, but the overall failure was manifest and described the risk assessment process:

In addition to its minimal tasking role, NSA did not participate in the risk assessment process (to establish the likelihood of enemy hostile actions) on these Navy flights. During the 20-year period dating back to 1950, U.S. reconnaissance aircraft were subject to enemy attacks on over 40 occasions. Most of these incidents, in which the United States lost 16 aircraft, were attributed to the Soviet Union. On occasion, however, the North Koreans attacked United States reconnaissance vehicles. One incident occurred just after the armistice concluding the Korean conflict. North Korean antiaircraft fire in August 1953 shot down a USAF T-6 intelligence mission over the DMZ. Six years later, the North Koreans attacked a U.S. Navy reconnaissance flight. The Martin P4M-1Q Mercator, originally designed as a long-range bomber, had been modified in the late 1950s to take on a new role in electronic reconnaissance. A number of these served the VQ-1 and VQ-2 squadrons. On July 16, 1959, two North Korean MiGs shot at an Elint Mercator flight.

The incident occurred at 7,000 feet over international waters, nearly 40 miles off the Korean coast. The Mercator managed to escape by diving to sea level and badly damaged, with a wounded tailgunner, limped back to a forced landing on a Japanese airfield. On April 27, 1965, North Korean MiG-17s from So'ndo'k attacked and badly damaged another Elint mission, an Air Force RB-47, over the Sea of Japan, 80 miles off the coast.

The seizure of the USS *Pueblo* on January 23, 1968, brought to a climax this series of occasional attacks on elements of U.S. intelligence forces. Originally a U.S. Army supply ship in the Pacific from 1944–54, the *Pueblo* was reactivated and turned over to the Navy in 1966. It was converted to an Auxiliary General Environmental Research (AGER) vessel as a result of an urgent request by the secretary of the navy, Paul H Nitze also asked for two more trawler vessels to augment the tactical surveillance and intelligence collection capability [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

While the USS *Pueblo*, under Lieutenant Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, was undergoing its final mission preparations in December 1967, the National Security Agency issued a warning about North Korean dangers. In a message dated December 29, 1967, to the [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] Sent to aid in the JCS-CINCPAC risk assessment process, the message cited the downing of the USAF RB-47 in April 1965 as an example of this North Korean sensitivity. The item further cited recent reactions by the North Korean Navy to South Korean Navy vessels and even fishing vessels near the North Korean coastline. These included the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel on January 19, 1967, by coastal artillery.

The NSA message sent during the height of the holiday season was virtually ignored. It was routed as routine information to CINCPAC and not seen by Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp until after the capture of the *Pueblo*. The seizure of the ship by a subchaser and torpedo boats of the North Korean Navy occurred 12 days after the *Pueblo* had departed from Sasebo harbor on its first (and only) intelligence mission.

The *Pueblo* seizure was certainly a major reason for increased U.S. intelligence efforts against North Korea. The incident was still under investigation by a Congressional subcommittee as Lieutenant Commander James H. Overstreet met with other members of an EC- 121 crew for a preflight briefing. The routine briefing did contain a warning. Overstreet discussed three messages in the briefing including one from the commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, General Charles H. Bonesteel III, to CINCPAC (Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.) on April 11, 1969. 46 This message warned of unusually vehement and vicious language used by the North Koreans in recent Military Armistice Commission meetings held at Panmunjom. Although this communication was especially directed to crews of [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

the VQ-1 squadron was told to be alert and be prepared to abort at the first indication of any serious reactions by the North Koreans. Despite these warnings, neither the Seventh Fleet nor CINCPAC made an attempt to change the [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] which[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]/ In fact, this flight track was reviewed by Seventh Fleet on April 14 with no basis seen or an [XXXXXXXXXXXXX] As a precaution, however, the flight was to approach no closer than 50 miles to the Korean coast.

While Commander Overstreet and other members of the EC-121 crew prepared for their mission, they were unaware of the unusual activity at an airfield on North Korea's east coast. Hoemun was the home base of the North Korean Air Force (NKAf) School's Jet Training Element. While this element was normally equipped only with MIG-15/17 aircraft, two NKAf First Fighter Division MiG-21 (*Fishbed-F*) aircraft flew to Hoemun on March 28 from Pukch'ang-ni Airfield, The Joint Sobe Processing Center, located at Torii Station, Okinawa, sent a message on March 30, 1969 to all Far East military commands and Sigint sites which indicated that this first reflection of *Fishbed-F* type aircraft at Hoemun was probably related to pilot training since a MiG-21 Transition Training Unit was located at another east coast location, Pukch'ang-ni. There was no known NKAf tactical unit located at Hoemun. On the morning of April 15, the two MiG-21s remained at Hoemun. Such was the initial warning of the coming crisis.

BELENKO, VIKTOR. While on a routine training mission from his base at Chuguyevka in September 1976, 29-year-old Lieutenant Viktor Belenko flew his MiG-25 to Hakodate's civilian airport in Japan and applied for political asylum in the United States. Trapped in an unhappy marriage, the deputy squadron commander left behind his wife and child. The high-altitude interceptor, designated Foxbat by **NATO**, first seen in flight in 1967 at the Domodedovo airshow, was dismantled and returned 67 days later to the Soviet Union; the avionics having been examined by American experts in a hangar at Hyakuri. The event was of considerable counterintelligence significance because **Adolf Tolkachev** was the Phastron engineer commissioned to redesign the compromised *Foxfire* radar and *Strela-3* electronic countermeasures. Codenamed VANQUISH, Tolkachev was run by the **Central Intelligence Agency** station in Moscow until his arrest in June 1985.

BERLIN TUNNEL. Dug by the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) from the American zone of occupation 500 yards to a cable conduit in the Soviet sector, the Berlin Tunnel was a technical operation designed to tap into Soviet communications. Codenamed GOLD, the tunnel provided intelligence for a year until it was closed by East German troops in April 1956 but had been

betrayed in the planning stage by George Blake but the KGB had allowed the operation to proceed in an effort to protect its mole.

In August 1967, the CIA wrote a summary of the entire operation and provided a (partially redacted) assessment of its value. [See Appendix 3]

While disappointed at the tunnel's loss, the CIA understandably relished the broad public reaction to the operation, which was supportive of what was perceived to be an inspirational and imaginative initiative. The redactions in the CIA's declassified report mainly concerned the British participation which included the employment of GPO telephone engineers from the Post Office Research Station at Dollis Hill, to complete the tap chamber, and the location in England of the mock-up constructed in similar sandy soil at a Royal Engineers base. The report also concealed the buildings' cover role of a radar station and omitted the estimated \$25million cost of what was code-named PRINCE by the Secret Intelligence Service, and known to the CIA as "Harvey's Hole."

BERLIN WALL. The construction of the Berlin Wall early in the morning of Sunday, August 13, 1961, was a well-planned *coup-de-main* undertaken by the East Germans with Soviet support in one of the great milestones of the Cold War. At the time, Berlin was the Cold War's frontline, and the *agent-sumpf* (spy-swamp) was a testing environment in which the various competing Allied intelligence agencies concentrated on the KGB *rezidentura* in the old St Antonius hospital compound at Karlshorst and gave such legendary **CIA** case officers as Al Ulmer, Peter Sichel, Tom Polgar, and George Kisevalter the opportunity to ply their trade.

The local CIA base, headed by Bill Graver, gave no warning of the sudden imposition of a ban on travel to the western sectors, and his superior in Washington, D.C., David Murphy, as Chief of the Clandestine Service's Eastern Europe Division, was also taken entirely by surprise. Murphy had been promoted to headquarters after a long period at the Berlin Operations Base, known as BOB, and had been replaced by Graver who had served at the BOB office on the Clayalee between 1954 and 1958, running agents in the Soviet zone. At the moment, news arrived of the Berlin crisis, Murphy had been on vacation at his home in San Francisco.

Graver and his deputy, John Dimmer, had issued contingency communications for about 25 of their sources in the Soviet zone, so they were not isolated and able to send their messages by a clandestine transmitter or via pre-arranged dead-drops which could be serviced by visitors from the west. Over the next year, the BOB case officers conducted more than 50 support missions to re-establish contact with another 30 agents, and this emergency

program of engagement resulted in 262 field reports. Nevertheless, the CIA had failed to give advance notice of the event and helped make **NATO** appear relatively impotent, despite a newly developed plan codenamed LIVE OAK which had been drafted with just such a coup in mind.

The East German strategy had been to restrict knowledge of the operation, codenamed ROSE, to very few trusted individuals, perhaps less than 20, until a few hours before the initiation of what was widely believed to be a mere exercise, which had explained the distribution of fencing and barbed wire to the military. As for the KGB *rezidentura* at Karlshorst, it too was in the dark. The *rezident*, Aleksandr Korotkov, had been on leave in Moscow, and had spent Saturday August 12 at Ivan Serov's country dacha. In the middle of a game of tennis he had been called to the telephone to be informed that his protégé Bogdan Stashinsky had defected to the west. Shocked by the news, Korotkov had promptly dropped dead from a heart attack. His replacement as *rezident* was General Aleksei Krokhin, then deputy chief of the First Chief Directorate who previously had served as *rezident* in Paris (and would later do so again).

When the western powers hesitated to intervene, the East German leadership was emboldened, and took the opportunity to strengthen the wire barriers and start construction on a permanent wall. The CIA's Office of Current Intelligence, caught off-guard, reported the new "travel restrictions" to President John F. Kennedy at his vacation home in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, on August 13/14:

FROM: CIA/OCI

TO: WHITE HOUSE HYANNIS

FOLLOWING IS PRELIMINARY CIA/OCI ANALYSIS OF EAST GERMAN RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL TO WEST BERLIN.

ON 13 AUGUST THE EAST GERMAN REGIME ANNOUNCED AND PUT INTO EFFECT A SERIES OF DECREES INTRODUCING SEVERE NEW CONTROL MEASURES DESIGNED TO STOP IMMEDIATELY THE FLOW OF REFUGEES TO WEST BERLIN AND WEST GERMANY. THESE STEPS WERE ANNOUNCED BY THE EAST GERMANS AS HAVING BEEN TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO A PROPOSAL BY THE WARSAW PACT NATIONS, PUBLISHED ON 13 AUGUST, WHICH IN EFFECT CALLED UPON THE EAST GERMAN REGIME TO INTRODUCE EFFECTIVE CONTROLS AROUND WEST BERLIN; IT IS HIGHLY UNUSUAL FOR THE WARSAW PACT TO DEVOTE ITS ATTENTION TO THE SPECIFIC DOMESTIC PROBLEMS OF A MEMBER NATION.

ACCORDING TO THE NEW DECREES SPECIAL POLICE PERMITS, OBTAINABLE FROM LOCAL POLICE OFFICES, WILL BE REQUIRED FOR ALL EAST GERMANS AND EAST BERLINERS WHO WANT TO GO TO WEST BERLIN AND THESE PERMITS WILL HAVE TO BE PRESENTED AT ONE OF 13 SPECIFIED SECTOR CROSSING POINTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BERLIN. APPROXIMATELY 90 PERCENT OF THE EAST GERMAN REFUGEES IN RECENT WEEKS HAVE CROSSED INTO WEST BERLIN OVER THE SECTOR BORDER. IT WAS ALSO DECREED THAT ALL EAST BERLINERS AND EAST GERMANS WORKING IN WEST BERLIN COULD NO LONGER CONTINUE TO WORK THERE.

THE DECREES ARE VERY SPECIFIC IN MAKING CLEAR THAT THERE ARE NO CHANGES IN THE EXISTING REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE TRANSIT RIGHTS OF THE THREE WESTERN POWERS BETWEEN WEST GERMANY AND EAST BERLIN, OF WEST GERMANS TRAVELLING BETWEEN WEST GERMANY AND WEST BERLIN, AND OF WEST GERMANS AND WEST BERLINERS TRAVELLING TO EAST BERLIN AND EAST GERMANY.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE NEW DECREES IS BOUND TO INCREASE THE ALREADY HIGH POPULAR TENSIONS IN EAST GERMANY WHICH ARE REFLECTED IN THE ABNORMALLY LARGE REFUGEE FIGURES FOR 11 AUGUST OF OVER 2,300 AND FOR 12 AUGUST OF OVER 2,400. IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, THE NEW CONTROLS ARE RIGOROUSLY ENFORCED, THE LIKELIHOOD IS SHARPLY INCREASED OF SPONTANEOUS OUTBREAKS IN EAST BERLIN AND EAST GERMANY OF LOCAL DISTURBANCES SUCH AS STRIKES, RIOTS AND ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITIES.

At this early stage, there was little appreciation that the East Germans intended rather more than "travel restrictions" and that a wall would be built which would survive for the next 28 years. There was, however, an apparent lack of political will to intervene and a tacit understanding that the Soviets could not be expected to tolerate the growing refugee exodus.

By Tuesday August 15, when the CIA circulated a situation report, it was becoming clear that the East Germans were intending rather more than impose mere travel restrictions, and the suggestion of unrest in the Soviet zone had been dropped:

BERLIN SITUATION REPORT (as of 1630 hours)

1. The East German regime introduced new measures on August 15 designed to give it better control over the entry of West Berliners and

West Germans into East Berlin. Press reports earlier today gave conflicting accounts on the new steps that have been taken. According to East German announcements, West Berliners will now be required to secure permits for their vehicles before entering East Berlin; West Germans can now secure permits for entry into East Berlin at only two sector crossing points (four were specified in the August 13 decrees).

The August 15 measures only specify West Berliners and West Germans in contrast to the August 13 decrees which also specified that they did not apply to the three Western Allies. 1 Today's decrees violate, as do the August 13 decrees, the freedom of movement provisions guaranteed in the postwar Four Power agreements relating to Berlin.

The East German government warned on August 15 that agreements regulating traffic between West Germany and West Berlin might be affected if the West German government broke off the Interzonal Trade Agreement. This threatening statement probably was made in response to West German Chancellor Adenauer's statement that Bonn was considering abrogating the 1961 Interzonal Trade Agreement if there is no solution for the Berlin situation. This latest East German threat would not affect Allied military travel between West Germany and West Berlin.

According to the latest information available from U.S. officials in Berlin, telephone service between West Germany and East Germany, West Berlin and East Germany, West Berlin and East Berlin, and West Berlin via a third country to East Germany is not possible. Telegram and postal service, however, between these areas is normal.

[XX]

On September 22, a month after the wall had been erected, Oleg Penkovsky reported while on a visit to Paris that he had learned of the plan to build it, but had not the means to alert his contacts in Moscow. He had been in London between July 18 and August 7, 1961, and in his debriefings with SIS and the CIA had supplied "prize material on Soviet thinking and preparations for Berlin" which he had brought with him, having gained access to Supreme Military Council's thinking on Berlin through his father-in-law, Marshal Sergei Varentsov, whose 60th birthday party he had just attended. Nikita Khrushchev himself had chaired the Council, and Penkovsky detailed the deployment, plans, and preparedness of Soviet and East German troops in relation to Berlin but had not known at that time, of any intention to build of a wall across the city.

Quite apart from the obvious intelligence failure of the NATO Allies to fully grasp what the Eastern bloc had really intended on August 13, the relevant intelligence agencies had been taken so completely by surprise. On

explanation for the confidence manifested by the East Germans may be the information supplied to the KGB by an American spy in Berlin who had access to most of the routine intelligence circulars and copied them for his Soviet handlers. Robert G. Thomson was then an airman based at Tempelhof working for the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations who had been engaged in espionage since he had volunteered to spy in 1953. He came under FBI surveillance in 1963 after he was spotted at a rendezvous with his Soviet contact and was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment at his trial in 1965.

In February 1962, the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, chaired by James Killian, completed a review of the CIA's perceived failure to predict the wall's construction, combining it with consideration of the military coup in Syria which had followed in September 1961, another unexpected event:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your request, made when this Board last met with you, a study, has been made with a view to determining: (a) advance information was available to the U.S. Government from the intelligence community concerning the "Berlin Wall" action of August 13; and the Syrian coup which occurred on September 28, 1961; and (b) what lessons might be learned from such study.

As a basis for our review, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of State and Defense (including the Military Intelligence Services and the National Security Agency) were asked to identify and submit any intelligence reports and related materials which constituted advance information regarding the Berlin and Syrian incidents.

Review has been made of: [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

Reports [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] of the subjects under review by the Board; and (c) pertinent National Intelligence Estimates and other specialized intelligence publications produced within the intelligence community for dissemination at highest government levels in support of the policy and decision-making process. (Substantiating information which was developed in the course of our review is being retained in the offices of the Board for such further reference as may be required.)

Our consideration of all of the intelligence documentation, which was made available for the Board's review, leads us to the following major conclusions:

1. The Berlin and Syrian incidents demonstrate that the estimative processes of the intelligence community are not fully geared to the timely production of current appraisals of developing Cold War crisis situations

which are required for consideration by the president and his principal policy advisers.

2. In both the Berlin and Syrian cases, indications of imminent significant developments were apparently lost sight of in the mass of intelligence reports which were produced over an extended period of time.
3. The surprise created by the Berlin and Syrian incidents might well have been reduced had the significant advance intelligence which was available to the intelligence community been given sensitive, continuing, and discriminating assessment for timely consideration by the president, the members of the National Security Council, and other top policy officials. In reaching this conclusion, we note that:
4. Although our foreign intelligence agencies produced no
5. reports which pinpointed in advance the specific date or particulars of the "Berlin Wall" action, during the period; preceding that event our intelligence collectors did obtain information which pointed to the possible imminence of drastic action by the East German regime to shut off the flow of refugees into West Berlin; and
6. While our foreign intelligence agencies did not report advance information as to the date and particulars of the Syrian coup, the intelligence which was available did point to the likely imminence of a military revolt, [XXXXXXXXXXXXX]

In both the Berlin and Syrian events, more importance should be attached to the failure of the intelligence community and the Department of State to provide adequate and timely appraisals of the advance information which had been collected, than to their inability to estimate the exact nature of the events which were to occur. Had such appraisals been prepared and appropriately channeled to our major policymaking officials, there would have been little justification for the United States to have been surprised so completely by the East German planners and the Syrian plotters, even though no one could have been expected to predict the precise form which those events would take.

The two case histories which we have studied illustrate the importance of having in the estimative and appraisal process the most alert, perceptive and qualified men obtainable. No machinery or multiplication of personnel can serve as a substitute for the sensitive judgments which are required in the analysis of intelligence information and the preparation of assessments thereof for consideration by our top policy officials.

We have noted several explanations which have been offered to justify the absence of advance intelligence on the precise timing and circumstances of the two incidents. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

The Board realizes that questions of judgment, interpretation and relative priorities always confront the professional intelligence officer in the field and at the headquarters level, in the process of collecting, reporting, appraising, and disseminating intelligence concerning a developing political situation in a foreign country. There were undoubtedly a number of factors which inhibited the acquisition of advance information or the formulation of forecasts on the exact timing and the specific character of the incidents which were about to occur in Berlin and Syria.

Nevertheless, [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] indications of the imminence of the Berlin and Syrian incidents appear to have been available at the Washington headquarters of the CIA and other member agencies of the intelligence community. Had our review reflected that these indications were considered by our intelligence analysts and rejected for cause, this might present a question as to whether, from the vantage point of hindsight, the analysts were correct in their interpretations. We raise no such question, however, for it appears from our review that the fault was not so much an error of interpretation as a failure to pull together all of the pertinent information which was available as the basis for a meaningful appraisal. Otherwise, [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] the best indicator was Ulbricht himself who declared in a major address on August 10 (three days, before the “Wall” action), that “We have discussed the (refugee) matter with our Soviet friends and with representatives of the Warsaw Pact states, and we have agreed that the time has come when one must say ‘so far and no farther.’”

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

Rather than attempting to achieve unanimity in intelligence appraisals, as was done in this instance, it would appear that differing views which are held by members of the intelligence community regarding matters of substance should be reflected in the “Watch Report” and other intelligence assessments. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX]

Recommendations

To the end that the president may be afforded the earliest opportunities for the advance consideration of counter-action to be taken in response to developing Cold War crisis situations, we recommend that

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

1. A sense of urgency be imparted at the field and headquarters levels of our intelligence agencies, with a view to ensuring the timely reporting, dissemination, and assessment of foreign intelligence indicating the imminence of crisis situations which are of potential significance to the

foreign policy and national security interests of the United States. [XXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

2. Without imposing delay upon the transmittal of raw intelligence to Washington, competent State Department officials in the foreign countries involved to exercise responsibility for preparing periodic appraisals of all available intelligence concerning developing crisis situations, for use at the field collection level and for consideration by the Washington intelligence community in the “timely production of analyses and estimates.”
3. Procedures of the USIB and its subordinate bodies, such as the Watch Committee, be modified to insure that the appraisals of such bodies will reflect any significant differences of view which may be developed in the course of the estimative process.
4. In keeping with our earlier recommendations that the DCI serve as the president’s principal intelligence officer with responsibility for assuring the timely flow of intelligence to the White House, the DCI be requested to review, in consultation with appropriate White House officials, existing arrangements and procedures to assure that: (a) the CIA’s intelligence assessments and spot reports on developing crisis situations are made available for timely consideration by the president and, where appropriate, by members of the National Security Council; and (b) copies of assessments and spot reports which are made available for such consideration from any other source be furnished to the DCI for his information and for introduction into the intelligence estimating process.

BINET, GUY. Born in April 1934, Colonel Guy Binet was a Belgian Air Force officer attached since April 1987 to NATO’s equipment procurement branch in Evere when he was arrested in September 1988 and charged with espionage. He confessed to having sold details of the F-16 fighter’s electronic countermeasures and other material to the GRU. Binet had been about to fly to the Farnborough Air Show in England when he was detained at his home in Braine d’Alleud by Belgian Sécurité d’Etat officers who found a transmitter and other incriminating espionage paraphernalia hidden in the house.

Binet, who was married with two children, had joined the Air Force in 1960 and had been promoted to the rank of colonel in 1985. In his confession, he admitted having passed classified data to his Soviet contacts through dead-drops in the local area and during visits to Vienna.

BOONE, DAVID S. A retired National Security Agency (NSA) analyst, 46-year-old U.S. Army Sergeant David Boone was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at a Virginia motel in October 1998 and

charged with having sold secrets to the Soviets between 1988 and 1991 for \$60,000. He had been lured back to the United States from his home in Germany in a sting operation in which he had been invited by the FBI's **Dmitri Droujinsky**, to resume his espionage which had begun after he had walked into the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C., in October 1988 and sold a classified document for \$300. Thereafter he had been posted to Augsburg for a third tour of duty and had met a Soviet intelligence officer, known to him simply as "Igor," four times a year to sell top secret documents and reports. However, he had been betrayed by a KGB officer, Aleksandr Zaphorovsky, who had been posted to the *rezidentura* in Addis Ababa and had made an approach to the local **Central Intelligence Agency** station.

Boone had spent most of his 21-year army career as a cryptologic traffic analyst and had been based at the NSA's headquarters at Fort Meade. Short of money after he had separated from his wife and two children, he had become burdened by debt. He had remarried, and found a job working for a computer company in southern Germany, but in September 1998 had met an undercover FBI special agent at a hotel in London who had invited him to start spying again, gave him \$9,000 and suggested a further meeting the next month in Virginia. Boone was sentenced to 24 years' imprisonment.

BOURBON. The mainstay of western **signals intelligence** derived from the Soviet Union in the early days of the Cold War, BOURBON was originally codenamed RATTAN by the U.S. Navy which had been in the forefront of tackling "the Russian problem."

American cryptographic operations had been handicapped for years by an Army/Navy rivalry, and Op:20:G of the Office of Naval Intelligence competed with the Signal Security Agency which became the Army Security Agency (ASA) in 1945 but remained uncoordinated until there was amalgamation in 1949. In the meantime, the Op:20:G section acted independently and opened intercept facilities dedicated to Soviet collection at Port Lyautey and Wahiawa, with Guam added later, and began training Russian linguists at Boulder, Colorado.

In February 1946, the head of Op:20:G, Captain Joseph N. Wenger, summarized the Navy's progress:

The Navy began its attack on BOURBON traffic in August 1943. During demobilization, the BOURBON section dwindled somewhat, but an early policy caused only persons who could be relied upon to stay with it for an appreciable time to be assigned to it. On February 7, 1946, 32 intercept positions covered RU naval circuits and at the Army's request, five intercept positions on military circuits.

There was a full exchange of raw traffic with the Army [XXXXXX]

Out of 100 or more Soviet cryptographic systems, 50 were isolated. The navy studied [XXXXXX] The texts were of low intelligence value but considerable of long-range value. ./

The Navy concentrated on naval, police, and weather traffic and helped Army with diplomatic. Certain low-level naval and police systems were brought to a point which enabled [XXXXXXX]

The value of the resulting intelligence was necessarily problematic.

Meanwhile, and quite independently, British cryptanalysts based at Bletchley Park and its outstation at Eastcote in west London, had been addressing the Russian challenge ever since the German surrender. The skills developed over the past five years in working against various Axis communications systems were to be applied, almost seamlessly, against the Red Army. While, superficially, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) had little to offer in any partnership with the ASA, the reality was that the organization possessed that most valuable of commodities, practical experience, and that other limited asset, real estate. The war may have ended, but GCHQ still ran secure ground stations in virtually every colony across the world, whereas the ASA's facilities were limited to a wartime legacy in the Pacific. The British chain of intercept sites from Ascension to Hong Kong, from Darwin to Vancouver was enhanced by the Admiralty's naval bases and the RAF's airfields. Furthermore, GCHQ could rely on its regional centers in Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Ceylon, India, and Singapore. Additionally, the British government-owned Cable & Wireless, the world's most important international cable business. For all of the ASA's massive processing power, harnessing IBM calculating apparatus and automated card-sorters, their machinery was hungry for the raw material.

When in June 1945 the British were first consulted by their American colleagues, they acknowledged the existence of a compartmented 50-strong group at Bletchley Park codenamed TAPER which was devoted to a project, BLUE, concentrating on about 30 Soviet systems which had accumulated 20,000 call signs. The origins of BLUE lay in the vast *Balkanabteilung* archive which had been rescued from Bergsheidingen and delivered to GCHQ by the Target Identification Committee (TICOM), an Anglo-American joint enterprise. TICOM consisted of several teams of adventurous cryptanalysts who were tasked with seizing German crypto-equipment before it was destroyed by the Nazis or captured by the Red Army. When examined, the TICOM material reveals the fruit of the enemy's very impressive research into Soviet wireless traffic.

At the end of August 1945, as BLUE had been inspected by their American counterparts, Arlington Hall declared the scale of its focus on the Soviet target:

1. Navy: 192 (61 officers, 131 enlisted);
2. Army: 99 (5 officers, 94 civilians); and
3. Systems: 35, of which:
 4. 6 were diplomatic, 2 in process of solution; and
 5. 29 were “non-diplomatic” of which 4 were being read (2 enciphered codes and 2 substitution systems);
 - a) Intercepts: 12,500 messages, of which 6,000 were diplomatic; and
 - b) Collateral: 10,000 separate items, “on 60,000 cards.”

The task of reading some of this data was made easier by the Soviet use of their version of the Swedish Hagelin B-311 cipher machine, known to them as the K-37, which was very familiar to American cryptanalysts, and one of the devices had been acquired by TICOM.

Even before the end of hostilities, GCHQ had taken steps to create a 60-strong compartmented unit led by Arthur Bonsall devoted to Soviet traffic which would be deliberately isolated from Bletchley Park and accommodated in Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) premises in Ryder Street, conveniently close to SIS’s headquarters across St James’s Park in Broadway. Almost simultaneously, GCHQ’s Diplomatic Section in Berkeley Street had been closed down, and another sensitive branch, dealing with Palestine, moved to Aldford House in Park Lane. Naturally, GCHQ and SIS were reticent about their current activities, and the secrecy caused the NSA historian to comment that “The British did not seem to be hiding this operation from the Americans, but they were slow to show. December 1946 had rolled around before an American cryptologic official finally had his arms around this unusual British effort.” At that time the SUSLO recorded:

Since the [XXX] project brushed up against the activities at Ryder Street, which have hitherto been somewhat of a mystery to us all, I found that I had a ready-made opportunity to ask questions. Jones explained to me both the old and the new work at Ryder Street, by which I mean that he is now in process of bringing the Ryder Street activity into the London Signals Intelligence centre family. The unit at Ryder Street was first established as a sort of off-the-record group working on certain aspects of BOURBON [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]. It flourished in a clandestine way under the aegis [XXXXXXXXXXXXX]. The raw material upon which they worked was mostly non-Morse BOURBON traffic. . . . I have Jones’s absolute assurance that as of today nothing produced in Ryder Street will be concealed from [us].

On August 18, 1945, GCHQ issued its first BOURBON circular, entitled *Russian Exports from the Occupied Territories* and included original text with a summary of the activities between May and July of the Red Army's 3rd and 4th Transport Brigades based in Poland:

Brigade and its units have received orders to demobilize the older age groups during the period from 5/7 to 20/8/45. The necessary preparations for demobilization are being made by the units of the Brigade. There are due for demobilization: in the 39th Regiment-182 men; in the 23rd Regiment-37 men. As a result of this, the 39th Regiment will be short 105 drivers and the 23rd Regiment, 37. I request your instructions.

This sort of intelligence summary was typical of the material that had been distributed during the war and earned Bletchley Park its richly deserved reputation. Later reports covered the Soviet Naval Air Force's organization and activity in the Baltic; the Red Air Forces' operations in the Kiev Military District; details of the Soviet 4th and 5th Air Armies; and agricultural harvesting operations by the Red Army in the autumn of 1945. In February, there were more on the Red Army's participation in the 1945 agricultural harvesting campaign; and evidence of the existence of a Soviet NKVD Air Force. During 1947, GCHQ issued some 80 BOURBON T/A reports, and by December 1948, GCHQ had produced 185 intelligence reports during the previous 12 months. In the same year, it also distributed 349 technical reports.

In March 1946, the ASA recorded what had been accomplished thus far, stressing the value of British cooperation:

For reasons not known to personnel now at ASA, the BOURBON problem was first begun late in 1942 (employing two persons), was for some reason abandoned soon after, and was again started early in the spring of 1943. The unit grew to number 25 persons by January 1, 1944, an increase necessitated by the tremendous volume of traffic passed by the country in question. The first solution entry was gained late in 1943 in diplomatic traffic, and the exploitation of this break-in, combined with the increase in traffic, brought the number of personnel employed in the project to about 75 by V-J Day. Solution of two military systems (now obsolete) had been accomplished in the winter 1944-45, but otherwise little had been done with operational traffic before August 15, 1945. This was true also of (radio teletype) traffic, which began to come in only in the spring of 1945. After victory over Japan, when personnel became available and positions in the monitoring stations became idle, it was possible at last to study military-operational traffic and to develop the teletype activity; the availability of personnel also affected favorably the diplomatic studies, in which a large amount of hand work is essential because of the nature of the systems. Finally, collaboration with the British, becoming effective on the technical level in August 1945, gave a much-extended picture

of the BOURBON traffic of every sort, since their intercept covers an area hitherto unattained by U.S. sources.

After the defection of **Igor Gouzenko**, the project received a boost when he was debriefed by the ASA's Frank Rowlett who wrote a 21-page report, *Special Report on BOURBON Cryptography*. This access was a manifestation of the cooperation between Bletchley Park and Arlington Hall and established relationships that would be cemented in March 1947 by the BRUSA agreement on SIGINT collaboration. By that same month, ASA was offering its consumers a growing volume of SIGINT relating to a priority target list, headed by the Soviet Union and Soviet Satellites (defined as **Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary**). The burden was shared by the British, concentrating on European collection, with the U.S. component covering the rest of the world with a special focus on the Far East. Within the U.S. collection effort the labor was divided between the ASA, responsible for Soviet Ground Forces, joint service, diplomatic, and air systems, and Op-20-G handling the Soviet Navy, NKVD police, and weather systems.

Even if the actual text could not be read, traffic analysis could extract valuable information, as was demonstrated in sample taken in December 1946 of one month's study:

- a. SMERSH garrisons were found to be located at Sverdlovsk, Bryansk, Saratov, Krasnodar, and Vinnitsa;
- b. A Soviet Major General of Artillery named Pochitalin, was identified at Port Arthur;
- c. The move of the headquarters of the Soviet 39th Army from Dairen to Port Arthur was confirmed; and
- d. A Soviet Naval command afloat was tentatively identified, based on evidence that traffic was being routed to a "commander [of] Cruisers, Pacific Fleet" in the Kalinin area, where cruisers were known to be at sea.

The disciplines of traffic analysis (T/A) and direction-finding, refined during the war, were applied against the Soviet traffic to help build a verifiable order-of-battle. During 1947, BOURBON T/A was credited with:

- a. 11 Military Districts (MD) and their headquarters;
- b. 11 Armies, 3 Rifles Corps and a Brigade;
- c. 2 numbered Fleets in the Soviet Far East, and 2 River Flotillas;
- e. 9 Air Armies, 2 Bomber Air Corps (one in northern Korea), and 2 Air Divisions;

- f. 1 Long-Range Aviation headquarters in Moscow, with 1 Air Army and 2 Air Corps subordinate;
- g. 2 Fleet Air Forces, 1 Fleet Air Division and 7 Fleet Air Regiments;
- h. 4 Antiaircraft Air Defense (PVO) headquarters and 1 PVO Fighter Air Division; and
- i. 3 SMERSH units, subordinate to the MVD.

By the time the BRUSA agreement had been signed, 16 Americans had been posted to GCHQ's new headquarters at Eastcote, and nine British personnel attached to Arlington Hall and OP:20:G's base in Nebraska Avenue. In addition, Special Liaison Officers (known as SUKLO and SUSLO) were appointed to act as an administrative channel, with Patrick Marr-Johnson and Grant C. Manson fulfilling those roles, respectively, in their embassies. Until January 1948, the raw intercepts were exchanged by transatlantic liner, but the introduction of a regular courier flights. The links between ASA and GCHQ, both in terms of human contact and teleprinter circuits, became so efficient that by 1949 it was estimated that virtually all low-level Soviet traffic was covered, to the point that the movement of any Soviet aircraft in Europe was reported to Washington within five hours of the flight being scheduled. The British excelled at traffic analysis and direction-finding and had the benefit of high quality captured German intercept equipment.

The Anglo-American investment in SIGINT was gigantic and escalating, although the precise budgets were never disclosed publicly. By May 1947, the United States was running 19 intercept facilities, eight of which were overseas, providing a total of 196 terminal positions (with 104 of them dedicated to the Soviet traffic), with the British rather more at 224 (with 206 monitoring the Russians). The ASA's facilities were at Clark Air Base in the Philippines; Kaohsiung, Shu Lin Kou in Taiwan, Taichung, Taipei, Jasaka, Atsugi, Camp Zama, Beppu, Chitose, Camp Fuchinobe, Hakata, Hokkaido, Kuma Station, Kunia, Kyoto, Misawa, Monoyama, Ojimachi, Tokyo, Torri Station. Sobe; Yokosuka; Amchitka in the Aleutian Islands; Frankfurt, Germany; Asmara in Eritrea; Bellmore on Long Island; Fairbanks, Alaska; Heleman, Hawaii; Guam; Indian Creek, Florida; New Delhi, India; Two Rock Ranch at Petaluma, California; Tarzana, at Reseda, California; and Vint Hill Farms, Warrenton, Virginia. American output in 1947 reached between 25 and 50 individual T/A-based reports a month. In 1948, where there were some Anglo-American 600 analysts working on BOURBON, the ASA disseminated 734 reports, but none mentioned the then top priority issue, the Soviet atomic weapons development program.

GCHQ particularly excelled as the interception of high-frequency air-ground more channels, traffic analysis, and direction-finding, with a global

reach supplied by the Royal Navy across the Empire. A survey in January 1949 showed the numbers had increased, with 584 terminals manned for Soviet signals, averaging between 150,000 and 450,000 messages a month, but the British continued to produce about 70 percent of the raw traffic.

As well as T/A, D/F and crypt analysis, the interceptors often encountered large quantities of clear language in voice channels, and this material was added to the overall SIGINT matrix. At the height of the BOURBON program, the ASA applied considerable resources to this valuable source:

Beginning in January 1948 with a strength of [XXX] Russian linguists, ASA in the first month scanned about 67,000 plain-language messages, extracted information from over 4,000 messages, “processed” (meaning typing information onto IBM cards) about 1,000 messages, and issued one report and 16 supplements:

Those numbers rose rapidly throughout the year until in December 1948 [XXX] Russian linguists at ASA scanned over 221,000 messages in one month, extracted information from 25,400 of them, processed on IBM almost 7,000 messages, issuing 139 translations and 70 supplements to earlier reports and translations.

For the year, ASA scanned over two million Russian plain-language messages, extracted information from 380,000 messages, and IBM-processed 52,000 messages (or about 2.4 percent of the number scanned). Moreover, during 1948, ASA published 28 COMINT reports, 436 translations, and 560 supplements.

Although BOURBON would wind down in 1949, the program had achieved two major triumphs which would be of permanent value for the rest of the Cold War. First, the Allied cryptographic organizations had accumulated a comprehensive database of the entire Soviet military order-of-battle; Second, they had mapped much of the Soviet industrial monolith. The centrally planned economic model might have allowed the Kremlin to exercise total power across the military-industrial complex, but it was also burdened by a gigantic bureaucracy of ministries, directorates, and institutes, all with their own internal communications. Of interest to the interceptors were the more than 24 ministries associated with defense that appeared on the requirements list, among them were

Armaments, Automobile and Tractor Industry, Aviation Industry, Chemical Industry, Coal Industry for Western Areas and Eastern Areas, Communications Industry, Electrical Industry, Electric Power Stations, Ferrous Metallurgy, Fish Industry, Health (USSR, RSFSR, and several SSRs), Heavy Machine Building, Internal Affairs (MVD), Light Industry, Medical Industry, Metallurgical Industry, Nonferrous Metallurgy, Oil Industry

of Southern and Western Areas, Procurement, Railroad Transportation, River Fleet, Rubber Industry, Shipbuilding Industry, Trade and Transport Machine Building.

All these mighty structures, bloated with officialdom, supervised dozens of subordinate departments, depots, and factories which all communicated with each other. In the aviation industry alone ASA identified no less than 24 numbered production plants building fighters, bombers, helicopters, and airliners in 1948, not to mention the associated flight test institutes and another half-dozen sites in the aircraft parts supply chain.

At the end of his tour of duty in London in 1949 on the SUSLO's staff, Herbert Conley summarized what BOURBON had been accomplished;

By mid-1948, the basic organization of the Russian Military and Military Air Command had been determined and practically all major headquarters had been identified. In the Far East, unit identifications and dispositions were almost complete down to air regiment and army division levels, and in Europe a large number of lower level units had been identified and their strength had been computed. Continued attempts to build up intercept strength in Europe had made it possible by the summer of 1948 to begin intercept of Russian operational or low-level Military and Military Air circuits in this area. The intercept and analysis of such links has been increased during the past few months, with emphasis being accelerated as the Russians have reduced transmission of high-level traffic. Operational air links employing radiotelephone transmissions have not been intercepted regularly, but cover of Morse links is extensive.

BRANTING, GEORG. Born in September 1887, Georg Branting was the son of the Social Democrat who was prime minister three times between 1920 and 1925. Having qualified as a lawyer, Branting was elected to the Riksdag in 1932 and remained an active politician until his retirement in 1961. He was also a keen fencer and represented his country in that sport at the Olympics in 1908 and 1912.

During the Spanish Civil War, Branting publicly supported the republicans, and consequently the Scandinavian battalion of the International Brigade was named after him. In April 1954, following the defection in **Australia** of the NKVD *rezident* **Vladimir Petrov** and his wife, MI5 passed to its Swedish counterpart the allegation that when they had been posted in Stockholm during the war between 1942 and 1947, they had known of a senior asset at the top of the Social Democratic Party. According to **VENONA**, intercepts made available by the Swedish Forsvarets Radioanstalt, and decrypted by the NSA, Branting was a spy codenamed SENATOR but he died in July 1965, before he could be interviewed.

BULGARIA. Within the **Warsaw Pact** Bulgaria confronted two nuclear-armed **NATO** countries, Turkey and Greece, and took a special responsibility for researching Allied war plans in south-east Europe. The Defense Ministry's intelligence branch, RUMNO, monitored Turkish activity from the naval base at Egerli and maintained a watch on the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean which was believed to deploy three Polaris submarines from Rota. Even after the withdrawal of the 15 Jupiter MRBMs from Izmir, and 30 from the Giola del Colle airbase near Bari, the Bulgarians remained concerned about NATO's nuclear threat and the likelihood of tactical nuclear weapons stored at the Hellenikon airbase in Greece.

All three countries remained priority intelligence collection targets for RUMNO, and in January 1962, a Bulgarian MiG-17 *Fresco* flown by Lieutenant Milusc Solakov crashed during an overflight of Giola del Colle. The low-flying jet hit a tree in an olive grove 600 meters from the airfield and the injured pilot, who was hospitalized at Aquaviva, immediately applied for political asylum. When questioned, he acknowledged having been based at Bergovitsa with the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron. He spent a year in a Bari gaol, narrowly escaped espionage charges, and was repatriated through his embassy in Rome in January 1963.

Bulgarian preoccupation with the threat of a surprise NATO missile attack continued into the 1980s, as reflected by the conclusions of a meeting convened in March 1984 by the Darzhavna Sigarnost (DS) Chief General Stoyan Savov.

The aggressive foreign policy course of action, adopted by the United States and NATO at the end of the 70s, and the line of accelerated militarization and race in armaments led to the aggravation of international tension to the edge of military confrontation. This situation called for steps to improve the System for detection of indications of preparation of the enemy for war and sudden nuclear-missile attack against Bulgaria and the Warsaw Pact countries.

In 1981 a Program for work in the Ministry till 1985 was elaborated where the task on the System improvement was included and it was assigned to PGU, VGU, III Directorate DS, VI Directorate DS and Border Troops Directorate (UGV).

Until now the work on detection of indications of preparation of the enemy for war and sudden nuclear-missile attack was regulated by Ministerial Order 1-7/ January 19, 1977. It charged DS services to work on this issue and had an attached list of details but it did not regulate a number of important issues. This necessitated the issuing of a second order to confirm the main areas of work and regulate more precisely the functions and tasks of different units, the organization of work to gain specific information, its concentration, verification, processing and analyzing, control over the operational work, as well

as the mechanism for coordination between DS services and cooperation with other institutions.

At the initial stage of work on the improvement of the system for detection of indications of preparation for war and sudden nuclear-missile attack, contacts were established between the central units for consultations and cooperation for joint accomplishment of the tasks set. PGU-DS worked out the assignments and sent them to the units. Some of the units received detailed assignments that served as the basis to work out specific plans for the future, taking into consideration the specifics of their work and their agent and other capabilities.

For the purpose of close coordination between the central units regarding nuclear-missile attack (RYAN) problems, on February 17, 1984, a meeting was held in PGU with the heads of units, where some additional issues on collaboration were agreed on. They agreed to establish the necessary working contacts between information-analytical units on nuclear-missile attack problems and decided that the heads of these units periodically conduct meetings to exchange their experience on the work organization, operational staff preparation, and information exchange on the enemy activities on nuclear-missile attack problems.

At the meeting, it was also agreed that the first deputy chiefs of departments be charged with the responsibility for the work related to nuclear-missile attack problems and for sustaining contacts at working level and ensuring the accomplishment of the planned activities.

On Feb 27, 1984, the first working meeting with the chiefs of information-analytical units was held.

In PGU-DS, the work on nuclear-missile attack problems was labeled as a priority task for every resident network. Item 1 in every agenda includes reports on the conducted planned activities, while information gained on the problem is being sent in telegrams. Taking into consideration the deficiencies in plans, they are currently being reviewed, updated, and changed in compliance with the requirements of the task to improve the system for detection of indications of nuclear-missile attack. This is based not only on the current capabilities of the resident networks but primarily on the type of objects of penetration on the territory of the country of stay.

Specific tasks have been worked out for the agents, who have proved their loyalty, and are capable of working on nuclear-missile attack problems. Activities were outlined for agent penetration into the objects related to the preparation of a sudden attack. Lists were prepared with the names of individuals who could be informed in advance about the preparation of a nuclear-missile attack in order to keep track of their movement and location. In countries hosting U.S. bases, resident networks periodically route

operational workers with the task to observe and look for outer indications for any changes in the bases.

The PGU started specialized training for the operational staff to detect indications of the enemy for war and sudden nuclear-missile attack. The intention is by the beginning of the summer to train all operative officers from the Center, and during the summer holidays to conduct courses with the operative officers from the *resident* networks.

The PGU pays special attention to the work of underground *resident* networks, taking into account the possibility that in a crisis period the opportunity of legal *resident* networks to work will be restricted and even terminated. Activities have been planned both to improve the information capabilities of agent networks, and to preserve their ability to work in a crisis.

An information-operational staff was established within the Information-Analytical Department in PGU-DS to detect the indications of war and sudden nuclear-missile attack. It focuses on data processing and analysis, preparation of the operational staff to work on nuclear-missile attack problems, methodological support for the resident networks, and cooperation with other DS services.

Recently, a system for electronic data processing on the nuclear-missile attack problems was elaborated in PGU-DS, and now it is being implemented. At this stage, the programs deal with statistical analysis of data, and after the subsystem VEGA-6 is introduced, a thematic processing of information will be possible.

VGU-DS elaborated detailed instructions and a list of the features for the operational departments in the Directorate to follow when collecting information about U.S. and NATO preparation for war and sudden nuclear-missile attack against Bulgaria. The instructions were sent to Sofia MVR Directorate and the regional MVR directorates. An instructional meeting was held with the chiefs of departments on nuclear-missile attack problems, and specific plans are being worked out to deal with the agents who will be responsible for solving nuclear-missile attack problems.

The Directorate pays special attention to processing materials, gained by operational-technical means.

The acts and behavior of diplomatic representatives from NATO countries are being analyzed of ambassadors' meetings, defense attaches' movement and activities, intensity of liaison and carrier services.

Data received from border check points and volunteers, concerning indicators of higher level of combat readiness and tension in neighboring countries, is summarized and analyzed.

Attention is paid to detect indicators during interrogations and talks with immigrants who have returned or are temporarily staying in our country, as

well as during discussions with Bulgarian citizens prior to departure and after their return from other countries.

III Directorate DS elaborated a list of the features to observe when collecting information. The necessary organizational work was carried out in the Directorate to define the assets to accomplish the task. The most perspective and possessing the biggest capabilities to work on RYAN problems within the Directorate is considered to be the agent network of the department for counterintelligence work beyond the frontline and the agent network and the operational links of the same department on our territory.

A part of the agents of III Directorate DS are assigned to work with the technical equipment for radio and radio-electronic intelligence in the Military Intelligence Directorate General Staff.

Currently, the Directorate is conducting intensive training of both the operational staff and the agents, whereas every agent is assigned specific tasks according to his intelligence capabilities. Recruiting of new agents with capabilities for detection of indicators of sudden nuclear-missile attack is being planned.

The Directorate has difficulties solving the problem of communication with agents abroad. This problem will be solved after the provision of modern technical communications equipment. Contacts have already been established with PGU, and the problem will be solved soon.

A general plan was elaborated in VI Directorate DS based on the activities from the department plans. At departmental level, plans have been worked out for work with available checked agents with capabilities for detection of indicators of sudden nuclear-missile attack, as well as for recruiting new capable agents. Plans are included in the Directorate control system and there is strict control over their implementation. The agents are assigned tasks to reveal such features that could be detected among foreign diplomats, merchants, scientists, etc. both during their visit to our country and when routing the agents to some Western countries.

UGV has directed its efforts to gain information on the enemy preparation in the border regions in Northern Greece and the European part of Turkey.

In order to improve the agent capabilities abroad, a set of activities have been planned in UGV. Both the operational staff and the agents are being trained. The agents are redirected to the objects to be investigated. In 1984, some agents abroad will undergo special military training that will be in compliance with the specifics of investigated objects. Technical equipment will be provided for communications with some of the agents and agent links will be established with some agents—communication officers. Annually there will be seminars for technical, special and language training of the staff working with technical devices.

In IV Department-DS, a list was elaborated of the specific features of preparation for war and sudden nuclear-missile attack that would appear in deciphering, radio-intelligence, and radio-counterintelligence. The personnel of the department are aware of these features and are looking for them daily.

In conclusion, we can state that although the work in different central units on RYAN problems is at different stages, it has been included in the plans and is daily a subject of discussion by the units' leaderships. The operational staff is becoming aware of the problem and even though gained information is not always systematic and comprehensive, we expect that after training the staff and agents, the accomplishment of the task be adequate to its importance.

Savov's purpose was to focus the attention of his own organization, and in particular Directorate III which dealt with foreign intelligence collection, and Directorate VI, the political branch, the counterintelligence Second Main Directorate (VGU) and the Border Troops Directorate (UGV), so they coordinated their RYAN research.

BYELORUSSIA. Between 1951 and 1959, the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) mounted a series of operations codenamed AEPRIMER to establish long-term, durable assets illegally infiltrated into Byelorussia as part of the REDSOX program. Individual agents were nominated by the Byelorussian National Council (BNR), trained in Germany, and then parachuted into Soviet territory, employing techniques and tradecraft developed during World War II. In parallel, the British Secret Intelligence Service cultivated the Lonson-based Byelorussian Liberation Movement, a group of émigrés formed from the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations.

Another infiltration project, codenamed AEQUOR, with similar objectives and was terminated in 1956 when, to the CIA's embarrassment, information the operation was published in *Pravda*. The CIA was always concerned about poor security and later cut AEQUOR's relationship with the BNR. Thereafter, AEPRIMER's link with the BNR was restricted to its president, Mikola Abramtchik, and his representative in New York, Francis Kushel.

A CIA reported dated March 1954, outlining future AEQUOR plans, gives an indication of the challenges involved.

1. The obviously innocent and inadvertent disclosure made by AECAM-POSANTO 11 to the assessing CO concerning the insecurity of the LOUVAIN complex has made it necessary for the project to revise its basic operating principles which had governed the course of action during the past three years. We have been able to determine that the rudimentary elements of a professional intelligence operation had been violated by the Principal.Agent~AECAHBISTA 2. Although a certain

amount of security leaks had been deemed inevitable, the complexity of the disclosures has forced an immediate curtailment of the KUFIRE effort under its present operating procedure. Therefore, before any further commitments can be undertaken, it is necessary to list and re-evaluate the existing, salvageable assets. These assets will become points of departure for future AEQUOR **REDSOX** operations.

Generally these assets are:

1. The three-man team inside the Byelorussian SSR
2. Those indigenous elements which have been contacted by the team and are available for anticommunist work
3. The availability of certain individuals within AECAMBISTA 1 who are not in accord with AECAMBISTA 2 and his devotion to the nationalistic effort. One such individual has indicated that he is more prone to our suggestions and therefore would
4. be more acceptable to our purposes.
5. The potential untapped source of agent candidates, which according to AECAMBISTA 2 are available to us within the continental limits of the United States, Canada, and South America.
6. The rapport which has been established with AECAMBISTA 1, accepted as the leading group of the Byelorussian emigration.
7. The ability to train agent candidate and a new P/A secure surroundings and operational methodology
8. The experience

Discussion of the Assets

The three-man team inside the Byelorussian SSR With the dispatch of AEQUOR TEAM II in 1952, the Agency assumed the responsibility of aiding the team, that is, on a material basis if the team was uncontrolled on a moral basis if it became apparent that the team was controlled. To date, an analysis of the W/T traffic tends to leave a doubt regarding the team's cleanliness; however, there has been no conclusive evidence to indicate control. It is, therefore, essential that we consider future KUFIRE activities with two approaches: (1) how to exploit the team to insure the flow of positive intelligence and how to utilize the reported dissident elements within the BSSR, if the team is not controlled or (2) how to provoke the controller into revealing his intelligence interest, method of operation, intelligence data, if the team is controlled,

Planning if the team is not controlled. Although the original mission of the team did not include the gathering and transmission of positive intelligence,

circumstances since the dispatch has forced us to rely upon the team as an intelligence source, wanting as it may be. In the opinion of the case officer, to develop and exploit this source most effectively, it will be necessary to divide the team into two distinct operating areas. One area of the operation would be in BARANOVICHI under the aegis of AECAMPOSANTO 6, while the other would concern itself with the KAMEN area under the supervision of AECAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9. The division as contemplated is not a random, haphazard decision. During the course of the operation, the operation itself emerged as a natural division. Because AECAMPOSANTO 6 had been able to legalize, he detached himself, per plan, from AECAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 and established himself as a lumber worker in the BARANOVICHI area. AECAMP08ANT0S 8 and 9 remained within the KAMEN area. To date, the primary drawback to this highly desirable approach has been the lack of independent communication for the BARANOVICHI unit. Whenever AECAMPOSANTO 6 had a message to transmit, he had to make contact with the other two team members and relate the message to them for transmission to the base by W/T. Needless to say, this procedure was insecure. AECAMPOSANTO 6 had to arrange absence from work, travel needlessly, and he had no guarantee when he made contact with AECAMPOSANTO 8 and 9 that the latter were not under control. Therefore, to preclude this type of insecurity in the future, the team was asked to activate the S/W link. An address in Berlin was transmitted to AECAMPOSANTO 9 to give to AECAMPOSANTO 6. According to the latest W/T contacts, this had been effected and the base was told that a letter was forthcoming. When this letter is received, the team will be requested to relay to the base an address which AECAMPOSANTO 6 could service. Once the circuit is completed, other addresses, unknown to AECAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 will be submitted to and from AECAMPOSANTO 6 via the S/W. It is envisioned that this action would then sever any remaining contact between the two areas of operation.

Once some semblance of an organized network has been established by AECAMPOSANTO 6 and it becomes obvious that AECAMPOSANTO 6 can be spared from the operation, he should be asked to exfiltrate from the BSSR. Although it is impossible to select the course of action now, it is anticipated that in view of his employment and mobility, he may be asked to journey north in the Karelo-Finnish Republic and cross the border into Norway near the Baltic Sea. This seems possible with the limited information available at the present time,

AECAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 should be made to legalize. The "black-living" approach is not conducive to intelligence gathering and expansion of the operation. However, the problem of outdated documents held by AECAMP03ANT0 8 and the apparent reluctance of AECAMPOSANTO 9 to legalize

presents problems which are peculiar to the KAMEN area only and therefore should be discussed at this point.

At first, it was considered that AECAMPOSANTO 8 or 9 arrange with some of their indigenous contacts to service a cache which had been prepared by AEMOBLE 27. W/T traffic would have informed the team of its location and its contents, among which were documents and legends for legalization. However, the revelation that AENOBLE 27 was under control discounted this approach. There are three other possibilities,

- (1) to attempt a resupply by an overland infiltration, (2) an air drop, or (3) buy documents on the black market. Because we have no one in training at the present time, and because the KUFIRE segment of the operation has been suspended, the first possibility is not considered feasible in the near future. The second possibility, the air resupply, would not be considered practical for an operation of this size. Therefore, the only remaining possibility would be for AECAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 to purchase documents on the black market. In their W/T message number 36, the team informed us that documents could be purchased. As far as can be determined, the team should have about 120,000 rubles remaining from the original sum taken in on the 1952 dispatch. Therefore, money should pose no problem to this facet of the transaction. The team will be asked to investigate this possibility and may be able to use one of its legal contacts for arranging the purchase. This analysis of the problem of legalizing should not be considered as conclusive. In the past, the case officer was informed that the possibility of getting documents to the team could be arranged in conjunction with other projects operating through that area. However, this analysis attempted to view the project on its own merits and capabilities.

Those indigenous elements which have been contacted by the team

The recent encouraging disclosure by the team that dissident elements existed among the population and were being carefully scrutinized by the team members for collaboration, offers AEQUOR KUFIRE a tremendous asset for expanding the KAMEN and BARANOVICHI areas. Although the message did not so state, it can be assumed that the dissention is not peculiar to the area from which the transmission took place. Hence, the team should be encouraged to continue its contacts among the indigenous people and evaluate them in reference to the aims of the project. When the evaluations are made available to us, it will then be possible to determine the feasibility of continuing this activity.

If determined feasible, requirements will be relayed to the individual areas based upon information received from SR/6. The initial requests will be verifiable and low-level type assignments will be suggested. Obviously, the intelligence value of such an effort is practically nil, but it would provide the case officer with an opportunity to appraise the *modus operandi* of the indigenous elements and how well they were trained by the team members responsible for the two areas of operations. Should they prove their competency in the tasks, their utilization will be developed along intelligence and organizational lines to obtain positive intelligence of a higher level. Once the report has reached us that these people are available to us, the team should be notified to segregate them into a cell system. Operational guidance will be transmitted to the team members in the KAMEN and BARANOVICHI independently, since at this stage of the operation, it is envisioned that the two areas will no longer be in contact with each other.

The availability of certain individuals within AECAMBISTA 1 prone to Agency supervision

When the release of AECAMBISTA 2 from AEQUOR, ops became inevitable, some BR elements directly connected with the operation became alarmed at this move and considered this severance as detrimental to the collaboration between the Agency and AECAMBISTA 1. One such individual, AECAMBISTA 5, noted that he was dissatisfied with AECAMBISTA 2. Although he did not say why, it can be assumed that AECAMBISTA 5 probably was of the opinion that AECAMBISTA 2 was not devoting enough time to his role of principal agent. AECAMBISTA 5 had been in close working contact with AECAMBISTA 2, therefore was in a position to appraise the efficiency of the collaboration. Undoubtedly, his association with the project and AECAMBISTA 2 would enable him to offer concrete suggestions for a professional operation,

AECAMBISTA 5 is not new to the KLIBARK effort. Several months earlier, a proposal had been advanced to utilize AECAMBISTA 5 as CART source within the Byelorussian emigration. This proposal, stimulated by information received from the field regarding AECAMBISTA 5's potential, however was not honored on the recommendation of CART Munich. It noted that AECAMBISTA 5 had been out of contact with the emigration; also a formal study of CART methods could not be taught to him at the present time.

AECAMBISTA 5 at one stage in our contact stated that he would be willing to associate himself with us without the knowledge of AECAMBISTA 1. It is therefore earnestly advanced that AECAMBISTA 5 received P/A training. At the present time, the project is without a principal agent and the

re-evaluation period would offer an ideal opportunity to transfer AECAMBISTA^ to PBPRIME for the required work. It would ensure us of having a principal agent versed in clandestine methodology available for immediate consolation when it again becomes time to initiate AEQUOR KUFIRE KUGOWN operations.

The field also requested that AECAMBISTA 11 be given consideration for the principal agent position. However, it is the opinion of the case officer that, although the individual has demonstrated his competence; on other tasks, he is too well known among the emigres in PBPRIME. It may also be undesirable to utilize AECAMBISTA 11 from the political point of view.

He has never expressed his opinion concerning the KUBARK-AECAMBISTA 1 relationship or his feeling toward the personalities involved in the collaboration. If an attempt should be made to prepare him in lieu of AECAMBISTA 2 or wean him away from AECAMBISTA 1 we may suffer an embarrassing incident.

The potential untapped source of agent candidates

According to a survey undertaken by AECAMBISTA 11, approximately one year ago in PBPRIME and Canada, the influx of young people has been constant. Although not enough is known about recruiting potentialities in Central and South America, the survey which is being undertaken by KUBARK should clarify this doubt somewhat. However, it is an admitted fact, by AECAMBISTA 2 himself, that Europe can no longer be regarded as a source of agent candidates. This depletion can be explained by the emigration which has taken place since the termination of World War II. Not having any family or material ties in Europe, these young emigres, like their grandfathers before them began to leave the European continent in an effort to reclaim some of their lives. However, the emotional fervor against the invaders of their homeland by the communists left its mark on their thinking. Hence, AECAMBISTA 4 has often noted to the case officer that he has been approached by these young emigres and asked whether or not he could not help them in an active struggle against the Communist in their homeland. Therefore the availability of Byelorussian youth, abetted by its desire to engage in an active struggle against communism offers KUBARK an opportunity to select agent candidates for KUFIRE ops.

Although the case officer has been told that Canadian recruitment is out, PBPRIME difficult and South America uncertain, it is firmly believed that this opportunity should not be allowed to wither without first exploiting every possibility. AECAMBISTA 4 has noted that many of the young DPs are now serving in the armed forces. He further stated he saw no reason why they could not use the same cover for agent candidates. For those potential

candidates not subject to military service, AECAMBISTA 4 said that often a young emigre may wander from the Byelorussian community where he had been living. After a while, his absence is explained by the fact that PBPRIME is a large country and he could be living anywhere; eventually he is forgotten. Here again AECAMBISTA 4 reiterated it would be an ideal opportunity to remove the agent candidate for training.

It is recommended for FI 1955 that the possibility of Western hemisphere recruiting be investigated. Although no candidates would be recruited until the legal points are clarified, the early training of AECAMBISTA 5 and approval to proceed with the recruiting would insure a good start to a renewal of AEQUOR KUFIRE ops.

The rapport which has been established with AECAMBISTA 1

During the past four years, the Agency has established a working relationship with AECAMBISTA. Although this period included moments of apprehension and personality conflicts, the basic desire to work together has allowed the Agency to dispatch two units into the BSSR. It has enabled us to establish internal listening posts, the potential of developing an intelligence-gathering component and through the publication of printed media, it has enabled us to express Agency and United States policy in quarters that would ordinarily have been denied us.

It is desirable, therefore, to develop the rapport which has been established to further exploit the intelligence potential of AECAMBISTA 1 by continuing the present relationship, with modifications. The entire situation should be explained to AECAMBISTA 1, within security restrictions, and attempt should be made to enable him to understand the problems of engaging in secure covert operations. We should be amenable to his suggestions and should implement them whenever possible. We should try to utilize any personnel he may submit for our consideration, if deemed satisfactory. If not, AECAMBISTA 4 or his representatives should be informed of our rejection and a plausible explanation given. In the past, unfortunately, AECAMBISTA 2 has conducted the operations on an emotional, basis, that is, he could tell whether the man was good "by looking in his eyes." This all must be explained to AECAMBISTA 2 or the new principal agent as unsound practice.

Therefore, in a general concept, before any further operations are undertaken there should be a "meeting of the minds" with each party to the contract; knowing his responsibility and aware of the problems which are peculiar to his partner. The AECAMBISTAS should be made to feel that they are consulted on all problems through the principal agent. If this relationship cannot be furthered under the aforementioned working arrangement, it is then

suggested that the AECAMBISTA 1 complex be dropped and the possibility of engaging independents for operations be explored.

The ability to train agent candidates and a new P/A

It is generally conceded that most of the difficulties experienced in the fore-running operations were caused by the inability or lack of desire expressed by the principal agent in recruiting agent candidates. The insecure practices have led to doubt which exists today concerning the status of AEQUOR TEAM II and the feasibility of conducting future operations with AECAMBISTA 1. With the transfer of training facilities and the selection of a new candidate for P/A, most of these fears may be allayed. However, before any consideration be given to new candidates or new operations, the new P/A should be trained for a period of not less than one year. He should be given all the aspects of covert operations similar to the training received by agent candidates. He should further be given specialized training regarding the role of the P/A in covert operations. When he has completed his training, it would then become necessary to determine whether or not it would be desirable to have him begin recruiting immediately. The new concept of the role of the principal agent should be to:

- i. implement the recruiting mechanisms.
- ii. Escort any agent candidates to PBPRIME for training,
- iii. Be present at the training site during the course of instruction.
- iv. Participate in the instruction schedule, if necessary expanding the course of instruction to include those eventualities which may be peculiar to BSSR ops.
- v. Maintain liaison with AECAMBISTA 1 and arrange for political and psychological indoctrination of the agent candidate by prominent figures in AECAMBISTA 1, e.g., AECAMBISTA 4 or AECAMBISTA 10.
- vi. During the course of training, hold discussions with the agent candidates re Soviet policy, Byelorussian culture, etc.
- vii. Be consulted on particular problems which may arise during the course of instruction.
- viii. Aid in the evaluation of the agent candidates during and upon the completion of the course of instruction, and finally
- ii. (9) Assist in the dispatch of the agents.

It should be stressed at this point, however, that the position of the P/A under the new concept should not be such as would preclude the influence of the Case Officers on the project over the agent candidates. At best, the P/A

should be represented as a limited partner to the agent candidates and under no conditions is he to be represented as the primary contact between the agent candidates and the case officers. Although it is realized that this is the optimum in covert operations, if we start with these concepts, then any alteration in operational procedure will be from the ideal and not from a concept which would include a “watered-down” version of operations.

1. The experience

Although this asset may be considered an intangible, it can influence the course of future operations. Through it, we have been able to evaluate our shortcomings, those of our colleagues, methodology and personalities. We have been able to alter our operational concept based upon realism as contrasted to the idealistic version of a mission. If taken for its face value, this asset can be instrumental in the success or failure of future KUFIRE KUGOWN missions.

C

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA). Throughout the Cold War, the CIA was the West's principal protagonist, responsible for the collection of information relating to Soviet Bloc strengths and intentions. The Agency derived its information from open sources, diplomatic reporting, **liaison relationships, imagery, MASINT, signals intelligence**, various other categories of technical intelligence, electronic data, and human agents (**HUMINT**). All this material contributed to estimates circulated to policymakers which were either accepted as the basis of future decisions or filed to await further corroboration or maybe rejection.

When the wartime Office of Strategic Services was wound up in September 1945, the Secret Intelligence (SI) and counterintelligence (X-2) branches were absorbed into the War Department's Strategic Services Unit (SSU), and in the spring of 1946 moved into a new Central Intelligence Group (CIG) which established an Office of Special Operations (OSO) in October 1946 and that became the **Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)** in September 1948.

When the CIA was born in September 1947, it took over OSO which retained responsibility for foreign HUMINT and, in the early days of the Cold War, became an instrument of the White House declared policy of containment, which meant an acceptance and political accommodation with the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe. However, despite the Truman doctrine espoused to Congress in March 1947 to counter Soviet expansionism and to protect Greece and Turkey, the CIA would play a major role in the Italian elections held in April 1948, having seen Czechoslovakia succumb to a Communist coup two months earlier.

Thereafter the CIA's Clandestine Service undertook covert operations in the Baltic countries, Eastern Europe, and **Albania** in an effort to undermine the local Communist regimes.

The CIA was taken by surprise by the **Korean War**, a failure which prompted the Directorate of Intelligence to create a project codenamed CAESAR to study the Kremlin leadership. The first major CAESAR report was issued in July 1953 on the so-called Doctors' Plot which inspired a

wave of anti-semitism across the Soviet Union. In the same vein, POLO was instituted in 1956 to study the Chinese leadership, and in 1959, ESAU was created to monitor the highly contentious issue of the Sino-Soviet split. *See also* ACOUSTIC INTELLIGENCE; AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE; AGEE, PHILIP; AGENT OPERATIONS; AIRBORNE INTERCEPTION; AIR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE; AMES, ALDRICH; BAY OF PIGS; BERLIN TUNNEL; BERLIN WALL; BOURBON; BULGARIA; BYE-LORUSSIA; CLAYTON; CUBAN MISSILECRISIS; CULTURE WAR; *DREADNOUGHT*, HMS; ENBOM FRITHOF; ESTONIA; GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC; GOLITSYN, ANATOLI; GRENADA; GULF OF TONKIN; HANSSEN, ROBERT; HUNGARIAN UPRISING; HUNGARY; INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM; ITALIAN GENERAL ELECTION; KUKLINSKY, RSYZHARD; LATVIA; LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS; LITHUANIA; MISSILE GAP CONTROVERSY; OGARODNIKOV, ALEKSANDR; OSWALD, LEE HARVEY; PENKOVSKY, OLEG; POLYAKOC, DMITRI; POPOV, PIOTR; PROXY WARS; *PUEBLO*, USS; REDSOX; ROOSTER-33; RYAN; SATELLITES; SOFT TOUCH; STEALTH; SUBMARINES; TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER; TELEMINT; TOLKACHEV. ADOLF; TROFIMOFF, GEORGE; UKRAINE; WARSAW PACT; WISNER, FRANK.

CLAYTON, WALTER. Born in New Zealand in 1906, Wally Clayton moved to Melbourne, **Australia**, in 1931 and joined the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) in 1933. Although he was briefly arrested in June 1940 when the CPA was temporarily banned, he remained largely in the shadows until he was identified as KLOD, the head of a major Soviet spy-ring which had succeeded in penetrating the Department of External Affairs, the police, and the private office of the leader of the Opposition. Analysis of the **VENONA** decrypts demonstrated that the NKVD spy codenamed KLOD was a trusted and loyal subordinate who acted as an intermediary, recruiter, and agent handler, but when he testified before the Royal Commission on Espionage in 1954, he denied ever having met anyone from the Soviet embassy and said he had never met Jim Hill or Ian Milner. Secrecy prevented the incriminating **VENONA** material from being adduced to contradict him, and he escaped prosecution. Accordingly, the ASIO initiated a lengthy surveillance operation, codenamed PIGEON, to watch Clayton, but he proved to be a skillful operator. In April 1957, when ASIO suspected Clayton and his wife were planning to defect, their passports were confiscated to prevent them from leaving the country.

Clayton eventually fell out with the CPA leadership and moved to a modest home at Salt Ash, near Nelson Bay in New South Wales. In 1993, he finally

conceded, privately to the CPA's national secretary Laurie Aarons that he indeed he really had spied for the Soviets. He died in October 1997.

COLDFEET. In March 1962, the **CIA** learned that a Soviet research station on Arctic drift ice had been abandoned by its staff, and the decision was taken to visit the site and remove any remaining equipment or documents. The assignment was particularly challenging as the target's location was beyond the range of an icebreaker or helicopter. The establishment, designated NP8, had been evacuated shortly before the airstrip when the pack ice began to break up, and the CIA's plan called for the insertion of two intelligence officers to be dropped by parachute from a B-17 Flying Fortress operated by a propriety company, Intermountain Aviation. The pair, James Smith and Leonard A. LeSchack, were dispatched on May 28 and were recovered, by a Sky-Hook, on June 2 by a converted B-17 flown by Connie Seigrist and Douglas Price.

COMINFORM. Founded in September 1947, the Communist Information Bureau was the successor to Lenin's Comintern (Communist International) which supposedly had been dissolved during World War II in deference to Allied sensibilities. The stated purpose of the Cominform was as an expression of solidarity between the Soviet Bloc and the Communist Parties of France, Italy, and **Yugoslavia**, and a vehicle for propaganda opposing U.S. foreign policy as encapsulated by the Truman doctrine. The organization was disbanded in April 1966 as part of Moscow's strategy to re-engage with Josip broz Tito.

In reality, the Cominform acted as a conduit for individual Communist Parties passing information to Moscow and provided the Kremlin with a means of exercising influence over foreign parties by liaising closely with their secretive Control Commissions, the bodies that maintained internal discipline. The Cominform also sponsored training schools in Socialist ideology, distributed propaganda pamphlets and managed radio broadcasts aimed mainly at Europe and North Africa.

In July 1955, the U.S. **CIA** circulated a short analysis of the Cominform:

The Cominform, actually named the intonation Bureau of the Communist (Informatsionnoye Byuro KoaBBunlstlohealtikh 1 Babochmh Bagtii) is a purely political organization, linking the Communist Parties in the Soviet orbit, and possibly maintaining liaison with Communist parties outside the Soviet sphere. It has no intelligence or counterintelligence functions, and no MVD personnel were attached to it. Since the MVD had its own "Advisers" in all satellite countries, the use of Cominform facilities was quite unnecessary.

Actually, however, the Cominform has considerable intelligence value. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union received all information collected by the Cominform in the course of its political activities. In turn, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union uses the Cominform newspaper as an outlet for giving advice and instructions to Communist Parties abroad.

Pavel Fedorovich Yudin, former editor of the Cominform newspaper, held his post by virtue of his standing as a Communist theoretician rather than by reason of any organizational affiliations. Although, he was under the supervision of Mikhail A. Suslov, Chief of the Foreign Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he probably was not a member of the Foreign Section.

Another important medium of information for foreign Communist parties is the Party Congress. At the 19th Party Congress in Moscow, at which practically all Communist Parties were represented, a great deal of literature was sold, and delegates and guests received copies of all speeches and books and various other gifts, it is quite certain that the Congress was the occasion for the issue of various directives, in addition to the decisions and resolutions of the Congress.

Schooling for individual communists from satellite countries is provided in the Higher Party School.

In the event of a Communist uprising in a Western country, the Soviet intelligence services would assist the Communist Party in placing communists in key positions and would furnish to the Soviet Government information on the participants and recommendations for their assignments. The revolt would be supported by Soviet propaganda.

While the extent of Soviet financial aid to foreign Communist movements is difficult to assess, it is certain that much money is spent for this purpose. It is doubtful that a number of organizations could exist without Moscow's financial support.

Communist parties invariably represented themselves as independent, legitimate political movements engaging in authentic democracy, but in reality, they were instruments of the Kremlin's political power and an essential component of the Soviet intelligence monolith. The evidence for this manipulation was to be found in the close correlation between Communist Parties and espionage. The VENONA decrypts revealed that the CPUSA's general-secretary, Earl Browder, was an NKVD agent, as was his sister and his common-law wife. Also compromised was the Communist Party of **Australia**, through the activities of **Wally Clayton**, and the Communist Party of Great Britain where the membership included the postwar spies

Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, Engelbert Broda, Melita Norwood, and Edith Tudor Hart.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (CPUSA). Under the leadership of Earl Browder the CPUSA reached a membership of 60,000 during World War II and had successfully promoted the image of a legitimate political party, but in reality, the FBI knew it to be a convenient and plausible cover for espionage orchestrated from Moscow. During the first decade of the Cold War, the FBI pursued leads in the **VENONA** decrypts to identify spies in a network that had penetrated the Manhattan project, among them Klaus Fuchs, Harry Gold, David Greenglass, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Ted Hall, and many others. **VENONA** also served to incriminate the Party's secretary-general, Earl Browder, and reveal his wife, Kitty Harris, and his sister to be NKD agents operating under false identities in Europe. Additionally, evidence of the Party's connections to the NKVD were revealed by a defector, Elizabeth Bentley, who had worked as a courier for the NKVD illegal *resident* in New York, Jacob Golos, before his death in November 1943.

The FBI maintained physical and electronic surveillance on SPUSA officials, kept a watch on CPUSA premises, and recruited informants to join individual chapters in an effort to discover clandestine links with the Soviets and disrupt any attempts at subversion. By 1957, the membership had dropped to 10,000, of whom an estimated 1,500 were FBI informants. In 1949, the CPUSA leadership, including Gus Hall and Eugene Dennis, were prosecuted under the Smith Act and served terms of imprisonment.

Following widespread publicity in 1946 of what was purported to be the influence of the CPUSA in Hollywood, the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA) held hearings in October 1947 and issued invitations to 43 witnesses, of whom 11 were categorized as "unfriendly." Only one, Bertolt Brecht, agreed to cooperate with the committee, and the other 10 were cited for contempt for refusing to answer questions which they claimed infringed their First Amendment constitutional rights. The 10 were the screenwriters Alvah Bessie, Herbert Biberman, Lester Cole, Ring Lardner Jr., John Howard Lawson, Albert Maltz, Samuel Ornitz, Adrian Scott, Dalton Trumbo, and the movie director Edward Dmytryk. All were given prison terms, but the Canadian-born Dmytryk fled to England. When he returned, he was arrested and imprisoned, however, when called to testify a second time, he cooperated, acknowledged his CPUSA membership in 1945 and named 26 other Party members. Eventually all the "Hollywood Ten" would admit their past Party membership.

Having comprehensively penetrated the CPUSA's lower echelons, the FBI's domestic security division initiated an ambition project, codenamed TOPLEV, to approach senior officials, and a pitch to Morris Childs in Chicago in 1958 recruited in a successful recruitment operation codenamed SOLO that continued until 1977.

COT, PIERRE. Born in Grenoble in November 1895, Pierre Cot was elected to the National Assembly in 1928 and was appointed undersecretary in the Foreign Ministry in 1932. In January the following year, he was appointed air minister in Eduard Daladier's government. During the Spanish Civil War, when France had adopted a policy of neutrality and non-intervention, Cot directed his aide, Jean Moulin, to arrange for supplies to be delivered to the republicans.

In May 1940, Cot was sent by the prime minister Paul Reynaud, to Moscow to negotiate the purchase of aircraft, but his mission failed with the French surrender. Instead of returning to Paris, he flew to London to support Charles de Gaulle's Free French, but his offer was rejected because of his known Communist sympathies. He then moved to New York where he was in touch with the local NKVD *rezidentura* and, according to some VENONA decrypts, was codenamed DAEDALUS.

The first mention of Cot was found in a message from the New York *rezident*, Vasili Zubilin dated June 26, 1942, which showed that contact had been established with the TASS correspondent, Vladimir Pravdin:

Reference No. 230.

Taking advantage of a speech by Pierre COT (see [2 groups unrecovered]. at a big gathering, SERGEI had a meeting with him [48 groups unrecovered], screening himself behind deceitful talk is trying to win the people's trust and to take on an important administrative post in WASHINGTON. [2 groups unrecovered] will be glad to meet SERGEI upon returning.

On July 1, 1942, the New York *rezidentura* reported the 'signing on of Pierre COT (henceforth DAEDALUS)', and subsequent texts, dating from a year later, referred to his active collaboration under that cryptonym. On July 1, 1943, Zubilin telegraphed Moscow about a report from DAEDALUS, but much of the text was unrecoverable, although a few fragments suggested that Cot was about to travel to Algiers and was concentrating on political issues.

[43 groups unrecoverable] elections. [44 groups unrecovered] I am ready in general to move to ALGIERS to study the situation, [15 groups unrecoverable] if there is [1 group unrecovered] use me in any sort of role in the future [1 group unrecovered] to begin the struggle with the Fascist [8 groups

unrecovered] Anti-Fascist activity. [5 groups unrecovered] role in the setting up of the Popular Front, conducted during the war in SPAIN [55 groups unrecovered] BARBO.

I personally did not see DAEDALUS and have had no opportunity to discuss his proposal. It is completely [30 groups unrecoverable] [1 group unrecovered] 10th July.

I request your instructions as to the essentials of his proposals by that date.

Moscow must have responded in the time demanded, for Pavel Klarin, operating under consular cover in New York, sent a long, two-part telegram on July 8 based on DAEDALUS's view of what he termed "the Algiers Committee" and his perception of General de Gaulle's (codenamed RAS) ambition to mount a coup at the liberation, using the head of his Intelligence Bureau, André Dewavrin, as the instrument:

[46 groups unrecoverable] [2 groups unrecovered] PASSY's group has set up in FRANCE a secret organization with the task of seizing power after the war and forming a military dictatorship headed by RAS. (Part II) The group has established a monopoly of the business of illegal communications [36 groups unrecovered]

This account was not so far from the truth for Dewavrin, who like many other senior figures in the Free French movement had adopted a Paris metro station as his nom-de-guerre, called himself Colonel Passy, and was an ardent Gaullist. His organization, the Bureau Centrale de Renseignement et d'Action (BCRA) had dominated the resistance scene in London and had eclipsed the communists who initially had been better represented in occupied France. Judging by a highly fragmented text from Zubilin on July 13, 1943, Cot must have made some suggestion that caused some discussion in Moscow, and there is also a reference to a journey, perhaps the one Cot made later that year to Algiers. Later in the same month, on July 22, Zubilin listed eight individuals who were to be checked "through DAEDALUS," one of whom was identified only as BIBI, a covername that had occurred elsewhere three times.

As for Cot himself, he did not reappear in a VENONA text until October 12, 1944, when Stepan Apresyan reported that Cot had made contact in Algiers on September 2. Cot had traveled to Russia in March 1944 and had remained there for five months, although the New York *rezidentura* may have been unsure of his whereabouts. Certainly Vladimir Pravdin had not been informed of Cot's movements, for Apresyan reported on December 12, 1944:

SERGEI has repeatedly rung up DAEDALUS's wife, and the woman who is living in her apartment says that she has left for Europe. When he rang earlier, the answer was that she was out of town. The parcel and the letter have not been forwarded.

The extent to which Cot's wife knew about his clandestine activities is uncertain, although the VENONA from New York of July 1, 1942, may have referred to her role in support of him:

[46 groups unrecoverable] [1 group unrecovered] and how he carries out [2 groups unrecovered], [2 groups unrecovered] information about his wife, her [1 group unrecovered] of DAEDALUS. Report on how the training is progressing.

The reason why Pravdin failed to find Madame Cot in New York in December was because she had sailed to Europe on October 21 to work for the United Nations Refugee Relief Agency, but the implication of the two references to her was that she had acted as an intermediary for her husband. At the very least, it can be said that neither Pravdin nor Apresyan expressed any concern about possibly compromising her husband by contacting her, and this omission definitely suggests their confidence in her.

At the end of the war, Cot was re-elected to the National Assembly where he represented his prewar constituency of Savoie until 1956. In 1967, he received Communist Party support to be elected an independent depute for Paris, but lost his seat the following year.

Cot was never confronted with the VENONA material and after the death of **André Labarthe**, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire investigators were reluctant to pursue him. He died in August 1977, his liaison with the Soviets widely suspected but never proved.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. Both protagonists invested heavily in counterintelligence (CI) during the Cold War, the Americans primarily to detect hostile penetration and attract defectors, while their Soviet counterparts concentrated on aggressive Second Chief Directorate counterespionage (CE) security operations in Moscow to deprive "the main adversary" of recruitment opportunities.

With the benefit of the passage of time, it is possible to reach some conclusions about the efficacy of CI operations, such as the fact that the most successful penetrations of Soviet intelligence were achieved by individuals (**Oleg Penkovsky**; **Dmitri Polyakov**) who were self-recruited in contrast to the few who were "pitched" (**Oleg Gordievsky**; **Oleg Lyalin**; and **Alexander Ogorodnik**).

From Moscow's perspective, the KGB enjoyed continuing success in attracting "walk-ins," with at least one person, usually an NCO, volunteering to sell classified material to an embassy or consulate during every year of the Cold War. Numerically, relatively few of these volunteers came from the U.S. intelligence community, and only four were from the FBI (**Robert Hanssen**; Randy Jefferies; Richard Miller; James Earl Pitts) and eight were

from the **CIA** (**Aldridge Ames**; David Barnett; Edwin Moore; Harold Nicholson; William Kampiles; Karl Koecher; Sharon Scranage; and Edward Ellis Smith).

The CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, headed between 1954 and 1974 by James Angleton, undertook more than 50 controversial molehunts to identify hostile penetration, and a few suspects, among them Peter Karlow, Paul Garbler, Richard Kovich, and David Murphy, were investigated and purged. In 1967, in an effort to coordinate Allied CI operations, Angleton sponsored the creation of CAZAB, a forum in which CI information could be exchanged between carefully selected and cleared CI professionals.

In terms of **defectors** to the Soviet Union, Edward Lee Howard was the only CIA officer to successfully reach Moscow, where he lived until his death in an accidental fall in July 2002. In contrast, the CIA, supported in some cases by the FBI, was very successful in attracting defectors from the KGB (Andrei Agranyants; Anatoli Bogaty; Grigori Burlutsky; Chang Pen; Piotr Deriabin; Olga Farmakowsky; Michal Goleniewski; **Anatoli Golitsyn**; Viktor Gundarev; Reino Hayhanen; Artush Hovnesian; Vladimir Ignaste; Aleksandr Kaznacheev; Nikolai Khokhlov; Raya Kiselnikova; Yuri Krotkov; Aleksei Myagkov; Konstantin Nadirashvili; Yuri Nosenko; Sergei Papushin; Anatoli Polokov; Yuri Rastvorov; Evgenni Runge; Vladimir Sakharov; Viktor Sheymov; Rupert Sigl; Bogdan Stashinsky; Kaarlo Tuomi; Vitali Yurchenko; and Ludek Zemenek) and even the GRU (Vyacheslav Baranov; Sergei Bokhan; Anatoli Chebotarev; Stanislav Levchenko; Stanislav Lunev; Nikolai Petrov; and Evgenni Sorokin). All these Soviet defectors were resettled, usually under alias, and proved to be invaluable sources of information.

The ability of an intelligence agency to attract defectors is one performance indicator which reflected poorly on British intelligence. During the 1940s, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) only attracted **Grigori Tokaev** and Yuri Tasoev, but the latter changed his mind and returned home. It would not be until 1971 that another Soviet intelligence officer, Oleg Lyalin, would seek political asylum, giving rise for concern that MI5 had experienced undetected hostile penetration during that period, as had been alleged by Igor Gouzenko in 1945 and Yuri Rastvorov in 1954. While SIS had dismissed Kim Philby in 1951, and imprisoned George Blake in 1961, no other case of penetration was ever confirmed although several officers who came under suspicion, among them Andrew King, Tony Milne, and Donald Prater, were dismissed.

A joint MI5/SIS working party established in 1963 to investigate evidence of penetration, interrogated the two principal suspects, MI5's former deputy director-general, Graham Mitchell, and his director-general, Roger Hollis. The former was cleared, but the case against the latter was declared "not proven." This inconclusive verdict left the issue of penetration during the

period 1945 to 1971 unresolved, although the recruitment of **Oleg Gordievsky** in 1974, and his successful management until his exfiltration from Moscow in 1985, was taken as a measure of confidence in the organizations' integrity, and this appeared to be supported by evidence supplied after the Soviet collapse by the defector Vasili Mitrokhin.

Sensitive to the damage inflicted by defectors, the KGB's First Chief Directorate (FCD) established Directorate K to enhance the organization's counterintelligence capability and attached "Line-KR" ("*kontazvedka*") specialists to overseas *rezidenturas* to reinforce the "Line SK" ("*Soviet Kolony*") security staff. Within Directorate K a specialist unit, designated Group North, was created to concentrate exclusively on American and Canadian targets, while the FCD's Vadim Kirpichenko assembled an innocuously titled Coordination Committee to oversee a long-term recruitment campaign intended to cultivate assets within the wider Allied intelligence community. These measures were designed to protect the FCD from known and suspected CIA penetrations.

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. From an intelligence perspective, the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 amounts to a massive failure on both sides. Allied intelligence collection conducted by the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) correctly identified the Soviet build-up of conventional troops in Cuba and was able to alert policymakers to the threat as missile sites were constructed, and provide compelling evidence in the form of imagery captured by high-level U-2 overflights and low-altitude photo-reconnaissance missions flown by Voodoo F-101 fighters. This visual proof was enhanced by some human reporting, mainly from refugee interviews and **liaison relationships**, and a contribution from the National Security Agency maritime platform, the USS *Oxford*, which was positioned off the Cuban coast to monitor Russian language voice traffic. Nevertheless, as subsequent performance reviews noted, the CIA underestimated the true number of medium and intermediate range missiles sent to Cuba, and came nowhere close to realizing that the Red Army's local garrison had totaled 42,000 troops. The margin of error had been substantial as the CIA had indicated only 22,000 Soviet troops present on the island and had not mentioned six free-fall atomic bombs for the UI-28 *Badgers* at Holguin, four nuclear mines, nor 80 nuclear warheads for the 150 *Samler* coastal defense cruise missiles which were counted at Siguanea, Santa Cruz del Norte, Banos, and Campo Florida. However, post-event studies noted that the missile numbers were broadly accurate, with 33 SS-4 MRBMs found out of an actual total of 42.

It would not be until January 1992 that a Soviet dimension was added to the usual historical assessment of a tense confrontation in which Nikita

Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy took the world to the brink of a global thermonuclear exchange. With the benefit of information disclosed by Soviet participants who attended a pair of conferences held in Havana and Key West to mark the incident's thirtieth anniversary, it is now clear that there were several very serious omissions in American intelligence collection effort which failed to spot 36 Luna short-range missiles, 12 of which were armed with tactical nuclear warheads. The decision to send the Lunas, designated *Frog-7* by NATO, to Cuba, which was never part of the Kremlin's original plan, Operation ANADYR, was taken by Khrushchev on September 7, 1962, and the SS-4 warheads were not delivered on the SS *Indigurka* until the following month. Accordingly, there was only a very limited window of opportunity for the dual-use tactical missiles to be detected before they were hidden in tunnels around Santa Cruz del Norte. Nor were the Lunas considered much of a priority because, as battlefield artillery armed with a one-ton conventional warhead, it was unguided and considered inaccurate, but an atomic payload was a rather different proposition and one that was overlooked by CIA analysts. Indeed, although the photo-interpreters and analysts correctly identified the presence of MRBMs and 24 of their launchers, MiG-21s, Ilyushin-28s, *Frog* missiles, *Komar* patrol vessels, IRBM launch sites under construction, and hundreds of SA-3 *Guideline* antiaircraft missiles, there was never any evidence of a single nuclear warhead ever having been delivered. It would be several decades before Russian sources confided that 36 SS-4 *Sandal* warheads had been unleaded from the SS *Aleksandrovsk* on October 4, 1962, and stored at a special facility at Bejucal, but 24 *Skean* IRBM warheads had remained on the ship.

The other revelation, unanticipated by the CIA nor anyone else, was the true role of Operation KAMA, a flotilla of four *Foxtrot* diesel-electric Red Banner Northern Fleet submarines from Sudya Bay destined for Mariel, of which three were forced to the surface by a U.S. Navy task group led by the carrier USS *Randolph*, with an escort of 11 destroyers, on October 27, 1962, while imposing the "quarantine" a polite term for blockade involving no less than 183 warships and 40 aircraft. Three days earlier, the U.S. State Department had issued a formal notice to mariners, and the U.S. Navy had broadcast the same warning about a requirement to surface immediately, in an easterly direction, when signaled to do so by four grenades, but the *B-59* had neither received the warning message nor heard from headquarters at Severomorsk since receiving alarming instructions on October 15 to cancel the voyage to Mariel and "take up combat positions" in the Sargasso Sea. Similarly, the *B-36* and the *B-130* had been placed in a similar dilemma and their presence having been compromised, each also considered launching their own single T-5 nuclear-tipped torpedo in retaliation.

All four submarines were detected as soon as they transited the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap, although initially they evaded surveillance by diving deep to avoid the ASW Lockheed Orions from Kevlavik, Argentia and Bermuda searching for them. The U.S. Navy had also deployed 10 diesel-electric submarines, in a line from Newfoundland to an area 350 miles north-west of the Azores to interdict any Soviet intruders. In addition, the Royal Navy's 6th Submarine Squadron at Halifax sent HMS *Astute* and *Alderney* on a patrol to find their Soviet quarries which were suspected by the CIA, in a report circulated on October 20, of possibly carrying a cargo of nuclear warheads to Cuba.

As they became aware of the intense level of surveillance, the slow, noisy *Foxtrots* with their three screws and distinctive acoustic signature were obliged to manoeuvre constantly, an exhausting activity intended to deplete their batteries and harass the crews. The necessity to only charge the batteries at night became a serious burden, as did the need to surface to receive and transmit high-frequency radio messages. With an underwater speed of just two knots, the *Foxtrot* had little chance of racing away from trouble. Thus, the periscopes of three would eventually be spotted from the air as they snorkeled, and *B-130* was found on the surface attempting to repair its three faulty Kolomna diesel engines. When finally cornered, the stricken vessel signaled for a tug and, after a rendezvous near the Azores with the tugboat *Tamir*, was towed home ignominiously.

The acoustic contacts (provisionally identified as *Foxtrots* and a *Golf*) made over the previous two days had been reported to headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia, on September 27 by the SOSUS terminals on Grand Turk and the Bahamian island of San Salvador, and thereafter their progress had been tracked using the usual techniques of airborne magnetic anomaly detectors; passive JEZEBEL and active JULIE sonobuoys; shipborne and submarine-based passive sonar, and Sea King helicopters equipped with dipping sonar. Altogether the target flotilla had been engaged for 23 days, involving contacts being processed over 2,889 hours, with almost every "burst" wireless signal monitored from a network of intercept platforms and shore-based direction-finding stations.

It was not until October 2002 that the Russians disclosed the nature of the weapons carried by the *Foxtrots*, and the debate among the vessels' officers about firing them. In the end, all four submarines obeyed the American instructions and returned on the surface to the 69th Submarine Brigade base at Polyarny, in the Gadzhievo naval complex on the Kola peninsula, as required, under constant surveillance. At no point during the crisis was any American aware that the *Foxtrot* crews had trained to fire their nuclear torpedoes up river estuaries along the eastern seaboard nor even suspected

that the submarines had been carrying “special weapons.” The implication, of course, was that the most dangerous nuclear confrontation had taken place in the waters of the Caribbean, and not on the island of Cuba itself, as had been assumed hitherto.

As well as the four *Foxtrots*, the Red Banner Fleet also deployed a *Zulu* diesel-electric, *B-75*, armed with two nuclear-tipped torpedoes, to escort the Soviet merchantmen across the Atlantic, but it was found on the surface by a Lockheed Neptune maritime reconnaissance aircraft on October 22 while refueling from the Uda-class auxiliary tanker *Terek*, a very distinctive oiler accompanied by the *Shkvaal*, *SIGINT vessel*. Already demonstrably compromised, the *Zulu* was recalled when the quarantine was announced. Another submarine, the *B-88*, was deployed into the Pacific from Petropavlovsk on October 28 on a mission that included orders to attack Pearl Harbor but was recalled on November 18.

For the Soviets, ANADYR accomplished the twin goals of guaranteeing Castro’s regime from invasion, in an undertaking given by President Kennedy, and the withdrawal of the offending *Thor* and *Jupiter* missiles from Turkey, Italy, and Great Britain. The Kremlin’s evident miscalculation seems to be restricted to the perceived humiliation, loss of prestige and international status associated with a major public climb-down.

Nikita Khrushchev’s gamble was to deliver and install troops, coastal defenses, missile boats and ICBMs protected by SA-2 batteries before they were discovered, and when he formulated his plan, there were immediate objections within the leadership about the likelihood of the plan being executed before the American elections due in November. The deception, or “*maskirova*,” developed to protect the project was supervised in Havana by the KGB *rezident*, Aleksandr Shitov (alias Alekseev) and by the GRU *rezident* in Washington, D.C., Georgi Bolshakov, whose role as back-channel to the White House would be replaced by a veteran intelligence professional, Aleksandr Feklisov (alias Fomin) who had been appointed KGB *rezident* in 1960, having headed the FCD’s 1st Department.. Khrushchev’s scheme was to establish some 50,000 Soviet troops on the island, armed with tactical nuclear missiles, to protect the regime which would be bolstered by the Ilyushin bombers, the MiG fighters and 40 ICBMs protected by SA-2 *Guidelines*. Thereafter, having tested the American reaction to what amounted to the fait accompli, the Kremlin intended to expand the naval facilities at Banes for a permanent Red Banner Fleet presence in the Caribbean, which would include a submarine base at Mariel. The timely imposition of a quarantine, just a few days before the *Poltava*, loaded with 20 ICBM warheads, was scheduled to sail across the line, effectively wrecked the entire operation. A large-hatch freighter previously employed to transport some of the MRBMs,

the *Poltava* had loaded its cargo at Odessa and then declared the false destination of Algeria as it had entered the Bosphorous and was one of five ships carrying missiles which turned back mid-voyage on October 24.

CULTURE WAR. As well as engaging the Soviet Bloc on a strategic and military level, the **Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)** sought to undermine the **Cominform's** influence by establishing and funding various external organizations, such as Radio Free Europe, sponsored by the **Office of Policy Coordination**, the National Student Association and the Congress for Cultural Freedom, (CCF) an ostensibly independent organization dedicated to the cause of promoting Western values. Launched in Berlin at the end of the blockade, the CCF was launched with a gathering of prominent intellectuals that included Hugh Trevor Roper and Freddie Ayer (who had both been wartime British intelligence officers), Arthur Koestler, Bertrand Russell, and Arthur Schlesinger Jr (who had been an analysis in the U.S. Office of Strategic Services). The CCF acted as a sponsor for numerous cultural events, initiatives, and publications, including *Encounter* magazine. Few of the CCF's supporters and beneficiaries knew of the involvement of the CIA's International Organizations Division and elaborate precautions were taken to disguise the actual source of its finances by constructing a network of trusts, foundations, and endowments, some legitimate, others dummy. These subsidies were eventually exposed in the media in 1966 along with other fronts and youth groups.

Another CIA proprietary, the Continental News Service, codenamed WUHUSTLER, distributed helpful news features to a large number of foreign clients who could not afford their own Washington correspondent, and several publishers received subsidies, including Frederick Praeger, designated WUBONBON, and the veteran travel guide writer Eugene Fodor.

Another major CIA project in the cultural Cold War was the covert promotion of Boris Pasternak's novel *Dr Zhivago* in an operation codenamed AEDINASAUR which began in December 1957 with the printing of thousands of copies in the Russian language for distribution to Soviet visitors to the west. The intention was to undermine confidence in the Communist regime which had banned the book as subversive.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA. *See* INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

D

DALZIEL, ALLAN. Born in December 1908 at Pymble, Sydney, the son of a ship's officer from Scotland, Allan Dalziel was a freelance journalist influenced by his strong Presbyterian beliefs and political campaigning for improved housing on behalf of the Christian Socialist Movement. In 1936, he was appointed to the Housing Conditions Investigation Committee, and in 1940, became the electoral agent for Dr. **Herbert Evatt**. When Evatt became attorney-general, Dalziel acted as his secretary. In 1947, following the creation of the United Nations, Dalziel was selected with his friend Jim Hill to represent **Australia** at a conference held by the UN Commission on Human Rights in New York.

In 1954, Dalziel, Hill, and another External Affairs official, John Burton, were named as having been listed in **Vladimir Petrov's** "G Documents" which were examined by the Royal Commission on Espionage. Evatt appeared as counsel for Dalziel who was cross-examined about his appointment to Evatt's staff of a young typist, Frances Bernie, a Communist Party of Australia (CPA) member, and about his links to another CPA member, Rupert Lockwood, who also had been compromised by VENONA and Petrov.

When Evatt retired from Parliament in 1960, Dalziel worked for the New South Wales Council of Churches, and in 1967, published Evatt's biography, *Evatt the Enigma*. The next year he was appointed general-secretary of the New South Wales Temperance Alliance and died in October 1969.

Although Dalziel denied having been a Soviet spy, he was never confronted with the incriminating VENONA decrypts, ASIO had other suspicions too. One of Dalziel's regular contacts had been a Sydney jeweler, Hyman Brezniak, a prewar Polish refugee who was known to be in touch with the NKVD *resident* Vakentin Sadovnikov and at least two members of his staff, Fedor Nosov and Ivan Pakhomov. Surveillance on Brezniak, as part of Operation BOOMERANG, had also proved a link between him and another Pole, Mark Younger, who also appeared in the VENONA material, and this heightened ASIO's growing concern.

ASIO also learned that Dalziel's Russian-born mistress, Lydia Mokras, previously had been in a relationship with Michael Bialoguski, the

Polish dentist who had acted as an intermediary between ASIO and Petrov. Although considered a fantasist, she would eventually admit to ASIO that she had been trained by the NKVD in the **Ukraine** before she emigrated to Australia. In July 2015, ABC TV traced Mokras to her home and conducted an interview with her in which she confirmed her previous relationship with the NKVD.

DEFECTORS. Among the most valuable of intelligence commodities in the Cold War was the defector, the turncoat who switched sides and earned political asylum through the delivery of a “meal-ticket” consisting of valuable information that could be exploited by counterintelligence agencies. The potential of such individuals was acknowledged before the war, but it was the unexpected appearance of **Igor Gouzenko**, Konstantin Volkov, and **Grigori Tokaev** who proved their importance.

In August 1948, MI5 completed a study of the phenomenon [see Appendix 4] which illustrates how attitudes would develop, even if the anonymous author failed to grasp the significance of Volkov’s mysterious disappearance in Istanbul before he could complete his negotiations with the British. *See also* COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

DRAGON RETURN. An Allied intelligence collection program originally sponsored by the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Bureau (STIB) designed to interview German scientists returning home after employment on nuclear and missile projects in the Soviet Union, DRAGON RETURN was codenamed PROJEKT HERMES by the Bundesnachrichtendienst. Prisoners of War and other personnel with wartime experience on the V-2 rocket thought to have worked at Soviet missile and atomic weapons facilities were interviewed with the intention of gathering information about the Kremlin’s development of ICBMs. Altogether some 300,000 Returning technicians were briefly accommodated at refugee reception centers, administered from Marienfelde, while they underwent a screening process to identify any who had acquired knowledge of Soviet chemical, biological, or atomic research. *See also* GRIGORI TOKAEV; SOFT TOUCH.

DREADNOUGHT, HMS. The first British nuclear-powered submarine, HMS *Dreadnought* was launched in 1960, after three years of design and construction at Vickers Armstrong at Barrow and represented a significant development in terms of speed, duration, capabilities, and equipment. Accordingly, it became a priority target for Soviet intelligence operations. *Dreadnought* enjoyed the benefit of an American-designed, third-generation nuclear propulsion system and carried the very latest Type-2001 sonar.

Nuclear propulsion eliminated the need for refueling so the duration of any patrol was governed by the need to feed the crew. The distinctive horseshoe-shaped transducer, six feet high on the bows, gave a 280° spectrum and the ability to track an adversary at some 30 miles, while the retro-fitted **towed array** had an enhanced capability.

Dreadnought's principal task was to undertake **signals intelligence** collection missions to eavesdrop on Soviet communications and monitor the movements of Northern Fleet submarines transiting into the Atlantic. Soviet interest in *Dreadnought* became clear when an espionage questionnaire was found during a search of Ethel Gee's home in Portland in January 1961. She had worked at the Underwater Detection Establishment where the Type-2001 sonar had been built in a joint venture by the Admiralty and Plessey. The project, which had begun in 1957, was tested aboard the surface vessel HMS *Verulam* and then the submarine *Finwhale*.

Dreadnought also carried the Type-2007 low-frequency passive sonar, with 24 hydrophones, and the Type 2019 active/passive sonar with a higher frequency range. Her sea trials were observed by a Soviet trawler stationed at the mouth of the Clyde, and when the first Victor-class Soviet nuclear submarines entered service in 1967 it was found to be equipped with the Skalks sonar system, designated SHARK GILL, which was derived from the British Type-2001 system.

Secret papers described by the **defector Anatoli Golitsyn** in 1961 suggested there had been another spy with access to *Dreadnought's* design, but when the Admiralty clerk John Vassall was arrested in October 1962 it was realized he could not have been responsible for the leak, which was never solved.

DROUJINSKY, DMITRI. In September 1987, a veteran Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent, Dmitri Droulimsky, played the role of an Arab drug-dealer to entrap a Palestinian terrorist in Cyprus. A notorious aircraft hijacker, Fawaz Younis had been lured to Famagusta in the hope of completing a drug purchase, but he was the target of GOLDENROD, an FBI sting intended to render Younis to New York to face charges relating to his participation in the attack on a Royal Jordanian airliner in Beirut in June 1985.

Fluent in nine languages, including Hebrew, Greek, Armenian, and French, Droujinsky had been born in Palestine to Russian emigrants. He was educated at a French school and studied Arabic for 12 years until his family emigrated to the United States. He joined the U.S. Marines aged 21 and was at Guantánamo Bay during the **Cuban missile crisis**. He also served with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. In March 1968, he joined

the FBI and after training at Quantico was posted to New Orleans and then to the field office in Washington, D.C., where he was assigned to operate under a “false flag.”

Droujinsky finally retired from the FBI in 1998, having masqueraded as a KGB handler in several important investigations. One of the first was Warrant Officer **James W. Hall**, who had been betrayed by an East German defector in 1988.

Born in New York City in 1957, Hall joined the Army in 1976 and was posted to the NSA’s Field Station Berlin, where he sold classified information to the HVA. In 1988, Hall was transferred to Fort Stewart, Georgia, where he was contacted by the defector who, operating under the FBI instructions, arranged a rendezvous in Savannah where he was introduced to Droujinsky. Thereafter, Hall incriminated himself by boasting of his past espionage and was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment,

In December 1988, Chief Petty Officer Craig Kunkle, a specialist in anti-submarine warfare, telephoned the Soviet embassy in Washington in December 1988 to sell classified information. The call was intercepted and Droujinsky, posing as a KGB officer, arranged to meet him at an Econo Lodge in Williamsburg, Virginia. Five further meetings in motels would follow, by which time Kunkle had incriminated himself sufficiently to justify his arrest.

The son of a U.S. Navy commander, Kunkle had been discharged in 1985 for several acts of indecent exposure to women on a Hawaiian beach. Embittered by the experience, Kunkle had sought revenge and gave this as his motive to Droujinsky. He was arrested in January 1989 and was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment.

In 1993, Droujinsky posed as a KGB officer, Sergei Nikitin, to contact **Robert Lipka**, a former NSA analyst living near Lancaster, Pennsylvania, who had been identified by a **defector**, Vasili Mitrokhin, as a spy. The two men agreed to meet outside the Comfort Inn, and in over a period, Lipka made enough admissions on videotape to incriminate himself. He was arrested in 1996 and was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment, served half and was released in 2006. He died in 2013, at the age of 68.

In January 1988, Sergeant Daniel Richardson, an M1/A1 Abrams tank instructor was arrested at the Holiday Inn near the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland after he had been spotted trying to approach Soviet diplomats with an offer of classified information. He attended a meeting with Droujinsky and compromised himself.

In September 1998, Droujinsky was deployed against David Boone, another spy denounced by Mitrokhin. Born in Flint, Michigan, in 1952, Boone joined the U.S. Army in 1970 and between 1988 and 1991, while assigned to an NSA site at Augsburg, sold classified information to the KGB.

By the time Alexander Zaphrprvsky supplied the clues to Boone's true identity, he had retired and was living in **Germany**. When Droujinsky telephoned him at home, Boone eagerly accepted his invitation to rendezvous in London. There he was offered a flight to Washington, and he was arrested in October 1998 at the Marriott Hotel in Dulles Airport. He was sentenced to 24 years' imprisonment and is incarcerated at Safford, Arizona.

In February 1999, a retired U.S. Army officer, Colonel **George Trofimoff** was yet another spy identified by Mitrokhin. Born in Berlin to Russian émigré parents, he became a naturalized U.S. citizen and eventually headed the Joint Interrogation Center in Nuremberg, although in 1969 he had been recruited by a childhood friend, Igor Suemihl a Russian Orthodox priest and childhood friend who was also a KGB cut-out.

Trofimoff retired to Melbourne, Florida, in 1995, but in February 1999, he agreed to meet Droujinsky, posing as "Igor," at the local Comfort Inn. After many hours of self-incrimination, Trofimoff was eventually arrested in June 2000 and sentenced to life imprisonment. He died, aged 87, at the federal penitentiary in Victorville, California, in 2014.

In October 1997, a 50-year-old graduate of University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, James M. Clark, entered a plea agreement with the Department of Justice and agreed to give evidence against two of his friends: **Theresa M. Squillacote**, a 39-year-old retired Defense Department analyst who was arrested and charged with having engaged in espionage for the East Germans for the previous two decades. She is believed to have been recruited in 1980 while a student at the University of Wisconsin where she had been a political activist for the Democratic Socialists of America, although her husband Kurt Stand had been a spy for the East Germans since 1972. Until her resignation in January 1997 Squillacote, a member of the Committees of Correspondence (a CPUSA front organization) had worked as a lawyer in the Pentagon's Office of Acquisition Reform with a security clearance. The FBI's mail cover disclosed her correspondence with Ronnie Kasrils, South Africa's defense minister and veteran Communist Party leader.

In October 1996, she made incriminating statements to Droujinsky whom she believed to be a South African intelligence agent, and passed him four classified documents. In January 1999, she was sentenced to 22 years' imprisonment. Stand received 19 years and Jim Clark received 12 years and seven months.

In November 1990, Droujinsky attended a meeting at Newark Airport, New Jersey, with Jamal Mohamed Warrayat, a Kuwaiti-born veteran of the U.S. Army who had telephoned Iraq's mission to the United Nations to offer his services as an assassin. At their meeting, Warrayat suggested various acts of terrorism and was sentenced to a year's imprisonment for making threats.

E

ENBOM, FRITIOF. Early in 1952, a former petty officer in the Swedish Navy, Ernst Hilding Andersson was convicted of espionage for the Soviet Union and imprisoned while his contacts, an assistant military attaché and a TASS correspondent, left the country. Soon afterward, the Security police made a further six arrests. Those detained were Fritiof Enbom; his girlfriend Lilian Ceder, a journalist working on the north Swedish Communist newspaper *Norraskensflamman*; his brother Martin Enbom; an ex Swedish army sergeant Hugo Gersowold; Leo Fingal Larsson, a railway linesman and head of the local anti-sabotage unit in Buraa; and Artur Karlsson, a local councilor and member of the police board in the port of Halmstad. Simultaneously, a further five Soviet embassy staff went home.

In his confession, Enbom admitted that he had worked for the GRU for ten years and had been handled by five different GRU contacts who were interested in details of Swedish mobilization plans; naval charts of east coast minefields; maps of the posts at Stockholm and Karlskrona; and all information about coastal defenses and military installations. They also sought information about the fortress at Boden and the Kalix line in northern Sweden near the border with Finland. The Soviets were anxious to recruit a group of Communist railwaymen to sabotage Boden's arsenal and power station and to disrupt the rail system, perhaps using explosives stolen from the nearby iron ore mines. The intention was to equip the saboteurs with wireless communications so they could report on troop movements in the event of conflict. In SAPO's damage assessment it was concluded that one of the Enbom network's objective was to thwart plans for Swedish forces to fall back to a pre-prepared defensive position, having demolished the power stations at Porjus and Havapranget, and destroyed the iron ore assets at Kiruna, Gallivare and Malnberget, so as to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. *See also SWEDEN.*

ESTONIA. By virtue of its cultural heritage, the unpopularity of the Soviet occupation and the large number of emigrés concentrated in Germany, Estonia became one of the Cold War's intelligence frontlines, with the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) covertly supporting émigré groups in contact

with the partisans. A Central Intelligence Group report dated January 4, 1947, claimed that

Partisan activity centers around a wooded region some 40 km south of Tallinn and south of the railroad line Tallinn-Narwa-Leningrad. During the summer of 1946, repeated attacks were made on Red Army soldiers (Estonians drafted into the ranks) guarding German PW work details. It is said that after an initial show of resistance, the guards joined the partisans, Churchill's Fulton university speech has been summarized and given wide distribution by the partisans.

In January 1953, the CIA produced a comprehensive country plan, code-named AEBASIN, which set out the priority foreign intelligence (FI) targets:

1. Purpose

This Basic Plan is written to include all FI operations into the Estonian SSR and all activities connected with these objectives which are the responsibilities of the SR Division as defined in the USSR Country Strategic Plan.

2. Background

The originally approved LCHOMELY Project OPC/EE, 32-CMGFG, November 30, 1950, aimed to utilize Estonian emigre groups, leaders and organizations for the purpose of contacting underground resistance forces in the Estonian SSR and to infiltrate agents into the area. Upon receipt of AEBASIN approval, the former OPC Project LCHOMELY will be terminated.

3. References

1. OPC/EE-II Project LCHOMELY, 32-CMGFG, November 30, 1950.
2. USSR Country Strategic Plan (Top Secret Document Ref. #59961, May 1, 1952).

4. Objectives - FI

1. To organize, develop, and execute operations for infiltration into and exfiltration from the Estonian SSR of alien personnel for the purpose of establishing clandestine support points in the Estonian SSR and for the procurement of operational and strategic intelligence.
2. To determine the locations and composition of resistance nuclei which may exist in the Estonian SSR and which may be utilized in support of FI operations.
3. To establish in the Estonian SiSR covert resident agent personnel who can assist agent infiltration and exfiltration to and from the neighboring target areas of the USSR and who can assist in the coverage of long-range intelligence objectives.

5. Targets

Specific intelligence targets in the Estonian SSR are outlined in:

1. Top Secret SR Memorandum, Control #73433, March 21, 1952, "Intelligence Targets for 1952."
2. Top Secret SR Memorandum, Control #811795, 2 November 1952, "Priority Targets in the Baltic Republics, East Prussia, Karelo-Finnish SSR, Murmansk and Leningrad area."

6. Tasks

1. Dispatch trained agent personnel into the Estonian SSR.
2. Develop W/T, S/W, and courier communications with the Estonian SSR.
3. Accumulate operational data and documentation.
4. Spot and recruit local agents in the Estonian SSR.
7. Financially support certain Estonian Veterans Organizations in the U.S. in order that their membership may be used in spotting and recruiting agent candidates and, further, insure the necessary motivation on the part of these persons to undertake hazardous missions.

Implementation

1. Spot, assess, recruit, and train Estonian personnel for use in operations directed against the Estonian SSR.
2. Spotting and development of agents in the United States for dispatch into Estonia will be handled by principal and sub-agents recruited for that purpose in the United States
3. Recruitment of Estonian agents outside the United States will be implemented through the facilities of the CIA area stations involved.
4. Training of Estonian agents will be conducted primarily in the United States.
5. Agent candidates will be selected on the basis of area and language knowledge, physical and mental fitness, and psychological motivation.
6. While in training, agents and indigenous instructors will be physically controlled under DOB rules, regulations, and facilities under the direction and supervision of the HQ staff case officer. After infiltration, headquarters plans to maintain contact with agents via W/T, S/W, and courier facilities.
7. The cover used by case officers in the United States in contact with principal and operational agents is that of an unidentified U.S. government agency. The prospective covert associates probably are aware of being contracted by "American Secret Service." Agent cover legends will be prepared to fit the specific agent requirements and will be based on available documentation.

Coordination

1. Coordination of this plan has been effected with the Office of Communication, TSS, and Procurement and Supply. Consultations are in progress with the SR Logistics, Air and Maritime Support Offices.
 2. All activities under this Plan which will affect the areas of WE and/or WH divisions responsibilities will be coordinated with these divisions.
- c. Training of alien instructors has been and will continue to be coordinated with the Office of Training and DOB.
1. The problems of entry of aliens, and so on have been and will be coordinated with the Alien Affairs Staff, Inspection, and Security Office.

Requirements

A Personnel

1. U.S.Principal Contract Agent 5,200.00
2 U.S. Contract Sub-Agents 4,800.00
2 Contract alien Instructors 9,000.00
6 Operation agents 18,900.00
\$37,900.00

One alien contract instructor has been trained and is currently occupied in translation of trade craft material. One alien contract instructor has been granted covert security clearance and an admission to the United States under Section 8, Public Law 110.

Both of these instructors have had previous CIA connections abroad and experience in covert operations.

The Principal Contract Agent in the United States has been recruited and is under contract.

Six agent candidates have been spotted. Of the agents, three have covert security clearances and will arrive at the training area on/about June 1, 1953. The other three are expected to be recruited by July 15, 1953.

Equipment

Special equipment will include W/T, S/W, compasses, binoculars, personal wares, cameras, "I." tablets, Soviet-type clothing, writing paper, concentrated

foods, medical supplies, equipment for document falsification, rubles and articles of value for bribery and barter.

Other Support

1. Documentation and S/W requirements will be determined in coordination with T/SS during the course of agent training.
2. The personnel and safe-house facilities and training equipment for the training area will be provided by SR/DB.
3. Agent infiltration and exfiltration facilities are developed in conjunction with other related projects.

Financial - FI

Estimated Cost of the Plan (per 12 month period)

4. Personnel compensation – with a maximum salary \$5,200.00 and a minimum compensation \$1800.00 p. a.
\$37,900.00
 - Supplies, material, and equipment (including Commo equipment)
 - Operational expenses of the principal agent in the obtainment of operational intelligence and for spotting and recruitment of agent personnel
 - (U) Travel and transportation and living expense of potential recruits, agents and staff personnel
5. Bribery and barter items for agents under operational conditions
 - This amount includes Commo equipment, medical, chemical, ordinance, quartermaster, and other supplies and devices in the course of training and for infiltration.
 - This estimate does not include the cost of SR/D0B, TR, Commo, and other support branches personnel costs to the CIA nor the costs of establishment of operational support points outside Estonia.

Special Problems and Commitments

1. No commitments are made to other organizations under the AEBASIN Plan.
2. No disposal problems exist with the contract agents so far recruited. The principal agent is a first paper U.S. citizen and does not represent a disposal problem. The prospective agent candidates from Sweden will be promised help in re-establishing themselves in Europe or the Western Hemisphere after completion of their missions.
3. Contracts have been signed with two alien agent instructors, one of whom will also act in a consultant capacity.

AELUNG's contract was signed effective September 5, 1952, for one year for the period of his stay in Germany to the amount of \$4,200.00 per annum, with the understanding that upon his arrival in the United States, a new contract is to be signed with an increase in salary up to \$14,800 per annum. The present contract also includes disability and death benefits up to \$5,000.00 and is to be included in the renewed contract. CIA has sponsored AELUNG's immigration into the United States, and immigration permit for a permanent U.S. residence has been granted.

AENOTE is a contract covert associate has taken out the first U.S. citizenship papers and intends to become a permanent resident of the United States. His contract dates from September 22, 1952, for one year, at the annual salary rate of \$4,200.00, subject to termination on 15 days' notice.

This office has authorized the [XXXXXXXXX] to make commitments to the recruits up to \$350.00 per month salary, up to \$5,000.00 bonus to each agent after two years of satisfactory duty in the denied area, and death benefits of \$10,000.00.

In the case of agents recruited in the United States, compensation, bonuses, insurance and other benefits will be requested on the merits of each case. A \$10,000 policy for death benefits is considered to be appropriate in most cases.

4. More stringent border and internal controls as well as renewed mass deportation of the Estonian population will adversely affect the operation.

By May 1953, AEBASIN had developed into a proposal:

Area of Operations

Estonian SSR and vicinity

Purpose

Procurement of operational and strategic intelligence in the Estonian SSR

Establishment of support facilities in the Estonian SSR for the attainment of long-range intelligence objectives as defined in Reference a. below.

References

a USSR Country Strategic Plan (Top Secret document Ref. #59961, May 1, 1952)

AIBASIN Basic Plan (Top Secret document, Reg. #86981)

Background

In May 1952, LCHOMELY recruitment efforts in Sweden were canceled due to the unfavorable character of persons involved in recruiting, including controversial Estonian politicians. The agent candidates who had been spotted prior to May under LCHOMELY declined to undertake the mission in October. It was then considered necessary to concentrate all efforts for AEBASIN agent recruitment in the United States. The restrictions imposed upon the recruitment of FI agents in the United States for AIBASIN area necessitated the search for suitable assets in other areas. Since the Estonian emigre pool in Sweden was still considerable, a new approach to recruitment, well compartmented from political activity, was initiated in December 1952. A recruitment plan for AEBASIN candidates which specifically eliminated the LCHOMELY mistakes was submitted to the [XXXXXXX]. The plan was activated by the Principal Estonian **REDSOX** Agent in Stockholm, who proceeded with the recruitment task in his area in an efficient and secure manner. So far, the results produced by this principal agent through the [XXXXXX] have provided FI agent assets sufficient for the AEBASIN FI Project I.

Objectives.

To establish in the Estonian SSR covert resident agent personnel who can assist agents in the procurement of operational and strategic intelligence and provide assistance in agent infiltration and exfiltration.

Targets

Specific intelligence targets in the Estonian SSR are outlined in (1) Top Secret SR Memorandum, Control #73h33* March 21, 1952, "Intelligence Targets for 1952," and (2) Top Secret SB Memorandum, Control #8U795, November 21, 1952, "Priority Targets in the Baltic Republics, East Prussia, Karelo-Iinnish SSR, Murmansk and Leningrad Area."

v/ b« Other targets will be included according to the requirements from the JCS and according to the capabilities of the operating agents.

Tasks

- a) Establishment of infiltrated agents as legal residents.
- b) Establishment of W/T and S/W communication with the Field Base from the Estonian SSR.
- c) Establishment of support points in the Estonian SSR and utilization of these points for procurement of operational and strategic intelligence.
- d) Finding of suitable locations and means of infiltration and exfiltration from the Estonian SSI of non-American personnel.

- e) Location of resistance nuclei that may exist in the Estonian SSR which may be utilized in support of FI operations and who can assist in the coverage of long-range intelligence objectives.

Personnel

Pseudonyms or cryptonyma

1. AELUNG
2. AENOTE
3. AEPALM
4. AESKIP
5. AETAXI
6. AESTEM
7. RNCHANGE

Personal Data

AESTEM principal agent. AESTEM is a former Estonian Air Force colonel who, while still a high school student, began his fight against the communists in 1918 as a volunteer in the Estonian Army. He is 54-years old, a graduate of Estonian Military Staff College and speaks, reads, and writes Estonian, English, Osman, and Russian. He acquired some intelligence experience as Chief of the Estonian Voluntary Self-Defense Corps and Estonian Traffic Police during the German occupation of Estonia in 1941–1944. From February 1945 to April 1945, Subject worked with the German Abwehr on the Eastern front. During the years of 1929, 1932, and 1939, Subject was assigned by the Estonian government to the British Royal Air Force for the purpose of taking various courses and for the purchase of airplanes and equipment. Subject holds an important post in the Estonian Veterans Union in New York City, is a member of the Estonian National Committee in the United States, is a member of Anglo-Estonian Cultural Society, and a member of the Executive Board of the Estonian Relief Committee, Inc. in New York City. His contacts and connections with the Estonian emigre organizations to provide him good access to the potential agent pool for AEBASIN. AESTEM will be given training in spotting, recruitment, CE operations, and SI.

AELUNG: Agent Trainer. AELUNG is a former Estonian General Staff officer with a rank of captain up to 1940. He had an extensive experience in training agents for behind the Soviet line missions with Finnish and German intelligence during 1940–1945. He was recruited by the CIA in 1951 as a

principal LCHOMELY agent instructor in Germany. He was transferred to the United States in February 1953 in the same capacity for the AEBASIN project. AELUNG speaks, reads, and writes Estonian, English, German, and Russian and has an excellent area of knowledge as well as the understanding of handling native-born Estonian personnel. As a reputable and patriotic Estonian officer, he can contribute substantially to the agent motivation and psychological build-up in addition to trade and fieldcraft training. AELUNG will also serve in the capacity of an interpreter to the American Commo instructors.

ANOTE is employed as a junior non-American AEBASIN instructor. He is a native-born Estonian. The Subject has worked for five years for CIA and predecessor organizations in Europe and received formal tradecraft by OTS after being recruited in the United States. AENOTE has acquired a considerable knowledge about the Soviet reality by serving in the Soviet armed forces and labor camps during 1941–1945.

AEPALM (Agent) is a native-born Estonian with frontline experience in Estonian military units under German command from 1943 to July 1945. He is 26-years old and has signed an agreement to go to the Estonian SSR as a W/T operator for a two-year period after training in the United States. His motivation for undertaking the task is that of a patriotic Estonian soldier who wants to continue the fight against the Russians and communism.

AESKIP (Agent) is a native-born Estonian, 28 years of age and has been recruited as a W/T operator for work in the Estonian SSR after complete training in the United States. AESKIP has had no military training but has been a seaman since 1942, and as a seaman has visited most of the European ports. According to the recruiter's assessment, AESKIP is capable of learning everything that is necessary for the task before him.

RNCHANGE (Agent) is to be trained as a W/T operator agent for the Estonian SSR. He has many relatives and friends in the target area who probably will provide some support to him and to the other agents. The Subject is 30 years old and a seasoned frontline veteran of the Estonian front during World War II and has had experience with the Estonian partisan forces. He was recommended by the AEBASIN recruiter as a man with a well-developed character, an old soldier and a bitter enemy of the communists and Russians; he is undertaking the assignment as an opportunity to work against the Russians in Estonia—an opportunity for which he has waited for a long time.

AETAXI (Agent), native-born Estonian, 30 years of age, is to be trained as a W/T operator agent for the Estonian SSR. He has relatives and friends whom he hopes to be able to contact for operational support. He has frontline experience fighting the USSR with Germany during the war. He and

RNCHANGE are friends of long-standing and have confidence in each other's ability.

AEPALM was in training from June until October. He was removed from the Project because he did not fit in with the other two men. He is being considered for other projects within the branch.

AESKIP was found unacceptable for agent work. He was returned to Sweden and told that, because of improved world conditions (truce in Korea) that the proposed missions were canceled.

Cover

The cover used by the case officers in the United States in contact with the principal agents, instructor agents and with agent trainees is that of an unidentified U.S. Government agency. The covert associates are aware of being contacted by the American Secret Service. Agent cover legends will be prepared to fit the specific agent requirements and will be based on available documentation. The Cover Division will provide AESTEM, the principal agent in the United States with an appropriate cover for employment.

For operational purposes, Subject has a natural cover due to his positions in various Estonian emigre organizations. His employment cover with a manufacturer of aircraft parts is in agreement with his profession and training as an Air Force officer.

Contact and Communications

- a) a. There will be direct contact between the agents and the case officer during the training period. Personal contact will be maintained with the principal agent and AEBASIN instructors.
- b) Through DOB facilities, an emergency contact with AESTEM will be established via a mail box.
- c) b. AESTEM agent will establish his own contacts with the sub-agents in the United States and other areas.
- d) c. W/T communication is planned as the primary channel of communication with the agents in the Target area.
 - a. An alternate or emergency channel of contact will be attempted through S/W channels.
- e) Control and Motivation

AESTEM and indigenous instructors (AELUNG) are physically under U.S. control due to the fact that they have established permanent residence in the United States. In the case of action agents, they are dependent on the CIA

for help in rehabilitation after completion of their missions; their salaries and bonuses remain under Agency control. They are apparently not subordinated to any other government, with the possible exception of future free Estonia. The agents are neither connected with nor owe their loyalty to the old Estonian, politicians, or diplomats. In the case of AELUNG and AESTEM, there is a patriotic officers' desire to continue the battle against the Communists and to liberate Estonia. To be able to work even remotely for this purpose on a full-time basis appears to be the primary motive for working with the Agency. Both of these agents realize that the defeat of communism can come only through U.S. leadership as the major world power. (AENOTE apparently has a definite liking for intelligence work; he also has a desire for the relatively good income derived from employment as an agent instructor.)

Coordination

- a. Coordination of this project has been effected with the Office of Communication, TSS, Procurement and Supply, SI Logistics, SR/DOB, and consultations are in progress with Air and Maritime Support Offices.
- b. All activities under this project which affect the areas of WE and/or WH divisions' responsibilities are and will continue to be coordinated with these divisions.
- c. Training of alien instructors and agents has been and will continue to be coordinated with the Office of Training and DOB.
- d. The problems of the entry of aliens have been and will continue to be coordinated with the Alien Affairs Branch, Inspection and Security Office.
- e. Procurement of supplies and equipment has been and will continue to be coordinated with the Procurement and Supply Office.

Timetable

- a) Mission I. The estimated date of engagement of three agents will be about June 1, 1953. Training will **begin** about 15 June and will continue through March 31, 1954. The estimated time of agent departure from the United States and the beginning of the target mission will be in early spring 1954. The date of termination for Mission I is estimated to be in summer 1956.
- b) b.Mission II. The estimated date of engagement of three additional agents will be in July 1953. Training of the team will begin about August 1, 1953, and will continue through July 1954. Departure of Mission II from the United States and the beginning of the target mission will be

in mid-summer 1954. The mission is estimated to be terminated in the summer of 1956. Infiltration Method: The team will be dropped by air into the Target area.

Special Problems and Commitments

1. The Agency is committed to providing assistance for rehabilitation in Sweden or in the Western Hemisphere after satisfactory performance of duty on a two-year mission in the denied area.
2. Agents who go on missions into the denied area have been promised \$10,000.00 death benefits and \$5,000.00 bonus each after two years of satisfactory duty in the target area.
3. More stringent border and internal controls as well as a renewed mass deportation of the Estonian population will adversely affect the operations.
4. Escrow accounts are authorized for RNCHANGE and AETAXI. During each month of the training period, each agent will be paid \$100 in cash and \$250.00 will be deposited in an escrow account. If the agent refuses to go on his mission, the amount in escrow will be forfeited. During the period that the agent is on his mission, his entire salary will be placed in escrow.

EVATT, HERBERT. Born in April 1894 at East Maitland, New South Wales, the son of a publican from India, “Bert” Evatt graduated from St Andrew’s College, University of Sydney, in 1918 with a law degree. He traveled to London in 1926 to attend an international conference on labor migration and in 1930 was appointed **Australia’s** youngest high court judge. He was also a prolific historian and was elected to Parliament in 1940 and was appointed attorney-general in September 1941, a post he would hold until 1949. When the Labor Party leader Ben Chifley died in June 1951, Evatt succeeded him

When in April 1954 **Vladimir Petrov** was defected, Evatt did not grasp the ramifications and instead interpreted the decision to appoint a Royal Commission on Espionage as a scheme masterminded by Sir Robert Menzies’ government. When he learned that some of his own staff, including his secretary **Allan Dalziel** were to be accused of inappropriate contact with the Soviet embassy, Evatt chose to represent them before the tribunal, and he did so until he was excluded in September, but he accused Petrov of participating in a plot and denounced his documents as forgeries.

Although the Royal Commission members were briefed privately about the VENONA material, which incriminated Dalziel and made Evatt look naïve,

it was not referred to in the final report which was published in September 1955. Evatt remained unaware of the nature of the evidence against several of his colleagues. Specifically, the decrypts showed that a veteran Communist, Wally Clayton, was identified as a spy codenamed KLOD who headed a spy-ring which had penetrated the wartime Security Service with an agent codenamed BEN, who was actually a police officer, Sergeant Alf Hughes. Clayton answered to the TASS correspondent, Fedor Nosov, codenamed TECHNICIAN, and was in contact with several sub-agents who passed him information. Among these sources was Dr. Ian Milner, a high-flying civil servant who had been the External Affairs representative on the Post Hostilities Planning Committee with access to a document known to have been sent to Moscow. Milner had been mentioned by name in a fragmented VENONA text dated September 29, 1945, which was in itself inconclusive, but it had placed him in the company of James F. Hill, another External Affairs official who had been explicitly credited with supplying British Foreign Office documents which had been removed from Evatt's office.

Apart from this, both at the first and second meeting MILNER and HILL told him many interesting things. In addition, Hill gave him copies of several official telegrams from the British Foreign Office and also a copy of a most secret report of the Australian Department of External Affairs and the Institute of International Relations on the political and economic situation in South-East Europe. The report, addressed to EVATT, contains a [1 group unrecovered] secret information received from the British Foreign Office and also gives certain important conclusions and the current situation in BULGARIA, ROMANIA, and GREECE.

Although the signature on this VENONA was unrecovered, and it remains only one of two VENONA texts referring to Milner, the evidence against both him and Hill was conclusive. The other text, dated October 6, 1945, and sent in the name of General Pavel M. Fitin at Moscow centre, contained instructions about the recruitment of new agents and, taken together with the heading, showing that the telegram was addressed to Semen Makarov in direct response to his of 29 September, amounts to convincing proof that Makarov had taken the initiative for recruiting both Milner and Hill and had accepted information from both without the proper authorization from the centre. For this, Makarov had earned a rebuke:

Send by the next post particulars required for clearing and detailed biographical descriptions for MILNER and HILL.

If possible do not take any steps in the way of bringing in new agents without a decision from us. As can be seen from your report about M and H, you automatically gave your consent to their employment without having informed us and are already receiving materials. Be careful in your work and

more exacting both toward yourself and toward the agency as regards the quality of intelligence.

In spite of this compelling link with Makarov, Milner was never confronted with the allegation and was allowed to remain in External Affairs, having been detached to the United Nations secretariat in New York at the end of 1946. There he remained, with the rank of first secretary, under intermittent surveillance by the FBI, and apart from one visit home in late 1949, when ASIO kept a watch on him, and a temporary secondment to UN duty in Seoul, he remained in the United States until his annual vacation in June 1950. Then he and his wife Margot took their leave in Switzerland, but unexpectedly traveled to Vienna, and early in July, slipped over the Czech border and took up a post teaching English literature at Charles University, and he remained in Prague until his death in May 1991.

Whereas Milner was only mentioned in two VENONA texts, Jim Hill's name appeared in several others, and subsequently was ascribed the code-name TOURIST. Indeed, one dated May 5, 1948, mentioned his sister's husband, Wilbur N. Christiansen, who apparently was also an active source for Makarov, codenamed MASTERCRAFTSMAN. Dr. Christiansen was a radio astronomer at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, where his work on radio physics was unclassified, and when much later he was interviewed by the Royal Commission, he denied ever having been a Communist and was unable to explain how he might have acquired a Soviet codename.

There could be no question about Hill's involvement as one of Makarov's key sources, but he remained an official in the Department of External Affairs, first in the Post Hostilities Division working alongside Dr. Milner, and then in London after his transfer to the Australian High Commission with the rank of first secretary late in December 1949. Although his brother Ted, a leading barrister, was a well-known Communist, Jim's CPA membership, which dated back to 1938, had lapsed, but he realized his connections had been investigated in the middle of June 1950 when he was interviewed by MI5's Jim Skardon but declined to confess to espionage. Thereafter Hill was denied access to classified data and recalled to Canberra. In January 1951, he was transferred to the Legal Services Bureau of the Attorney General's Department, and when it was made clear to him that his career would go no further, he retired into private practice in June 1953.

One of Hill's friends was Rupert Lockwood, who four years later was to come under suspicion himself when he was identified as the author of a document removed from the *resident's* safe by Petrov as he defected in April 1954. As for Eric Burhop, he had been the subject of a partly fragmented VENONA text dated August 29, 1945, which suggests that he too had been

recommended by Clayton as being of interest to the Soviets as a potential source:

KLOD at the end of a letter talks about a professor in MELBOURNE [6 groups unrecovered] physics Australian scientist Eric BURHOP [42 groups unrecovered]

BURHOP did not come to Australia and at the present time is in LONDON, continuing scientific research. According to KLOD's words, B was considered a prominent scientist in Australia. Furthermore, the latter has been a member of the FRATERNAL [Communist Party] since 1937. On an assignment of the Party, he conducted great [1 word unrecovered] among scientific workers. [7 groups unrecovered] Note: KLOD has been given the task of collecting on BURHOP [6 groups unrecovered] his address, place of residence, and work in America [25 groups unrecovered]

Wally Clayton's network may or may not have included Burhop, who appeared in only this one VENONA, but the intercepts proved that his organization extended even further into External Affairs, with three references to another diplomat, Ric Throssel, the son of a war hero, Hugo Throssel VC, and Katherine Prichard, a member of the CPA's Central Committee. The first VENONA concerning Throssel, from Makarov dated September 30, 1945, was unflattering:

KLOD has reported that the Department of External Affairs has appointed THROSSEL—the son of a member of the FRATERNAL [Communist Party] the well-known authoress Katherine PRICHARD—as 3rd secretary to the Australian Legation in MOSCOW. THROSSEL has only just passed out of the diplomatic school at the Australian Department of External Affairs. Even before he received the appointment, KLOD in a conversation with PRICHARD clearly hinted to her that from the point of view of the Party it would be better if he went to a post in Europe, for example in HOLLAND. PRICHARD, however, very much wanted her son to go to the Soviet Union and had her way.

THROSSEL is described by KLOD as a person of limited intelligence. His relations with his mother are normal; his mother dotes on him.

Note: THROSSEL's appointment is rather strange, in that EVATT is well aware who PRICHARD is. It may be possible abroad to establish clearly the significance of EVATT's move. KLOD has been given the task of discovering the real ulterior motive for THROSSEL's appointment and detailed information about his character.

1. This initial, unencouraging assessment was sent when Throssel was working in the Post Hostilities Division with Hill and Milner, and shortly before his departure to the legation in Moscow as a third secretary. Three years later, just before his appointment to Rio de Janeiro,

Throssel appeared in two VENONA decrypts, by which time he had achieved the codename FERRO. On May 16, Makarov was instructed by the centre to Hold the meeting with KLOD on May 20 and find out the following from him:

1. Among his old sources whose material he passed to us formerly, whom does KLOD recommend that we should take on, apart from PROFESSOR and TOURIST?
2. What opportunities have FERRO and GIRLFRIEND and does KLOD recommend that we should use them [74 groups unrecovered]

This directive was followed on June 5, 1948, by a longer questionnaire from Moscow, signed in the name of Fitin's successor, General Petr V. Fedotov, in which Throssel was mentioned again. A member of the Soviet Central Committee, Fedotov, was very close to Beria and, according to the FBI's informant Boris Morros, was "a softly-spoken intellectual, who had been Stalin's bodyguard at both Potsdam and Yalta." For Throssel to come to Fedotov's personal attention was indeed significant:

At the next meeting with KLOD please ascertain:

- (a) what positions SISTER and BEN occupy at present and whether they can be used for our work? (b) [2 groups unrecovered] GIRLFRIEND with the work and the possibility of using her in the future. (c) Where are FERRO and ARTISTE living? (d) Is it advisable to bring FERRO into our work in view of the fact that his mother is well known in the Commonwealth as an influential ACADEMICIAN [Party member]? (e) How is it proposed to organize liaison between FERRO and MASTERCRAFTSMAN in view of the fact that they live in different town? (f) Will KLOD release ARTISTE from secretarial work if he is suitable for us?
2. Hurry up getting detailed character reports on all candidates recommended by KLOD. Ascertain what experience of working with people under illegal conditions [59 groups unrecoverable]

This VENONA text casts some doubt on Throssel's status as one of Clayton's fully indoctrinated spies, and when he was interrogated by ASIO in March 1953, he denied ever having been a Communist (although his wife Dorothy had been between 1942 and 1944), or having met Clayton. ASIO remained dissatisfied and another, more hostile interview was conducted in July 1954, but he was adamant. Eventually, the Royal Commission, which investigated Vladimir Petrov's assertion that Throssel had been a spy but had been dormant since his return from Brazil in 1952, cleared Throssel of

having consciously passed information to Clayton. Nevertheless, Throssel is discussed in one VENONA decrypt in the same context with two other confirmed Soviet sources. The first was Herbert W. Tattersell, codenamed ARTISTE, an English migrant and veteran CPA member then working as a civil servant in the Department of Postwar Reconstruction, whose identity only emerged after Petrov's defection. A friend of Clayton's, he had probably not enjoyed access to classified information but more likely had acted as his assistant. The second, however, was more important and was quickly identified as Frances Burnie, codenamed SISTER, a typist who had worked for Allan Dalziel, and who first had been the subject of a VENONA from Makarov on April 25, 1945:

KLOD has informed TECHNICIAN that Francisca BURNY, who began to work 4 or 5 months ago at EVATT's as a secretary-typist, is an under-cover member of the FRATERNAL [Communist Party]. Without giving details about BURNY, KLOD indicated that she is 22 years old, married and that he personally is connected with her through the FRATERNAL. Furthermore, KLOD says that he is giving her detailed instructions on how to conduct herself while working in EVATT's outfit particularly emphasizing to her that she should be scrupulously careful in speaking about her work so that none of her friends, or even her relatives, with the exception of himself (KLOD) should know what she is doing and what materials pass through her hands.

Note: Secretary-typist BURNY really does work at EVATT's. TECHNICIAN has seen her a number of times in the secretariat. At the next meeting with KLOD, TECHNICIAN will ask for detailed data about her and also will establish whether KLOD is receiving any materials through her and how.

Later, on July 5, 1945, Makarov had much more to report about Burnie:

KLOD has given additional data about SISTER. In 1942, she took an active part in the work of the EUREKA youth organization (the local Young Communist League), and since 1943 has been a member of the FRATERNAL [Communist Party]. In 1943, SISTER was working as assistant secretary of the EUREKA organization. At this period, the FRATERNAL had some doubts about her social past, environment, and connections. The doubts were raised by the instability of her conduct. SISTER comes from the middle levels of the population. Her family was against her becoming a member of the FRATERNAL. Despite this, SISTER later of her own accord entered the FRATERNAL, but did not become an active member. In 1943, SISTER left her parents. She wanted to get away from family restrictions and be a bit nearer to the centre of the youth organization. While in the latter she appealed to KLOD to get her into a post in the FRATERNAL organization. Being at that time in an extremely poor state of health (advanced tuberculosis) she was

advised to go back to her family and rest for about six months. Some months later, she came back again and was told of a decision to find some sort of work [6 groups unrecovered]

X GLUCK who is a member of the FRATERNAL and that being married had had an exceptionally favorable influence upon her. She became steadier and more serious. Her husband at present is in the army in the Labor Corps and is afraid that people might know about his being a member of the FRATERNAL.

While working as a journalist in AUSTRIA, he was a member of the Social Democratic Party. He attempted to hide this fact saying that he was a member of the Austrian FRATERNAL. He apparently gives the impression of being a weak fellow and a typical social democrat in his convictions and conduct. At one time, he asked the Party to release him from the Labor Corps, but his request was refused. KLOD says that his connection with the Party is founded on a basis of emotion rather than of class. A good quality in SISTER as KLOD notes is that she is not talkative. However, he thinks that a lot of work will need to be put in on her in order to turn her into a worker we can be sure of. KLOD has begun to carry out work along these lines. He has already had a number of meetings with her. KLOD thinks SISTER is EVATT's secretaries' typist for secret correspondence. She sits in a separate room. At one of the meetings, she brought KLOD some copies of some of secretary DALZIEL's letters to his minister EVATT in SAN FRANCISCO. The materials are of no great interest. However, there are some data on the increasing struggle between the Liberal Party (MENZIES) and the Labor people, and also on the growing squabble for power within the Labor government, in view of which DALZIEL, giving vent to the opinion of some Labor Party members, advises him to hurry back to AUSTRALIA and make himself the power in the government. [6 groups unrecoverable] urgently put forward the necessary propaganda and agitation in opposition to the reactionary Liberal Party. KLOD warned me that for a start he refrained from accepting any documents from SISTER and instructed her on the lines that she should try to give interesting accounts herself from memory.

Frances Bernie, easily identified by the description and her marriage to Max Gluck, was a typist who had begun work for Dalziel in Dr. Evatt's office in Sydney in November 1944 and had been employed until April 12, 1945. She was eventually interviewed in 1953 by ASIO's Regional director for New South Wales, Ron Richards, when she acted as a referee for a migrant's naturalization application. ASIO took the opportunity to interview her six times and, with the offer of immunity from prosecution, she admitted that she had passed documents to Clayton on about half a dozen occasions. In October 1954, he gave further testimony to the Royal Commission, and her evidence

provided the essential link that could be made public by the authorities, connecting Clayton to Soviet espionage. However, she was far from candid, and deliberately limited her statements to avoid incriminating Clayton more than was absolutely necessary, so she denied she had ever been guided by Clayton, and insisted that she had found the job in Dr. Evatt's office on her own initiative, answering a newspaper advertisement.

Evatt himself never learned of the weight of evidence against his staff, and the truth would only emerge when the VENONA program was declassified in 1995. In the interim, Evatt's Labor Party was defeated in the elections called for December 1954. He suffered a stroke in March 1962, resigned his seat in October and died in November 1965 in Canberra.

F

FALKLANDS CONFLICT (1982). Although not a **proxy war**, the Argentine invasion and occupation of the Falkland Islands in April 1982 provided the British with an opportunity to apply the tactics and techniques developed in anticipation of a Soviet confrontation in the North Atlantic, particularly in relation to the deployment of the Royal Navy's nuclear-powered hunter-killed submarines.

Although there was never any formal declaration of war between the two protagonists, the conflict involved the first naval engagements for the Royal Navy since the **Korean War**. The first British submarine on the scene was HMS *Spartan*, which was followed by *Splendid*, *Conqueror* and finally *Valiant* (equipped with a towed array), but because their arrival was too late to prevent the Argentine landings, they were deployed along the Argentine coast to enforce a declared exclusion zone and to monitor Argentine naval and air activity.

On May 2, 1982, HMS *Conqueror* was responsible for sinking the ARA *General Belgrano* as it participated in a pincer-movement attack on the British Task Force, with the loss of 321 Argentine crewmen. This episode, a turning-point in the conflict, persuaded the remainder of the Argentine fleet, including its aircraft carrier the *Veinticin co de Mayo*, to remain in port or keep with the country's 12-mile territorial limit. On several occasions, the four nuclear submarines had other targets in their sights, but were prevented from sinking them by adherence to very strict Rules-of-Engagement. On May 16, *Splendid* spotted two Type-42 destroyers, the *Hercules* and *Comodoro Py*, and three A69 frigates, but was refused permission to attack. Similarly, when *Valiant* found two destroyers well inside the sanctuary of the territorial limit in the Strecho de la Maire, the Attorney-General Sir Michael Havers refused the Ministry of Defence's request to allow an attack. These events were watched closely by the Soviet Bloc.

Great Britain's recovery of its dependent territories had a profound impact on the Kremlin which misjudged the country's determination to fight and thought victory was unlikely. The U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman described the episode as "a major contribution to breaking the will of the

Soviet Union.” Moscow strategists were obliged “to rethink their assumptions for Western Europe and begin to take NATO forces far more seriously.”

FERRET FLIGHTS. Throughout the Cold War both the protagonists drew reconnaissance missions up, and occasionally into, hostile airspace in an effort to evaluate the local air defenses. The procedure usually adopted by **NATO** was for one aircraft to deliberately infringe Warsaw Pact airspace and provoke radar and communications traffic while a stand-off electronic surveillance platform would monitor and record the resulting transmissions. The objective was to identify the location and frequencies of radar stations; the range and specifications of the radar; communications exchanged between the radar sites and airfields; and the efficiency of vectoring interceptors. These missions found gaps in the radar coverage that could be exploited if a genuine air attack was contemplated, gave NATO pilots a realistic picture of fighter response times, and provided analysts with the crucial data required to develop countermeasures.

In August 1947, the U.S. Army Air Force began its ferret flights; code-named **PASSIONATE** and **BIOGRAPH**:

1. The subject operations are divided into two projects, **PASSIONATE** and **BIOGRAPH**, both of which are classified Top Secret.
2. **PASSIONATE** consists of one especially fitted B-29 electronic search airplane. It is operating in the Alaska, Kurile, Siberian coastal areas and has been over the North Pole. Its primary mission is a search for enemy radar and loran data, covering a search range of from [XXXXXXXXXX] MCS. The crew includes six countermeasures specialists and one man from ASA.
3. This mission is considered a most hazardous one both from the natural peril and capture standpoints. All flight personnel are volunteers and are fully apprised of possible consequences should the plane be forced to land in foreign territory. The crew is warned that in the event of detention in foreign territory, repatriation will be attempted but will probably be unsuccessful. For purposes of cover, the project is described as a weather mission. Equipment for complete demolition of the plane and its contents has been provided. Foreign coasts are approached to within 15 or 20 miles.
4. As a supporting project, three other planes (not B-29s) are in the Alaskan area but electronic search in this instance is considered secondary to regular operations.
6. Mission **BIOGRAPH** operates in the European area primarily in search of guided missile activity. Operations are conducted in the Baltic and other suspected areas using two B-17 planes.

7. These two projects will be rapidly expanded and by July 1948 it is expected that 10 B-29s, especially fitted as in PASSIONATE, will be available for special electronic search projects under cognizance of the Strategic Air Command.

By their very nature, ferret flights were hazardous undertakings and resulted in casualties. On December 14, 1965, an RB-57 was lost over the Black Sea, a disappearance attributed to Soviet action or an accident with the oxygen supply, although no evidence was ever found to explain what had happened to the mission which had flown from Incirlik. The aircraft, assigned to the 7407th Support Squadron based at Rhein-Main, had a crew of two, the pilot Lester L. Lackey and his navigator Robert Yates, and the incident led to the termination of all further electronic and photographic missions flown from Turkey.

Ferret flights continued throughout the Cold War, concentrating on Germany from airbases in the Federal Republic; the Baltic, from RAF Mildenhall, RAF Molesworth and RAF Wyton; the Black Sea, and Kamchatka from bases in Japan. Soviet air defenses reacted with varying degrees of aggression to these flights, and of course the Kremlin undertook similar exercises into NATO airspace.

On September 4, 1954, a U.S. Navy P2V-5 was shot down off Siberia by two MiG-15s and all but one of the crew of 10 was rescued. On November 7, 1954, an RB-29 was shot down by two Soviet fighters near the Japanese island of Hokkaido, but 11 of the crew survived, with one fatality. On April 17, 1955, two MiG-15s shot down an RB-47E near Kamchatka. Based at Eielson with the 4th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, all the crew of three were killed. On September 2, 1958, a C-130 on a SUN VALLEY signals intelligence collection mission was shot down near Sasnashen in Armenia by a MiG-17, killing the crew of 17. On July 1, 1960, an RB-47H Stratojet of the 38th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron was shot down by a MiG-15. Four of the crew were killed, but the pilot and navigator survived.

FOCCART, JACQUES. Born in August 1913 and employed at the Renault car manufacturer, Jacques Foccart was called up for the army but was demobilized in June 1940 and participated in the resistance, joining the Direction-General des Etudes et Recherche. After the war he ran his own import-export company, Safiex, conducting business in West Africa, but maintained his links to the intelligence community and was closely associated with General de Gaulle's security adviser Jacques Soustelle. In 1958, he was appointed an adviser on African policy to the prime minister and during the Algerian crisis was linked to the Service d'Action, a covert group led by Colonel Robert Roussillat that acquired an unsavory reputation for taking ruthless

countermeasures against the Organisation Armée Secrete. Between 1960 and 1974, he worked at the Elysée Palace in the role of secretary general for African Affairs, but during this period, he came under investigation as the source of leaks to Francois Saar-Demichel, a suspected Soviet spy and member of the SAPPHIRES network.

SAPPHIRES was described by the KGB defector Anatoli Golitsyn as a Soviet spy-ring inside the Service de Documentation Exterieur et de Contre Espionage (SDECE) and prompted the resignation of the organization's representative in Washington, D.C., Philippe Thyraud de Vosjoli, who was suspicious of SDECE's apparent reluctance to investigate the claims. SDECE's chief, the Comte Alexandre de Marenches, instituted a purge at SDECE's Paris headquarters and dismissed several senior officers, among them René Bertrand (alias "Colonel Beaumont") who was replaced by Didier Faure Beaulieu, and Jacques Hervé who was succeeded by Ferret Patin.

No evidence was found to confirm suspicions about Foccart, but the controversy surrounding his career continued long after his death in Paris in March 1997.

FRANCE. The decision of Charles de Gaulle's government to leave NATO's integrated military command in June 1966 came as a considerable relief in some parts of the western alliance which was concerned about the Kremlin's influence over the Elysée Palace. In particular, successive **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) station chiefs in Paris, such as Jim Hunt and Al Ulmer, had attempted to alert the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire's (DST) Marcel Chalet and Daniel Doustin, and a few other trusted members of the French intelligence community of the extent of hostile penetration of SDECE. The French government seemed incapable of seeping secrets from the Kremlin and any double agent operations attempted by SDECE or the DST against the KGB invariably foundered.

The catalyst had been the defection in December 1961 of Anatoli Golitsyn in Helsinki who had spent a year working in the KGB First Chief Directorate's NATO section where he had been fully briefed on Soviet sources within the French government. Golitsyn had been able to give his CIA interrogators enough clues for them to identify John Vassall as a spy in the British Admiralty and **George Paques**, then working at NATO headquarters. Both were arrested and convicted of espionage, but there were several others, in positions of significant influence, who had burrowed deep into the French establishment and enjoyed a measure of political protection, if not immunity.

Golitsyn's revelations, particularly in regard to penetration of SDECE, the Elysée Palace and the Hotel Matignon caused alarm in Paris, especially when

he described a spy-ring codenamed SAPPHIRES, “so called because they were so brilliant,” who had been recruited before or during the war when they had held leftist or pro-communist views.”

Among those implicated by Golitsyn were Francois Saar-Demichel, a former SDECE officer who had been compromised by the Soviets in Moscow in 1960. He had been questioned by the DST in March 1960 because he was suspected of being a Czechoslovak agent. He had left the SDECE in 1950 and had set himself up in business dealing with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He was a frequent visitor to the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early 1960s. He also had connections with **Jacques Foccart**, and this gave rise to suspicions in the CIA that Foccart was the source of leaks from the Elysée Palace. In February 1964, Chalet disclosed that Saar-Demichel, who had also been denounced more recently by the KGB defector Yuri Nosenko, would be “taken out of circulation” by the spreading of adverse information on him through the judicial, political, and economic authorities. In May 1965, the DST reported that he would soon be arrested, based upon a well-documented case showing how the KGB had made extensive use of Saar-Demichel as an agent of influence, and this dossier was passed to the CIA in 1971.

Also implicated was Constantin Melnik, Prime Minister Michel Debré’s intelligence adviser between January 1959 and April 1962 who had once alerted Chalet to his suspicion that Paques was rather more left-wing than he pretended. Melnik, who had a Ukrainian family background, had been heavily involved in the management of a SDECE double agent codenamed PERPIGNAN, actually Jacques Soubrier, a journalist on a right-wing newspaper who had been used by French intelligence against the Abwehr in the prewar and early wartime periods. In 1957, SDECE had attempted to run him against the Soviets and was handled first by Igor Yezhov and then Vladimir Snegirev of the KGB’s Paris *rezdientura*. At Snegirev’s suggestion, PERPIGNAN had introduced him to a leading Gaullist député, Christian Lunet de la Malene. This operation continued until August 1960 when the Soviets terminated it without explanation, leading the DST to suspect that Melnik, who was a prolific author, specializing in books on espionage subjects, may have been an authentic Soviet spy. Curiously, after Paques’ release from prison, Melnik approached him to write an autobiography.

The DST’s enquiries into high-level Soviet penetration of its own organization, SDECE and the entire French government was probably doomed because of the very considerable influence exercised by the powerful Communist Party and served to further undermine the confidence of British and American allies who remained unimpressed by the failure to clear up so many unresolved espionage leads.

G

GAST, GABRIELE. A Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) analyst who fell for Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) Romeo spy Karl-Heinz Schneider, while completing her doctorate in Karl- Marx-Stadt in 1968, Gabrielle Gast applied for a job with the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) at its headquarters in Pullach and by 1987 was deputy chief of the BND's Soviet Bloc political branch and a dedicated convert to Communism. Three years later, she was betrayed by Karl-Christoff Grossmann, a senior HVA officer anxious to ingratiate himself with the Federal Republic, who knew only that his chief Markus Wolf had been running a woman inside the BND for years and that the woman had adopted her sister's handicapped child, but this was enough information for the BfV to identify Gast and she was arrested in September 1990 as she attempted to drive across the Austrian border. At her trial, she was sentenced to six years and nine months' imprisonment and was released on parole in 1998.

Born in March 1943, Gast joined the BND in November 1973 and continued her relationship with Schneider for 17 years before she learned his true role. She published her autobiography in 1999 and has since campaigned to protect former East German intelligence personnel.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (GDR). Throughout the Cold War, the Soviets regarded Berlin as the focus of attention for collection operations against their **NATO** adversaries and established Karlshorst as the KGB's largest *rezidentura* on foreign territory. However, the KGB also acknowledged a reliance on the East Germans, and in particular the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), under the leadership of the legendary Markus Wolf, to penetrate NATO through the Federal Republic. The HVA was the foreign intelligence branch of the Ministry of State Security (MfS) that employed an estimated 85,000 full-time staff, supported by a much larger number of informers. Externally, the HVA was thought to run around 4,000 agents.

The HVA's agents inside NATO included Ingrid Garbe, a member of the **Federal Republic of Germany's** (FRG) mission at NATO's headquarters;

Ursel Lorenzen, who worked in NATO's general secretariat; and Imelda Verrept, a secretary in NATO's international secretariat who published a booklet, *NATO Gambles with Nuclear War*, based on an interview that was broadcast by the GDR on April 29, 1980.

An economics graduate, **Rainer Rupp** joined NATO in 1977 and, together with his English wife Ann-Christine Bowen who also worked at the Brussels headquarters, spied for the HVA. She was codenamed TURQUOISE, and her husband's name appeared on a file marked TOPAZ. They were betrayed by the HVA defector Heinrich Busch and were arrested while on a visit to Saarburg in 1993. The following year he was sentenced to 12 years and she received a 22-month suspended prison sentence. He was released in July 2000.

The HVA's priority targets were NATO at all levels, the Federal Republic and its institutions, with a special emphasis on the FRG's foreign intelligence agency, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), and the counterespionage service, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV). Both organizations were penetrated, the BND by Hans Clemens, Heinz Felfe and Willi Krichbaum, and the BfV by Klaus Kuron and Hans-Joachim Tiedge.

Wolf also recruited Gabrielle Gast, a BND analyst who had fallen for Karl-Heinz Schneider while she had been completing her doctorate in Karl-Marx-Stadt in 1968. Under his guidance, she had applied for a job with the BND at its headquarters in Pullach and by 1987 was deputy chief of the BND's Soviet Bloc political branch and a dedicated covert to communism. Three years later, she was betrayed by a senior HVA defector, Karl-Christoph Grossmann, who knew only that Wolf had been running a woman inside the BND for years, and she had adopted a handicapped child, but this was enough for the BfV to identify Gast and she was sentenced to six years and nine months imprisonment. She was released in 1994 and returned to Munich.

The HVA particularly favored the infiltration of agents into the FRG's political establishment, and Wolf successfully supervised the penetration of Konrad Adenauer's chancellery with an agent codenamed FELIX who pretended to be a sales representative marketing beauty products to hairdressers and had seduced NORMA, one of the Chancellor's less attractive secretaries. Their relationship had lasted for some years until the BfV had started to take an interest in FELIX and he was withdrawn to safety in East Berlin. On FELIX's advice another potentially vulnerable secretary who worked for Hans Globke, Adenauer's secretary of State was cultivated, this time by the HVA's Hans Stöhler, who pretended to be a Russian. She was eventually recruited and codenamed GUDRUN. She continued to supply valuable information until Stöhler, a former Luftwaffe pilot whose cover was that of an estate agent, fell ill and was brought home to die.

In a similar case, Margarete Hoke, a secretary in the office of the FRG's president, was seduced by one of Wolf's men, Hans-Jürgen Henze. She had

previously worked in the mobilization and security departments, and in 1968, she agreed to help him with what he described as purely academic research. Using the alias “Franz Becker: he pressed her for further information, and over a period of 10 years supplied him with mobilization plans, secret weekly Foreign Ministry reports, and details of the president’s meetings with foreign diplomats. Even after Henze returned to East Germany in 1976, he continued to meet her in Bonn and Zurich, where she handed over plans for the deployment of **Pershing II** missiles. When she was arrested in 1985 Höke confessed and was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. She was released in December 1989.

Another of Wolf’s agents was Dagmar Kahlig-Scheffler, a 27-year-old blonde divorcee and another of Stöhler’s conquests who in December 1975 worked in Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s private office. She would be compromised a couple of years later when her HVA controller, Peter Goslar, came under BfV surveillance. Goslar’s home had been searched and among the papers found had been Schmidt’s notes of a conversation with British prime minister James Callaghan about his recent discussions with President Jimmy Carter. Goslar was then watched as he collected more information from Dagmar and, under interrogation, she revealed she had fallen for Stöhler while on holiday in Bulgaria with her 7-year-old daughter, and she was sentenced to 53 months’ imprisonment for espionage.

Another HVA source was Helge Berger, a buxom secretary in the Foreign Ministry who believed that the handsome “Peter Krause” she met in Bonn in 1966 was a South African working for the British Secret Intelligence Service. In fact he was a former Wehrmacht prisoner of war who spoke very fluent English and he persuaded her to supply him with thousands of copies of classified documents over the next six years until she was arrested in May 1976 and sentenced to four-and-a-half years’ imprisonment.

Wolf’s best false flag operator was Roland Gandt who persuaded Margarete Lubig, a German secretary at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) at Fontainebleau, that he was a Danish intelligence officer operating in France under journalistic cover. Accepting that Roland was a national of another NATO country, Margarete fell for him in Vienna but, as a devout Roman Catholic, insisted that she should confess her espionage to a priest. Ever the master of improvisation, Wolf had arranged for a bogus priest to hear her confession at a remote Jutland church and give her an equally worthless absolution. Lubig was arrested in 1990 following the defection of an HVA officer, Heinz Busch, and given a suspended prison sentence of 18 months.

In the example of Dietmar Schumacher, another of Wolf’s stars, he had kept up the pretense of being a peace activist named Olaf for the 12 years of his relationship with an English secretary, Helen Anderson. Codenamed

MARY, she had been persuaded by her lover to stay in Germany and obtain a job at a U.S. Army base in West Berlin where she stole classified NATO documents for him. She was only arrested in March 1992 when Schumacher's HVA controller, Karl-Henz Michalek, compromised him, revealing that he had a wife, Margarite, in East Germany, and a son. Because Anderson was able to demonstrate that she had no idea her lover had been a Communist spy, she was sentenced to just two weeks' community service before she settled down in Arbroath, Scotland, while Schumacher received a suspended prison term of 12 months.

Another of Wolf's agents, Herbert Schöter, started an affair with Gerda Osterreider, a 19-year-old student who was on a languages course at the Alliance Francaise in Paris. When she returned to Bonn in 1966 she found a job as a cipher clerk in the Foreign Office and gave her lover the original teletype tape on which incoming diplomatic telegrams were printed. Five years later, she was posted to Warsaw where, in Schöter's absence, she had taken up with a German journalist to whom she had confessed her espionage, and when he reported her she was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

Renate Ubelacker, a secretary in the FRG's Defense Ministry, married her partner, Lothar Lutze, in September 1972, and was arrested with him at their Bonn apartment in June 1976. She was sentenced to six years, he to 12, but later they were freed in an exchange negotiated by Wolf.

Wolf's other agents included Inge Goliach, who had penetrated the CDU; Christel Broszey, secretary to the CDU's deputy leader Kurt Biedenkopf; Helga Rödiger, a secretary in the FRG's Ministry of Finance; and Ursula Höfs, a secretary in the CDP. All were arrested in early June 1976 during a BfV investigation of refugees from the East, and a Düsseldorf court sentenced Lutze to 12 years' imprisonment, the others to seven years. In April 1987, Lutze was repatriated to the GDR.

The East Germans came to rely on **HUMINT**, in preference to other technical alternatives, because the HVA was in a perfect position to infiltrate agents into their operational country where they could speak their own language, receive a generous welcome as refugees, and exploit the FRG's naivete. In consequence, virtually every branch of the FRG's government experienced high-level penetration. The HVA also counted on the likelihood of being able to repatriate any prisoners captured in the FRG through a spy-swap.

Wolf, who would be the longest serving chief of any espionage organization, headed the HVA for 34 years until his retirement in 1986. His familiar tradecraft, of preying on vulnerable women employed by the FRG government eventually unwound when the BfV instituted a screening program to identify potential espionage suspects.

The **Central Intelligence Agency's** (CIA) HUMINT collection efforts against the GDR was extensive, run from Operations Bases across the FRG,

and some measure of the scale involved can be gained from a CIA memorandum dated May 1965 relating to CATRANSIT, a large network of couriers developed to “maintain a pool of indigenous couriers for the operational support of agents in East Germany.”

During the past year, the agents under this project performed 28 operational missions in support of 18 agents or targets in East Germany and East Berlin. Fifteen agents were recruited during the last project year. All have had at least one training or familiarization mission in East Berlin. Two have actually conducted an operational mission. Eleven agents were terminated. For the first time, the number of active couriers exceeds the minimum necessary for current operations. This has enabled the Station to tighten up on compartmentation and other security devices.

The review of CATRANSIT described the challenges of running human sources in a totalitarian environment after the construction of the **Berlin Wall**:

Current Objectives:

Project objectives continue to be the establishment and maintenance of a pool of indigenous couriers for the operational support of agents in East Germany. The Project serves further as a vehicle for the couriers’ administrative and operational management.

Changes:

Although Project objectives are unchanged, the direction of courier operations has been modified to reflect conditions which have changed since Project submission. Current and anticipated East German agent operations are of a somewhat different nature than the post-Wall recontact operations which Project couriers formerly supported.

Also, for the first time the number of active couriers exceeds the minimum necessary to support current and expected agent operations. Lastly, experience suggests that the security of East German operations can be increased by further compartmentation in the management of courier operations. Some features of the Project’s modus operandi and administrative procedures have been modified to reflect the foregoing factors.

Modus Operandi

- a. Couriers are now each servicing but one agent exclusively, to limit compromise in the event the courier should unwittingly come under surveillance and contaminate the agent(s) subsequently serviced.

- b. Every effort is now made so that each courier utilizes only dead-drop sites he himself has selected, to avoid the proliferation of risk connected with a courier's using a site known to (but unused by) one or more other couriers.
- c. An even wider variety of dead-drop sites is being employed, while certain types of sites found to be potentially hazardous or unreliable are no longer used.
- b. Efforts are being made to devise an even wider variety of concealment devices as well as means for disguising the cache in place.
- c. To reduce risking overuse of experienced and reliable couriers, the number of their sector border crossings has been firmly limited.
- d. To avoid unnecessary border crossings, intensive simulated mission training exercises in West Berlin are replacing heretofore customary familiarization missions in East Berlin.
- e. Even stricter standards of performance are required of all couriers.
- f. When the courier pool is at full strength, suitable courier candidates identified in the course of the screening mechanism will nevertheless be recruited and held in standby against future need, by devising such reasonable inducements as may be necessary.
- g. Couriers whose performance has been satisfactory, upon being retired for performing the maximum number of missions, will no longer be considered for conversion to accommodation addresses or other operational support roles. Rather, through payment of minimal retainer or other suitable inducements, they will be held for eventual reactivation as couriers, with new documentation as necessary.
- h. So long as the pool of couriers is of adequate size, greatest selectivity will be employed in the screening of courier candidates for recruitment.
- i. Greater emphasis will be made during screening to identify and recruit exceptional willing and qualified candidates for eventual personal contact missions to agents in East Berlin or East Germany.
1. A small number of qualified couriers will be withheld for emergency missions in support of operations mounted by other German Station elements or other ODYOKE agencies, missions which are not predictable as to timing or frequency.
2. Personnel
 - a. New Recruitments: Fifteen agents were recruited during the last project year (May 1, 1964 to April 30, 1965). All of these have had at least one training or familiarization mission in East Berlin. Two of them have actually conducted an operational mission.
 - b. Terminated Personnel: Eleven agents, two of whom were recruited during this period, were terminated during the past project year.

Intelligence Production:

Any intelligence which may be produced by this project would come as an incidental by-product of its primary service of operational support.

Effectiveness:

During the Project year, Project couriers performed 19 training missions and 28 operational missions, the latter in support of 18 agents or targets in East Germany and East Berlin. In the course of the operational missions, they have infiltrated and dead-dropped material including East German and other Bloc currency, SW carbons, pills and instructions, cipher pads and instructions, OWVL instructions, a miniature camera, accessories and instructions, a radio receiver, sanitized case officer letters, concealment devices, exfiltration documents with instructions and associated pocket litter, and intelligence collection briefing material. Agents in East Berlin and East Germany cannot be sustained without such supplies, and no facility other than that provided by Project personnel exists to resupply these denied area agents.

In May 1967, when the operation came up for renewal, the Station Chief in Bonn submitted a review of the network's performance over the previous year:

1. No changes in the Project objectives have been necessary or are foreseen. However, because present operational requirements at BOB dictate a greater emphasis on Berlin-based (CABUS) courier assets, barring any change in the operational environment in Berlin, there are no plans to add any new assets to the Project during the coming Project year.
3. In addition, administrative management for the funds provided to the family of CATRANSIT-50, arrested in January 1966 while performing an operational mission, is included in the Project for the first time.

Cc PERSONNEL

Current Project Personnel

1. CATRANSIT-19, a 54-year-old bank clerk from Wuerzburg, has performed three sting and three operational missions since recruitment in June 1963. He is scheduled to perform a recontact mission during the coming Project year, and following its completion, will be terminated.
2. CATRANSIT-21, a 51-year-old wholesale meat buyer from Wuerzburg, has performed one sting and five operational missions since recruitment in June 1963.

4. CATRANSIT-22, a 61-year-old retired Bavarian businessman, has performed one sting and two operational missions since recruitment in August 1963.
5. CATRANSIT-26, a 66-year-old salesman from Munich, has performed three sting and one operational mission since recruitment in November 1963. He has suffered from ill health for some time and may no longer be able to perform operational tasks.
6. CATRANSIT-32, a 48-year-old office manager from Stuttgart, is presently considered temporarily inactive because of personal problems.
7. CATRANSIT-33, a 38-year-old traveling salesman from Essen, has performed one sting and one operational mission since recruitment in April 1964. He is presently inactive.
8. CATRANSIT-35, a 44-year-old Krupp employee from Essen, has performed three sting and two operational missions since recruitment in May 1964.
9. CATRANSIT-36, a 45-year-old railway employee from Essen, has performed one sting and one operational mission since recruitment in July 1964. His wife, CATRANSIT-46, is available to accompany him on operational missions.
10. CATRANSIT-39, a 42-year-old female draftsman from Stuttgart, has performed three sting missions since recruitment in August 1964. She is considered temporarily inactive because of poor performance.
11. CATRANSIT-40, a 42-year-old engineer from Essen, has performed two sting missions, including a special address check, since recruitment in August 1964.
12. CATRANSIT-45, a 52-year-old bank employee from Duesseldorf, has performed one sting and one operational mission alone. In addition, he has performed one sting and one operational mission jointly with CATRANSIT-52.
13. CATRANSIT-46, the 46-year-old wife of CATRANSIT-36, was recruited in November 1964 and has accompanied her husband on one training mission.
14. CATRANSIT-52, a 61-year-old retired bookkeeper from Hamburg, has performed one sitting mission alone, in addition to one sting and one operational mission with CATRANSIT-45.

Terminated Personnel

Two courier assets, CATRANSIT-34 and-43, were terminated during the past Project year. Another asset, CATRANSIT-44, is no longer active and has been offered to Ops Base, Frankfurt, for possible activity as a CABATON asset.

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

Any intelligence which, may be produced by this Project, would come as an incidental by-product of its primary service of operational support.

EFFECTIVENESS

1. During the past Project year, CATRANSIT assets have performed two sting and five operational missions. In the course of the operational missions, Project couriers have infiltrated and dead-dropped material including East German currency, SW carbon sheets, cipher pads and instructions, developer pills, pre-written cover letters and sanitized letters of instructions. Agents in East Berlin and East Germany cannot be sustained without such supplies. In addition, one mission was run for the purpose of an operational telephone call to attempt recontact of a former agent, and one mission was run for the purpose of a personal meeting between a Project asset and a potential operational target, in order to make a recruitment pitch.
2. Although the number of operational missions performed by Project assets during the past Project year decreased over that performed in previous years, the activities of these couriers serve as a necessary supplement to those of CABUS Project assets. In addition, CATRANSIT assets are able to perform certain unique tasks such as making telephone calls or one-time personal contact for which CABUS assets, for reasons of cover and security, would be unsuitable.

The documentary evidence demonstrates that the CIA ran a large organization inside the GDR and employed classic tradecraft to manage them, usually through dead-drops. Rather more than a decade earlier, the British had attempted the same but had experienced a catastrophe when the local Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) station at the Olympic stadium in Berlin had been penetrated by a KGB mole, George Blake. His betrayal of SIS's HUMINT assets resulted in one likely execution and several long prison sentences. The final tally of his victims known to have been caught and interrogated at the Hohenschoenhausen Stasi prison was grotesque and included Hans Mohring, a 42-year-old state planning commission employee, who was released from the Federal Republic in 1976 upon payment of a ransom; Colonel Robert Hofmann of the National People's Army (NVA); a member of the Potsdam building committee who was arrested in 1961, sentenced to five years' hard labor, and released in August 1964; Otto Georgi, aged 64 when he was arrested in March 1958, was a stenographer who had worked for German governments

since 1918. He was sentenced in February 1959 to life imprisonment, but was released in September 1964 and remained in East Berlin until his death in the 1970s; Hans Schiller, a 40-year-old planner in the Ministry for Mechanical Engineering who was arrested in March 1960, sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment and released in October 1966; Wolfgang Rabinstein, a 38-year-old staff member of the Foreign Trade Ministry who was arrested in November 1959 and sentenced to life imprisonment in December 1960. He was released from the Frankfurt (Oder) prison in 1969 and remained in the GDR.

The human cost of running agents in a denied territory were never more starker than in the GDR where a substantial proportion of the country's population acted as Stasi informers, making the environment hostile in the extreme.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (FRG). Throughout the Cold War, the Federal Republic was the fulcrum of intelligence operations conducted by both sides. Geographically, the FRG represented the frontline, and by virtue of the many Displaced Persons (DP) camps across the country, there were plenty of refugees and emigres who made attractive targets for recruitment. The transitory nature of such a large part of the population affected all protagonists, with Eastern bloc agencies applying pressure on DPs seeking to move to the West, and their Western counterparts actively recruiting for volunteers to return home and spread subversion.

The two FRG agencies, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) had developed out of the Gehlen Org which owed its existence to sponsorship by the U.S. **Central Intelligence Agency** which had a massive presence on the ground, located at Operations Bases within the American Zone of Occupation (and later) at Frankfurt, Berlin, Karlsruhe, and Munich. Similarly, the British ran their own station in West Berlin, but exercised influence through Otto John's Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and the Intelligence Division of the Control Commission for Germany at Bad Oeynhausen.

Almost inevitably the BND and the BfV became targets and the KGB, and both organizations experienced high-level, long-term hostile penetration, including Heinz Felfe, **Gabrielle Gast**, Wilhelm Krichbaum, Gydrun Hofer, and Hans Clemens. The BfV, the counterintelligence service, suffered much the same with Klaus Kuron, who was exposed in 1981, and Hans-Joachim Tiedge who had been recruited by Markus Wolf in 1981 and defected in August 1985.

The KGB regarded the East German Ministry of State Security (MfS) as a trusted partner as well as a convenient back-door into NATO. When the Pershing II missile was deployed in the FRG, the weapon and its launch sites became priority intelligence targets. The sheer scale of the espionage

conducted by the Eastern Bloc agencies is evident from the 1963 BfV's annual report [See Appendix 5]

Although the annual report only offers a snapshot of the challenge presented by the Eastern bloc intelligence agencies, it is clear that the overall picture is typical, with hundreds of new infiltrations, recruitments, and other operations being conducted every year. Certainly the KGB went about its business with impunity, confident that the Karlshorst *rezidentura* gave its personnel easy access to the FRG and that any agents unlucky enough to be caught would quickly be released through a spy exchange.

GOLITSYN, ANATOLI. A **KGB** defector, Anatoli Golitsyn turned up unexpectedly on Friday, December 15, 1961, at the home of the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) Chief of Station in Helsinki, Frank Friberg, and negotiated political asylum for himself, his wife, and his baby daughter. He carried with him a selection of recent KGB circulars and a scrap of paper with details of 10 KGB illegals he had handled. Having served in the KGB's department handling information from spies inside **NATO** he was able to give sufficient information for **George Paques** and **Hugh Hambleton** to be identified eventually as moles. He also suggested leads to a spy in the British Admiralty, who turned out to be John Vassall, and mentioned a British network, recruited at university, known as the "Ring-of-Five." He insisted that several Western intelligence agencies had been penetrated and revealed that the KGB had adopted a strategy of global deception to conceal their true objectives.

Golitsyn moved to a mill in upstate New York to write and conduct his research, but he was shattered when his teenage daughter died of a drug overdose while studying in Europe. When the CIA learned that he had acquired a vast collection of classified documents, given to him by the Counterintelligence Staff to assist his research, they were recovered in an operation code-named **WHITE KNUCKLE**.

Golitsyn's views on what became known as "the monster plot" and his influence over the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff would prove controversial. He passed two polygraphs, administered in March 1962 (on following says, one in English, the other in Russian) and from November 1963 had acquired the status of a consultant with access to CIA files. Among the material he was invited to study and offer advice on were: 32 papers relating to **Oleg Penkovsky**; all 85 reports concerning **Nikolai Artamonov**; documents from **Piotr Popov**'s file, such as secret writing messages, transcripts of meetings and contact reports; copies of the first four substantive cables from Geneva in 1962 about approaches from Yuti Nosenko; all 13 transcripts of meetings with Nosenko in Geneva in 1964; biographic sketches of nine

Americans who had served at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, of whom four were CIA officers; two reports, dated 1962 and 1964, about Soviet listening devices found in the Moscow embassy. The second document disclosed the discovery of 52 microphones, of which 42 were found to be active; details of various sensitive cases, such as Boris Belitsky, codenamed AEWIRELESS, who was the Radio Moscow correspondent, Boris Belitsky who had been recruited by the CIA at the World Fair held in Brussels in 1958. According to **Nosenko**, he had subsequently reported having been approached by the CIA, claiming it had not happened until 1961 or 1962, and then had been run as a double agent. This and much else were shared with Golitsyn who would denounce Nosenko as a false defector, thereby creating a crisis.

Nosenko would endure numerous polygraphs administered by the CIA's Office of Security, beginning in April 1964. He submitted to a second series in October 1964 amounting to just over 28 hours of examination over nine days, with some of the sessions lasting more than three hours at a time. In addition, he experienced 15 hours of hostile interrogation. The third and final series, completed over four days in August 1968, involved 60 questions and resulted in 7,000 pages of transcripts. Nosenko would be incarcerated in the attic of a safe-house from November 1964 to August 1965, and then moved into a purpose-built cellblock until October 1967 when he was transferred to a safe-house. Finally, in May 1968, he was released altogether and acquired his own home in April 1969 and bought a car two months later. The controversy surrounding his bona-fides and his harsh treatment would last for decades and survive long after Golitsyn's death in December 2008.

GORDIEVSKY, OLEG. Originally recruited by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in Copenhagen in 1973, Gordievsky had proved to be a hugely important coup for an organization with a depressingly long history of penetration, and his true name was kept a closely guarded secret at Century House. Unfortunately, the **Central Intelligence Agency** had worked out for itself his likely identity as the only KGB officer who had served in Denmark in the 1970s, and was later gaining access to critical political intelligence material in the London *rezidentura* a decade later. **Aldrich Ames** named GT/TICKLE as Gordievsky, and in August Vitali Yurchenko confirmed SIS's worst fears by mentioning that the KGB's *rezident* designate in London had been recalled in May as a suspected spy and was still in Moscow under investigation. Incredibly, SIS reacted by pulling off a remarkable achievement, succeeding in infiltrating their man from Moscow and driving him through Finland to Norway.

When Gordievsky was recalled for interrogation in May 1985, he chanced upon his neighbor who clearly had not been told that the SIS spy had come

under investigation. “What happened in London?” he had asked. “I’ve had to withdraw all our illegals. Our entire organization has been wrecked.” From this indiscretion, Gordievsky had realized that the KGB was on his trail and had taken drastic precautions. As he had commented later, “it is reasonable to conclude that in the summer of 1985 the KGB, for the first time in over 60 years, may not have had a single illegal left in Britain.”

Evidently the KGB had credited Gordievsky with far greater knowledge of illegal operations in London than had actually been justified. In fact, he had played an occasional role as an illegal support officer, replacing the “Line N” officer during his temporary absence, the last time to leave a bundle of £8,000 cash in a dead-drop for an illegal passing through the capital. The agent, codenamed DARIO, had experienced difficulty with his radio link and a complicated procedure of signals had been agreed to indicate which dead letter drop had been selected. The operation had been completed on May 18, 1985, the day before Gordievsky’s return to Moscow, and his participation may have suggested to his inquisitors, whom he subsequently eluded, that he had contaminated DARIO and any other illegals in England. Certainly Gordievsky had compromised every other member of the KGB and GRU *rezidenturas* in London; 31 intelligence officers were expelled in September 1985, after the British mole had been exfiltrated from Moscow.

During his period as an active spy, Gordievsky compromised the diplomat **Arne Treholt** in Norway, the Danish journalist Arne Petersen in Copenhagen, and MI5’s Michael Bettaney in London. Although he had studied an internal KGB history of the Third Department, Gordievsky had no knowledge of previous penetration of the British security or intelligence services and had been unaware of the existence of Geoffrey Prime, the GCHQ spy who had been run by a separate section, the 16th Department.

GOUZENKO, IGOR. A 26-year-old GRU cipher clerk based at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, Igor Gouzenko was scheduled to return to Moscow at the end of a tour lasting three years in September 1945. However, he decided to stay in Canada with his wife, Svetlana, and his daughter, and over a period of weeks, he smuggled documents from the closely guarded *referentura* in which he worked to give himself something to bargain with. In total, he removed from the building and hid in his home 109 items which included copies of telegrams to Moscow and file entries relating to individual NKVD and GRU sources, among them a Member of Parliament, Fred Rose, and numerous Communists.

As soon as the Soviets realized Gouzenko had gone missing the NKVD’s *rezident* Nikolai Pavlov broke into his apartment and reported to the Canadian authorities that he was wanted for the theft of money. Belatedly, the

Canadian government grasped Gouzenko's value, and he was granted full protection. The implications of the material he had purloined were far-reaching: the atomic scientist Alan Nunn May was identified as a Soviet spy and in February 1946 more than a dozen others were arrested and accused of supplying secrets to the Russians. A Royal Commission was empaneled to examine Gouzenko's compelling evidence, and when its report was published, complete with facsimile reproductions of secret Soviet files, 12 suspects were convicted.

Gouzenko enjoyed his new-found fame and courted publicity. He sold interviews to magazines, appeared on television with a pillowcase over his head, and even sold the movie rights to his story, *The Iron Curtain*, to Twentieth Century Fox. However, for his Royal Canadian Mounted Police bodyguards, with whom he lived in Hamilton, Ontario, he proved very difficult to handle. With the help of his RCMP interpreter, Mervyn Black, and two journalists, John Dalrymple and Laurie McKechnie, he wrote a novel, *Fall of a Titan*, and an autobiography, *This was my Choice*, both of which were bestsellers. His wife also wrote a book, *Before Igor*.

At different times, Gouzenko offered various motives for his defection, saying it was the burden of knowledge he had accumulated, but this was not what he claimed in *This was my Choice* or what he had told the Royal Commission. According to one transcript, in October 1945, he asserted that he was "convinced that such double-faced politics of the Soviet Government toward the democratic countries do not conform with the interests of the Russian people and endanger the security of civilisation, I decided to break away from the Soviet regime and announce my decision openly." However, in his 1948 autobiography, Gouzenko had stressed the ideological nature of his conversion: "instead of convincing myself that doctrines instilled by the Soviet Union were still sound, I had found my thoughts drifting toward the democratic way of life."

The most likely explanation is that Gouzenko, who was from typically Slav peasant stock, simply wanted to improve his life and that of his family. He knew that only austerity and hardship awaited him at home, whereas Canada offered living conditions that could never be matched in the Soviet Union. Doubtless he also feared the reception he would receive upon his arrival in Moscow, for he had been recalled on disciplinary grounds. In terms of the damage Gouzenko inflicted, his testimony and the evidence of his stolen files probably did more than any other single event to alert the West to the nature and scale of the espionage offensive waged by the Kremlin. Apart from the dozen or so defendants convicted of spying, Gouzenko wrecked an organization which had taken years to develop, exposed the penetration of the Manhattan atomic weapons project and demonstrated the very close relationship between the Canadian Communist Party and Moscow.

Surprisingly, although Gouzenko's subsequent whereabouts in Canada were something of an open secret, no attempt on his life was ever uncovered and, despite the dangers, he frequently courted publicity. In 1955, for example, he volunteered testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Gouzenko was provided with the identity of a Canadian of Ukrainian extraction who had been born near Saskatoon in Saskatchewan and lived off his royalties and a generous government pension. He died at his home outside Toronto in June 1982, blinded by a combination of diabetes and alcohol, and embittered that his literary merits, which he regarded as on a par with Tolstoy, had gone largely unrecognized by anyone apart from his loyal wife and children.

GRENADA. On October 24, 1983, a U.S.-led invasion, at a time of significant tension in the Cold War occupied the Caribbean island of Grenada an operation designated URGENT FURY. The task force, representing the largest U.S. military undertaking since the end of the Cold War, seized control six days after the Marxist prime minister, Maurice Bishop, was removed from power and then assassinated in a coup led by even more extreme radicals. The order for the invasion had been given by President Ronald Reagan on October 21, and the plan remained secret until U.S. troops landed three days later. Altogether, more than 8,000 Americans were deployed against an estimated 50 Cuban soldiers, 700 Cuban construction workers, and 1,200 members of Grenada's People's Revolutionary Army. In the conflict, 19 American servicemen were killed, among them nine SEALs, and 123 wounded, probably a third of them by "friendly fire." Four SEALs were drowned while attempting an unrehearsed night drop into the sea, and more were killed while under fire from U.S. Rangers. A further 17 mental patients were killed or wounded accidentally.

The day after the invasion the **Central Intelligence Agency's** Office of African and Latin American Analysis drafted *The Cuban Factor*, an assessment of the intelligence situation, drawing on information from the DIA and the NSA, and the Department of State.

GRENADA: THE CUBAN FACTOR

Prior to yesterday's Invasion, the Cuban contingent in Grenada was believed to comprise at least 400 personnel consisting of the following elements:

- a construction brigade housed at the Point Salines Airfield (350 personnel)
- a military advisory mission headquartered about a mile north of Point Salines (10 to 12 advisers)

- the Cuban Embassy staff and guard force located in southeastern St. Georges (at least 15)
- civilian technicians and advisers (including 25 medical personnel and 15 technicians at Radio Free Grenada)

This does not include any forces that may have been aboard a Cuban Naval Academy training ship, the *Vietnam Herolco*, which has been used to transport—cargo and as a troop carrier that was anchored at Port St. Georges. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

The 300 Cuban workers at the airfield were safe and in their barracks. These men include many military reservists, some of whom may have had combat experience in Angola or Ethiopia. [XXXXXXXXXXXX] indicated they were armed and may have been formed into squads or companies. Cuban Colonel Pedro Tortola Comes, who arrived on the Island only Monday, was said by Radio Havana yesterday to be in charge of the workers holding out at the airport.

The Cuban military advisory contingent is evidently larger than we had previously estimated and could number as many as 100. Reporting from the [XXXXXXXXXXXX] indicated personnel from the mission were active in fighting at the Point Salines Airfield, firing on U.S. helicopters with small arms and a machine-gun, and making a stand against a ground assault near the fuel tanks north of the airfield. The Cubans who reportedly were encountered at Pearls Airfield and at the Radio Free Grenada site north of St. Georges may have included advisers from the military mission as well.

The Cubans could have landed some additional forces from the *Vietnam Herolco* without our knowledge, but we know that it loaded sugar 500 tons of cement and other cargo in Mariel harbor before departing Cuba for Grenada on October 1. There are accommodations on the ship for 240 personnel when carrying cargo. The cargo manifest and destination were declared on August 29 and it took one month to complete the loading. We believe that the cargo was delivered, suggesting that no more than 240 additional Cuban personnel could have been transferred to Grenada. The ship has been in port or just outside St. Georges' harbor since the week before the coup.

We have received at least two reports of landings but none have been confirmed, [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] On the other hand, a U.S. field commander estimated that U.S. forces in Grenada were facing the equivalent of two well-armed and well-trained Cuban light infantry battalions, which could indicate that some additional forces were inserted. A report yesterday that tanks and armored personnel carriers were located near Pearls

Airfield was not corroborated [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] and CINCLANT Intelligence has disavowed the report.

The stiffness of the resistance thus far can be attributed to the following factors:

- Colonel Tortola's effective command of Cuban personnel on the Island.
- The Cubans had warning of the likelihood of landings and had time to arm and disperse themselves for defensive action. They probably had a plan for deployment in case of attack and had the advantage of knowing the terrain.
- Heavy, accurate antiaircraft fire from known Grenadian Army positions downed or disabled the majority of the Black Hawk transport helicopters early in the action, severely reducing the mobility of U.S. forces in the St. Georges-Point Salines area.
- The only road leading from the airfield north toward St. Georges goes right past both the Cuban workers housing area and their military mission headquarters, where 300–400 armed Cubans were concentrated.
- The strongest units of the Grenadian Army—at Fort Frederick and in the Frequente-Grand Anse area north of the airfield—have probably been stiffened by Cuban advisers.

We believe that the arrival at last night of additional helicopters and troops of the 82nd Airborne at Point Salines, the reported Marine armored force landing north of St. Georges, and continued heavy suppression of antiaircraft and artillery positions in the Fort Frederick area will lead to a collapse of organized resistance today.

POSSIBLE CUBAN DIVERSIONS

As President Fidel Castro has publicly admitted, the Cubans are incapable of reinforcing their forces in Grenada. Nor are they likely to risk a direct attack on U.S. Naval forces off Grenada. Cuba's two FOXTROT submarines were observed in port on Monday. Castro, however, may be angry enough to order sabotage against U.S. forces, bases, or embassies elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin or in the continental United States, using surrogate forces or Cuban operatives employed in such a manner to provide plausible denial. While some isolated Cuban retaliatory acts may occur, we do not believe Havana can create any diversion sufficient to alter the outcome in Grenada.

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

PEOPLE’S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (PRA)

Commander: General
Hudson Austin

<u>Size</u>	<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1,000 – 1,200	AK-47s, RPGs Heavy machine guns, Mortars recoilless and at Rifles, BTR-60 and junior BRTM Armored personnel Carriers, ZU-23 ZPU 4 AA batteries, corps and field artillery,	Headquarters at Ft Rupert with camps near St Georges Calivigny. Groups of officers NCOs trained in Cuba. Some Cuban advisers on island provide basic training. Officer probably loyal to Austin.

People’s Revolutionary Militia (PRM)

Commander: Winston Bullen (deceased)
2,000–4,000

AK-47s, small arms Possible heavy machine guns and light artillery	Created by Bishop as his personal security force. Several hundred members reportedly trained in Cuba. The Militia reportedly was disarmed last week by PRA with Bul- len subsequently executed. Loyalties unknown.
---	--

Grenada Police Service (GPS)

Commander: Major Ian St Bernard
300–500

Small arms Coast Guard Has four small British Patrol Boats provided by Libya.	Consists of Prison Service Immigration Service, and Coast Guard, Some police received training including Political indoctrination, in Cuba.
---	---

ATTACHMENT TO GRENADA: THE CUBAN FACTOR

At approximately 0130 hours on October 26, Cuban president Castro made a public statement and answered questions from the press in Havana. When asked how many Cubans are in Grenada, Castro responded that there were more than 700, including some 550 construction workers. At 0945 on October 26, we received a report [XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX] stating that the Cuban Foreign Ministry was informing Missions overseas that there are approximately 1,000 Cubans in Grenada. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

Previous reporting has indicated a basic complement of 350–400 construction workers, although approximately 200 additional workers were introduced late last year—presumably to replace construction workers already there—but we were never able to confirm their return to Cuba. If they did not return to Cuba, this would account for much of the discrepancy with our previous estimate of 350 construction workers. *Vietnam Heroico* could have

brought in some 200–300 more personnel, accounting for the remainder of the discrepancy.

In view of the conflicting reports and the lack of good independent information, we estimate that as many as 1,000 Cuban personnel could be in Grenada, although an estimate of 400 to 700 still appears to be a more credible range.

[The INR believes that the range is more likely to be 600 to 1,000 Cuban personnel.

A week later, the CIA issued a revised *Preliminary Assessment* of what had happened in Grenada:

Key Judgments and Exploitation Considerations

We must emphasize that this paper is preliminary because thorough exploitations of documents, interrogation of prisoners and defectors, a technical examination of the Point Salines airfield and its facilities, and a careful inventory of weapons must be finished before we can reach final conclusions. Available intelligence and documents exploited to date establish that:

The Soviet Union, Cuba, and North Korea had embarked on major military assistance programs to Grenada.

- The Soviet Union and North Korea signed agreements with Grenada committing themselves to the delivery of some \$37.8 million worth of military equipment including artillery and small arms, antiaircraft armament, and armored personnel carriers.
- This also involved the dispatch of some 40 Cuban military advisers,
- a commitment to send smaller numbers of Soviet military advisers (and perhaps some North Koreans) and the military and security training of Grenadian personnel in the USSR.
- The military equipment and the advisory presence appear intended to bolster Grenadian defenses. In view of Bishop's expressed concerns about a possible invasion, it is reasonable to believe that the captured arms stocks inventoried to date were intended to ensure internal security and to defend Grenada against attack, particularly in view of apparent plans to expand the size of the Grenadian armed forces.

We are aware of statements by U.S. personnel in Grenada that the quantities and types of weapons in Grenada are beyond what would have been considered necessary for Grenada's defense. Some of the arms may have been intended for use as a stockpile from which arms could be transhipped

to revolutionary governments elsewhere in the eastern Caribbean. Similarly, some arms could have been prepositioned for contingency use by Cuban forces, but specific confirmation of either of these potential uses is lacking in documents exploited to date.

The use of identifiable Soviet arms to support guerrilla movements would be uncharacteristic. For example, insurgents in El Salvador are not supplied with Soviet-made weaponry. Moreover, we doubt that the weapons found in Grenada were stockpiled for use in an invasion of neighboring island states because Cuba and Grenada would be deterred by anticipated U.S. responses.

As it turns out, however, that the quantities of weapons are considerably in excess of those enumerated in the bilateral military assistance agreements with the USSR and North Korea, then we must consider that some of stocks in Grenada were intended for use elsewhere in the region.

The CIA, DIA, and NSA now estimate that the Cuban presence in Grenada probably never exceeded 800 and that fewer than this number will be returned to Cuba. State/INR believes that the total Cuban presence may well be higher—in the range of 800 to 1,000. As of October 30, U.S. forces in Grenada had reported 659 Cubans had been captured and about 60 had died in combat.

Statements that 1,000 or more Cubans were in Grenada and that 300–500 Cubans have fled into the hills to continue the fight are not supported by the available evidence. A report that the Cubans intended to transfer as many as 6,800 Cuban personnel to Grenada in an effort to take control of the island was a misinterpretation of a captured document that referred to efforts to expand the Grenadian army and militia to a force of 6,800.

Recent events in Grenada suggest several conclusions regarding our assessment of the situation in Central America, and especially in Nicaragua:

- There may well have been more arms deliveries to Nicaragua than we have observed: Estimates of arms delivered usually tend to be conservative because they are based on only a limited ability to monitor such shipments.
- Similarly, the Grenadian experience underscores the importance of viewing most estimates regarding the number of Cuban military and civilian personnel overseas as rough approximations due to the dearth of hard intelligence and Cuba's ability to reduce or augment such force levels substantially in only a short period of time.
- Many of the estimated 5,000 to 6,000 Cuban civilian personnel in Nicaragua—and especially the 2,000 construction workers—should be counted as potentially well-trained and disciplined combatants.

Despite their domestic economic problems, the Soviets, Cubans, and other Soviet allies are prepared to make a substantial financial commitment to provide military equipment and training to defend their investments in client states such as Grenada and Nicaragua. In the wake of recent developments in Grenada, the commitment of additional military personnel, weapons, and equipment to Nicaragua and Cuba would not be unexpected, but the introduction aircraft to Nicaragua is considered unlikely.

Captured Documents

The recent acquisition of documents captured in Grenada reveals the existence of secret military agreements between the Grenadian government and the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Cuba. These treaties make clear that about one-and-a-half years after the takeover by Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement, the Soviet Union and its allies demonstrated their commitment to solidifying a Marxist-Leninist regime in Grenada by playing a major—although largely clandestine—role in equipping and training the Grenadian armed forces. The weapons promised by the Soviet-aligned countries presumably were primarily destined for the Grenadian army and militia.

Three separate military agreements between Grenada and the Soviet Union detail Soviet commitments to provide gratis nearly \$25.8 million in military equipment between 1980 and 1985. During a visit by Maurice Bishop to North Korea in April 1983, he signed a military assistance agreement calling for Pyongyang to provide Grenada \$12 million in weapons and ammunition in 1983 and 1984. An undated agreement between Cuba and Grenada concerning military training obligated the Castro government to provide 27 "permanent specialists" and 12–13 specialists for short periods through the end of 1984.

The USSR began its military relationship with Grenada in October 1980 when Soviet officials met with Grenadian Army commander Hudson Austin in Havana to sign an agreement calling for \$5.85 million in military deliveries to Grenada. The treaty, labeled Top Secret, specified that the Soviets hoped to "strengthen the independence of Grenada" and that deliveries would be made by sea to Cuba, with the onward transfer of equipment to be arranged by Grenada and the Castro government. The promised equipment consisted of artillery and small arms, antiaircraft armament, ammunition, communications gear, and vehicles. It included specific items such as 1,500 7.62 millimeter carbines, 1,000 7.62 millimeter sub-machine guns, and 18 ZU-23 antiaircraft mounts. The agreement called for Grenadian military personnel to be trained in the use of the new equipment in the USSR at Soviet expense.

In February 1981, a protocol to the original Soviet-Grenadian military agreement was signed in Havana obligating the USSR to provide equipment worth some \$6.65 million. Among the most noteworthy items were eight BTR-60 armored personnel carriers and two BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance and patrol vehicles. By July 1982, the date of the third Soviet/Grenadian military agreement, Moscow promised additional military deliveries worth 113.4 million over the period 1982 to 1985. Major items included 50 additional armored personnel carriers, anti-tank guns, and anti-tank grenade launchers. Like the Soviet treaties, the secret North Korean military agreement with Grenada, signed in Pyongyang in April 1983, stressed the need to strengthen the defense of Grenada. Major items to be provided by North Korea in 1983 and 1984 included 1,000 7.62 millimeter automatic rifles, 50 RPG-7 grenade launchers, 6,000 uniforms, and two boats for Grenada's Coast Guard.

Captured Weapons and Equipment

The reports of weapons captured in Grenada are preliminary, listing types of arms but incomplete on numbers. Most of the equipment recovered is for infantry; no field artillery or tanks were cited. Virtually all arms inventoried to date are of Communist manufacture, although two British-manufactured Bren machine guns and some Marlin 30-30 rifles have been noted. The quantities and types are consistent with those listed in the bilateral military agreements. The types of larger weapons captured are consistent with those the Intelligence Community had reported to be in Grenada prior to hostilities. There was never a definitive listing for small arms believed to be on the island.

Estimates of Cuban Personnel

On October 28, the Cuban government announced the presence of 784 Cubans in Grenada, providing a detailed enumeration of their functions. As of October 30, 1983, U.S. forces in Grenada had reported that 659 Cubans been captured and about 60 more were killed in combat. Intelligence Community analysts estimate that the actual number of Cubans likely to be identified for repatriation to Cuba will probably range around 750 because:

- Some Cubans will elect to return to Cuba.
- Castro may have ordered others to stay behind to harass the multinational forces on the island or to perform acts of sabotage or other intelligence functions. State INR accepts the premise of this estimate but notes that the number repatriated may well be higher.

- Intelligence Community analysts do not totally exclude the possibility that hundreds more Cubans may still be operating in the hills given the fluidity of the tactical situation. Earlier assertions that the Cuban presence numbered 1,000 or more probably reflect:
- The acceptance at face value of claims by two captured Cubans that there were 1,100 Cubans on the island.
- The tendency of U.S. forces to be surprised by the military effectiveness of the Cuban construction workers, leading to inflated estimates of their numbers.
- [XX]
- The discrepancy in the October 26 Intelligence Community estimate of 400–500 Cubans in Grenada and current higher estimates of Cuban personnel could be attributed to some combination of the following factors:
- Lack of information on the number and scope of technical assistance programs resulting in a slightly lower estimate of the number of Cuban advisers.
- Lack of information on the extent of the military assistance programs. Instead of the 10-12 estimated Cuban military advisers, more than 40 were identified.
- Our assumption that an equal number of construction workers probably were rotated back to Cuba after approximately 200 additional workers were dispatched to Grenada last January.
- The possible arrival of a replacement group of construction personnel aboard the *Vietnam Heroico* in early October. The sudden crisis could have caused the Cubans to keep the workers that were supposed to be replaced on the island until the situation improved.

The less likely, but possible, clandestine infiltration in October of several hundred additional Cuban personnel—now identified as construction personnel, but possibly regular forces or Ministry of Interior personnel—aboard either the Cuban merchant/training ship, the *Vietnam Heroico*; a Cuban chartered Panamanian vessel, the *Kranaos*; or a Cuban bulk cargo carrier.

The *Vietnam Heroico* can carry between 240 and 1,500 personnel, depending upon how much cargo it is carrying. We know that the ship loaded sugar, 500 tons of cement, and other cargo in Mariel harbor before departing Cuba for Grenada on October 1.

The cargo manifest and destination were declared on August 29, and it took one month to complete the loading. We believe that the declared cargo was delivered. We do not know what the *Kranaos* was carrying or where it came from. It has been in St. Georges since about October 12. Other ships have been noted in St. Georges, we do not know their history.

We have received at least two reports of troops and materials being off loaded at St. Georges, but none have been confirmed. It is highly unlikely that a substantial number of Cuban personnel were airlifted into Grenada undetected during the last month.

Cuban Intentions

Since Maurice Bishop and his followers overthrew the regime of Eric Gairy in March 1979, Grenada has served as a focal point for efforts by the Cubans to expand their influence in the eastern Caribbean. Havana had taken the lead in trying to make the island a showcase of Cuban-aided development policy, and it trained in Cuba over 500 members of Grenada's security forces as well as providing substantial amounts of military equipment.

Intelligence reports show that military shipments to Grenada via Cuba had increased substantially since mid-1982. A large shipment of military equipment was delivered clandestinely to Grenada in late August 1982 which probably included several BTR-60 armored personnel carriers and some anti-aircraft batteries.

Other intelligence reporting has noted that Grenada:

Served as an intelligence collection center and clearing house for contact with regional leftists.

- Was a major propaganda distribution center for Cuba (in part by utilizing a 75-kilowatt radio transmitter that began operations in early 1982).
- Served as a training center for leftists.
- Could be a future refueling point for Cuban military transport flights to Africa when the Point Salines airport opened as scheduled in March 1984.
- Could provide a staging base for the rapid deployment of Cuban troops to other countries in the region such as Suriname and Guyana.

Castro was personally close to Maurice Bishop and strongly supported his regime. Havana probably was aware of the frictions between Bishop and Coard before Bishop's trip to Eastern Europe but seems to have expected that such differences could be smoothed over. The event which apparently precipitated Coard's power play was Bishop's rejection of Coard's proposal to assume the senior party post, with Bishop becoming the head of state. The Cubans would have preferred that Bishop remain in full control but probably would have acquiesced to a power-sharing arrangement if circumstances so dictated.

Havana, in fact, may have been planning to send a delegation to St. Georges to help negotiate a suitable compromise after Bishop was placed under house

arrest, but the mission probably was aborted by the news of Bishop's execution. On balance, the evidence points strongly against an interpretation that the Cubans helped engineer Bishop's downfall. This was underscored by Havana's public reaction to the news of Bishop's execution and their cautious treatment of the new government in subsequent days.

Castro almost certainly interpreted the U.S. decision to deploy a naval task force to Grenada as a sign an invasion was seriously being contemplated, if not underway. He apparently responded by dispatching Colonel Tortola Comas to Grenada on Monday, October 24, to organize the resistance. Shortly thereafter, Cuban military elements on the island were instructed to improve their defenses.

Castro's instructions that same day to Cuban personnel on the island to resist an invasion probably were motivated by the belief that to do otherwise would deliver the wrong signal to Washington and thereby tempt the United States to intervene militarily in Nicaragua. A decision not to resist would also have unnerved the Sandinista regime which is depending on Havana to help defend it from external attack. In addition, a meek surrender would have badly damaged Castro's credibility as a world revolutionary leader by giving the appearance of knuckling under to U.S. military pressure.

Soviet Intentions

The USSR apparently wanted to consolidate a Marxist regime in Grenada as a model and a source of influence over other east Caribbean countries. We have had reports that it was channeling some money through Grenada to leftist groups on nearby islands. Its willingness to provide free weapons to Grenada contrasts sharply with its usual policy of expecting eventual payment from its Third World recipients, indicating the value Moscow placed on having a toehold in the region. We believe Soviet interest in using the Point Salines airfield for naval reconnaissance was marginal at best.

Moscow seems to have preferred a low profile in Grenada. The purpose of this would have been to deflect criticism and avoid alarming nearby countries over Soviet involvement, instead using the regionally more acceptable Cubans for a leading role. The secret military agreements' provision for Soviet weapons to be delivered to Cuba and transshipped from there shows a desire to disguise a Soviet role. So does the delay by Moscow in establishing an embassy in Grenada until a year and a half after agreeing to supply it with weapons.

We lack any evidence that the USSR was behind the dispute within the Grenadian leadership that led to Bishop's death.

Nonetheless, the Soviets were aware of the extreme economic difficulties into which Grenada was falling, and they might have feared that their own

unwillingness to provide significant economic aid could weaken Grenada's orientation toward the USSR and Cuba.

Both Moscow and Havana might have been concerned by Bishop's efforts to improve relations with the United States last summer but cannot establish a Soviet role in Bishop's demise.

The events in Grenada, and the related expulsion of the Cuban Ambassador from Suriname, are likely to affect Soviet thinking about the Caribbean-Central American region in several ways:

- Moscow will intensify its efforts to build up Caribbean Communist and other far left parties by supplying funds and advice, the goal will remain a long-term hope of communists benefiting from economic problems, overpopulation, and other strains with continued Soviet advice to consolidate their own parties and build solid bases of public support.
- The USSR will continue and probably increase efforts militarily to harden Cuba against possible U.S. attack.

Moscow will continue to enhance the ability of the Sandinistas to defend their regime, but it will seek to avoid a major public role by, for instance, not sending identifiable Soviet military personnel or shipping major weapons directly on Soviet ships.

The Soviets will be more careful about an armed confrontation with the United States in the region as a result of the U.S.'s willingness to use force in Grenada. The Soviets still are not likely to authorize Cuban shipments to Nicaragua of high-performance jet fighters, and they will reinforce their admonitions to Cuba against undertaking actions that might lead to a Cuban confrontation with the United States

GUILLAUME, GUNTER. A close friend, and one of three personal assistants to the German Chancellor Willi Brandt, for whom he worked in his private office, Gunter Guillaume was also a long-term mole run personally by the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung's (HVA) Markus Wolf, who had recruited him, and his wife Christel, in 1955.

Guillaume had arrived in the **Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)** as a refugee in 1956, four years after he had joined the East German army as a loyal Communist Party member and had served as an officer with the rank of captain. He had also been trained as an agent, and when he settled in Frankfurt, supposedly as an authentic refugee, he had joined the Social Democratic Party (SDP) as a voluntary worker before becoming a full-time party functionary. In 1970, he had expressed the wish to become a civil servant in Bonn and, having sailed through a security check which failed to reveal his service as an officer in the East German army, had been appointed to the economic

and social affairs staff of the Chancellery. Soon afterward Brandt had picked him to act as his link to the SDP, and he maintained an office both in the party's headquarters and in the Palais Schomburg. For the next three years, Guillaume enjoyed access to the very highest classifications of secret information and passed it back to Wolf who shared it with Moscow. As well as material about the FRG's foreign policy and relations with NATO, Guillaume passed on details of Brandt's rather exotic extra-marital affairs which, at that time, were completely unknown to the public.

In around 1974, the BfV initiated an investigation after a study had been conducted of illicit East–West communications and found traces of an illegal codenamed GEORG who had completed several missions in the 1950s. Allegedly, a detailed analysis of contemporary decrypted East German wireless traffic had revealed a message, dating back to April 1957, in which a source known as ‘G.G.’ had been sent birthday greetings. Supposedly, his clue had led the BfV molehunters to conduct a lengthy trawl for anyone with the same birthday, and eventually the field had narrowed to Guillaume's son Pierre. ‘G.G.’ was somehow linked to the missions undertaken by GEORG, and both agents were tentatively identified as Guillaume who had been placed under intensive surveillance. Gunter Nollau, the BfV's counterintelligence chief briefed Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on May 29, 1973 and informed him that Guillaume was the subject of an investigation.

Guillaume continued to spy for 11 months before he was finally confronted, and even allowed to accompany Brandt on his holiday to his hideaway retreat at Hamas in Norway. During these final months, Christel, who had been appointed an aide to Georg Leber, Brandt's defense minister, reported that she thought she was being watched but her warning was ignored by the HVA.

Guillaume came under intensive surveillance, which he also spotted, and was arrested by the BfV early in the morning on April 24, 1974, thus provoking a major political scandal that led to Brandt's resignation just 12 days later. When the police had burst into his house, Guillaume had not attempted to deny he was a spy, but instead had identified himself proudly as an officer and citizen of the GDR, and demanded the appropriate, respectful treatment.

Guillaume was sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment in Rheinbach prison, outside Bonn, and Christel received eight. Suffering from kidney disease, he was released in October 1981 in a spy-swap, and returned as a hero to East Germany, where he died in April 1995.

GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT. On the evening of August 2, 1964, two U.S. Navy destroyers, the USS *Maddox* and *Turner Joy*, operating as SIGINT platforms in the Gulf of Tonkin, reported that they had been attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration used the incident, a significant turning-point in the Cold War, as an

excuse to escalate the conflict, and cited SIGINT as proof of the aggression. However, documents recently declassified by the NSA suggest that the evidence may have been misrepresented.

On August 2, 1964, the destroyer USS *Maddox* was on a DeSOTO signals intelligence collection patrol near Hon Me island, eight miles off the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Vietnam, when the intercept operators reported that they had picked up North Vietnamese VHF naval traffic indicating that permission had been granted for an attack on an enemy. The message, transmitted from Port Wallut to a squadron of *Swatow* gunboats, was unequivocal: USE HIGH SPEED TO GO TOGETHER WITH THE ENEMY FOLLOWING TO LAUNCH TORPEDOES.

At that time the North Vietnamese navy consisted of 24 Chinese *Swatow* gunboats, 12 Soviet modern, 52-knot motor torpedo boats (MTB) delivered to Haiphong in late 1961, and a few minesweepers, subchasers, and patrol craft. Their communications were monitored by the DeSOTO ships and two shore stations, USN-414T at Phu Bai, and USN-27 at San Miguel in the Philippines.

Another signal identified the target as being in the *Maddox*'s exact location, so the crew was put on action stations and was ready at 1600 when three North Vietnamese MTBs attacked. The engagement lasted half-an-hour but surface fire from the destroyer kept the MTBs at a distance, and when air support from the carrier USS *Ticonderoga* appeared they withdrew, one having been sunk and another damaged.

Despite this episode, the *Maddox*'s patrol continued, reinforced with a destroyer, the *Turner Joy*, as an escort. Intercept operators at San Miguel reported that the surviving MTB, the *T-142* had claimed to have shot down two American aircraft, asserting "WE SACRIFICED TWO COMRADES BUT ARE BRAVE AND RECOGNIZE OUR OBLIGATIONS."

Two nights later, the *Maddox*'s radar operators warned of several small vessels approaching at high speed, and a message was sent to the *Ticonderoga*, which launched fighters to support the *Maddox*. However, on the moonless cloudy night, the pilots were unable to find the attackers, and the destroyer slipped away into international waters unscathed, having fired on radar targets for two hours. Nevertheless, the version of events sent to Washington, D.C., suggested a significant naval engagement had taken place, and led Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin resolution which formalized the conflict with Hanoi and authorized President Johnson "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force" against North Vietnam. In retaliation for the supposed attack on the *Maddox*, aircraft from the *Ticonderoga* and the *Constellation* flew 64 bombing missions, codenamed PIERCE ARROW, against North Vietnamese naval bases.

The NSA's post-combat analysis concluded that the version supplied by the ships involved, which would have such a profound political impact, was deeply flawed:

Chronological Sequence of Events USS *Maddox* (DD 731) and USS *Turner Joy* (DD 951) action of August 4, 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin.

BACKGROUND

On August 2, 1964, USS *Maddox* (DD 731), commanded by CDR Herbert L. Ogier, Jr., USN, with commander Destroyer Division 192 (CTG 72.1), Captain J. J. Herrick, USR embarked, was conducting a surveillance and intelligence patrol (DESOTO) in the Gulf of Tonkin. During the afternoon of that date, *Maddox*, while in international waters about 28 miles from North Vietnam, was attacked by three DRV PT boats. *Maddox* successfully evaded three observed torpedoes and took the attacking PTs under fire. All three PTs were hit by *Maddox* fire. *Maddox* suffered no damage.

Following the engagement, COSEVENTHFLT, by message 022225Z August 1964, directed CTG 72.1 to take operational control of the USS *Turner Joy* (DD 951), commanded by Commander Robert C. Barnhart, Jr., USN, which had joined *Maddox* after the engagement. Both ships were directed to resume the DESOTO Patrol along a newly prescribed route which was specified in CINCPACFLT msg 02H04Z August 1964.

On the morning of August 4, the patrol proceeded from the East in the direction of Point Delta, an arbitrary DESOTO Patrol point off the coast of North Vietnam (DRV). At 1145G, the patrol turned southwest to a course roughly paralleling the DRV coast, and proceeded to the vicinity of Point Charlie, arriving there at 1608G. At no time did the patrol approach closer than sixteen miles from the DRV coast. The patrol turned East (090) at 1605G in order to retire for the night to a prescribed 24 mile square area centered about 100 miles from the DRV coast. It was intended that *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* would during the night, maneuver in company within the prescribed area once it was reached.

Because of the August 2 attack, a CAP was being provided by *Tigonderaga* (CVA 14) for the August 4 DESOTO patrol. This CAP was present during the evening except for the period 1649 to 20

CHRONOLOGY

NOTE: The times included herein are the best results obtained from the integration of information and plots from both *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* with careful reconstruction of the engagement common plot. Prior reported times, if at variance, should be disregarded as less accurate.

1800 Steaming in the Tonkin Gulf off the coast of North Vietnam as units of Task Group 72.1 on DESOTO Patrol. Ships in company include *Maddox* and *Turner Joy*. SOPA and OTC is CONDESESDIV **192/CTG 72.1** embarked *Maddox*. Ships in column formation, *Maddox* is guide in Station one, *Turner Joy* is in Station two, 1,000 yards astern on base course 090, speed 20 knots proceeding to night-steaming area. Very dark night with no moon and thunderstorm activity in area,

1941 *Maddox* picked up an intermittent radar contact (skunk unidentified surface contact) to the northeast at 42 miles. Not held by *Turner Joy's* radar.

NOTE: From prior experience of *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* in the Gulf of Tonkin, junks are seldom encountered more than 30–40 miles from the coast. During the engagement of the night of the 4th, no contacts identified or suspected as junks were detected in the area of engagement. Thus, except for the contacts described in this chronology, the radar-scopes of both *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* were free from distracting contacts. (A few weather and wake contacts were soon identified as such).

1945 *Maddox* detected a contact at 070, 36.4 miles and designated it as skunk “N” with course 170, speed 33 knots. This contact was not held by TURNER JOY. Contact was evaluated as a probable patrol craft due to its high speed. Considered to be a threat, in that it was closing rapidly. Maximum boiler power ordered at this time by OTC. Soon after, two other contacts were picked up to the northeast (in the same general area as first contact), at approximately 40 miles, also closing.

NOTE on speed and other characteristics of Tonkin Gulf vessels: Gulf of Tonkin junks are of two basic sail powered types which generally operate in fleets of 20 to 100. Within the fleets the junks operate in pairs when towing a large trawl net between the boats. When engaged in crawling, the net acts much like a large sea anchor and prevents the jerks from making more than a few knots through the water. Junks not fishing and under full sail can make about 6 knots. Tonkin Gulf junks a very similar in appearance to the South Vietnam types, VTAC-2 and PTBC-1a as shown in the OSOD Junk Blue Book.

Two types of PT boats are *known* to belong to the DRV Naval Forces which operate in the Gulf. The P-4 class is a “50 knot (plus) boat which carries two 18” torpedoes and two 12.7 mm twin guns. The P-6 class has a maximum designed speed of 43 knots. It carries two 21mm torpedoes, two 25mm twin guns and is equipped with radar (Skinhead).

There is a third type of vessel, the PGM “Swatow” class boat which has a speed of 25 knots, a SKIN HEAD radar, and guns. It is believed that these slower crafts are used to lead the PTs in to their target during night engagements, leave the last moments of the run-in up to the individual PT to make their own adjustments for the attack solution. It is further believed that the

PTs reposition themselves for subsequent attack by first seeking the fresh wakes of the target vessels, getting their “bearings,” and then opening out for another attack.

1946 Changed course to 130 to open threat. CTG 72.1 evaluated the situation as a trap, since these relatively high-speed craft appeared to be waiting in the area used on prior occasions, and most recently, the night before, by the *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* as a night-steaming area.

Maddox designated a contact at 044, 38 miles as skunk “O,” course 243, speed 28 knots. Designated a contact at 060, 36.6 miles, as skunk “P” course 340, speed 40 knots.

NOTE: All three skunks, “N,” “O,” and “P,” were tracked consistently with no chance of confusion between contacts. Courses and speeds were determined. Initial contact was made by a third-class Radar and with 3 year’s experience. Skunk “N” was detected on the bridge radar repeater and plotted independently by the Executive Officer on the bridge at 1945. Long detection ranges were attributed to “ducting” or “trapping” which is a propagation phenomenon consistently experienced since August 2 in the Gulf. Ducting is caused by a temperature inversion in the lower atmosphere, and, when it exists, ranges of surface contacts up to 100 miles are possible. Validity of contacts positive. None of these contacts were held by *Turner Joy*, because its radar was tuned for detection of close contacts in order to obtain ranges on *Maddox* while operating at high speeds, darken ship and in close formation.

1955 Changed course to 140. A *Maddox* contact was designated skunk “R” bearing 104, 29 miles, with course 270, speed 10 knots. Evaluated as possible threat. Bearing drifted left and closed slowly. No electronic intercept. Closest point of approach on “R” was 055, 20 miles at 2027. “R” made no change in course to intercept *Maddox* and *Turner Joy*.

2005 Changed speed to [XXX] (maximum boiler power was almost achieved at this time).

2007 *Maddox* observed that contacts “K,” “O,” and “P” merged on *the* radar at about 32 miles. (This was taken as an indication that they had joined up in close formation. For a short time after “N,” “O,” and “P” closed up, the *Maddox* Operations Officer was able to observe, on the bridge repeater, that the three contacts were close together in a straight line formation).

2012 Changed speed to [XXXX]

2020 Changed course to 160 to further open skunks “N,” “O,” and “P.”

2030 Skunk “N,” “O,” and “P” (merged), continued on course 240, 30 knots. *Maddox* commenced tracking an undesignated skunk at 330, 40 miles, on about the same course and speed as the *Maddox* and *Turner Joy*. All contacts drifted ‘aft and faded about 2045 j due to long range.

2111 Both ships detected and tracked a skunk designated “U,” at 090, 13 miles, course 160, speed approximately 30 knots. (Prior reported course of 200 was in error). Both ships fire control radars locked on skunk “U” which was evaluated a probable PT boat.

2116 *Maddox* evaluated “U” as 4 contacts proceeding together in close formation. *Turner Joy* evaluated “U” as 3 contacts proceeding together in close formation.

2117 Vectored CAP to investigate skunk “U,” with negative results.

2134 “U” closed to 23,200 yards when a new threat was detected by *Maddox* closing at high speed (35–40 knots), bearing 093, 9,800 yards. *Maddox* locked on this new contact, designated “V” antibatteries were released. *Turner Joy* locked on a 50 knot contact nearer in and slightly to the right of “V,” designated as “V-l.” At this time designated another contact as skunk “i,” but soon evaluated it as weather.

2139 *Turner Joy* opened fire on “V-l” bearing 090, range 7,000 yards.

2142 *Maddox* lost contact on “V,” bearing 090, 9,000 yards and opening, after an apparent quick turn of “V” to the left. At the same that this maneuver was noticed, *Maddox* sonar reported hydrophone effects bearing 051, which was classified torpedo. The turn away by contact “V” was similar to that noticed in the action on August 2 as a maneuver peculiar to boats launching torpedoes. (A comparison of the proximity of *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* marks, in plotting “V-l” and “V,” respectively, at time 2139 indicate a possibility that this might have been only one contact which launched at time 2137, turned back, and launched another torpedo at 2142). Initial fall of shot from *Turner Joy* was over the contact and a 10 mile down spot was applied by director 52 radar operator (Mk 35 Radar - Mark 56 Gunfire Control System). The spot did not have time to take effect because fire was checked at 2141. The contact “V-l” was tracked by *Turner Joy* at high speeds (50 knots) closing on an intercept course. Firing immediately resumed with both its 52 and 53 (5”/54) rapid fire and hits were observed by the Mk 35 radar operator. “Lock-on” lost and firing ceased at 2142. While contact was held, target echoes on both surface search and FC radars were strong, though small, and a good steady lock-on was obtained. This contact was evaluated as a definite high-speed small craft.

2143 *Maddox* changed course to the right with full rudder to avoid the torpedo, transmitting a warning to *Turner Joy*. At no time during the action did *Turner Joy*’s SQS-23 detect torpedo noises. (This is a general characteristic of this type sonar and, in fact, *Joy*’s sonar has in the past failed to detect torpedo noises when, during exercises, torpedoes were known to have passed close aboard.). At about 2144 *Turner Joy* received the *Maddox* report of a torpedo in the water bearing 040. This bearing was plotted on *Turner Joy* DRT and a right course change was immediately recommended by CIC to

the bridge to avoid the torpedo in accordance with standard torpedo evasion doctrine which is: If torpedo is fired from abaft beam then ship turns away and stops 30° beyond the reciprocal of the torpedo bearing. *Turner Joy* came right and just after steadying on course 210°, a torpedo wake passed up the port side aft to forward, at a distance of about **300** feet. This torpedo wake was seen by four people: the ASI Officer in director 51, the director 51 rangefinder operator, the port lookout, and the director 52 operator. All evaluated it as a definite torpedo. The ASW Officer has seen many torpedo wakes before as had director 51 rangefinder operator. The port lookout reported this sighting to the bridge and course was changed again to the right.

2143 Maddox illuminated the target area to the east with star shells after having lost target “V.” **Turner Joy** also had no radar contacts at this **time**.

NOTE: Throughout the ensuing action *Maddox* expended 24 star shells. Illumination was attempted by various methods, by firing on point targets, by covering a large area with shots on each quarter, and by firing overhead. Except for one instance of such doubtful validity that it is not mentioned in the chronology, results were negative. On several occasions, aircraft requested star shell illumination, which was provided. It is conceivable that the illumination assisted the patrol boats more than it did the destroyers and aircraft since there were strong indications that the boats did not have radar. The same comment applies to aircraft dropped flares and photo-flash.

Turner Joy did not fire star shells because she had none aboard. 5"/54 star shells have been withdrawn from the fleet pending redesign and reworking of stocks. Star shells flares would be more effective with larger, more slowly moving targets. The arc of visibility for one star shell is only about 3°; the great number of shells needed to illuminate a PT action would probably be better spent directed at the PTs.

2144 Torpedo noises were reported again from *Maddox* sonar, almost immediately after the first evasive action. The first contact sonar reported was evaluated positively as a torpedo. Many subsequent reports by *Maddox* sonar reported over the next hour, however, are believed to have been mostly self-noise with some being aircraft noise and possibly also patrol boat sounds.

Note: *Maddox* sonar personnel were accustomed to **AS.W** exercises conducted at 15–20 knots. They were, therefore, relatively unfamiliar with sounds associated with [XXXX] steaming rapidly changing courses). For the remainder of the action, however, *Maddox* evaded such reported contacts, not feeling it appropriate to question the source of the sounds reported as torpedoes while in action. *Turner Joy* continued a wide circle right, changing course at intervals whenever *Maddox* reported a torpedo wake. No surface radar contacts were obtained from 2142 to 2201.

2201 *Turner Joy* picked up a 20 knot radar contact at 2,000 yards to the West (V-2). Contact appeared to be opening and *Turner Joy*'s course was changed at 2204 to 010 to bring guns to bear. Contact turned around initially to close, then began opening to the West. At 2210, course was changed to 060 to unmask guns and turn continued until ship steadied on 180. Firing was commenced and terminated shortly thereafter due to lost radar contact.

2212 Contact was regained at about 6,000 yards to the West and firing resumed by *Turner Joy* on "V-2."

2212 *Turner Joy* ceased firing. It was estimated by radar that three hits had been obtained. *Turner Joy* again proceeded on a Southerly course (160°T), firing briefly on the contact to the West.

2218 *Turner Joy* detected another contact to the Northwest at a range of (approx) 3200 yards. Fire control lock-on was obtained and a southerly course observed. Firing began at 2218 and ceased, at 2219 when contact plotted DIW (Dead in Water). Evaluation of this contact is low possible since its presence cannot be correlated with other contacts *ot* tracks. Furthermore, the contact persisted for only about 2 minutes. *Turner Joy* continued to the South (160°T) to rejoin *Maddox*.

2221 *Turner Joy* obtained a contact, designated "V-3" bearing 008 at a range of 3,600 yards and closing with a speed of 48 knots. At 2224 contact had closed to 2,500 yards and had been "locked-on" by F/C system.

2222 Firing commenced at this time. Explosions were observed by many *Turner Joy* personnel. After numerous hits right on target "V-3," the contact disappeared from *all* radars and was believed to be sunk at 2228. Commanding officer and others observed a thick column of black smoke from this contact, with no flame, leading to belief that a contact sank and did not burn on the surface.

During the next few minutes, *Turner Joy* was having difficulties with her after 5" mounts and was unable to engage any targets. *No targets* were detected on any radar with the exception of an intermittent contact closing rapidly from the North.

2237 Aircraft, at request of *Turner Joy*, began strafing the general area of the above contact as *Turner Joy* continued southerly. By 2242 this contact had closed to 2,100 yards. *Turner Joy* changed course to starboard and contact overshot wake at 2243. By 2247, ship took this contact under rapid fire for about 1 minute. This PT boat was sighted by six people at various times during its closing track. Contact appeared to be following in wake. One depth charge was launched to shake up the PT. As soon as depth charge launched, *Turner Joy* turned to starboard and contact again overshot wake.

2247 Many personnel on the *Turner Joy* saw a searchlight bearing approximately due north at a distance of approximately 10 miles. At this time *Turner*

Joy was on course, 310°. *Maddox* bore about 305°, definitely eliminating that ship as the source of the light. All *Turner Joy*'s original contacts, V-1, V-2, and V-3, had been plotted in the vicinity of from 10 to 15 miles north of the *Turner Joy*'s 2247 position. Thus, the major contact area coincided with the apparent position of the light. Three theories have been proposed for this light, (a) It was a recall light for all PT's in the action, (b) It was a call for assistance from a damaged vessel, or (c) It was a light used by the PT boats to pick up survivors.

2252 The contact which had been closing from the north just prior to 2237 was held by *Turner Joy* bearing 105°, 2,200 yards. At 2254, rudder was put over hard left and a ram was attempted at 2252. Contact was lost in sea return at 700 yards.

2259 Contact was regained bearing 320, 1,500 yards. Contact appeared on opposite side of *Turner Joy* after having evaded ran. Immediate "lock-on" was obtained and firing began at. 2300. Four bursts were observed on this contact and contact was lost at 2303. The entire episode with this contact, lasting from 2232 until 2303, provided what is considered by *Turner Joy* as definite proof that contacts were using wake to obtain sighting and intercept. This contact over shot the wake twice indicating that he could not observe a course change from any position but dead astern. USS *Turner Joy* verified on ECM equipment BIR that contacts had no radar in operation by complete absence of normal CHEKH or DRV seaborne radars.

Furthermore, it is believed that the DRV PTs used as chase and quarter approach tactics because most U.S. destroyers including *Maddox* which they had engaged on August 2, have two 5" mounts forward and only one aft. While *Turner Joy* has two 5" mounts aft, the PTs were possibly unaware of this because of *Turner Joy*'s recent arrival in the Gulf, with no involvement in the August 2 engagement.

2300 *Maddox* acquired an intermittent radar contact close-up astern. This time *Turner Joy* also detected a contact astern of *Maddox*, but too close to *Maddox* to take under fire. *Maddox* fired 3-inch mount astern in attempt to flush shadower. Validity of contact: possible.

2306 *Maddox* released a depth charge against time 2304 contact. No apparent results. Boats seem to seek the wake possibly to take advantage of a relatively blind area and also as a means of locating the target.

Turner Joy turned West to rejoin *Maddox* then 9 1/2 miles bearing 272.

2309 A surface radar contact was obtained at 2,800 yards and movement toward *Turner Joy*'s wake was noted. At 2310, depth charge was launched and firing commenced. No hits were observed. Contact was lost at 2311.

2319 *Maddox* sonar reported torpedo bearing 200. (Post engagement analysis indicates doubtful). Fired on weak intermittent radar surface contact to the West.

Range end bearings were not recorded. Validity of contact: poor. Various maneuvers were made as *Turner Joy* began falling in 4,000 yards astern of *Maddox*.

2321 A contact bearing 005 was obtained by *Turner Joy* at 1,300 yards and taken under fire. This was evaluated by *Turner Joy* as the same contact which was lost at 2311. Firing ceased at **2322** with contact opening, no hits were observed.

2342 *Turner Joy* observed another contact on radar to the North at a range of 4,000 yards, and taken under fire for a brief period. This contact closing fast and was tracked at 39 knots. Again no hits were reported and contact was lost at **2351**.

2347 *Turner Joy* observed a contact between *Maddox* and *Turner Joy*. This was finally evaluated as high-speed wake. Fire control could not lock on this target. On detecting the contact, however, *Turner Joy* informed *Maddox*, who dropped a depth charge astern.

No other surface contacts were observed until contact with USS *S.N. Moore* was obtained at 0016. At this time, *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* had reached the southern end of the Gulf of Tonkin. No other significant incidents occurred thereafter. As a final descriptive note, the entire engagement took place on a generally North to South axis with the distance between the first turn to the South of *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* to open skunk “N” at 1946, and the final contacts about 2340 was about 85 miles. Ammunition expended in both ships: *Maddox*, 5/38 Frag (2), 5/38 AAC (3), 5/38 star shells (24); 3/50 Frag (95) and 4 depth charges; *Turner Joy*, 5/54-Frag (134), 5/54 AAC (86), 3/50-Frag (28), and 1 depth charge.

Following passage of the Congressional resolution, the number of troops deployed in South Vietnam rose from 21,000 to more than 500,000 by the end of 1968. Between 1966 and 1973, U.S. forces suffered 58, 193 killed and 149,000 wounded.

In January 2008, the NSA declassified a report on the incident which concluded that there had not been any North Vietnamese attack on August 4 and that inexperienced radar operators had mistakenly identified “ghost radar returns” as hostile torpedo boats. The official version of events relied upon just 15 items of SIGINT, whereas the subsequent NSA analysis, entitled *Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery August 2–4, 1964*, drew upon 122 pieces of evidence.

H

HALL, JAMES W. Information from an East German defector in December 1988 led the U.S. Army's Foreign Counterintelligence Activity (FCA) organization to an army warrant officer, James Hall III, who was arrested at his home in Savannah, Georgia, on December 21, 1988, when he boasted on videotape to **Dmitri Doujinsky**, undercover Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special agent, posing as a Soviet intelligence officer, that he had supplied top secret information to the East Germans for the previous six years.

Hall's military career had taken him to some of the National Security Agency's most sensitive sites, starting in 1977 with Scheeberg, an intercept facility on the East German frontier, and included a transfer to the 513rd Military Intelligence Brigade at Fort Monmouth in New Jersey in 1985. A year later, Hall had volunteered to return to Germany, to a signals intelligence post with the 205th Military Intelligence Battalion in Frankfurt, but by January 1988 was back in the United States, enjoying a Top Secret clearance and working at a succession of headquarters military intelligence posts at Fort Stewart in Georgia, having undertaken training courses at Fort Still in Oklahoma, Fort Huachuca in Arizona and Fort Devens in Massachusetts.

When in July 1997 Hall was transferred to Fort Stewart in Georgia, he came under surveillance from both the FBI and the 766th Military Intelligence Detachment when he held three meetings with a Turk, Huseyin Yildirim, in November and December 1988. After his arrest Hall confessed that he had begun his espionage in 1982 when serving at the Teufelsberg listening post in West Berlin, and had dropped a letter into the Soviet consulate in Grunewald, offering a meeting. Hall attended the proposed rendezvous and was driven to a safe-house in Karlshorst for a detailed interview at which he persuaded the KGB that he was not a plant or double agent. Quite apart from the quality and authenticity of the material he offered, the fact that he had been willing to venture into East Berlin proved his *bona-fides*. Later, in October 1988, Hall had used Huseyin Yildirim as an intermediary to sell copies of the same material to the East Germans. As a young 25-year-old soldier with Heidi, his German wife, and their first daughter, he was short of money and was driven to espionage by his wish to earn some extra cash by exploiting his access to

hugely valuable signals intelligence. When reassigned to Frankfurt Hall had continued to sell information, for an estimated \$300,000. Following a plea bargain to avoid a death sentence, Hall was sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment in March 1989 and fined \$50,000 by a court martial.

Hall's plea bargain ensured the briefest of courts-martial, his evidence against Yildrin, and a release to his wife and two daughters within 10 years. As Colonel Stuart A. Herrington, who supervised the FCA investigation, later remarked,

Any time counterintelligence agents unmask a traitor who has looted the government of its secrets, the resulting revelations are embarrassing and unwelcome. The quicker the story drops out of the media, the better. Public exorcisms of security lapses caused by sloppy to non-existent controls are unwelcome by the government. And when the case deals with the hypersensitive subjects of signals intelligence, even greater impetus exists for the government to wrap it up as quickly and quietly as possible.

What infuriated the FCA investigators was the knowledge that Hall's systematic betrayal had gone far beyond compromising sigint methodology or, as he had attempted to justify it, supplying Soviet order-of-battle data that his KGB controllers must have been very familiar with but had resulted in actual loss of life. On one occasion, in January 1985, Hall had attended a meeting in Berlin at which photos had been circulated of the inside of a T-72 tank. According to the loquacious representative of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission, the pictures had been taken by one of his organization's officers who had exploited poor security at a Soviet armored base at Ludwigslust to climb into one of the vehicles.

The man with the camera had been Major Arthur Nicholson, who had been shot dead by an unusually alert Red Army sentry two months later, on a quiet Sunday afternoon in March 1985, when he had attempted to repeat his coup. His death, according to the FCA, was directly attributable to Hall's tip, but he was never charged with endangering his life.

The damage assessment conducted by the FCA and the NSA, with Hall's cooperation, verified by polygraph examinations, and conducted at Fort Meade, suggested that over six years Hall had made between 30 and 60 deliveries of classified documents, some of them in packages three inches thick, to the Soviets and to the East Germans. Only in June 1985, following a meeting in Vienna, had he broken with the KGB but kept in contact with the HVA through Yildirim, information that was later to be confirmed by the interrogation of former East German intelligence personnel. The quantity of documents taken by Hall at the Teufelsberg was so great that he feared he would exceed the limits on the use of his office photocopier, so he installed another

one in a van he parked in the base's car park. Later, in Frankfurt, he rented an apartment solely for the purpose of installing a copier. On two occasions the KGB dispatched signals intelligence experts to question him and to direct his document acquisition, which included details of a highly classified "black" operation initiated in 1984 that was to be published in 1990 in the German magazine *Quick* when the relevant papers were found in the HVA's archives.

In a further twist to Hall's story, the East German defector who identified him decided in 1989 to return to Germany with his wife and dog and settle in Bonn, but before being allowed to live in the Federal Republic, he was obliged to undergo a debriefing at the hands of the West German BfV. Two senior BfV officers, Dr. Peter Frisch and Klaus Kuron, were given a detailed briefing by the NSA on the damage inflicted by Hall so as to assist their interviews, but six months later Kuron confessed that he had spied for the East German HVA since 1981 and had received \$375,000 for his information, which had included confirmation of the importance of the material betrayed by Hall, who was released from Fort Leavenworth in September 2011.

HAMBLETON, HUGH. In December 1961, the KGB defector Anatoli Golitsyn had described an important Soviet spy in NATO codenamed STUDENT, but his information was insufficiently specific for counterintelligence molehunters to identify him. Then, in May 1978, the KGB illegal Colonel Ludek Zemenek, alias Rudolph Hermann, disclosed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation that he had run Professor Hugh Hambleton of Laval University, Quebec, as an agent in Canada. Consequently, Hambleton was placed under covert surveillance, which was to last 18 months. Eventually, on November 4, 1979, when Zemenek's switch in loyalty had been disclosed publicly, a raid was mounted on the home of the much-respected academic who was an expert on Latin America.

The son of a wealthy and politically prominent Ottawa family, and known to his friends as Hugo, Hambleton had been an active agent for the KGB over the past decade, having been recruited originally in Ottawa in 1949 by Vladimir Borodin, the suave young cultural attaché.

An intelligence liaison officer with the Free French forces in North Africa at the end of the war, Hambleton had made only limited admissions concerning his espionage to the RCMP in 1979, but the following year, after 13 sessions with RCMP interrogators, he had agreed to cooperate and make a full confession in return for a formal immunity from prosecution signed by the Canadian solicitor-general. His later statement to British detectives, which was to run to 264 pages, centered on his work in NATO as an economist, a post he had been appointed to in 1955 after he had graduated from the Sorbonne. However, Hambleton admitted that his first act of espionage had been

the theft of a secret paper on the subject of submarine detection systems from his father-in-law, Dr. Beaulieu, a senior French-Canadian civil servant who, at the time of Hambleton's marriage to his daughter Therese in 1948, had held an important post at the Department of Defense. Hambleton explained that he had first met Borodin at one of the regular social gatherings organized by his Marxist-leaning mother, Bessie Hambleton, a well-known Ottawa hostess who often entertained middle-ranking European and Eastern Bloc diplomats at her sumptuous home on Ruskin Avenue. Borodin had become the student's case officer and had encouraged him to leave his job at the National Film Board of Canada and take up an academic career, which had started after his release from military service at Ottawa University and was to continue through studies in Mexico City, and to the Sorbonne. When in Paris four years later, toward the conclusion of his course, Hambleton recalled that he had unexpectedly encountered Borodin who had turned up in March 1955 at his home in the suburbs, accompanied by a colleague, Pavel P. Lukyanov, who was actually a senior FCD officer based at the Paris *rezidentura*, working under a trade delegation cover. Having graduated from the Sorbonne, Hambleton had intended to use a scholarship he had won to gain his PhD at the London School of Economics, but Borodin and Lukyanov had persuaded him to delay his departure to London and instead to seek a job with NATO. In November 1956, his application was successful and during the five years he spent with NATO's International Secretariat in Paris, Hambleton confirmed that he had given hundreds of photographs of classified documents to Lukyanov and estimated that between 1957 and 1958, he had taken 750 pictures of secret papers, an average that he had continued to maintain. Hambleton was later to concede that one of the papers he had removed in late 1958 had contained references to Western intelligence sources in **Estonia** and **Lithuania** and may have endangered the lives of agents.

Significantly, Lukyanov had not merely instructed his agent to copy everything he could, but had directed Hambleton to specific dossiers, to the extent of giving him lists of particular files, each with its correct NATO registry number, a clear indication of the existence other spies within NATO.

Hambleton received coded signals every week at eight o'clock on Thursday evenings on a shortwave radio and using one-time pads to decipher the texts, but he was anxious to return to academic life. In 1961, after a rendezvous with the KGB in Vienna, Hambleton had resigned from NATO and had moved to England, with his second wife, to study for his doctorate at the London School of Economics. Nevertheless, the KGB remained in touch and Borodin, who was later attached to the Soviet embassy in The Hague, visited Hambleton at the academic's holiday villa in Spain. Four years later, having obtained his PhD, Hambleton had accepted an appointment at Laval

University in Quebec. It was not until April 1967 that Zemenek, acting for the KGB and declaring himself to be a movie producer, had reestablished contact with Hambleton and had arranged for him to attend a meeting with two KGB officers in Ottawa who had given him details of dead letter drops so he could continue to communicate. Having indicated his willingness to work for the KGB, he was given an assignment, to meet Lukyanov in Vienna in preparation for a mission to Tel Aviv. The objective was a survey, conducted under the cover of historical research into the 1480 Siege of Rhodes, of the economic prospects for Russian immigrants to Israel, with the underlying purpose to discover how illegals could be infiltrated into the country and be established in business. Hambleton's 10-page report was handed to Lukyanov at a second rendezvous held in Vienna in July 1970, and the academic later recalled that he had also mentioned a side trip he had made to Beersheba, the town nearest the secret Israeli atomic weapons facility located at Dimona in the Negev Desert.

Upon his return to Quebec Hambleton, who had cultivated a reputation as an expert on the Caribbean and Latin America, based on his student days in Mexico and a visit to Cuba in 1961, had obtained an invitation to take a years' leave from Laval and act as an adviser to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). In this capacity, he was seconded to Lima in 1972 as economic adviser to General Velasco Alvarado, the left-leaning, anti-American leader of the military junta that had taken control of Peru. Hambleton returned briefly to Quebec in 1972 but in September the following year he was posted to Port-au-Prince on behalf of CIDA to supervise an agrarian reform project. This assignment lasted until 1975, following which Hambleton made an extensive tour of Europe, accompanied not by his second wife, but by his newly acquired 22-year-old Haitian girlfriend. At the end of his appointment in Haiti Hambleton had returned to Paris and, missing a pre-arranged rendezvous with Lukyanov in Vienna, had flown to Tel Aviv in July and had spent three weeks undertaking academic research at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Since he had last visited Israel more than 160,000 Soviet Jews had settled as immigrants, among whom the KGB had concealed an unknown number of illegals. While the Israeli security agency Shin Beth routinely screened all the new arrivals, and had uncovered several putative illegals who had intended to travel on to Canada and the United States, an undetermined group had almost certainly slipped through undiscovered. One of Hambleton's tasks in Israel had been to determine a more effective method of protecting illegals from the ubiquitous Shin Beth, but as he believed he himself had come under its scrutiny, he had not undertaken any clandestine activities. Early in August he had flown to Athens and then caught a train to Vienna, stopping to stay overnight in Belgrade with Lili Galeva, a young

Yugoslav girlfriend with whom he had shared a compartment. During this short interlude, Hambleton had been unnerved by an interview with officers from KOS, the Yugoslav security agency, who indicated that they knew of his KGB connections. This he had reported to Lukyanov the following day when they had met in Vienna, and arrangements had been made for Hambleton to be driven to Bratislava in a Soviet diplomat's car, whence he had caught a military flight to Moscow. For the next six days, Hambleton had been feted by the KGB and had been introduced to its chairman, Yuri Andropov. He had also been trained in the use of a new communications device, an ingenious gadget that when placed next to his Grundig radio would convert shortwave signals and display them as numbers on an illuminated panel. A few months after Hambleton's return to Quebec, he was sent a letter in secret writing from Berlin which instructed him to collect one of these conversion units from an unidentified intermediary who met him in the underground garage of a shopping centre in Montreal.

Later in the summer of 1978 Hambleton was investigated by MI5 when he had taken a leave of absence from Laval and had moved to London where he had borrowed a friend's flat in the Barbican estate. On most days he had visited the British Museum where he had worked on an analysis of the oil industry in the Persian Gulf and in October he had traveled to Vienna for a meeting with Lukyanov, at which the Soviet had warned him that Zemenek, whom Hambleton had known as the movie producer "Rudolf Hermann," could no longer be regarded reliable, and that Hambleton should consider urgent defection. Hambleton had rejected the offer and instead had spent the rest of his sabbatical criss-crossing the continent, visiting his girlfriend in Belgrade. When the university term had started in September 1979 Hambleton was back at Laval, teaching his students, and occasionally emptying dead-drops, apparently unaware that he was under surveillance by the RCMP. At one point, after his return from London, Hambleton was observed to insert surreptitiously a note into a book on a shelf in a bookshop on Elgin Street, which had been retrieved moments later by a Soviet diplomat.

When Hambleton accepted his immunity from the Canadian authorities, he had been warned that he should not contemplate travel to Britain or to the United States, where he would certainly face arrest, but in June 1982, aged 60, he flew to London with his son, and was taken into custody by Special Branch detectives. Charged with offenses under the Official Secrets Act, Hambleton initially pleaded not guilty, but under cross-examination, his case collapsed. He admitted to having fabricated the reference to his war record in *Who's Who in Canada*, in which he had claimed falsely to have worked behind enemy lines with the French resistance in 1943. Halfway through his trial, and confronted by his own contradictions, Hambleton changed his plea

to guilty and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. He served part of his sentence in England, at Gartree prison, but in June 1986 was transferred to a prison in Canada, and released in March 1989. He died in Madrid on July 6, 1995.

HANSSEN, ROBERT. A senior Federal Bureau of Investigation officer, who spied for the GRU and later the KGB, and was estimated to have caused damage costing \$44 billion to the United States government. In November 1979, he volunteered to spy for the GRU in New York by walking into the Amtorg office and making the offer to the GRU officer he had been assigned to watch. He sold a collection of classified information, including the identity of **Dmitri Polyakov**, codenamed TOP HAT, for \$20,000, but abandoned his espionage the following year after he had confessed to his wife and promised his local priest to stop passing classified information to the Soviets. He remained inactive until 1984 when he reestablished contact with the Soviets in Washington D.C.

Hanssen was arrested in February 2001 after incriminating physical evidence was supplied to the FBI by a Russian defector, Aleksei Shcherbakov, formerly the head of the FCD's First Department, was paid \$7million and exfiltrated from Moscow in 2010 to be resettled in the United States. The evidence consisted of a plastic bag bearing Hanssen's fingerprints, which he had sued to deliver documents to his KGB handlers and an audiotape of a brief telephone conversation he had held in July 1986 with Aleksandr Fefelov, a member of the Washington *rezidentura*. To avoid a death penalty, Hanssen pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 15 life terms.

HELMICH, JOSEPH. Arrested at his home in Fort Lauderdale, Florida on July 15, 1981 and charged with having sold U.S. Army cryptographic information to the Soviets between January 1963 and his leaving the army in 1966, 44-year-old Staff Sergeant Joseph G. Helmich Jnr. of the Signals Corps had worked as a crypto-custodian in France and at Fort Bragg. Having encountered financial problems, and needing to cover two dud checks, Helmich visited the Soviet embassy in Paris in January 1963 where he had sold information about the KL-7 cipher machine, including the rotors, lists of the daily settings and maintenance manuals, for \$131,000. He had a further meeting at the Soviet trade mission, and when he was posted to Fort Bragg in North Carolina, he made several return trips to Paris to meet his GRU contact, the naval attaché Viktor Lyubimov, who had instructed him to make emergency contact if he learned of plans for a surprise attack on Moscow.

On one trip to Mexico in 1964 he had been paid \$30,000 and in his confession, made to Special Agent James K. Murphy in February 1981, at a motel

in Niagara Falls, Helmich admitted that he had continued to maintain contact with the Soviets, and only cut his ties to them in August 1980, after having made another approach to the Soviets in Washington, D.C., which had attracted the attention of the FBI.

Helmich changed his plea to guilty, during his trial, was sentenced to life imprisonment and died in November 2002.

HOUGHTON, HARRY. A Royal Navy veteran who had been blackmailed into working for the Polish Sluzba Bezpiecznstwa while making black-market currency deals in Warsaw while attached to the British embassy, Harry Houghton, codenamed SHAH by the KGB and REVERBERATE by MI5, was identified as a spy by Michal Goleniewski. He was arrested in January 1961 after a lengthy surveillance operation as he kept a rendezvous with the KGB illegal *rezident* in London, Konon Molody, codenamed LAST ACT accompanied by his girlfriend, Ethel ('Bunt') Gee, codenamed TRELIS. At the time of their arrest Houghton and Gee had access to classified research in Building 231 at the Underwater Detection Establishment at Porton in Dorset. Among the items seized from them were 212 of 400 pages of a secret document, *Particulars of War Vessels /British Commonwealth of Nations*, Copy No: 268; copies of Confidential Fleet Orders; Confidential Drawing DUN.3 SH-2 52 CT Hull form of *Dreadnought* with cable run for Type 2001 Sonar; test pamphlets results for ASDIC and a blank 35mm exposed film. More documents recovered from Houghton's home at 8 Meadowview Road, Upwey, and from Bunt Gee's address, 23 Hambro Road, where a detailed questionnaire recovered, apparently translated from a foreign language.

Both received prison sentences of 15 years, although another suspect, also thought to have assisted Houghton, escaped prosecution for lack of evidence. A lengthy surveillance operation, codenamed WHISPER, on Houghton had led MI5 to Molody, alias Gordon Lonsdale, and he in turn had compromised his other contacts, Morris and Lona Cohen, who were taken into custody at their home in Ruislip on the same afternoon.

HUMINT. While popular with novelists and the movie business, human sources are by their nature problematic, and often fare poorly when their reporting is compared to the technical intelligence so favored by policymakers. One photograph tends to impress a politician far more than any amount of agent reporting. This was well demonstrated during the **Cuban missile crisis** when President John F. Kennedy's senior advisers paid close attention to the compelling briefings, illustrated with photo-reconnaissance imagery, they received from Art Lundahl of the National Photographic Interpretation

Center, whereas Tom Karamessines of the Clandestine Service found it difficult to convince his audience whenever he referred to IRONBARK information concerning Soviet rocketry. The CIA's knowledge of SS-4 and SS-5 missile capabilities originated from **Oleg Penkovsky** in Moscow, but the analysis could give no hint of his existence because he remained at liberty and was therefore extremely vulnerable. Penkovsky, of course, had access to authentic Soviet missile handbooks and photographed them for his handlers. This was intelligence of the highest value, at the most historically relevant moment, yet it was never given the value it merited.

In that example, the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) found itself in considerable difficulty in September 1962 when it sought to reverse its previous findings on Soviet ICBM strengths. As recently as June 1961 the Directorate of Intelligence had signed off on a National Intelligence Estimate that declared the Soviets possessed 50 to 100 ICBMs on launchers and would achieve 100 to 200 within a year. Eleven months later, based on IRONBARK, the CIA circulated a document, *The Soviet ICBM Program*, revising that estimate down to "25 or fewer ICBMs on launchers." The implications of this uncomfortable admission, not least on the Air Force budget, were immense and policymakers preferred to overlook it.

The CIA had considered more candor regarding the origins of the IRONBARK material, but ultimately chose caution so as to avoid compromising Penkovsky. This meant that his sub-source, also mentioned in his reporting, could not be identified as his father-in-law, Marshal Sergei Varentsov, the artillery officer commanding the Red Army's rocket force. In the event, the CIA's new figures were only fully accepted when they were supported by analysis based on the CORONA **satellite** imagery.

While the U-2 imagery was very impressive, it is worth noting that the pilot, Colonel Steve Heyser, was sent on his mission on October 14 to overfly a location that had been identified already by a human source and had been reported in secret writing as an MRBM launch site under construction at Los Palacios near San Cristobal. In other words, the photo-reconnaissance was tasked to verify HUMINT and accomplished its goal very successfully. On that occasion the photo-interpreters found the MRBM launch site . . . and two IRMB launch pads under construction.

In the months before the Cuban missile crisis, at a time when there were clearly inadequacies concerning the reporting from the island into which thousands of Soviet troops were pouring, the CIA had invested heavily in HUMINT, establishing MONGOOSE in Florida to screen refugees and recruit agents. MONGOOSE would eventually employ 500 staff employees and further 4,000–5,000 contractors. Despite the scale of investment, the operation failed to provide advance warning of Soviet intentions.

Later in the Cold War NATO would benefit from three human sources, the GRU's General **Dmitri Polyakov**, and then Colonel **Ryszard Kuklinski**, to keep Western analysts informed about the Kremlin's war planning, and in particular to betray details of Marshal **Nikolai Ogarkov**'s innovative strategy, a document that probably could never have been compromised by technical means. Thereafter, **Oleg Gordievsky** kept his SIS handlers supplied with mainly political material that revealed the politburo's hand while engaging in high-level negotiations.

As well as being of immense value in themselves, through their reporting, such self-recruited sources represented confidence in the agencies in whom they placed their trust. The fact that such well-informed and sophisticated professionals, all well-trained in the intelligence business, should manifest such assurance spoke volumes about the organizations' integrity and reputation for dependability.

From a counterintelligence perspective, this top-level reporting was valuable but unpredictable and suggested that while field recruitments were a staple, they could rarely offer the advantages of long-term access. Equally, the tactical advantage of a defector would inevitably be devalued by swift damage limitation.

Throughout the Cold War, the CIA invested in officers deployed worldwide under non-official cover in an effort to fill gaps in station reporting. In May 1961, the Clandestine Service prepared a 31-page primer for HUMINT, authored by C.D. Edbrook [See Appendix 6].

Although the Warsaw Pact may not have been able to match the West's technical resources, especially in the field of SIGINT and imagery collection, the KGB, GRU, and their Eastern bloc surrogates achieved considerable success in penetrating their principal targets, being NATO war planning, the West German political and intelligence establishments, and U.S. cipher systems and strategic communications. The Soviets benefited from a series of volunteers who only required adept handling, and not, in most cases, any recruitment effort. These "walk-ins" included, in chronological order, **William Weisband** since 1945; **William Whalen** from 1955; Sergeant Robert Johnson from 1961; **Joseph Helmich** from 1963; **John Walker** from 1968; **Robert Hanssen** and **Kenneth Myers** from 1979; Ronald Pelton from 1980; **Ana Montes** from 1984; **Aldrich Ames** from 1985; **David Boone** from 1988. Together, these spies, working independently but over long periods, represented high-level access to tens of thousands of classified items that influenced the course of the Cold War. The accumulated impact was an almost continuous, overlapping supply of top quality secrets, rather than disjointed occasional glimpses.

In addition, there were other opportunistic spies, such as Christopher Boyce in 1974 who compromised the Rhyolite satellite's crypto system, and William Kampiles who in 1977 handed over at least one KH-11 satellite manual to the GRU. These individuals, driven by financial motives, exploited a chance to make some money and although their illicit activity was short-lived, the consequences of their betrayal were rather more long-lived.

The benefit to the Soviets was threefold: the likelihood of an approach was high, so the only professionalism required was the avoidance of entrapment by "plants" and "coat-trailers"; second, the management of such volunteers, if handled under the strict rules of *konspiratsia*, (personal meetings held only in controlled environments in neutral cities, communications via dead-drops, etc.) was relatively risk-free; and third, in the event of compromise, the certainty of cash for secrets would receive wide publicity and probably attract others, the evidence being that publicized arrest and prosecutions generally do not deter but can even act as a catalyst to inspire other potential miscreants.

On the European front, Eastern Bloc agencies penetrated NATO from 1958 with **Nahit Imre**; from 1960 with **Francois Roussilhe** and **Robert van de Wiele**, and the East German Hauptaufklärung Verwaltung (HVA) infiltrated the Brussels headquarters through **Rainer Rupp** from 1969. Other known HVA agents included Imelde Verrept, **Ursel Lorenzen** and Ingrid Garbe. NATO's American component in Europe was successively compromised by Zoltan Szabo since 1967; Clyde Conrad from 1972; **James Hall** from 1982; and Huseyin Yildirim from 1988.

Great Britain's intelligence infrastructure experienced hostile penetration, also through volunteer agents, with a legacy of wartime spies, Kim Philby in the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) with Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, and John Cairncross in other parts of Whitehall. George Blake was a postwar volunteer who spied from inside SIS between 1952 and 1960, and the country's **SIGINT** infrastructure was penetrated by Douglas Britten from 1962 to 1968; and Geoffrey Prime, between 1968 and 1976. An MI5 officer, Michael Bettaney, twice delivered classified documents to the KGB in 1983. Although there were numerous other low-level mercenaries who had short-term contact with Soviets, Oleg Gordievsky reassured his British handlers that his *rezidentuara* had not benefited from a worthwhile source for years, and certainly not since the defection of **Oleg Lyalin** in 1972.

HUNGARIAN UPRISING. Following unrest in Poland, student in **Hungary** demonstrated for political reforms at a time when the Communist Party was becoming increasingly unpopular. A rally on October 23 was broken up when the secret police, the notorious Allami Védélmi Hatóság (AVH) fired

on the unarmed crowd. The incident sparked protests across the country and on October 24 the Kremlin over-reacted by sending Warsaw Pact tanks into Budapest, resulting in street fighting the destruction of several armored personnel carriers by petrol bombs. The Red Army then appeared to withdraw to allow a new government to be formed, but it returned in force on November 1 with an estimated 250,000 troops and 2,500 armored vehicles. The result was a fortnight's bloody conflict in which an estimated 700 Soviet soldiers and some 2,500 Hungarians were killed. A further 200,000 Hungarians fled the country as refugees. Immediately following the suppression of the revolt, the KGB stepped in to mop up and, according to a report submitted to General Serov dated November 27, 1956, 1,473 suspects were arrested and a further 768 were removed to detention in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet intervention was unanticipated by Western intelligence agencies, and the Anglo-French attack on Egypt on October 29 certainly acted as a major distraction. There was no formal CIA station in the Budapest embassy, just a single officer, Geza Katona, in a support role as a subordinate to Bronson Tweedy's station in Vienna and Tracey Barnes in Frankfurt. The CIA was powerless to intervene, and there was no political will in Washington, D.C., to do so.

Katona found himself at a significant disadvantage when the unexpected tragic events unfolded, as the CIA later described the role played by Katon who "engaged in no operations, performing some operational support tasks: the mailing of several letters, the purchase of some operational supplies. Headquarters enjoined him from becoming involved in operations and he was directed to concentrate on supporting [XXXX] in matters of security and on observing to the extent practical,[XXXXXX] intelligence activities."

During Katona's post into the U.S. legation, between September 1950 and December 1953, he "spent the greater part of his time (95 percent) on cover duties. He did not engage in any active operations, but did carry out various support tasks. He mailed letters, purchased stamps and stationery." Between December 1952 and December 1957 the report noted "no active operations were conducted during his tour; he participated in a considerable amount of operational support activity beginning in January 1954.' He also undertook "observational missions whenever required to do so" and he was "the sole CIA representative when the revolt broke out on 23 October 1954. He was nelded into the staff and found himself immediately over-burdened. In addition to his regular duties, he was faced with a great increase in his official contacts. [XXXXXXXX] and with interviewing the various visitors [XXXXXXXXXXXX] Communications [XXXX] were disrupted by a breakdown on TELEX service (commercial teletype)." He was not allowed to use the legation's transmitter, and the CIA was unable to send him a communicator until November 2.

Ironically, Katona's fluency in his native language meant that he was much in demand as an interpreter for the legation's many visitors and was therefore hard-pressed to pursue any clandestine activities. In any event, the official U.S. policy was of non-intervention, and the CIA had advised him on October 28 that "we must restrict ourselves to information collection only [and] not get involved in anything that would reveal U.S. interest or give cause to claim intervention." On the next day, he was instructed "that it was not permitted to send U.S. weapons in."

Katona's British counterparts did have a fully fledged SIS station in Budapest, headed by the redoubtable Machlachlan Silverwood-Cope, but the task of recruiting a local network was virtually impossible, partly because of ubiquitous AVH surveillance and harassment, but mainly through an absence of a sympathetic pool in which to fish. Hungary had fought with the Axis in the war and SIS did not have the advantage of local contacts or access to a wartime resistance organization. Accordingly, the Budapest station was dependent upon Vienna where stay-behind groups had undergone training along the Austrian frontier. A few Hungarian émigrés had been assembled in anticipation of being infiltrated back into Budapest, but the handful that made the journey had no impact on the outcome.

In London, the Hungarian uprising appeared as an unwelcome distraction from the Suez crisis, although the Joint Intelligence Committee expressed anxiety that the unrest would spread to East Germany and Poland, thereby destabilizing the divided Kremlin. Worse, the Americans might feel obliged to interfere. The JIC's chairman, Patrick Dean, wrote to his foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd on December 7,

personally I believe we were closer to global war about a fortnight or three weeks ago than is commonly believed. I think the Russians, with their present divided leadership, are more than ever prone to suspicions and fears and that they might feel compelled to take some action, say, in the Satellites or East Germany which would make it very difficult for the Americans not to intervene and which might lead rapidly to a very serious situation.

These were views that must have been reported to Washington by the CIA station chief in London, Dan Delabarelen, who attended all the JIC meetings held on the Hungarian crisis. From a domestic British intelligence perspective, the lasting impact of the revolt was the resignation of 7,000 Communist Party of Great Britain members and the defection of a junior diplomat from the Hungarian legation.

Ironically, the KGB *rezidentura*, which was equally unprepared for the uprising, blamed Western interference for the dissent. The KGB's chairman,

Ivan Serov, was so convinced of CIA meddling that he posted Aleksei Gorbatenko, a former head of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department, to Budapest to monitor the U.S. embassy. Serov's principal adviser on Hungarian issues, General Petr Fedotov, was also dispatched to establish personal contact with Janos Kadar, Anatoli Munnich, and other members of the Communist leadership. Other senior KGB personnel followed, and on the eve of the Soviet intervention the chief of the Third Chief Directorate, General Gussov, and Ivan Fadeykin, head of the FCD's German-Austrian Department, landed at the airport but found it had been occupied by the rebels. The pair were detained briefly but released when they were threatened by the Russians.

Following the CIA Clandestine Service's disagreeable experience during the uprising, a report was written, *The Hungarian Revolution and Future Planning*, with restricted circulation, to see what lessons could be learned (See Appendix 7).

In later years, it was often alleged that at the CIA's behest, Radio Free Europe irresponsibly urged the Hungarian rebels to sustain their opposition to the invading Soviet troops and broadcast promises of imminent support which failed to be delivered, in a cruel betrayal of Hungarian patriotism. The Soviet propaganda narrative, of course, was that RFE had actually provoked the unrest. There is no evidence of any such RFE bulletins and Cord Meyer, the CIA officer, then responsible for RFE refuted the allegation in his 1980 memoir *Facing Reality*. "Far from having planned or directed the Hungarian uprising, both RFE and officials in Washington were taken very much by surprise when the fighting broke out."

From my own exposure to these events and from the findings of the working group within the Agency that reviewed the taped RFE broadcasts, I am satisfied that RFE did not plan, direct, or attempt to provoke the Hungarian rebellion . . . Two independent and objective reviews of RFE's taped broadcasts were later undertaken and reached the same conclusion. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer directed that a study of the tapes be made by the West German government in response to press criticism, and on January 25, 1957, he announced that there was no evidence that RFE had incited the revolt by promises of Western assistance. A similar review by a special committee of the Council of Europe also found RFE not guilty.

The CIA, stung by the accusation of having sponsored recklessly inflammatory calls to arms, and promises of imminent external assistance, conducted its own internal review:

After the Hungarian revolt was crushed, my office in the Agency, with the help of two Hungarian-speaking analysts, did a careful review of the taped broadcasts that had been made in the weeks before the revolution. We could

not find evidence that in this period RFE had violated the standing instructions against inciting to violence or promising external assistance.

However, Meyer acknowledged that RFE did record and then rebroadcast some of the revolutionary demands on its own more powerful transmitter:

The radio did not act irresponsibly but as the disciplined instrument of a conscious policy decision by the Eisenhower administration. To have refused to replay these internal broadcasts would not have altered the course of events because by the time this rebroadcasting began, the revolution had already achieved an irresistible momentum.

Meyer also conceded that the tone of some of the RFE bulletins was “more exuberant and optimistic than the situation warranted,” and he admitted that the content of one particular script “clearly violated the basic policy guidelines and should never have been broadcast.”

HUNGARY. Foreign intelligence collection during the Cold War was directed from Budapest by the Államvédelmi Hatóság (AVH) which, with the guidance of between 20 and 50 KGB advisers, operated overseas, mainly under diplomatic cover to concentrate on the perceived threat from NATO. Between 1945 and 1952, the organization was headed by Peter Gabor who was arrested in an anti-semitic purge and imprisoned until 1959. He died in January 1993.

While the AVH was certainly responsible for internal political repression, the collection of foreign military intelligence did not begin until February 1950 when a new organization, designated MNVK/2 was established by General Géza Révész who posted subordinates as military attachés to the embassies in Washington, Moscow, and London. Expansion to the deployment of a further 23 military attachés followed, and a training course introduced, at Nagykovácsi near Budapest, while others attended GRU courses.

MNVK/2 appears to have concentrated on collection against NATO countries and was found to have managed a spy-ring in the United States founded on Janos Mihaly Szmolka, a U.S. Army soldier who was recruited in December 1977 by Lajos Perlaki while visiting his mother in Budapest while on leave from his base in Mainz. When Szmolka, aged 23, had been drafted in 1966, soon after his arrival, he had been working as a bookbinder in New York. He was assigned as a telephone switchboard operator to the 459th Signal Battalion at Fort Huachuca in Arizona for training and then served in Vietnam.

Szmolka reported the approach and became a double agent, meeting Perlaki twice in Vienna under the supervision of the Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI). In that role, he compromised his Hungarian handlers and, after he had been transferred to Fort Gordon, identified another Hungarian-born

spy, 50-year-old Otto Attila Gyepes-Gilbert, who was arrested by the FBI in April 1982 at a rendezvous with Szmolka in Augusta, Georgia, and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. When interrogated, Gyepes-Gilbert, who had acquired American citizenship in 1962, admitted to acting as a courier and said he had emigrated to the United States in 1957 and had been living in a fifth floor apartment in Forest Hills, New York, for the past 20 years, which he had shared with his mother, sister, and brother-in-law. He was released in December 1990 and returned to Hungary where his biography was published. Smolka, who married an American servicewoman, Peggy, who had also worked at Fort Huachuca, died in Biloxi, Mississippi in May 1992.

In a similar case, a retired U.S. Army officer, Captain Zoltan Szabo, was found to have recruited a subordinate, Sergeant Clyde L. Conrad, who passed on classified documents for 13 years before his arrest in August 1988. Szabo, who allegedly held the rank of colonel in Hungary, had been an agent since 1967. Conrad had recruited Sergeant Roderick J. Ramsay, who had obtained a security clearance in 1978 when attached to the 8th Infantry Division headquarters in Bad Kreuznach, West Germany. Ramsay had access to a vault of classified material, including NATO war plans, which he sold to his Hungarian contacts. He was sentenced in August 1992 to 36 years' imprisonment and was released in February 2013. Ramsay had also recruited 30-year-old Sergeant Jeffrey S. Rondeau, who had photocopied hundreds of documents at Ramsay's direction, which another spy, Sergeant Jeffrey E. Gregory had stuffed into a military flight bag for delivery to the Hungarians. In June 1994, both Rondeau and Gregory were sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment. Rondeau was released in January 2002 and Gregory was freed May 2007.

The network also included two couriers, Sandor and Imre Kericsik, who were detained and imprisoned in Goteborg, **Sweden**. Szabo, who was arrested in Austria, gave evidence against Conrad who received a life sentence in Germany, died in Diez prison in January 1998. He also named Sergeant Tommaso Mortati, a 42-year-old former U.S. Army paratrooper, who was arrested at his home in Vicenza in August 1988 and later sentenced to life imprisonment.

The common denominator in the Hungarian HUMINT operations appeared to be the recruitment of immigrants in the U.S. Army who had served in Germany and had access to classified data which doubtless was shared with the GRU.



IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE (IMINT). Previously known as photo intelligence, the designation changed when other spectrum sources, such as radar and infrared, became available for interpretation from **satellites**.

IMRE, NAHIT. A 55-year-old Turkish army officer, Nahit Imre was employed in Brussels as NATO's financial comptroller when he was arrested in September 1968 and confessed to espionage. He was returned to Istanbul where he was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment. In his confession, he admitted to having spied for the past 10 years, having been recruited in 1958 by a Yugoslav in Paris, where he held another NATO post. In the meantime, he had served in Turkey and at the Turkish embassy in Rome. Married to a Hungarian, Colonel Imre had held one of NATO's top jobs since his appointment the previous December but had been under surveillance since March.

INFORMATION RESEARCH DEPARTMENT (IRD). Created by Christopher Mayhew MP in 1949, when he was deputy to Ernest Bevin, with the intention of countering what was perceived as a Communist propaganda offensive, IRD was established as a confidential branch of the Foreign Office and accommodated in Carlton House Terrace. IRD staff compiled background briefings on topical issues, based largely on SIS reporting for a list of trusted journalists who had agreed not to attribute material to a government source. One of the first major projects was the promotion of the Soviet defector **Grigori Tokaev** and his memoirs, *Betrayal of an Ideal*. Although closely associated with SIS, IRD disseminated information rather than collected it, although one IRD head, Nigel Clive, was a career SIS officer, and John Rennie would later be appointed as SIS's chief.

IRD remained active throughout most of the Cold War but was wound up in 1977 on the instructions of the Foreign Secretary Dr. David Owen. The heads of IRD have been: Ralph H. Murray (1948–1951); John H. Peck (1951–1953); John O. Rennie (1953–1958); Donald C. Hopson (1958–1962); Christopher F.R. Barclay (1962–1966); Nigel D. Clive (1966–1969);

Kenneth R. Crook (1969–1971; Thomas C. Barker (1971–1975); and Ray Whitney (1976–1978).

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. The precise nature of the role played by the Soviet Bloc in the sponsorship and direction of international terrorism during the Cold War were highly controversial issues for debate until German reunification exposed to degree to which the East German HVA and other Soviet Bloc surrogates had been implicated in providing logistical and other support to European radical groups, such as the Red Army Faction, and to certain Palestinian organizations, such as that led by Abu Nidal. After the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II in May 1981, the **CIA** investigated alleged links between various European and Middle East terrorist groups but failed to find hard evidence, a lapse that created controversy within the U.S. intelligence community when headed by Bill Casey until his resignation in January 1987. After the Cold War proof emerged of covert KGB backing for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and of some limited training given to Palestine Liberation Organization cadres, but nothing the scale suspected by some CIA analysts.

ITALIAN GENERAL ELECTION (1948). The future of Italy was scheduled to be determined on April 18, 1948, when a Communist victory at the polls was widely predicted, especially following the coup in Czechoslovakia in February. The newly created **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) intervened to support the Christian Democrats and did so by financing an overt poster, radio broadcast and pamphlet campaign, and a covert effort to undermine the Popular Democratic Front by forging supposedly compromising documents and daubing churches with offensive Marxist slogans, both tactics designed to infuriate the Roman Catholic electorate. While the Soviets were known to be channeling large amounts of cash to the Communists through the embassy in Rome, the CIA's Rome station chief, Gerald E. Miller, responded by funding newspapers, politicians, and political parties. Formerly a Detroit banker, and a bureaucrat rather than a field operator, Miller had risen to become the Office of Strategic Services' (OSS) Chief of Special Operations in London during the war, and he employed a wealthy subordinate, Mark Wyatt, another OSS veteran, to act as a conduit to the anti communists. Meanwhile, the CIA station in Brussels coordinated the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, an anticommunist trade union movement active in Italy, and James Angleton, until November 1947 the OSS X-2's chief in Italy, and then Office of Special Operations head, mobilized his contacts in the Carabinieri, police and intelligence agencies. Miller's success over an extended posting in Rome, until he was replaced in 1953 by Bill Colby, led to his promotion to

Washington, D.C., as assistant director for Policy Coordination, and deputy to **Frank Wisner**.

In the event, the Christian Democrats led by Alcide de Gaspari won a comfortable majority of 48 percent of the vote and formed a government that would exclude leftist parties until 1996. When in July 1949 the government came to ratify Italy joining **NATO**, the Chamber of Deputies passed it by a margin of 323 in favor and 160 communists against, and when the issue reached the Senate later the same month, it voted 175 for and 81 opposed.

INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA (1968). In March 1968, the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) circulated an assessment that “there is no evidence at this time, however, that the Soviets are moving any troops or that Moscow expects the Czechoslovak situation to deteriorate to the extent that would raise the question of intervention.” Five months later, some 300,000 Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops took control of the country, an event that caused much reflection in Western intelligence circles, as described in a CIA study, *The CIA and Strategic Warning: The 1968 Soviet-Led Invasion of Czechoslovakia*.

As a member of the Warsaw Pact, Czechoslovakia was perforce under a fairly high level of routine surveillance. As tensions heightened over the spring and summer of 1968, so did the attention paid to Czechoslovakia by U.S. and NATO intelligence services. The full panoply of sources available to Western intelligence included photo-reconnaissance satellites, covert intelligence collection performed by USAF aircraft transiting the Berlin traffic corridors—and by SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft along the inner German border, if required—SIGINT collection sites in southern Germany and on the Teufelsberg in occupied Berlin, and—particularly important during the Czechoslovak crisis—observations by the Allied military missions in East Germany. There also appeared to have been some agent reporting available.

Military tensions ratcheted up in the last half of March, as the USSR concentrated troops along the Czech-East German border in the period leading up to the Warsaw Pact summit in Dresden. This was judged to be a preventative measure, but on May 9 CIA reported that Soviet troops in Poland had been seen south of Krakow moving in the direction of Czechoslovakia. Noting that the Soviets had a total of 39 divisions available, should they decide to intervene militarily, CIA concluded that “(i)t would appear that Moscow has decided to some saber-rattling in order to influence the Czechoslovaks to put a brake on their democratization.”

The next month, the Soviet Union involving Soviet, East German, Czech, and Polish troops in Czechoslovakia; intervene militarily, but CIA concluded that “(i)t would appear that Moscow has decided to some saber-rattling in

order to influence the Czechoslovaks to put a brake on their democratization. The next month, the Soviet Union began a series of Pact-wide military exercises designed to mask the build-up of forces against Czechoslovakia.” These included:

- SUMAVA or BÖHMERWALD: over June 20–30, a command post and communications exercise
- NIEMEN: from July 23 to August 10, a rear-services exercise.
- SKYSHIELD: an air defense exercise, conducted over August 11–20.

Of the three, the rear-services exercise was regarded as the most ominous, since it involved recalling reservists, requisitioning transport from the civilian economy, and mobilizing forces from Latvia to Ukraine—measures that obviously could be designed to cover the mass movement of troops against Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, although CIA warned that these exercises could well be signs of military intervention, most analysts in the U.S. intelligence community continued to believe that the Soviet Union would exercise restraint.

The situation grew more ominous in July. On July 26, CIA reported that the Polish government was under great pressure to prepare for an invasion. The Soviet 32nd Army in Poland had mobilized, as had large forces in East Germany. Five Polish divisions in the Silesian Military District were at a high state of readiness. That same day, substantial elements of three East German divisions moved into restricted areas 75 miles south of Berlin. To find out more, USAF SR-71s flew along the inner German border, from where they could monitor developments up to 100 KM inside East Germany.

By the end of the month, most of the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia had been withdrawn, but they remained just outside the country and Western observers noted that the route signs leading into Czechoslovakia for the military movements had been left in place. Four Soviet divisions in Hungary were reported moving into the field, roadblocks were set up, and convoys were seen moving in the direction of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet air forces on July 31 were detected making contingency preparations for operations in Czechoslovakia, while high-level military officials in Moscow were reported operation on an indefinite alert status. Three days later, CIA’s Office of Strategic Research (OSR) warned, “(i)t would appear the Soviet high command has in about two weeks’ time completed military preparations sufficient for intervening in Czechoslovakia if that is deemed necessary by the political leadership.”

CIA Warning and the Czech Invasion

Over the next three weeks, CIA was forced to function without the support of its principal collection asset, photo-reconnaissance satellites. The film-return

systems in use at the time lacked the flexibility to respond to the rapidly changing situation in Czechoslovakia. A KH-4B satellite was in orbit, but its canister was not recovered until after the invasion. When it was, the film showed Soviet forces deployed to invade airfields packed with aircraft, Soviet military vehicles painted with white crosses to distinguish them from identical Czech equipment.

By this point in time, however, overhead reconnaissance was not really necessary; there already was ample intelligence from other sources to show that, by the end of July, the Warsaw Pact was mobilized for an **invasion of Czechoslovakia**. The next two weeks or so were something of an anticlimax, for so were something of an anticlimax, for the simple reason that the Soviets themselves had not decided to intervene. This hesitation gave some reason to hope that an invasion was not forthcoming but, with nearly 40 Soviet divisions on the move, it was clear the Soviet alert remained in place. When the Soviets did decide on August 18 to intervene, it was announced by SIGINT reporting of a Soviet military communications blackout all over Central Europe.

Two days later, on the morning of the invasion, director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms met with Bruce Clarke (director of Strategic Research in the DI) and Richard Lehman for an update on the Czechoslovak situation. Lehman relayed a wire service report that Soviet leaders had been summoned to Moscow for an urgent Politburo meeting, which, in fact, had occurred on August 18. This was unusual in itself: Soviet leaders normally spent August entrenched in their dachas, and only a crisis would suffice to get them out. Clarke, Lehman, and Helms agreed that, taken together with the military alert in Central Europe, the emergency Politburo meeting was a sure indicator something was about to happen, most probably the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Helms was already scheduled to meet with President Johnson and decided to convey the information personally. Remarkably, LBJ rejected that conclusion, saying, “Dick, that Moscow meeting is to talk about us.” What Johnson knew, and Helms did not know, was that the Soviet Union and the United States were due to make a joint announcement on August 21 concerning the planned strategic arms limitation talks. Not unreasonably, but unfortunately, LBJ believed that to be the subject of the meeting in the Kremlin.

The president and his advisers soon were disabused of that notion. At 2300, central European time, on August 20, a Soviet special forces’ battalion landed at and occupied Prague airport. At 2311, NATO radar monitors reported that the air space around Prague was covered with artificial “snow,” blanking out radar screens and preventing observation of what was happening. Just a few hours later, at 2200, EDT, Helms was summoned back to the White House for an emergency meeting. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was underway.

Given the swiftness of events, it is hard to see how Johnson could have received more warning than he did. Official Washington was holding its breath in August 1968, waiting to see what the Soviets would do. Ample, precise, and accurate strategic warning concerning events in Eastern Europe had been pouring in all summer. The August calm before the storm may have meant that much of the intelligence community was surprised by the invasion when it occurred, but there had been no indication that the Soviets had stood down in Eastern Europe nor had strategic warning ever been withdrawn.

A CIA memorandum prepared immediately after the invasion noted that the decision to intervene must have come very late in the game. Exactly how and when Moscow's forbearance "became unraveled" was something of a mystery. To CIA analysts, however, it was clear that the decision had come sometime after the Čierna and Tisou and Bratislava conferences. The time that elapsed, the scattering of the Soviet leadership to their dachas for the August holidays, the attitude of the Soviet press, the anodyne communiques that were issued after each meeting all were indicators that the Dubček government was being given more time—to do what was not clear. "The most likely explanation," Agency analysts concluded, "appears to be that, under the impact of internal pressures within the leadership and of importuning from its anxious allies in Eastern Europe . . . the DI fragile balance in the Soviet leadership which produced the Čierna agreement has, in the space of less than three weeks, been upset in favor of those who may all along have wanted the toughest kind of policy..." With the political scales in Moscow in such precarious balance, "it would not have needed a great shock to upset them."

And so, in the early morning hours of August 21, Czechoslovakia was invaded from the north, east, and south by 20 Warsaw Pact divisions totaling some 250,000 men. At the same time, the positions vacated by these units were backfilled by 10 Soviet divisions. Once strategic points in Czechoslovakia were occupied, most of these forces redeployed into western Czechoslovakia, restoring the front against NATO. There they were backed by the full might of the Warsaw Pact, including thousands of Warsaw Pact, including thousands of nuclear weapons targeted against Western and Central Europe. Nothing short of a world war was likely to get them out. In 1938, the Western powers had responded to threats against Czechoslovakia by backing down, rather than face a Nazi Germany they falsely believed was ready for war. In 1968, they had no choice.



JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (JIC). Great Britain's central intelligence assessment staff, concentrated within Whitehall's Joint Intelligence bureaucracy, was a small organization drawn from various client departments and divided into geographic or topical Current Intelligence Groups (CIG) consisting of just two or three analysts who were responsible for drafting reports for submission to the weekly JIC meeting, which was a gathering of the professionals and not attended by politicians.

The JIC itself comprised of a chairman and secretary, often drawn from the Foreign Office, at deputy secretary rank; the SIS Chief; MI5's director general; the chief of the General Staff; the Cabinet Intelligence Coordinator; the head of the Defense Intelligence Staff; the Permanent Under-Secretaries of the Home Office, Foreign Office and Treasury; and the head of the JIC's Assessment Staff. The weekly assembly would read and approve CIG assessments and sign off on the Red Book which would be circulated to the Queen, the prime minister and senior members of the Cabinet.

K

KEKKONEN, URHO. Born in September 1900 to a farming family, Urho Kekkonen studied law at Helsinki University and in 1933 joined the Ministry of Agriculture. He was elected to Parliament in 1936 and served first as minister of justice, and then minister of the interior. After the war, he was elected deputy speaker, and in 1948 speaker, a post he held for two years before he was appointed prime minister in March 1950. He was re-elected in October 1954 and remained in office until March 1956 when he became his country's eighth president.

As a prominent politician, Kekkonen advocated close relations with the Soviet Union and pursued a policy of neutrality, although in January 1959 he traveled to Moscow to negotiate directly with Nikita Khrushchev and Andrei Gromyko to resolve an economic dispute between the two countries.

In December 1961, a member of the KGB's *rezidentura* in Helsinki, Anatoli Golitsyn defected to the CIA and revealed that his *rezident*, Vladimir Zhenikhov, regarded Kekkonen as an important KGB asset who had been codenamed TIMO, as was his mistress, AILR:

The KGB *rezidentura* in Helsinki had established contact with Urho Kekkonen during his second period as minister of justice when he had the task of overseeing the trials of wartime political leaders. He was recruited as an agent codenamed TIMO in 1947 by Ivan Pakkanen, a Soviet Finn and KGB officer from Karelia who served under cover as a second secretary in the Soviet embassy in Helsinki. Pakkanen had developed a close social relationship with Uhro Kekkonen which involved drinking bouts and saunas, and he succeeded in persuading him that, in return for his collaboration with Soviet intelligence, the Soviets would forget the repressive action he had taken against communists in the past and would use all their influence to build him up into a major political figure. An important role in Kekkonen's recruitment was also played by a KGB agent with the cryptonym AILR, who was Anne-Marie Snellman, a former Associated Press correspondent in Helsinki and Kekkonen's mistress. Yuri Voronin was one of her case officers and the KGB rewarded her with diamonds and a vacation in the Crimea for the influence she exerted on Kekkonen to accept recruitment.

Kekkonen was an able and ambitious but opportunistic politician who threw in his lot with the KGB and served them with the kind of loyalty for which the Finns are noted. The KGB *resident* at the time of his recruitment, Mikhail Kotov, sent Pakkanen back to Karelia and took for himself the credit for Pakkanen's spectacular success. In late 1948 and again from 1955 to 1957, Kotov ran TIMO, who discussed with successive KGB *residents* whatever major problems he faced and what tactics he should adopt in parliamentary and presidential elections. He invariably acted on their instructions and Soviet intelligence kept its side of the bargain and threw its weight behind his political career. This support took various forms, including diplomatic help for his policies, secret financial backing for his electoral campaigns, advice on courses he should pursue and help in undermining rival candidates. With the KGB's support he served as prime minister with brief interruptions from 1950 to 1956 doubling for parts of this period first as interior minister and later as foreign minister. In 1956, he was elected president.

According to Vladimir Zhenikhov, the *residentura* had provided Kekkonen with funds for bribing members of the electoral college in this election and the bribes were "big enough to set up the recipients for life." The battle to secure votes lasted for a month and on Zhenikhov's instructions, the Finnish communists cast their 56 votes in Kekkonen's favor. Eventually, on February 15, 1956, Kekkonen won the election with 151 out of 300 votes, and the really decisive vote was that of Korshback, the leader of the Finnish People's Party who was also a KGB agent. The deputy *resident*, Viktor Vladimirov, was detained by the Finnish police while he had in his car a member of parliament and the electoral college, whom he had bribed. Vladimirov was released when he established his diplomatic immunity.

After the election, the *residentura* continued to support Uhro Kekkonen through agents of influence in the other Finnish parties and in the press. Kekkonen, for his part, acted as a classic agent of influence, consulting the KGB before taking major initiatives or decisions and keeping it fully informed about his discussions with Western leaders, especially the Scandinavians.

After he became president, Kekkonen set up a personal intelligence service of his own on KGB advice known as the "V Committee," headed by his trusted friend, Professor Kustaa Vilkkuna, Finland former wartime censor who was also a KGB agent. Kekkonen used the service to strengthen his own position in his contests with his political rivals and shared the service's product fully with the KGB. With the KGB's advice and help, Kekkonen systematically undermined the political standing of anticommunist, social democratic leaders like Tanner and Leskinen until the SDP dropped its opposition to the Soviet regime. In a number of other cases, Kekkonen appointed or promoted KGB agents to influential positions in the government, in the police, in

intelligence and security, and in the diplomatic service with particular reference to Finnish ambassadors to Moscow and Washington.

From 1958 onward, the KGB *rezident* Vladimir Zhenikhov ran Kekkonen as an agent and he told me that Kekkonen supplied him with reports from Finnish security on plans for operations to be conducted against Soviet intelligence. Once he allowed me to read one of these reports, which was five or six pages long and concerned a proposal to arrest a GRU officer named Vinogradov for espionage. The report listed recruitment approaches Vinogradov had made to Finnish officers and other evidence of improper collection of military information but, at Zhenikhov's behest, Vinogradov was quietly recalled to Moscow. Kekkonen also gave the KGB copies of reports from Finnish ambassadors and military attachés abroad and secret information from other government departments.

In 1960 and 1961, Zhenikhov and Kekkonen discussed the holding of the Eighth World Festival of Youth in Finland in 1962 and the agent promised his help in sponsoring and arranging the festival, in spite of fierce opposition from large sections of the Finnish public. When a strong challenger to Kekkonen emerged in the presidential campaign of 1961, in the person of the social democrat Olaf Honka with backing from a conservative coalition, the Soviet ambassador and Zhenikhov took successful countermeasures. At a staff meeting in the embassy, the ambassador ordered diplomatic staff to avoid Honka at receptions and to treat him as if he did not exist, and he instructed the consulate to deny him a tourist visa for the Soviet Union if he tried to pay a visit but more important was a carefully coordinated piece of political mischief.

First, TASS put out a report that there was concern in Moscow about Honka's candidacy which was regarded as an attempt by reactionary circles in Finland to alter the nature of Soviet-Finnish relations. Then, by prior secret agreement with Kekkonen, the Kremlin sent the Finnish government a stern note while Kekkonen was visiting Washington D.C. in October 1961. Hearing the "news," Kekkonen abruptly broke off his visit to the United States and returned to Finland to deal with the alleged crisis in Soviet-Finnish relations. The stir created by this incident was enough to finish off Honka as a serious candidate, and Kekkonen was duly re-elected president in 1962.

Meetings between Kekkonen and Vladimir Zhenikhov were held either at a farm owned by Kekkonen's brother or in the Soviet embassy, and when official receptions were held a special room was prepared for private conversations. Soviet leaders, including Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, were fully aware of Kekkonen's relationship with the KGB and when talks were conducted during Kekkonen's visits to Moscow, Mikhail Kotov and Vladimir Zhenikhov acted as interpreters and advisers. Zhenikhov would

often boast that he would get Kekkonen secretly awarded the Order of Lenin and, according to a Soviet publication, he was given his decoration in 1964.

Kekkonen resigned as president in 1981 for health reasons, having fallen ill while on a fishing trip to Iceland, and died in August 1986.

KOREAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 007. On August 31, 1983, a scheduled Korean Airlines Boeing-747, en route from New York to Seoul, was brought down over the Sea of Japan by two AA-3 *Anab* missiles fired by Major Vassili Kasmin, the pilot of a Sukhoi-15 *Flagon* based at Dolinsk after flight KAL 007 had strayed inadvertently into Soviet airspace over Sakhalin Island twice and was about re-enter international airspace. All 269 passengers and crew were killed but the Soviets claimed that the intruder was on an airborne intelligence collection mission. However, when the Russians finally conceded in 1990 that the plane's "black box" had been salvaged, examination of the flight recorder showed that the flight-deck crew had accidentally entered the incorrect coordinates into the inertial navigational system, causing the plane to diverge from its intended route.

Initially, the Kremlin had denied that the flight data and cockpit voice recorders had been recovered and circulated a very tendentious version of the incident, but a GRU source, Vyacheslav Baranov, revealed this information to his Central Intelligence Agency handlers in 1985, shortly before his arrest and imprisonment. As a former pilot, Baranov had kept an interest in aviation matters and had been shocked that the Soviet government had pretended the black box had not been found.

Before being shot down, KAL 007 had overflowed Sakhalin Island, and had come close to several military facilities, including the Su-15 airfield at Doninsk-Siokol, a MiG-23 airfield at Smirnykh, and the submarine base at Petropavlovsk. Apologists for the Soviets claimed that the Boeing had been on a covert reconnaissance mission, and that the aircraft had been mistaken for an RC-135 on a regular RIVET JOINT mission. Release by the State Department of tapes made of the exchanges between Kasmin and his ground controller, including the chilling message "the target is destroyed," eliminated the possibility that the Soviets could claim the incident had been an unfortunate accident.

A lengthy investigation was conducted by the U.S. intelligence community which was anxious not to reveal too much regarding its interception capabilities, but nevertheless stated publicly that the intruder had been tracked for at least half-an-hour before the attack and conceded that the Soviets probably did not know a civilian airliner was involved.

Moscow's reaction was a period of silence, until an acknowledgment of the incident on September 6, and an official explanation was delayed for a further

three more days until September 9, when the chief of staff Marshal **Nikolai Ogarkov** held a live press conference that ran for two hours. He insisted that the regional air defense unit had identified the aircraft as an RC-135, and that regardless of the aircraft type, it was unquestionably on a U.S. or joint U.S.–Japanese intelligence mission, and the local air defense commander had made the correct decision. Indeed, a KGB report submitted to the Politburo by the Defense Ministry indicates that this is what the Kremlin leadership really believed:

We are dealing with a major, dual-purpose political provocation carefully organized by the U.S. special services. The first purpose was to use the incursion of the intruder aircraft into Soviet airspace to create a favorable situation for the gathering of defense data on our air defense system in the Far East, involving the most diverse systems including the Ferret satellite. Second, they envisaged, if this flight were terminated by us [the US would use] that fact to mount a global anti-Soviet campaign to discredit the Soviet Union.

Evidently, Yuri Andropov and his colleagues considered the incident as a deliberate provocation, apparently unaware that the local air defense commander had blundered, having kept his organization on high alert since the spring 1983 Pacific fleet exercises which allegedly had included some infusions by U.S. aircraft. The tension that developed served to heighten Soviet sensibilities and may have been a contributing factor in the later misinterpretation of NATO's autumn exercises in the Norwegian Sea. *See also* RYAN.

KOREAN WAR. The invasion of South Korea in June 1950 took place almost 10 months after the successful detonation of a Soviet plutonium bomb, an event that effectively ended the American monopoly of atomic weapons. The conflict took the Western Allies by surprise and created an urgent intelligence requirement for military and political information. Specifically, the United Nations forces needed to know if the Chinese would intervene, and the Communists were keen for reassurance that President Harry Truman would not resort to a nuclear strategy. On June 19, four days after the northern offensive began, the Central Intelligence Agency issued a situation report describing an incursion by “four divisions of the People’s Army and two brigades of the puppet Border Constabulary” supported by up to 70 light and medium tanks and some Air Force involvement.

Communist China’s Role in Korean Conflict

Although the Chinese communists are not expected to play a major role in the Korean invasion, Chinese Communist leaders may regard Korea as a testing-ground for determining the intentions of the West, and Western policy

toward the support of South Korea may be reflected in Peiping's policy toward both Taiwan and Indo-China.

The Peiping regime has had a continuing interest in strengthening northern Korean forces for eventual military action against the southern Republic. While the Chinese Communists probably exert no independent influence on the northern Korean regime and have no voice in the formulation of northern Korean policy, a possible total of 20–30,000 Korean troops from Manchurian units of the People's Liberation Army have been transferred to northern Korea over the past few years, together with unknown amounts of materiel. While it is not anticipated that regular Chinese Communist forces will appear in the Korean conflict, some 60–70,000 additional troops of Korean extraction are available in Manchuria for transfer to the North Korean forces, should this prove necessary.

As the war progressed Western intelligence agencies, which demonstrably had failed to give advance warning of the aggression, scrambled to provide tactical intelligence of value to the frontline troops. The CIA had got off to a poor start with assessment, like this in January 1950, which was skeptical of imminent aggression:

The continuing southward movement of the expanding Korean People's Army toward the thirty-eighth parallel probably constitutes a defensive tactic to offset the growing strength of the offensively minded South Korean Army. The influx of Chinese Communist-trained troops from Manchuria, however, will partially solve North Korea's manpower shortage and will add materially to the combat potential of the North Korean Army. North Korean military strength has been further bolstered by the assignment of tanks and heavy field guns to units in the thirty-eighth parallel zone and by the development of North Korean air capabilities. Despite this increase in North Korean military strength, the possibility of an invasion of South Korea is unlikely unless North Korean forces can develop a clear-cut superiority over the increasingly efficient South Korean Army.

The CIA would later argue that in 1950 it was a small organization in January 1950 of only 5,000 employees worldwide, with just 1,000 analysts and only three operations officers in Korea, and therefore ill-equipped to make accurate predictions.

KUKLINSKI, RYSZARD. In August 1972, the military attaché at the U.S. embassy in Bonn received an anonymous letter post-marked Wilhemshaven and signed "PV," promising to telephone the U.S. embassy in The Hague a week later. When he did so, a rendezvous was arranged later the same night outside the main railway station, and this was followed by a meeting in a nearby hotel at which Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski identified himself as

a disaffected Polish General Staff officer who was sailing along the Dutch coast with colleagues aboard the two masted yacht *Legia*. Realizing he could not approach the U.S. embassy in Warsaw undetected, he had taken the opportunity to write his letter when the *Legia* docked at Wilhelmshaven. He confided in no one, including his wife Hanka and their two sons, Boguslaw and Waldemar.

The **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) responded to Kuklinski, code-named GULL, by setting up a series of dead-drops in Warsaw and arranged a meeting with him in January 1973 at the Wolski cemetery at which he delivered nine rolls of film containing classified material he had photographed at work. Six months later, in June 1973, Kuklinski was assigned a new case officer, David W. Forden, who had recently returned to Europe from Mexico. Known to Kuklinski only as DANIEL, Forden spoke Polish fluently, having served previously as the CIA's Station Chief in Warsaw, and they met at a safe-house in Hamburg so Kuklinski could be indoctrinated into the sophisticated tradecraft required to communicate with sources in a hostile environment. Personal meetings were to be avoided, with contact limited to exchanges of exposed film and messages at dead-drops indicated by a complex system of signals, each ostensibly completely innocuous, such as the wheels of Kuklinski's ancient Opel car being turned in a particular direction when parked on a certain street.

In 1975, after Kuklinski's fourth cruise out of Poland, the *Legia* was confined to Polish waters, so he was obliged to rely on dead-drops emptied by the CIA's Warsaw station, with whom he communicated via a Discus portable transmitter which could send and receive an alphanumeric message. By 1980, Kuklinski had been promoted to deputy chief of the Operations Directorate and was to supply some 30,000 documents on topics ranging from war plans, military maps, electronic warfare manuals, military targeting guidelines, and even blueprints for command bunkers. Kuklinski, who signed his messages JACK STRONG, also disclosed top secret plans for the imposition of martial law.

In November 1981, Kuklinski was summoned to a chief of staff's conference at which he realized that although he personally was not yet under suspicion, it was now only a matter of time before the molehunt now underway, which was concentrated on the only two people with uninterrupted full access to the martial law plans, trapped him because a crucial document had been compromised. The incriminating item was a paper drafted by Kuklinski which had referred to the circumstances under martial law in which the use of deadly force might become necessary. These vital words had been omitted from the final agreed text, but it was clear to the investigation that it was the original version that had leaked, thus narrowing the field to Kuklinski

alone. Accordingly, Kuklinski requested another emergency rendezvous and was met by the CIA Deputy Chief of Station in Warsaw, a woman who promised an exfiltration for him, his wife and his two sons, and arranged for future communications to be conducted by the sons because Kuklinski feared he was under constant surveillance. However, it proved almost impossible for the local CIA personnel to shake off their surveillance, and on three successive nights, the operation had to be abandoned. Finally two CIA officers under commercial cover flew in “black” to Warsaw from Germany to supervise an escape, and the group was driven to West Berlin, hidden under cardboard boxes in the back of a Volvo station-wagon. They were then flown in a military transport to Andrews Air Force base, where they were met by a jubilant David Forden, who escorted them to a safe-house in Warrenton, Virginia, and subsequently arranged the exfiltration from Warsaw of Kuklinski’s son’s mistress.

Altogether Kuklinski supplied the CIA with more than 35,000 classified Warsaw Pact documents, and after his exfiltration, he continued to interpret them for CIA analyst. He died in September 2004.

L

LABARTHE, ANDRÉ. Born in Paris in January 1902, André Labarthe was an aeronautical engineer who was attached in 1931 to the French Aviation Ministry's research department where he was closely associated with **Pierre Cot**. In August 1936, he undertook an unofficial mission to Spain, working closely with Jean Moulin, and upon his return to Paris, he was appointed director of Bureau of Research and Inventions.

Following the French collapse, Labarthe moved to London in support of Charles de Gaulle's Free French and served in his Cabinet as director general of armament and scientific research. In September 1940, he founded the monthly magazine *La France Libre* and with the sponsorship of de Gaulle's deputy, Admiral Emile Muselier, was appointed minister of information. In July 1943, he moved to the United States, and the **VENONA** decrypts would later reveal that both he and his secretary, Alta Lecoutre, were fully fledged Soviet spies reporting the GRU.

Labarthe appeared frequently in the VENONA traffic under the codename JEROME and was easy to identify because, in a message dated August 24, 1940, he was described as having recently "had a talk with CHURCHILL's private secretary." The latter stated that during the last three weeks, his morale had risen considerably in the ranks of the National Coalition government partly as a result of the success of the RAF but mainly because of SASHA's [United States'] promise of support. A simple check with (Sir) Jock Colville, who had fulfilled that role, enabled MI5 to put a name to the cryptonym. Labarthe's secretary, Alta Lecoutre, designated MARTHA, who was Pierre Cot's mistress and was married to another Soviet agent, Stanislas Szymonczyk.

A series of messages dating from July 8, 1940, indicated that JEROME had been in the pay of the Soviets in GASTRONOMIA (France) for the past five years, in collaboration with his secretary, MARTHA. Among the many damning VENONA texts implicating them was one from Simon Kremer of the GRU's London *rezidentura*, dated July 17, 1940, which suggested that Labarthe was using his influence over de Gaulle to have Admiral Muselier appointed as head of the Free French Air Force:

According to information from MARTHA and from the press, JEROME is successfully consolidating his position in the French group here. At the moment, he is organizing French technical [one group unrecovered] for the requirements of the British war industry. He has already been received by the Minister of Supply and has a letter of recommendation to another minister. The press writes about him favorably and puts him third in order after General de GAULLE.

In spite of my tact, they were both somewhat surprised by the nature of my questions and assignments. Previously he provided only political intelligence, while she worked in the international Trade Union movement. Comrade SHVERNIK apparently knows her through this work. I explained to them that they both had opportunities of helping us. She was formerly a member of the German CORPORATION [Communist Party] and though he is not a member of the Party, he is sympathetic toward us, and he was in SPAIN.

He will continue with the general until he receives your instructions. If [one group unrecovered] he will go where you instruct him to go. MARTHA declares that around JEROME and her husband a group of Frenchmen is forming who might agree to any sort of negotiations directed against Fascism. JEROME is taking steps to get an officer friend of his nominated to the post of Commander of the Air Force. In order to carry out your assignment JEROME will collect material under the pretense of writing a book on the subject of the defeat of GASTRONOMIA [France].

Last night MARTHA passed me some material on an invention by a French engineer for the improvement of bombing. This material is due to be handed over to the British. This morning the material was returned after being photographed. The material is in French and is accompanied by the appropriate drawings. Having formerly worked in the Ministère de l'Air, JEROME snapped up the material.

JEROME used to be paid according to the job in GASTRONOMIA. I confirmed that this would go on here as well. Apparently MARTHA did not get anything before, apart from occasional help from CACHIN. Since she will get very little as JEROME's secretary, I promised to give her financial support. Politically, she is stronger than JEROME and influences him.

We came to an agreement that contact would be through MARTHA only. JEROME, incidentally, speaks English badly. Please give permission to make APTEKAR or MARK the contact with her.

After the liberation of Paris, Labarthe developed a career in journalism and in May 1948, in partnership with Alta Lecoutre, published a fortnightly digest journal, *Constellation*, and later edited another magazine, *Science and Life*.

In 1965, MI5 alerted Marcel Chalet, the DST's deputy director to VENONA's incontrovertible evidence of Labarthe's espionage, and he was

interviewed in 1965. He confessed, but because of the political implications, and the potential for pressure from his wartime cronies, the details were kept secret, and he succumbed to a heart attack two years later, in November 1967.

LATVIA. In the grip of the Red Army occupation since October 1944, Latvia was regarded in the West as a satellite country which might eventually be detached from the Soviet Union and, given the strength of local political feeling and support for independence, an opportunity for fermenting resistance and the collection of intelligence.

In July 1950, the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) began to support the “forest brothers” at the request of emigres, some of whom had moved to Sweden and the United States. One of the political leaders, Fred Launags (alias “Cleveland O. Hahn”) sought the CIA’s aid, and a subsequent report described the current state of the active partisans who operated independently:

The activities of SGPSALM [resistance movement], in general, and Hahn’s group, in particular, are determined by the following political considerations:

- a. They realize that the movement within their home country would be incapable of overthrowing the forces of the TPSTALL [Soviet] regime and, therefore, their policy is directed toward keeping these forces alive and intact insofar as it is possible for eventual use at the time when the opportune moment will come.
- b. The groups are composed, for the most part, of those people who are scheduled for deportation and who, in their desperation, have chosen to hide themselves in the woods. Their number, which was variously estimated and could not be closely checked, was reported as large as 18,000 to 20,000, but Hahn, on the basis of his information, attempts to estimate this number between 7,000 and 10,000 at the most. He points out that the conditions of the individuals are extremely poor; that they suffer from various diseases contracted because of precarious living conditions, inadequate food and clothing supplies and almost complete lack of medical assistance. The movement in JBCLLOUD, [Latvia] according to his estimates, does not and could not represent any real danger to the TPSTALL [Soviet] authorities and this fact is reflected most clearly in the government official policy which feels itself quite secure on the territory of JBCLLOUD [Latvia] and in view of this has very considerably relaxed the internal security measures and controls.

Because of the above considerations, Hahn feels that the activities of his group should be directed toward preserving the movement within JBCLLOUD [Latvia], giving moral support as well as physical and above all, instilling a

faith and a hope that they are not alone, that others are working with them, and that the hour of liberation is slowly but surely approaching.

By September 1952, the CIA's plans to help Launags had developed into AECOB, a project to infiltrate agents into Latvia:

Operations will be conducted into the Latvian SSR. Recruiting of agents will take place primarily in the United States but exceptional candidates in Europe and the Western Hemisphere will also be contacted. Training will be conducted primarily in the United States. Political and psychological warfare activity will be conducted among Latvian emigre groups for the main part in the United States and Western Europe.

AECOB included an operation codenamed ZRLYNCH, which acknowledged that the CIA's British and Swedish counterparts were already on the scene:

- a. This project was developed in its early stages by OPC/EE-2 under project ZRLYNCH. The original purpose was to contact the resistance in the Latvian SSR by utilizing the contact group in Sweden of the Latvian resistance. The contact group, commonly known as the "SC," consists of the triumvirate CAMBAROS 1, 2, and 3, who ever since 1946 have attempted to interest the Western democracies in aiding and supporting the partisans and underground in Latvia. Since their alignment with DYCLAIM, they have recruited two agents in Sweden and one in Germany. In the latter part of 1951, the three agents began training under the direct supervision of CAMBARO 2, while CAMBARO 1 acted as operational planner.

Objectives

1. To organize, develop, and execute covert operations for the infiltration into and, as appropriate, exfiltration out of the Latvian SSR of non-American agent personnel for the purpose of establishing support points in the Latvian SSR and obtaining operational and/or strategic intelligence.
3. To establish in the Latvian SSR covert resident agent personnel who can assist agents being infiltrated into other strategic areas of the USSR and who will assist in the attainment of long-range intelligence objectives.
4. To assist in the organization, development, and execution of covert political and psychological warfare operations against the Soviet regime of the Latvian SSR for the purpose of placing a maximum strain on the Soviet structure and of driving a wedge between the Latvian people and the Soviet regime.

5. To establish effective clandestine contacts with and provide assistance and guidance to whatever resistance nuclei that exist in the Latvian SSR.
6. To organize and develop covert assets to be utilized in times of open hostilities with the Soviet Union for the conduct of psychological warfare operations in the Latvian SSR,
7. To organize and develop specially trained unconventional warfare teams to be infiltrated into the Latvian SSR and work with resistance and guerilla forces upon the outbreak of open hostilities with the Soviet Union.
8. To organize and develop covert assets to be utilized upon the outbreak of open hostilities with the Soviet Union for conducting sabotage against key Latvian industrial and military installations and communications,
9. To organize and develop covert assets for aiding Allied military personnel to avoid capture and to escape from the USSR via the Latvian SSR in time of open hostilities.

Targets

Specific intelligence targets in the Latvian SSR are outlined in Top Secret SR Memorandum, Control No. 73433, March 21, 1952.

Tasks

1. Recruitment, training, and dispatch of Latvian agents in the Latvian SSR.
2. Development of s/w, w/t, and courier communications with the Latvian SSR,
3. Unification of the Latvian emigration.
4. Stockpiling of materiel necessary for the support of resistance and guerilla groups in the Latvian SSR.
5. Continual accumulation of operational data and documentation.
6. Training of sabotage and unconventional warfare teams.
7. Establishment of a covert radio transmitter outside of the Latvian SSR.
8. Support of worthy publications, particularly those stressing any activity supporting emigre unification.

Personnel

- a. CALBARO 1 - Now serving as Chief Consultant by DYCLAIM case officers and the agent candidates in the AEOOB Project in Germany. Operational clearance has been granted.
- b. [XXXXX] is at present employed as spotter and recruiter of agent candidates in the U.S., as well as informing this office of developments

in Latvian emigre groups, gaining most of his information from the Latvian Legation in Washington which he has successfully penetrated for DYCLAIM. [XXX] has no personal political ambitions at present. Operational clearance has been granted.

- c. CAMBARO 2 - Now serves as chief indigenous instructor of the AEOOB group in training in Germany.

Operational clearance has been granted.

- a) d CAMUSO 11 is being used as a translator of training material from Russian into Latvian in Germany. Provisional Operational Clearance has been granted.
- b) CAMUSO 12: To be used as a translator of training material from Russian into Latvian in Germany. She is the wife of CAMUSO 11.
- c) Three agents are being trained in Germany for dispatch into the Latvian SSR. Two prospective, agents are being processed for dispatch into the Latvian SSR in 1953.

Cover

The cover used by case officers in the United States in contact with principal and operational agents [XXXXXXXXXXXX] Europe CAMBARO 1 and 2 are aware or being employed by DYCLAIM treca. use they were recruited under circumstances forcing revelation. The agents in training are aware of being employed by "American Secret Service."

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

Contact and Communications

- a. Direct contact is maintained between field and Headquarters case officers, and CAMBARO 1 and 2 and FLIPPIN.
- b. Direct contact will exist between action agents and training officers.
- c. W/T, S/W and courier contact will be developed between DYGIAM and agents inside Latvian SSR.

Control:

Complete U.S. control of all action agents is considered of paramount importance and all possible steps necessary to achieve such control are being taken. Originally, control of the agents was in the hands of the contact group.

- a. CAMBARO I, [XXXX] and CAMBARO 2 are controlled by their financial dependence on us, as well as their belief that the American government is the one most likely to aid them in regaining the freedom of Latvia.
- b. CAMBARO I is motivated by the belief that he is an emissary of the Latvian resistance movement and is responsible for doing as much as possible for his country. [XXXX] is ideologically motivated because of the high positions his father formerly held in the Latvian government, and his desire to see his father's work justified in the re-creation of a free Latvia.
- c. The agents in training are motivated by a strong desire to free their country. They all possess a strong anticommunist feeling and feel that by working for the American government they can aid in freeing Latvia and perhaps secure a position for themselves in any future Latvian government.
- b. Agents recruited will be controlled physically while in training in either Germany or the United States. It is hoped to control them financially as well.

Special Equipment

Special equipment will usually include w/t sets, s/w material, personal arms, cameras, "L" and "K" tablets, Soviet-type clothing, sterile concentrated foods, rubles, and articles of value for bribery and barter.

Coordination

1. British I.S. The British are currently in contact with a partisan group in northwest Latvia and claim to have individual agents in other unnamed localities. When it is to our advantage, and when individual circumstances warrant it, the British may be advised concerning certain aspects of our Latvian dispatches.
2. Swedish I.S. The Swedes are currently in w/t and s/w contact with a Latvian agent. While they have not welcomed our entrance into the Baltic area, they have on occasion agreed to facilitate certain aspects of our dispatch operation. When it is to our advantage, individual circumstances warranting it, we may advise the Swedes concerning certain aspects of our Latvian dispatches.

The [XXXXXXXXX] will usually be informed of our activities in this area.

Coordination will be effected with the appropriate area divisions.

Timetable

- a. One agent mission per year is anticipated. It is planned to dispatch one mission in 1952.
- b. Two U.S. agent prospects are expected to enter training in the early fall of 1952 in preparation for spring 1953 operations.

In another operation planned (if not actually executed) in June 1951, codenamed AEFREEMAN, sought headquarters funding for the purchase of weapons, an inventory that included “approximately 2,900 small arms . . . 20 anti-tank guns, 50 mortars, 11,00 lbs explosives, 12,000 grenades.”

The CIA’s paramilitary missions into Latvia continued until 1966 when the Domestic Operations Base in Alexandria, Virginia, designated AEPOT, was closed down. Additionally, the CIA ran psychological operations, and in 1958 purchased the rights to Milovan Djilas’s *The New Class* to distribute across the Baltic as part of AEFLAG, a campaign which from 1955 included daily shortwave broadcasts to Latvia from Radio National in Madrid.

LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS. A significant feature of the Cold War was the level of cooperation between Allied intelligence agencies. Whereas the Eastern Bloc looked to the KGB for guidance, training, and support, their Western counterparts were enthusiastic recipients of the financial aid offered to mount operations against mutual targets. This funding was on a massive scale and allowed, for example, the Argentine SIDE to develop technical surveillance against Chinese and Soviet Bloc diplomatic missions on a scale that the organization would never have been able to accomplish on its own, and give the Dutch BVD and Danish PET the resources required to sustain long-term monitoring of local Communists.

LIPKA, ROBERT. A former NSA analyst, Lipka was the subject of an investigation into a leak which lasted 20 years and was codenamed CAPSTONE by the FBI. The original tip concerning a KGB source inside the NSA came from Alexander Kulik in 1969, two years after Lipka left the NSA and broke off contact with his KGB handlers. Lipka was eventually identified by Vasili Mitrokhin in 1992 and was entrapped in a sting operation by Dmitri Droujinsky, an FBI special agent masquerading as a KGB officer anxious to re-establish contact.

A retired NSA communications clerk, Lipka was lured from his home in Millersville, Pennsylvania, in February 1996 to a meeting with Droujinsky, who pretended to be a Russian intelligence officer named Nikitin. Having enlisted in the U.S. Army in August 1963, Lipka had worked for the NSA

between 1964 and 1967, and according to Mitrokhin, had walked into the Soviet embassy in September 1965. Lipka had stopped meeting his KGB contacts in 1974, but he complained freely to Droujinsky that he was still owed some money, and believed he was in no danger of prosecution for the crimes he had committed when aged 20 because of the statute of limitations. In total, he had been paid about \$27,000 for his information, contained in film canisters which he had left at dead-drops along the Potomac, receiving between \$500 and \$1,000 per delivery. The material came from top secret reports taken from teleprinters and couriers at the NSA's headquarters where he was responsible for their sorting and distribution. According to the FBI, Lipka had stuffed the documents down his shirt or wrapped them around his legs to get them out of the building.

Lipka was arrested at home in February 1996 just after his two children had left for school, and in May 1997, he pleaded guilty to one count of espionage and in September was sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment. At one point, Lipka threatened to disclose further NSA secrets on the internet unless all the charges were dropped. Because Vasili Mitrokhin's role in identifying Lipka was concealed, it was initially reported that he had come under suspicion after his ex-wife had made allegations against him. Later it was stated by an FBI special agent, John W. Whiteside, in a trial affidavit that Oleg Kalugin had accidentally compromised him by referring in his 1994 autobiography *The First Directorate* to a young soldier, attached to the NSA, who had provided the embassy with copies of NSA reports addressed to the White House. According to Kalugin, the soldier's job had been to shred documents, but instead he had smuggled them out of Fort Meade, which showed "how incredibly lax security was at some of the United States' top-secret installations." Neither story was true, and Lipka's arrest came as a direct result of Mitrokhin's evidence, although there may have been some truth in Kalugin's assessment that much of the material was "of little value" to the KGB, and that the spy "had little idea of what he was handing over."

LITHUANIA. Reoccupied the Soviets in 1944, Lithuania developed the largest resistance movement of the Baltic countries, with an estimated 15,000 partisans living off the land until an amnesty in 1953 effectively brought their campaign to an end. The "forest brothers" were supported by British and Swedish clandestine organizations, but it was the **CIA** which took on the burden of arming and supplying the anticommunists through an operation code-named AECHAMP which ran for a decade from 1949. Candidates considered suitable for recruitment, usually members of the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania, were cultivated in the American Zone of Germany in

a program codenamed AEGEAN after they had applied for emigration visas to the United States and had their relocation delayed.

A report in April 1951, on an AECHAMP sub-component codenamed CAPSTAN, recorded that

This project was initiated approximately two years ago. The first dispatch consisting of [XXXXX] took place at the end of September 1950. To date two S/W letters from [XXXX] have been received by [XXXX] in Paris. 16 messages have been transmitted from Munich Operations Base [XXXX] to [XXXX] and 12 have been received, the last on December 8, 1950. The second team consisting of [XXXXX] with [XXXX] as jump master is ready for dispatch.

The age-old problem of hostile penetration and manipulation by agents operating under the adversary's control quickly emerged in AECHAMP, as is demonstrated by a counterintelligence analysis undertaken in December 1951 of the performance of an agent codenamed JACK who had failed to provide the correct answers to test questions. The report, COOKEE, would be controversial and make uncomfortable reading:

REDSOX/CAPSTAN/AERONAUT

ANALYSIS OF COOKEE TRAFFIC

1. The failure of Field to respond to the crypto challenge and his earlier failure to recognize the case officer challenge have brought the shortcomings and inconsistencies of Cooke traffic more clearly into focus. It is proposed herein to discuss the traffic in detail (dwelling on these basic inconsistencies) and insofar as possible, draw some conclusions from them.
2. In addition to failing to respond clean to either challenge, the messages from the field, close scrutiny, warrant the following observations:
3. The content of the traffic, which although on surface appraisal appears to be good, gives us very little information not already available to us;
4. References to movement and partisan courier communications are full of contradictions and inconsistencies;
5. Steve has not participated in the traffic, directly or indirectly.
6. The explanation of the two months which transpired between dispatch and coming on the air is unsatisfactory; and there is a complete lack of explanation of the six weeks' break in the traffic (June 26 to August 5), subsequent to which Field has been on the air with amazing regularity;
7. The fact is that most of the main inconsistencies referred to below revolve around the statements appearing in the first four messages and

the inconsistent, if not contradictory, comments in subsequent messages. There is a disparity between the request for a printing press for propaganda action and the reported conditions under which such action would have to be carried out;

8. There is complete disparity between the reception plan agreed on with Jack prior to his departure and that described by him. After a faltering start, Jack has been on the air with astonishing regularity.
9. As cited Para. 2 Reference, control seems to be indicated by the lack of detailed specific information which Jack knew we desired. If it is true that Jack is so isolated in the woods, and his colleagues are so hampered by repressions, etc., that they cannot acquire detailed specific information on any one subject, it appears likely that they would at the very least have access to rumors concerning general conditions in the country. On three separate occasions we asked Field for general information on conditions in country as well as “rumors of unrest, military activity,” and so on. These requests have gone unanswered. You will note in the breakdown below that almost without exception we have received replies to our specific questions (usually with a bare minimum of information), but it is only by implication that questions of a general nature (which we would be in a position to verify from knowledge gained from the repatriates and [XXXXX] have been answered. Attachment 2 gives a breakdown of “voluntary” information, which Jack has forwarded during the five months he has been on the air. It is not a formidable collection of vital information.
10. The failure of [XXXX] to procure and report even minimal general information is closely related to the inconsistencies revolving around the reported complete breakdown in communications between the partisan units. You will note that in Jack’s earlier messages, in which he reports the disruption of communications “within, the region,” he also reports the sending of people to neighboring areas, Prussia, Kaunas, and the Lithuanian–Polish borders. These reports are not in keeping with later messages in which he reports the refusal of some contact men to carry out their assignments and his apparent complete inability to learn anything about anything, since “no documents are reaching the Zalgiris Detachment,” etc. His reports of sending a letter to Stan “through contact men”; of Steve’s departure to attempt to make contact with Tauras Region Headquarters; of the “arrival of a contact man” with word that Steve had been killed—are all incompatible with the reported complete breakdown of communications as evidenced by the dearth of even most basic information either from the country as a whole or from his immediate surrounding area.

11. This basic inconsistency between reported breakdown of communications and what it is possible to learn and transmit is pointed up by the detailed information concerning the death of Steve (Message #11). This information had to be “wheedled” out of Field but since this was information which we had more or less insisted upon having, detailed responses were ultimately (although piecemeal) forthcoming. That it is possible to procure information is presumably here verified. Aitoniskiai (the reported place of Steve’s death) is approximately 15 km from the DZ selected by Jack for reception of new people. Jack’s hideout is reportedly a night’s march from the DZ, which together we can assume approximate 25–30 km. If Jack was able to obtain the details of Steve’s death from the distance involved in this instance, it does not seem unreasonable that he could discover the size, activity, etc., of the closest reported partisan detachment, which is approximately the same distance in another direction from where he is. In this regard, a discussion with the [XXX] and [XXX] elicited an immediate and unanimous comment to the effect that it was “unbelievable” that Jack’s “detachment” could maintain no contact with even its closest neighbors or to know nothing whatsoever of a Supreme Command.
12. Message #1 lays the groundwork for another inconsistency in regard to contact with other units. It is therefore reported that the drop was made about 7 km SE of the designated spot. Study of the map indicates that to have dropped 7 km SE of the designated spot would put them very close to Papilvis Village (which is there reported). Message #2 mentions Agurkiskiai, where the second set, ciphers, and common plans were buried and where “everything was found in order.” Agurkiskiai is ca. 10 km NW of where Jack says he and Steve dropped and is ca. 7 km NW of the DZ delineated by Jack in Message #11. If the points and distances provided by Jack are accurate, the container which was dropped with them is presumably buried within a radius of 3–li km of the selected DZ. His report in Message #11 that they are “attempting to re-establish contact with the Birutenai Detachment, in whose area the container is buried,” and his subsequent failure to mention the matter again seems quite strange since Jack’s “contact man” (Msg. @18) lives only 2–3 km from the alleged site of the burial. (You will note that there is no further mention of either the container or the “Birutenai Detachment in subsequent traffic.) Since Jack has indicated that either he or his colleagues have been active in setting up the new DZ, it is hard to believe that efforts to at least recover the container so near at hand would not have been made and reported,
13. The request for a portable printing press has provided additional questions. In the overall view, the stated desire for a printing press as being

“necessary to strengthen the morale of the partisans and their supporters” is not at all compatible with a partisan detachment to all intents and purposes completely cut off from outside contacts. The question immediately comes to mind: Just who would be circularized with this propaganda material? The very wording of the messages dealing with the subject of the press indicates rather strong pressure, which is not explained later by Jack with reasoned statements, but circumvented with vague and uninformative excuses. For example, in Msg.#12, after reporting that the press was necessary for his colleagues, he says: “As compensation I can count on their help in all of my other activities, etc.” Since we had figured that Jack had been forced to use the press as a bargaining point with his partisan colleagues, this reasoning made some sense. However, he goes on to say: “. . . it is not possible to avoid (propaganda) completely under the conditions at hand.” In Msg. #17, Jack says he agrees with our viewpoint concerning the dangers of propaganda activity but “nevertheless, under existing conditions, it is not conceivable to completely withdraw from it,” Field fails completely either to justify or elaborate these “conditions at hand” and our fears concerning compartmentalization of the two activities have not been allayed by the subsequent picture Jack paints of conditions under which propaganda would be carried on. If control is assumed, such circumstances might tempt one to venture that Jack’s controls were anxious only to receive our most capable and knowledgeable individuals, therefore, insisting upon a printing press and a propaganda man (i.e., a man politically knowledgeable) regardless of the unsatisfactory conditions which are described. Since we have made such a point of the printing press, the responses from the [XXX] are unsatisfactory and in their entirety open to serious question.

14. It also appears to us rather strange that no request for weapons was made. Jack refers to his colleagues from time to time as “fighters” yet he makes no mention whatsoever of any need for ammunition or weapons. We can only assume that if this is a bona fide resistance detachment, there would be need for weapons—if not for offensive action, at least for self-defense—or some other direct support in supplies, for instance, drugs or shoes, which are very difficult to obtain, even with rubles. The barest minimum he would ask for, it would appear is for new weapons for the two men who live with him in the bunker. And too, the twice-iterated request for sizable sums of rubles, although doubtless valid under any circumstances, can hardly be justified by the returns, for even assuming that 50,000 rubles were lost with Steve, we have very little indeed to show for the other 50,000 Jack had.

15. Another unanswerable question which has plagued us throughout the course of the traffic is the complete absence of Steve in it. Message #1 reports their separation on May 19, one month to the day after arrival. [XXXX] feels very strongly that, at the very least, Steve would have written out a message for transmission by Jack when he was able to come on the air. Both were instructed to send and Steve would have had a month prior to separation during which to write a message or at least give Jack some verbal greeting, acknowledgment or instructions to send.
16. In actuality, the nearly two months which transpired between dispatch and coming on the air are rather cursorily explained away. It was due to "uncertain conditions" that Steve and Jack separated on May 19. It was due to "danger of movement" which prevented checking back for the container. It was "uncertain conditions" which made it necessary, to stop sending temporarily." Whereas earlier there was danger of movement, Steve left to make contact with the headquarters of a region and persons were being sent to various and sundry places both near and far. Later traffic speaks of the failure of contact men to carry out assignments, while at the same time, six men are to assist in a dangerous reception committee, and one additional person has been selected to act as a contact man. There has been no indication that Jack has changed his locale during the course of the traffic; however, whereas it was necessary earlier to "stop sending," the same locale now offers the possibility to be on the air seven different times during the course of a three weeks' period (October 31 to November 20)
17. 11 Two additional points which might also be mentioned are:
 - a) Jack's plan for a reception varies in almost every respect with the plan provided him by [XXXXX] and Jack has totally failed to explain why he has changed the pre-arranged plan; in fact, has failed to make any reference to it.
 - b) Commo personnel report that Jack puts out such a strong signal that it is possible to hear it even without earphones on the opposite side of the room. His messages have had almost perfect readability throughout; and in addition, he handles the circuit in a competent, calm manner, indicating that at least while transmitting he is not under a strain or in nervous condition.
17. Para. 3 Ref: If Jack is, and has been under the direct control of an MGB Case Officer, it is hard to tell whether Jack or the control is making the most of the situation. The fact that—the first four messages excepted—there has never been any worthwhile or unsolicited information coming out over the link which indicates that a tight screening of messages has been maintained. This is the type of screening which presumably only

close direct case officer control would be able to insure. Such close control of information, however, is not entirely compatible with the fact that the controlling case officer allowed both of the challenges to go unanswered, while at the same time condoning the “Girenas” inconsistency mentioned below. One would tend to assume that if Jack were really broken, the case officer would have got at least one of the compromise signals from him; Jack, however, is an intelligent individual: he did have some leeway and “room to maneuver” in both challenges; and quite possibly may have succeeded evading disclosure of compromise signals by some sequence of lies of which we are obviously unaware but which explain the numerous inconsistencies in the messages we have noted.

18. In the first four messages (which are very characteristic of Jack and have a striking air of genuineness), he names names; cites locales; indicates knowledgeability concerning the whereabouts of Stan; the Tauras Region, LLKS headquarters, general conditions, and so on, and makes mention of Frank and Joe. In these four messages, he is abiding by instructions and doing just what we would want and expect of him. Since the subject matter of these four messages form the basis of the chief arguments for control, either in omission or contradiction in subsequent traffic, it would appear that they are the key to the question of control. On the basis of the traffic pattern and subject matter, Jack appears to have been free until after the fourth message, if that is the case, then, indeed, we must read the many inconsistencies and contradictions in the subsequent traffic as clues to Jack’s real status, and as parts of a story which Jack may have concocted to protect his previous traffic, his compromise and danger signals, and indicate to us control. The use of “Girenas” in one of the messages and his later failure to use it again may be one example of such a clue.
19. Jack’s failure to mention Birutenai Detachment in any message subsequent to the fourth is perhaps significant since he did mention a group similar to the Zalgiris Detachment in Message #18. This is the Gelezinis Vilkas (the “Iron Wolf”) Detachment, the reporting of which is the first instance wherein Jack failed to repeat a proper name. In this connection, since the name of “Birutenai” is associated with the container dropped with Steve and Jack, it may also be of considerable significance, that in Message #16, Jack says that “as far as other supplies are concerned, it is enough to have what we had in our personal bags and on ourselves.” It would not be unreasonable to take this as an indication that Jack has kept the fact of the existence of the container from his controls completely, hence the avoidance of any mention of the container, Birutenai Detachment, and other subjects raised in the first four messages.

20. If we assume MGB control subsequent to Msg. #1, it is still difficult to explain the complete absence of Steve in the traffic. However, an explanation may lie in the following circumstance: A careful study of the first four messages gives strong indication that almost from the moment Steve and Jack hit the ground they were hunted men. This could, in fact, explain why it took eight days to cover the distance to the first contact point. The genuine urgency of “uncertain conditions” in Msg. #1; “the danger of movement” in Msg. # 2 and again “uncertain conditions necessitating sending temporarily” in Msg. #4 give cause to suspect that the greater part of those two months was spent by both Steve and Jack keeping themselves alive and hidden. In addition to providing an explanation of the six-week break in the traffic (during which time Jack was presumably apprehended and “broken”) the premise of MGB control after the fourth message provides relatively good explanations for the overall content of the traffic and the inconsistencies appearing in the traffic after the first four messages. Before departure, Steve made it very clear that he would kill himself rather than fall into the hand of the enemy. Jack, on the other hand, limited his assurances in this regard to “doing his best.” If Jack did, in fact, succumb to MGB capture, he has done everything possible to inform us of his controlled status and is in fact “doing his best.”
21. Para 4 Reference: Although the many inconsistencies of the traffic and the danger signals are perhaps best explained by this theory, the mechanics of completely sealing Jack off from any sort of information would be hard to imagine. Under this theory, Jack has presumable access to a free radio, but is controlled either by the extreme limitations of access to information or is being required to submit his texts for approval prior to transmission. The inconsistency of the “breakdown of communications” could be explained by the fact that the contact men of the detachment carry out only those assignments for Jack (or his control) which will be of no harm to them and of little real value to us. The ability to get details on Steve’s death would be a very good example of the sort of thing which the contact men would be able to perform.
22. Since the first four messages indicate cleanliness, the explanation of absence of Steve in the messages would remain the same. Both Jack and he were so busy evading the security forces that there was no time for them to send a message before Steve had departed—and he counted on Jack to do the transmitting, when possible—while he proceeded to make contact with the neighboring regional headquarters. The nature of the replies to queries regarding the advisability of the printing press would tend to indicate the type of nonprofessional partisan control here

indicated, since it is assumed that an MGB case officer would have given more adequate answers in allaying our fears of compartmentalization, and the entire question of advisability to engage in propaganda work.

23. This theory offers the only satisfactory explanation of a change in the spirit of messages after a certain point that close scrutiny reveals. An early analysis of the traffic (up to and including #8 and prior to the discovery that no one here knew who “Girenas” was) had failed to convince us of control. Not only were those messages apparently in keeping with Jack’s character and briefing, but they were also in keeping with our cautious admonitions to work on a long-term basis, etc. Messages subsequent to Msg. #8 showed a characteristic sense of optimism and what appeared to be a surge of activity. We experienced fears at the time that, lacking the steadying influence of Steve, Jack would (again characteristically) try to do too much. It is conceivable that Jack was fed a great build-up of the potential of the group with which he was working, but then he gradually became aware of the notional setup of which he was a part. Whereas Jack’s early messages were not merely characteristic of him in their structure but also revealed personality and emotion (for instance, some enthusiasm); His later messages are matter-of-fact and spiritless, if not lackadaisical.
24. In summary, the fact that he did not respond properly to challenges leaves us with no choice but to assume that Jack is under control. The inconsistencies and contradictions, as well as some of the acts of commission or omission (referred to above) in the messages, give very strong support to this assumption of control. However, the question as to the nature or type of this control cannot be answered at this time. We tend to believe that it is direct MGB Case Officer control. We will make every effort to have the Field reveal itself more clearly on this score and certainly will make a simultaneous effort to keep this W/T link active indefinitely. We request your full views and recommendations on handling the link and the general lines of content our outgoing traffic should reflect.

By June 1953, it had become obvious to both the CIA and the SIS that there were hideous flaws in the reporting from the field, and a 25-page study, codenamed KAPOK, was completed to reach the depressing conclusion that at the three networks under scrutiny had fallen under Soviet control. [See Appendix 8]

The true identities of the individual agents were of course routinely concealed by codenames in the original documents, but we now know that the

CIA's first mission into Lithuania, led by SKRAJUNAS on October 4, 1950, consisted of Jaczas Luksa, a former engineering student at Kaunas University, born in August 1921, who had been recruited by the CIA in Pfullingen while acting as the chief intelligence officer of the VLIK resistance organization. He had been accompanied by Benediktas Trumpis and Klementas Siruys. At the time of his recruitment in December 1949, Trumpis, born in October 1919, was a member of the 4204 Labor Service Company at Legaede Kaserne, Bamberg who had received his visa to emigrate to the United States.

The second mission was composed of Julihonas Butenas and Jonas Kukauskas-Kukis, codenamed JACK, dropped on April 18/19, 1951, near Kaunas. A prewar student in Vilnius, JACK had been trained by the French intelligence service before his CIA recruitment, and was last heard from on December 17, 1952. Jonas Deksnys, the Swedish-sponsored agent infiltrated by the British in April 1949, had been born in Latvia in 1914 but had moved to Lithuania.

Ultimately the American, British, and Swedish efforts to support a paramilitary campaign against the Soviet occupation in Lithuania failed as a consequence of a ruthlessly ubiquitous security apparatus, bitter rivalries between politically incompatible émigré groups and operational inexperience. With 163 miles of Baltic coastline, a relatively open border with Latvia and Poland, and a broadly anti-Soviet population, Lithuania appeared to be a potential Cold War frontline, yet never achieved that status.

LORENZEN, URSEL. The arrest in March 1979 of a spy, Ingrid Garbe, who was a secretary at the Federal German mission to **NATO**, prompted the escape to East Berlin of two more Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) agents, Ursel Lorenzen, codenamed MOSEL, and her lover, Dieter Will, codenamed BORDEAUX, the manager of the Hilton Hotel at Brussels.

Lorenzen, who had been employed as a secretary by NATO's British director of operations, later appeared soon afterward in an East German television propaganda broadcast claiming to have been forced by her conscience to seek political asylum.

The HVA regarded MOSEL as the most valuable penetration of NATO since the organization was created in 1949, and her deliveries contained up to 3,000 documents.

LYALIN, OLEG. A KGB defector from the *rezidentura* in London who was persuaded, while conducting an illicit affair with his secretary, Irinaa Templyakova, to cooperate with a joint MI5-SIS team of case officers six months before he took political asylum in August 1972. Confronted with his compromising behavior, Lyalin had agreed to pass information in return for eventual

resettlement in England, and he soon supplied a complete order-of-battle for the KGB in London. He also revealed his own mission, reconnoitered while posing as a textiles buyer across the Midlands, to select targets for attack by Special Forces in the event of war, including the Fylingdales early warning radar installation in Yorkshire, V-bomber bases and the London tube, scheduled for flooding by the River Thames after strategically placed bombs had detonated. Chillingly the defector, who had been posted to London in 1967, also described a plan to infiltrate agents disguised as official messengers into Whitehall's system of underground tunnels to distribute poison gas capsules. Furthermore, he identified other members of the London *rezidenturas* of whom 90 were expelled in operation FOOT, and a further 15 refused reentry. Codenamed GOLDFINCH, Lyalin's debriefing covered five volumes and was circulated widely among Western intelligence agencies. In Ottawa it was copied by Gilles Brunet, a mole inside the RCMP Security Service and passed to his KGB handlers.

Thirty-four-year-old Lyalin's recruitment was accomplished by Tony Brooks of SIS and Harry Wharton of MI5, but his defection was unplanned, having been prompted by his arrest on drunken driving charges by a Metropolitan Police traffic patrol. When detained Lyalin arranged for his handlers to be contacted, and MI5 dispatched a team, equipped with the antidotes to various poisons, to extract him from the police station, and supervise his asylum. Lyalin and his girlfriend were resettled, and he died in February 1995 at his home in the north of England after a long illness. While living in Great Britain with a new identity Lyalin was the target of a sustained effort by the KGB to trace him, and John Symonds was approached to use his police contacts to establish his whereabouts.

Upon Lyalin's defection MI5 arranged for the arrest of his network which was headed by a Malaysian clerk, Sirioj Abdoolcader, who had been recruited in March 1967 by Vladislav Savin, a fellow "Line F" officer. Abdoolcader was employed by the Greater London Council in the vehicle registration department and had access to details of cars used by MI5 in covert surveillance operations. He was instructed by Lyalin, to whom he was introduced in 1969, to cultivate Marie Richardson, then a Ministry of Defence secretary working for the deputy director of the Royal Navy's Support and Transport Staff. She had been the subject of an approach while on a cruise to Leningrad in 1969, an incident that she had reported upon her return. Abdoolcader had failed in his pursuit of Richardson, but he nevertheless was regarded as a valuable source by the KGB.

Lyalin was also able to compromise two other KGB agents, Constantinos Martianon and Kyriacos Costi, both Greek Cypriots who had been members of the Young Communist League. When questioned they had

admitted having been recruited in 1961 when they had attended a Soviet trade exhibition.

As well as causing much political embarrassment for the Kremlin, Lyalin's disclosures severely compromised Department V which was promptly dismantled and its overseas staff recalled to Moscow. The very existence of Department V, with its commitment to assassination and sabotage, served to undermine the Soviet Union's alleged commitment to the principles of détente and inflicted lasting damage on East–West relations.

M

MCCARTHY, JOSEPH. Although Senator Joe McCarthy's much-publicized claim in February 1950 to have the names of 205 known Communists in the State Department, there is no evidence that he was ever the recipient of classified information relating to hostile penetration of the Truman administration. McCarthy's allegations came just after the conviction in January 1950 of Alger Hiss, a former State Department employee and GRU spy, but before the dismissal of John S Service in December 1951. Other Soviet agents inside the State Department compromised by **VENONA** decrypts included Laurence Duggan, who had committed suicide in December 1948.

Hiss, who later appeared in a GRU decrypt under the codename ALES, was confirmed as a spy, as was his wife Priscilla, and his brother Donald, who also worked as a State Department lawyer.

While the **VENONA** source remained known to only a handful of counterintelligence professionals in 1950, and had not even been disclosed to the **Central Intelligence Agency**, there was plenty of information in the public domain from **CPUSA** defectors, such as the former editor of the *Daily Worker*, Louis Budenz, the *Time* magazine senior editor Whittaker Chambers and the NKVD courier Elizabeth Bentley, who had been indoctrinated into espionage by her lover, the NKVD's illegal *resident* in New York, Jacob Golos. Among the 40 NKVD agents she named were Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, a Russian emigrant working in the Farm Security Administration, his wife Helen, and several highly placed sub-agents, including the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Harry Dexter White, and the White House counselor Lauchlin Currie. Another key figure was Victor Perlo of the War Production Board, and Major Duncan Lee, an aide to General Bill Donovan of the Office of Strategic Services. Most had strong **CPUSA** connections, as exemplified by Robert T. Miller, editor of the *Hemisphere*, a pro-Communist newsletter covering political developments in Latin America. Although well-known as a **CPUSA** member, Miller had been persuaded by Golos to sell the *Hemisphere* and take a job as head of the Political Research Division in Washington D.C., for the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), then headed by Nelson Rockefeller. When in August 1945 the CIAA had been absorbed into the

State Department, Miller had remained on its staff and had been promoted to assistant chief, Research and Publications Division. According to Bentley, the other Soviet spies in the CIAA were William Z. Park; the *World News* Latin America bureau chief Bernard Redmont, and Joseph Gregg, who had fought with the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War alongside Miller, and appeared in VENONA as GOR. In his 1992 autobiography, *Risks Worth Taking: The Odyssey of a Foreign Correspondent*, Redmont denied any espionage role, saying Bentley “never got anything from me,” but documents recovered from the Soviet central committee archive in Moscow showed that he had been a CPUSA member known as “Berny” and had been codenamed MON by the NKVD.

Later scrutiny of the VENONA texts revealed another Soviet spy who had penetrated the CIAA. Another Spanish Civil War veteran, Jack Fahy had been Miller’s partner in *Hemisphere*, and had also joined the CIAA before moving to the Board of Economic Warfare with the rank of principal intelligence officer. However, under the codename MAXWELL he was identified as a spy reporting to a naval GRU officer, Georgi G. Pasko, at the Washington *rezidentura*.

Two other former State Department staffers, John S. Service and Emmanuel S. Larsen, had been implicated during the 1945 *Amerasia* investigation into the leakage of classified documents to the journal’s editor, Philip Jaffe. Service had been fired by the State Department, but then had been re-employed and posted in September 1945 to Tokyo. He would later be dismissed again, in 1957, and reinstated. Larsen had resigned and taken up a career as publisher of the *Far Eastern New Letter* but had testified before McCarthy’s Congressional committee. Although Larsen had supported Service’s denial of having expressed Communist sympathies, he eventually admitted his guilt in passing classified document to Jaffe. Furthermore, the VENONA decrypts established a link between the Jaffe and the NKVD through a courier, Joseph M. Bernstein, codenamed MARQUIS.

McCarthy had no knowledge of VENONA and no evidence of CPUSA penetration of the State Department, but the substance of his accusations would prove to be broadly true. Through Jacob Golos the NKVD had made a determined effort to insert its nominees into the State Department, and VENONA proved its success.

MAIN ADVERSARY. Within the KGB the United States was invariably referred to as ‘the main adversary,’ even in official documents and internal communications. KGB personnel were thoroughly indoctrinated into the belief that the organization represented the Communist Party’s “sword and

shield” and that NATO’s sole purpose was to undermine Soviet influence in preparation for a surprise attack on the *rodina* (motherland).

Although the staff of the elite First Chief Directorate (FCD) was drawn from a relatively well-educated, sophisticated section of the Soviet public which enjoyed foreign travel, mainly within the Bloc, and access to good health care, it was hampered by a degree of nepotism and corruption. The remainder of the KGB was generally regarded with a mixture of fear and contempt, with the Third Chief Directorate responsible for repression.

In terms of providing the Kremlin with reliable political assessments, the KGB was handicapped by the lack of anything approaching the discipline exercised within the U.S. intelligence community to call upon a separate analytical capability for the production of independent estimates known as “finished intelligence.” Both the KGB and the Politburo retained an innate suspicion of any external analytic process and were content to leave such political judgments to the Central Committee membership. This inherent, structural weakness in the handling of raw intelligence meant inevitably that the collectors tended to concentrate their reporting on what they knew their political masters wanted to hear, an anathema to the Sherman Kent principle of “speaking truth unto power.” Accordingly, the Moscow leadership, which had limited foreign experience (if any) developed a very skewed view of Western culture, capabilities, and intentions.

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE (MASINT).

A major source of intelligence during the Cold War, available exclusively to the U.S. intelligence community, MASINT was the acquisition of data by technical means born out of a requirement to run collection operations across the Vietnamese border in the safe-havens of Laos. North Vietnamese (NVA) regulars transmitted to the south along the Ho Chi Minh trail, supposedly out of American reach, but the development by the DIA of ingenious remote sensors, such as the deployment of seismic monitoring devices at choke points provided an accurate picture of NVA movements over bridges and along isolated tracks. MASINT produced a baseline of activity which highlighted deviations, and thereby gave the South Vietnamese forces advance notice of intended offensives. The extremely sensitive apparatus designed for the purpose would later be adapted to operate in the Soviet Union, for example, to maintain surveillance on target airfields, nuclear research facilities, missile test sites and other protected sites in denied areas beyond the reach of HUMINT and more conventional measures. The Soviets seem not to have learned of the extent of U.S. investment in MASINT until the technology and its applications were explained to the KGB by **Aldrich Ames**.

MILITARY TOPOGRAPHIC DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL

STAFF. The Red Army's intelligence branch responsible for the assembly of maps was a massive secret enterprise involving thousands of personnel. Some two million maps were made of the West, which were kept under armed guard in a series of 25 humidity-controlled vaults.

MISSILE GAP CONTROVERSY. During the Cold War, one of the principal tasks of Western intelligence analysts was to advise policymakers of the scale of the military threat posed by the Soviet Bloc. However, with limited sources of information, the **Central Intelligence Agency's** (CIA) Directorate of Intelligence was dependent largely on the Kremlin's public policy statements. No other reliable statistics were available; there was little external independent research upon which to depend, and a complete absence of data relating to the production of plutonium and enriched uranium, the processing of which was undertaken in remote, closed purpose-built secure sites controlled by the KGB's Directorate K.

The facilities were constructed by prison labor serving long sentences, the technical staff was subject to rigorous restrictions and the KGB conducted sophisticated counterintelligence operations to identify and interdict potential traitors. Communication to and from the sites was conducted by secure teletype landlines to avoid microwave interception and any relevant open-source statistics, such as electric grid activity, were classified. After the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, opportunities to monitor the yield and efficiency of atmospheric tests were virtually eliminated, making the usual radiological analysis ineffective.

In those circumstances, Nikita Khrushchev's widely reported declaration in December 1958 that the Soviets possessed an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) which could carry a five-megaton warhead 8,000 miles, and in November 1959 that Soviet warhead production had reached a year from a single factory, were accepted at face value.

In December 1957, a Special National Intelligence Estimate had predicted the development of a Soviet ICBM with a range of 5,500 miles and suggested that up to 10 prototypes could be ready between mid-1958 and mid-1959. A year later, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) predicted 1,000 Soviet ICBMs would be in place by 1961, whereas Senator Stuart Symington insisted a figure of 3,000 by the end of 1961 would be more accurate. The gap was reflected by American plans to deploy only 130 Atlas and Titan ICBMs by 1962, and the Polaris and Minuteman missiles were not scheduled to become operational until 1963. Evidence given to Congress in January 1960 ranged from testimony from the director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles

that the Soviets then had about 10 ICBMs, while Air Force General Nathan Twining averred the correct figure was around 100.

In contrast, the first American ICBM was the Atlas, with a range of 8,000 miles, which became operational in October 1959, but its test record was poor, with almost half the launches ending in failure. Of the 42 launches between the first Atlas flight in June 1957, and August 1959, only 13 out of 24 were judged a success. Nevertheless, between 1959 and 1965 a total of 11 missiles were deployed at Vandenberg AFB in California, Warren AFB in Wyoming, Offutt AFB in Nebraska, Forbes AFB in Kansas, and Fairchild AFB in Washington. Eventually the massive rockets would be hidden in underground silos at Schilling AFB in Kansas, Lincoln AFB, Nebraska; Altus AFB, Oklahoma; Dyess AFB, Texas; Walker, New Mexico, and Plattsburgh, New York. By the time the Atlas became obsolete as an ICBM (but retained a continued usefulness as a satellite vehicle), there were 118 Atlas missiles deployed across the country, aimed at targets in the Soviet Union.

Eventually, when U-2 imagery became available, it persuaded the CIA to reduce the 1960 estimate of ICBMs in the Soviet arsenal in 1963 to 400 although the U.S. Air Force preferred 700. According to the CIA's spy **Oleg Penkovsky**, the actual figure of Soviet ICBMs in 1962 was three, with some doubt about one of them. He revealed that the Soviets regarded all missiles with a range of more than 600 miles as strategic, and they were on the test ranges where they took a long time to fuel. The SS-6, powered by a volatile mixture of kerosene and liquid oxygen, while useful as a rocket for space launches, was entirely unsuitable as an ICBM and Khrushchev had lied to buy time until the smaller, solid-fueled, silo-launched SS-7, SS-8, and SS-9 could go into production. Although President Dwight D. Eisenhower knew there had been only four SS-6 launches in 1957 (including two *Sputniks*), and only one in 1958, he was unwilling to compromise the U-2 by stating publicly that no Soviet tests had taken place in 1955 or 1956. The next successful test launch would not take place until 1959, although some failures were observed.

The politburo regarded the missile gap controversy as a triumph of deception, and between his recruitment in 1955 and his arrest in 1966 received confirmation from a GRU mole in the Pentagon, Colonel **William Whalen**, that the Americans had grossly overestimated the Soviet threat. The disadvantage for the Kremlin was that the fear of numerical inferiority led the Americans to accelerate the development of the Minuteman ICBM and the submarine-launched Polaris. In reality, the United States had always maintained a significant numerical advantage in nuclear weapons, and by 1962, the ratio was 17-to-1, with the respective arsenals being 5,000 to 300.

Even when the U-2, and then the CORONA satellite, identified most of the installations associated with the Soviet nuclear weapons development program, the CIA remained unable to calculate any precise warhead production figures, and a 1954 NIE acknowledged that

The absence of sufficient evidence from which to estimate installed or planned isotope separation capacity continues to be one of the most serious gaps in intelligence information on the Soviet atomic energy program.

Ten years later, the situation had not improved, and the Soviets were able to conceal a heavy investment in advanced centrifuge uranium enrichment which had been piloted at Novouralsk/Sverdlovsk-44 undetected. A February 1964 NIE noted, incorrectly, that the

present size of the Soviet gaseous diffusion complex tends to indicate that significant U-235 production by the ultracentrifuge and other methods is unlikely.

Overhead imagery gave the CIA the opportunity to spot the tell-tale characteristics of fissile material production centers such as the uranium enrichment plant at Zelenogorsk/Krasnoyarsk-45, the Sarov/Arzamas-16 warhead research facility, the assembly plants at Lesnoy/Sverdlovsk-45 and Trekhgomy/Zlatoust-36, the manufacturing site at Penza-19/Zarechny-25 and the research laboratories at Snezhinsk/Chelyabinsk-70, Ozersk/Chelyabinsk-65, Seversk/Tomsk-7, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk and Nizhi Novgorod, but the photo-analysts could not do much more than guess the production rates.

N

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE (NRO). Created in August 1960, the U.S. NRO was the secret organization responsible for the supervision and management of **satellite** collection platforms throughout the Cold War. Orbiting satellites provided the West with a highly efficient, relatively risk-free method of acquiring signals intelligence and imagery, and the successful recovery of film from the CORONA on August 12, 1960, was distributed under the designation KEYHOLE (KH-1) and continued until the end of May 1972. The imagery revealed Soviet construction of the SS-8 missile sites at Plesetsk and Yurya and instantly proved the project's value.


Within the CORONA program was stereo MURAL (KH-4), ARGON (KH-5), and LANYARD (KH-6), and the project was enhanced by GAMBIT 1, launched in 1963 with the KH-7 camera, and GANBIT 23 in 1966 with the KH-8. They were followed by the next generation, the HEXAGON (KH-9) system in 1971. In parallel, the U.S. Air Force developed a rival video program in 1960, codenamed SAMOS, which would be abandoned when CORONA proved a success. The NRO's first SIGINT platform was RHYOLITE which was positioned to receive Soviet microwave communications traffic and was redesignated AQUACADE when the original codename was compromised. It was replaced in June 1979 with the CHALET system, later renamed VORTEX, and the ARGOS, the AR designation being "Advanced RHYOLITE."

As well as harvesting communications and imagery, the NRO developed radar satellites, with LACROSSE entering service in 1988, equipped with synthetic aperture technology that enabled imagery to be collected through dense cloud cover.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION (NATO). Always a major target for Soviet intelligence collection, NATO was known to have been penetrated at a high level by several important spies, among them a Canadian, **Hugh Hanbleton**, who had been recruited by his mother, four Frenchmen, **George Paques**; **Robert van de Wiele**; **Francois Roussilhe**; and **Charles de la Salle**; a Belgian, Colonel **Guy Binet**; and a Turk, Colonel

Nahit Imre. The HVA's agents inside NATO included Ingrid Garbe, a member of the Federal Republic of Germany's mission at NATO's headquarters; **Ursel Lorenzen**, who worked in NATO's general secretariat; Imelda Verrept, a Belgian secretary; and Anne and **Rainer Rupp**.

Employed as deputy head of NATO's press department, Paques would be arrested in his apartment in August 1963 by the French Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire as he handed over a bundle of secret documents to a member of the KGB's Paris *rezidentura*, Vassili Vlassov, Paques was subsequently sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. In his confession, he admitted that he had been recruited just after World War II, after he had served with the Free French in Algiers as an aide to Louis Jacquinot, Charles de Gaulle's minister for the navy, and claimed an ideological motivation.



OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION (OPC). Created in June 1948, originally as the Office of Special Projects, under the leadership of **Frank Wisner**, the OPC was authorized by the National Security Council directive NSC 20/4 entitled *U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security* dated November 23, 1948, and effectively became the blueprint for America's position in the Cold War.

The Problem

1. To assess and appraise existing and foreseeable threats to our national security currently posed by the USSR and to formulate our objectives and aims as a guide in determining measures required to counter such threats.

Analysis of the Nature of the Threats

2. The will and ability of the leaders of the USSR to pursue policies which threaten the security of the United States constitute the greatest single danger to the United States within the foreseeable future.
3. Communist ideology and Soviet behavior clearly demonstrate that the ultimate objective of the leaders of the USSR is the domination of the world. Soviet leaders hold that the Soviet Communist Party is the militant vanguard of the world proletariat in its rise to political power, and that the USSR, base of the world communist movement, will not be safe until the noncommunist nations have been so reduced in strength and numbers that communist influence is dominant throughout the world. The immediate goal of top priority since the recent war has been the political conquest of western Europe. The resistance of the United States is recognized by the USSR as a major obstacle to the attainment of these goals.
4. The Soviet leaders appear to be pursuing these aims by:
 - a. Endeavoring to insert Soviet-controlled groups into positions of power and influence everywhere, seizing every opportunity presented by weakness and instability in other states and exploiting to

the utmost the techniques of infiltration and propaganda, as well as the coercive power of preponderant Soviet military strength.

- b. Waging political, economic, and psychological warfare against all elements resistant to communist purposes, and in particular attempting to prevent or retard the recovery of and cooperation among western European countries.
- c. Building up as rapidly as possible the war potential of the Soviet orbit in anticipation of war, which in communist thinking is inevitable.

Both the immediate purposes and the ultimate objectives of the Soviet leaders are inimical to the security of the United States and will continue to be so indefinitely.

5. The present Soviet ability to threaten U.S. security by measures short [XXXXXXX]
 - a. The complete and effective centralization of power throughout the USSR and the international communist movement.
 - b. The persuasive appeal of a pseudo-scientific ideology promising panaceas and brought to other peoples by the intensive efforts of a modern totalitarian propaganda machine.
 - c. The highly effective techniques of subversion, infiltration, and capture of political power worked out through a half-a-century of study and experiment.
 - d) The power to use the military might of Russia and of other countries already captured, for purposes of intimidation or, where necessary, military action.
 - e) The relatively high degree of political and social instability prevailing at this time in other countries, particularly in the European countries affected by the recent war and in the colonial or backward areas on which these European areas are dependent for markets and raw materials.
 - f) The ability to exploit the margin of tolerance accorded the communists and their dupes in democratic countries by virtue of the reluctance of such countries to restrict democratic freedoms merely in order to inhibit the activities of a single faction and by the failure of those countries to expose the fallacies and evils of communism.
6. It is impossible to calculate with any degree of precision the dimensions of the threat to U.S. security presented by these Soviet measures short of war. The success of these measures depends on a wide variety of currently unpredictable factors, including the degree of resistance encountered elsewhere, the effectiveness of U.S. policy, the development of relationships within the Soviet structure of power, etc. Had the

United States not taken vigorous measures during the past two years to stiffen the resistance of western European and Mediterranean countries to communist pressures, most of western Europe would today have been politically captured by the communist movement. Today, barring some radical alteration of the underlying situation which would give new possibilities to the communists, the communists appear to have little chance of effecting at this juncture the political conquest of any countries west of the Luebeck-Trieste line. The unsuccessful outcome of this political offensive has in turn created serious problems for them behind the iron curtain, and their policies are today probably motivated in large measure by defensive considerations. However, it cannot be assumed that Soviet capabilities for subversion and political aggression will decrease in the next decade, and they may become even more dangerous than at present.

7. In present circumstances, the capabilities of the USSR to threaten U.S. security by the use of armed forces are dangerous and immediate:
 - a. The USSR, while not capable of sustained and decisive direct military attack against U.S. territory or the Western Hemisphere, is capable of serious submarine warfare and of a limited number of one-way bomber sorties.
 - b. Present intelligence estimates attribute to Soviet armed forces the capability of overrunning in about six months all of Continental Europe and the Near East as far as Cairo, while simultaneously occupying important continental points in the Far East. Meanwhile, Great Britain could be subjected to severe air and missile bombardment.
 - c. Russian seizure of these areas would ultimately enhance the Soviet war potential if sufficient time were allowed and Soviet leaders were able to consolidate Russian control and to integrate Europe into the Soviet system. This would permit an eventual concentration of hostile power which would pose an unacceptable threat to the security of the United States.
8. However, rapid military expansion over Eurasia would tax Soviet logistic facilities and impose a serious strain on Russian economy. If at the same time the USSR were engaged in war with the United States, Soviet capabilities might well, in face of the strategic offensives of the United States, prove unequal to the task of holding the territories seized by the Soviet forces. If the United States were to exploit the potentialities of psychological warfare and subversive activity within the Soviet orbit, the USSR would be faced with increased disaffection, discontent, and underground opposition within the area under Soviet control.

9. Present estimates indicate that the current Soviet capabilities mentioned in 7a above will progressively increase and that by no later than 1955 the USSR will probably be capable of serious air attacks against the United States with atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, of more extensive submarine operations (including the launching of short-range guided missiles), and of airborne operations to seize advance bases. However, the USSR could not, even then, successfully undertake an invasion of the United States as long as effective U.S. military forces remained in being. Soviet capabilities for overrunning western Europe and the Near East and for occupying parts of the Far East will probably still exist by 1958.
10. The Soviet capabilities and the increases thereto set forth in this chapter would result in a relative increase in Soviet capabilities vis-à-vis the United States and the Western democracies unless offset by factors such as the following:
 - a. The success of ERP.
 - b. The development of Western Union and its support by the United States.
 - c. The increased effectiveness of the military establishments of the United States, Great Britain, and other friendly nations.
 - d. The development of internal dissension within the USSR and disagreements among the USSR and orbit nations.
11. The USSR has already engaged the United States in a struggle for power. While it cannot be predicted with certainty whether, or when, the present political warfare will involve armed conflict, nevertheless there exists a continuing danger of war at any time.
 - a. While the possibility of planned Soviet armed actions which would involve this country cannot be ruled out, a careful weighing of the various factors points to the probability that the Soviet Government is not now planning any deliberate armed action calculated to involve the United States and is still seeking to achieve its aims primarily by political means, accompanied by military intimidation.
 - b. War might grow out of incidents between forces in direct contact.
 - c. War might rise through miscalculation, through failure of either side to estimate accurately how far the other can be pushed. There is the possibility that the USSR will be tempted to take armed action under a miscalculation of the determination and willingness of the United States to resort to force in order to prevent the development of a threat intolerable to U.S. security.
12. In addition to the risk of war, a danger equally to be guarded against is the possibility that Soviet political warfare might seriously weaken

the relative position of the United States, enhance Soviet strength and either lead to our ultimate defeat short of war, or force us into war under dangerously unfavorable conditions. Such a result would be facilitated by vacillation, appeasement, or isolationist concepts in our foreign policy, leading to loss of our allies and influence; by internal disunity or subversion; by economic instability in the form of depression or inflation; or by either excessive or inadequate armament and foreign aid expenditures.

13. To counter threats to our national security and to create conditions conducive to a positive and in the long-term mutually beneficial relationship between the Russian people and our own, it is essential that this government formulate general objectives which are capable of sustained pursuit both in time of peace and in the event of war. From the general objectives flow certain specific aims which we seek to accomplish by methods short of war, as well as certain other aims which we seek to accomplish in the event of war.

Conclusions

THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

14. The gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR and from the nature of the Soviet system.
15. The political, economic, and psychological warfare which the USSR is now waging has dangerous potentialities for weakening the relative world position of the United States and disrupting its traditional institutions by means short of war, unless sufficient resistance is encountered in the policies of this and other noncommunist countries.
16. The risk of war with the USSR is sufficient to warrant, in common prudence, timely, and adequate preparation by the United States.
 - a. Even though present estimates indicate that the Soviet leaders probably do not intend deliberate armed action involving the United States at this time, the possibility of such deliberate resort to war cannot be ruled out.
 - b. Now and for the foreseeable future there is a continuing danger that war will arise either through Soviet miscalculation of the determination of the United States to use all the means at its command to safeguard its security, through Soviet misinterpretation of our intentions, or through U.S. miscalculation of Soviet reactions to measures which we might take.
17. Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States.

18. The capability of the United States either in peace or in the event of war to cope with threats to its security or to gain its objectives would be severely weakened by internal developments, important among which are:
 - a. Serious espionage, subversion, and sabotage, particularly by concerted and well-directed communist activity.
 - b. Prolonged or exaggerated economic instability.
 - d. Internal political and social disunity.
 - e. Inadequate or excessive armament or foreign aid expenditures.
 - f. An excessive or wasteful usage of our resources in time of peace.
 - g. Lessening of U.S. prestige and influence through vacillation or appeasement or lack of skill and imagination in the conduct of its foreign policy or by shirking world responsibilities.
 - h. Development of a false sense of security through a deceptive change in Soviet tactics.

U.S. OBJECTIVES AND AIMS VIS-A-VIS THE USSR

19. To counter the threats to our national security and well-being posed by the USSR, our general objectives with respect to Russia, in time of peace as well as in time of war, should be:
 - a. To reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations.
 - b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the UN charter.

In pursuing these objectives, due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions inherent in our way of life.
20. We should endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of war through the pursuit of the following aims:
 - a. To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of the USSR.
 - b. To encourage the development among the Russian peoples of attitudes which may help to modify current Soviet behavior and permit a revival of the national life of groups evidencing the ability and determination to achieve and maintain national independence.
 - d. To eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to

cause the world at large to see and understand the true nature of the USSR and the Soviet-directed world Communist Party and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward them.

- e. To create situations which will compel the Soviet Government to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving in accordance with precepts of international conduct, as set forth in the purposes and principles of the UN charter.
21. Attainment of these aims requires that the United States:
- a. Develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable support to our political attitude toward the USSR, as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable.
 - b. Assure the internal security of the United States against dangers of sabotage, subversion, and espionage.
 - c. Maximize our economic potential, including the strengthening of our peacetime economy and the establishment of essential reserves readily available in the event of war.
 - d. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations and help such of those nations as are able and willing to make an important contribution to U.S. security, to increase their economic and political stability and their military capability.
 - f. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power and particularly on the relationships between Moscow and the satellite countries.
 - g. Keep the U.S. public fully informed and cognizant of the threats to our national security so that it will be prepared to support the measures which we must accordingly adopt.
22. In the event of war with the USSR, we should endeavor by successful military and other operations to create conditions which would permit satisfactory accomplishment of U.S. objectives without a predetermined requirement for unconditional surrender. War aims supplemental to our peacetime aims should include:
- a. Eliminating Soviet Russian domination in areas outside the borders of any Russian state allowed to exist after the war.
 - b. Destroying the structure of relationships by which the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens, or groups of citizens, in countries not under communist control.

- c. Assuring that any regime or regimes which may exist on traditional Russian territory in the aftermath of war:
 - (1) Do not have sufficient military power to wage aggressive war.
 - (2) Impose nothing resembling the present iron curtain over contacts with the outside world.
 - d. In addition, if any Bolshevik regime is left in any part of the Soviet Union, insuring that it does not control enough of the military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable it to wage war on comparable terms with any other regime or regimes which may exist on traditional Russian territory.
 - e. Seeking to create postwar conditions which will:
 - (1) Prevent the development of power relationships dangerous to the security of the United States and international peace.
 - (2) Be conducive to the successful development of an effective world organization based upon the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
 - (3) Permit the earliest practicable discontinuance within the United States of wartime controls.
23. In pursuing the above war aims, we should avoid making irrevocable or premature decisions or commitments respecting border rearrangements, administration of government within enemy territory, independence for national minorities, or postwar responsibility for the readjustment of the inevitable political, economic, and social dislocations resulting from the war.

The OPC, created by the State Department but accommodated by the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA), would become the instrument of an undeclared foreign policy and would remain in existence for four years until October 1951 when it was absorbed into the CIA's Directorate for Plans. At the outset, OPC employed a staff of 302 with a budget of \$2.8 million and had established seven stations overseas. By the time OPC formally merged with the CIA, the budget had increased to \$4.7 million, with 2,812 personnel across 47 stations.

OPC enjoyed a wide remit, having inherited the covert psychological warfare program introduced in December 1947 by NSC 4/A which had been conducted under the auspices of the innocuously named Special Procedures Group and then the Special Programs Office. OPC also indulged in political and economic warfare, sabotage, stay-behind organizations, commodity market manipulation, fiscal intervention, and support for refugees and anticommunist resistance groups.

Under Wisner's direction, OPC initiated operations in several target countries. First, in partnership with the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), a group of **Albanian** volunteers was assembled in Malta for training before being infiltrated into their country on a mission to build a partisan network and undermine Enver Hoxha's tyrannical regime. Second, also with SIS support, OPC sponsored a group of refugees to be infiltrated back into Soviet-occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These operations, often in support of the "Forest Brothers" resistance groups, continued until 1960 when CIA senior management finally accepted that they had been largely controlled by the KGB.

Similarly, OPC developed links through émigré groups and refugees in Displaced Persons camps to an anticommunist group known as the *Wolność i Niezawisłość* (Freedom and Independence movement, WIN). A heavy investment was made in WIN but it was largely wasted on what turned out to be a sophisticated, Soviet-controlled deception scheme.

OGARKOV, NIKOLAI. Appointed Chief of the Soviet general staff in 1977, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov was a highly influential figure who redrew Soviet military strategy and developed a secret plan for a surprise invasion of western Europe. His principal assistant in reforming the Kremlin's doctrine was General Andrian Danilevich who drafted a three-volume study innocuously titled *Strategy of Deep Operations (Global and Theatre)*.

The central theme of the document was the launch of a sudden offensive under cover of a supposedly routine Warsaw Pact exercise, but in reality, it would involve two million well-equipped troops, supported by 2,000 ground-attack aircraft that in one operation would destroy all NATO's nuclear weapons in Europe and all its airfields. The key objective was to strike decisively within 48 hours so as to prevent NATO's political leadership from retaliating with nuclear weapons. All NATO's planning had relied on air power to stymie Soviet tanks rolling across the plains of north Germany, but Ogarkov called for three massive thrusts, 450 miles wide, reaching into 750 miles of NATO territory. Special Forces would be helicoptered behind the frontlines to seize vital bridges, and massive firepower would be concentrated against NATO anti-tank weapons. The plan predicted reaching the English Channel in 20 days, without any use of nuclear warheads by either side. The emphasis on surprise and speed was a dramatic departure from the original, established Warsaw Pact scheme to deploy slow Soviet armor to surround NATO strongpoints. These innovative tactics were welcomed by General Wojciech Jaruzelski who had been dismayed by the results of an exercise in 1980 which had left Poland devastated by a supposed NATO nuclear strike.

A further exercise the following year, ZAPAD-81, appeared to suggest that the Ogarkov approach could be executed successfully.

Marshal Ogarkov's new, ruthlessly aggressive doctrine, which depended on accurate intelligence on all western nuclear installations, was delivered to the **Central Intelligence Agency** first by **Dmitri Polyakov** and then by **Ryszard Kuklinski** and shocked the personnel authorized to examine it. The data was supported by independent **satellite imagery** which identified the new secret command bunkers under construction in the Moscow area. The plan amounted to political dynamite, but could not be made public for fear of compromising the sources. It remains unpublished, probably because its very existence undermines the adopted Soviet, and then Russian narrative that there was never any plan to attack NATO; merely a defensive strategy to fend off anticipated imminent NATO aggression.

The Ogarkov plan was effectively neutralized when Kuklinski defected in November 1981 and confirmed the locations of the new command-and-control bunker system, information that the Kremlin then knew to be compromised.

OGORODNIK, ALEKSANDR. Codenamed TRIGON by the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA), Ogorodnik was a Soviet Foreign Ministry official recruited in Bogota in 1973 when his Colombian girlfriend had become pregnant. He was arrested in July 1977, as his CIA contact in Moscow, Martha Peterson serviced a dead-drop, but committed suicide by swallowing cyanide concealed in a pen supplied to him, at his request, by the CIA. An investigation into the loss was conducted by Leonard McCoy in an effort to establish how TRIGON had been compromised, and it was noted that translations of TRIGON's reports had been prepared by a Czech spy, Karl Koecher. Entirely coincidentally, Ogorodnik had been handled briefly by a team of CIA case officers that had included **Aldrich Ames**.

OSWALD, LEE HARVEY. A U.S. Marine who had been posted to the Naval Air Station at Atsugi in Japan, and had subsequently gone to live in the Soviet Union, Lee Harvey Oswald was the subject of several lengthy investigations after he assassinated President John F. Kennedy in Dallas in November 1963. For the last six weeks of his posting to Japan, Oswald was imprisoned, having been court-martialled for accidentally wounding himself with an illicit weapon, and on the second occasion, for being drunk. Soon afterward, he returned to civilian life and became a political activist.

In October 1959, he obtained political asylum in the Soviet Union and later married a Ukrainian woman, Marina, in Kiev. Following his return to the United States, and a visit to the Soviet embassy in Mexico City, he shot the

president. The KGB's Service A took advantage of widespread doubts about Oswald's involvement in the assassination by distributing large quantities of forged documents and other material intended to embarrass the **Central Intelligence Agency**. Lee was himself murdered by a well-known figure in the Dallas criminal underworld, Jack Ruby, while in police custody.

The widely criticized Warren Commission concluded that Oswald had acted alone, and ruled out a conspiracy, although there is some evidence to suggest that he may have been in contact with the KGB while in Japan. The extent of his involvement with the KGB became a significant issue in 1964 during the debriefing of the defector Yuri Nosenko who claimed to have read his KGB file. Further details of his visits to the Soviet embassy in Mexico were later supplied by Oleg Nechiporenko. *See also* U-2.

P

PAKISTAN. From independence in August 1947, when a British intelligence officer, General Walter Cawthorn, was appointed the country's first director of Military Intelligence (DMI), Pakistan sided with the West for the duration of the Cold War, and when the embryonic Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) was established in 1948, Sayed Hamid, who had previously served as private secretary to Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, was his nominee for director-general. The civilian Intelligence Bureau was headed by Ghulam Ali, a Bengali Muslim who had been Norman Smith's deputy at the Delhi Intelligence Bureau (DIB) before partition.

Pakistan confirmed its anticommunist credentials in March 1951 when a military plot dubbed the Rawalpindi conspiracy was foiled with the arrest of a senior Pakistan Air Force officer, General Akbar Khan, and a group of Communist Party of Pakistan supporters. The scandal led to the resignation of the DMI, Colonel Mohammed Zahirudin, a legendary figure who had worked for the British during the war as a double agent codenamed BACKHAND. Soon afterward, Zahirudin committed suicide.

Pakistan's alignment with the Western powers during the Cold War was confirmed by the country signing a mutual defense pact with the United States in May 1954 joining the South East Asia Treaty Organisation in the same year, and then the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The relationship allowed the United States to exploit the country's strategically important position, bordering China and the Soviet Union, by establishing an air base at Peshawar, which would accommodate U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, and in 1958 building a **SIGINT** intercept site at Badaber codenamed SANDBAG which was staffed by the USAFSS 6937th Communications Group until January 1970. These facilities became the focus of intelligence collection against Semipalatinsk, Tyuratam, and the Chinese nuclear test range at Lop Nor in Xinjiang Province. American confidence in Pakistan grew to the point that Karachi was earmarked by the USAF Strategic Air Command with Okinawa as one of the DOUBLE QUICK emergency airbases from which a retaliatory nuclear strike would be launched.

While British links with ISI foundered because of Whitehall's preference for close ties with India, fostered by three successive MI5 Security Liaison Officers (SLO), Kenneth Bourne, Bill U'ren, and Walter Bell, and initially left liaison to MI5's SLO in Karachi, after a hiatus of two years post-independence, until the Secret Intelligence Service opened a station at the High Commission in Islamabad, the U.S. **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) adopted the organization and from 1980 ran the Afghan Task Force from the station in the U.S. embassy. To preserve a minute degree of plausible deniability, the CIA channeled financial and logistical support to the Mujahedeen through the ISI which sponsored the recruitment and training of refugees in the tribal areas neighboring the Afghan frontier. The CIA operations directed by Howard Hart until 1984; Phil Pieckney, and then Jack Devine, were largely conducted by intermediaries, and by the ISI acting as surrogates. The ISI-CIA campaign was intended to undermine the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and ended with the Red Army's final withdrawal in February 1989.

Sayed Hamid was succeeded as ISI's director-general by Brigadier Mirza Hamid Hussein (1948–1951), and then by Malik Sher Bahadur, Mohamed Hyat Khan, Riaz Hussain (1959–1966), Mohammad Akbar Khan (1966–1971), Ghulam Jilani Khan (1971–1978), Muhammad Riaz (1978–1980), Akhtar Abdur Rahman (1980–1987), Hamid Gul (1987–1989), Shamsur Rahman Kallu (1989–1990), Asad Durrani (1990–1992).

PAQUES, GEORGE. A long-term Soviet mole, Paques was arrested in August 1963 at his home in Feucherolles after he had been placed under surveillance, having been identified as a spy by the KGB defector **Anatoli Golitsyn**.

Born in Chaon-sur-Saone in January 1914, Paques was a schoolteacher in Nice at the outbreak of war and moved to Rabat in Morocco to join the Free French. He was closely associated with André Labarthe, later identified in the VENONA decrypts as a Soviet spy, and broadcast on French radio. He then served as chief of staff in the Free French Ministry of the Marine and post-war held posts in the Ministry of Reconstruction and the Ministry of Public Health. In 1958, he was appointed director of the National Defense Institute, and in July 1960, he was transferred to **NATO's** headquarters as deputy chief of the press department.

According to his confession, Paques was recruited by the Soviets in Algiers in 1943 and remained in contact thereafter, usually through the KGB *rezidentura* in Paris. He named several of his handlers and admitted that he regularly attended meetings with them every fortnight, although he protested that he had been motivated by his innate anti-Americanism rather than any

preference for communism. A damage assessment conducted by NATO in March 1964 identified some of the secret documents he had compromised.

Files of Exercises SHAPEX and FALLEX

SHAPEX 1961 File

SACEUR's statement on SHAPEX 61 reviews SHAPE's forces and concepts. SACEUR appraises the past, considers the present, and looks toward the future. He explains the concepts of "pause" and "threshold."

In view of the fairly general terms in which these concepts are described, the political statements and newspaper articles which have since appear may have diminished the importance of the divulgence of this file.

FALLEX 1961 File

There was no Exercise FALLEX in 1961, but in 1961, there was a follow-up of FALLEX 1960 and the preparation of FALLEX 1962. :

The main effect of the divulgence of the documents relating to the FALLEX Exercises, mostly classified NATO SECRET, is to furnish detailed information about NATO emergency planning procedures, military and political alike and some information about alert measures and the employment of signals facilities.

These documents are therefore of definite interest to the Soviet Intelligence Services.

NATO psychological warfare documents.

21 Operations plan for psychological warfare drawn up in 1959 by the Southern Europe Headquarters.

This NATO SECRET document contains general information about operational projects in the field of psychological warfare.

Its importance for the Soviet Intelligence Services lay in the fact that they obtained a knowledge of psychological warfare plans for the years ahead and the countries on which activities were going to be concentrated.

SHAPE Planning Directive dated February 11th, 1957 Classified COSMIC TOP SECRET Subject: psychological warfare, replaced in 1960 by the SHAPE Planning Directive dated May 31st, 1960

With these two Directives, the Soviet Intelligence Services have obtained a document that will hold good for the year ahead and it has enabled them to follow the trend of NATO thinking of psychological warfare of March 1960.

C-M(60)22 of March 1960

This NATO SECRET document contains proposals by the government concerning cooperation and coordination at NATO level in the field of psychological warfare.

Letter No.64GU/DFGP/S from General Gelde the French Representative on the Standing Group Washington, dated November 13th, 1959.

This is a covering letter, classified SECRET, accompanying a study, classified SECRET containing the same proposals as C-M (60) 22

Documents AC and C-M 186 of the Working Group on Psychological Warfare.

In this field, of which he had close knowledge since he was a member of the Working Group on Psychological Warfare, Paques was in a position to hand over any information considered to be of interest to the Soviet Intelligence Services.

It therefore seems that the Soviet Government has had an opportunity to become acquainted with NATO concepts, projects and plans in the field of psychological warfare and thus to be able to thwart them, as well as to accentuate or correct the conduct of its own operations, in the light of Allied reactions. (see below the analysis of document C-R(60)14)

Summary record of the meeting of NATO Defense Ministers Meeting on April 1st 1960 to April 25th 1960 classified NATO SECRET with an annex classified COSMIC TOP SECRET.

This summary record deals with several items:

cooperation in the field of research, development, and production.

NATO logistics in peace and war;
psychological warfare.

In this latter connection, Mr. Strauss draws the Council's attention to the proposals put forward by his government in document C-M(60)22 which is analyzed above. He stresses the seriousness of the psychological warfare engaged in by the Russians against Germany and in Germany, states that certain aims have been achieved and dwells on the need for a counter-move.

The COSMIC TOP SECRET Annex to C-R(60) 14 contains a statement by the United States secretary for Defense made at the meeting of NATO Defense Ministers on April 1st,1960. This statement deals with the assignment to NATO of medium-range ballistic missiles during the period 1963–1965 and proposes various ways of giving effect to this plan.

C-R(50)14 and its Annex were of unquestionable value to the Soviet Government.

Documents concerning the OTTAWA Ministerial Meeting (April 1963)
C-M(63)20 of April 1963 classified NATO SECRET

It contains a review of the situation in Latin America, conclusions, and suggestions about the attitude which NATO countries should adopt, Annexes

on the implications of the Cuban crisis and the problem of Castro-Communist subversion.

The Russians have thus obtained an analysis of Allied policy in this area of the world and acknowledge of projects which might be implemented.

C-M(63)52 of April 1963, UNCLASSIFIED

This is a review of present trends in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. It is not of much importance from the standpoint of defense secrets.

C-M(63)52 of May 1963

This NATO SECRET document contains an examination of the situation in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany. It studies the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet satellites.

The value of this document for the Russians is that it enables them to see how well-informed the Allies are about their Bloc and to take account of this knowledge.

Annual political appraisal and C-M(63)30 on NATO defense policy, May 1963 ~

These reports by the NATO secretary-General, classified NATO SECRET, contain, in addition to the political section on general NATO policy, a section on defense problems. The latter deals with the NATO forces posture, the long-term threat assessment and military contingency plans. The section devoted to Production, Logistics, and Infrastructure makes a critical analysis of cooperation.

The importance for the Soviet Intelligence Services of accurate and official knowledge of these topical data cannot be underestimated.

It is difficult to assess the contents of the notes on documents;

C-M(63)31 - Middle East, May 1963

C-M(63)26 - Par East, May 1963

C-M(63)22 - Communist penetration in Africa, April 1963

These NATO SECRET documents contain information about the policy of NATO countries toward some of the most important world issues. They also interpret the political action of the USSR in these same countries and attempt to predict what its next decisions will be.

The damage caused to NATO interests by the divulgence of the information contained in these political documents is particularly serious on account of their topicality at the time they were handed over.

Summary of the background documents and work of the PARIS Ministerial Meeting (December 1962)

The NATO Ministerial Meetings take place, every six months or so, in accordance with the same pattern. Consequently, in the absence of particulars

about the compromised documents, it is possible by analogy to refer to the foregoing analysis of the OTTAWA Ministerial Meeting in April 1963.

It is worth drawing attention to the importance of certain NATO military COSMIC TOP SECRET documents which may have been compromised.

These are:

The statements by the Chairman of the Ministry Committee and the three Supreme Commanders;

The 1962 Triennial Review, including a summary table of forces, the statement of achievements in relation to the stated requirements;

the report on NATO military activities.

Furthermore, the defense problem of Greece was dealt with at this meeting.

SG 161/11 of May 1st, 1958

This COSMIC TOP SECRET document contains a searching intelligence evaluation of Soviet Bloc forces and capabilities in the economic, scientific, technical, and military spheres.

It also contains information about Soviet military doctrines and strategic concepts and assumptions concerning the use of Soviet Bloc armed forces in the early stages of a general nuclear war, with supporting facts.

Apart from its intrinsic importance, Russian possession of this document is particularly dangerous because it gives them the opportunity of uncovering the Western intelligence system.

MC 100 of January 24th, 1963

This NATO SECRET document contains a Soviet threat assessment based on the most recent, data. It reproduces and amplifies the previous documents (including SG 161/11) and consequently is of considerable importance for the Russian Intelligence Services. It enables them to discover the sources of Allied intelligence. The consequence of its loss may be very serious.

Documents concerning Berlin

Among the NATO documents concerning Berlin, it seems that the preparatory drafts submitted to the Council and C-M(61)10U dated November 9th, 1961 have, in particular, been compromised.

This COSMIC TOP SECRET document describes the essential aims of NATO policy over Berlin and gives precise instructions to the NATO Military Authorities.

Broadly speaking, the NATO-Berlin file deals with the countermeasures to be taken in order to parry any Soviet move against Berlin.

With this information in their possession, the Russians can play the right cards so that NATO contingency plans for Berlin will have to be revised.

MC 70 (final decision) of January 29th, 1958

This COSMIC TOP SECRET document contains the report by the military committee on the minimum essential force requirements for the period

1958–1963. The NATO Military Authorities deal in detail with the intelligence assessment of the Soviet threat; assumptions concerning Soviet domestic and foreign policy; the NATO strategic concept; the implications of the development of advanced weapons, with a detailed analysis of new Soviet capabilities and a critical analysis of NATO defense measures which underlines existing weaknesses; the peacetime and wartime roles of NATO forces and Supreme Commanders; an analysis of force requirements which describes in detail the way in which the NATO strategic concept must be implemented.

This document is of very great importance.

MC 26/4 (final decision) of January 17th, 1962

This COSMIC TOP SECRET document contains a statement of force requirements for 1966 (for NATO countries, as a whole and country by country).

Paques died in Paris in December 1993, aged 79, having been released early from prison after serving just seven years through a pardon issued by his old school friend Georges Pompidou.

PENKOVSKY, OLEG. Married with a daughter, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky was a much-decorated, well-connected, senior GRU officer, with an apartment overlooking the Moscow River, who was destined for further promotion, but he was constantly troubled by an offense he had committed many years earlier. He had concealed the fact that his father had fought with the White Russians in the Civil War, and he was convinced that if his father's record was ever discovered, his career would be ruined.

Perhaps motivated by this guilty secret, Penkovsky made two direct approaches to Americans in Moscow and a Canadian businessman, which were rejected by the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) as rather crude provocations orchestrated by the KGB. However, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) proved more receptive, and in December 1960, he made an offer to Greville Wynne, an SIS asset who frequently visited the Soviet Bloc as an entrepreneur seeking business deals for British engineering companies. Penkovsky's role, as the GRU liaison officer with the State Committee for Scientific Coordination, gave him an authentic reason to continue to meet Wynne and to travel abroad. While in London in April 1961 he underwent a lengthy debriefing by an SIS case officer, Harold Shergold, in the presence of two CIA officers, George Kisevalter and Joe Bulik, who had been dispatched for the purpose. During these interviews, Penkovsky described the GRU order-of-battle, and named a GRU colleague in London, Eugene Ivanov, as a suitable candidate for recruitment or defection. Penkovsky made a second trip to London in July 1961 and later in the year flew to Paris where

more sessions were held with his CIA and SIS contacts. Upon his return to Moscow, his communications relied upon supposedly chance encounters in a park with Janet Chisholm, the wife of the local SIS station commander, and then through a complicated system of signals and dead-drops. This arrangement appeared to work well until October 1962, when an American diplomat was arrested by the KGB at the site of one of the dead-drops, in the act of retrieving a message from Penkovsky.

Ten days later, early in November, Wynne was taken into custody by the Hungarian security police while in Budapest and sent to Moscow where he was charged with espionage and tried, in May 1963, alongside Penkovsky. Both men pleaded guilty to treason and the trial lasted four days, at the end of which Penkovsky was sentenced to death by firing squad and Wynne received eight years' imprisonment in a labor camp. Eleven months later, Wynne was swapped in Berlin for the KGB illegal *rezident* Konon Molody, alias "Gordon Lonsdale," who had been released from prison in England.

It was only after Wynne had been freed that a book purporting to be Penkovsky's autobiography, *The Penkovsky Papers*, was released. It was edited by a defector, Piotr Deriabin, and a *Time* journalist, Frank Gibney, who had previously collaborated on *The Secret World*. The purported autobiography had been reconstructed from the transcripts of taped information that Penkovsky had provided over the 18 months he operated as a source and the entire publication project had been financed by the CIA.

Penkovsky delivered to the west vital technical intelligence and, aside from looting the GRU's files, he also provided a detailed analysis of the Soviet strategic arsenal at a critical time when Nikita Khrushchev was planning ANADYR, to deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba, and provided the documents which enabled the CIA to correctly identify the missile sites while they were under construction.

In 1971, the Directorate of Intelligence's Len Parkinson set out the lasting impact of Penkovsky's IRONBARK and CHICKADEE reporting in *Penkovsky's Legacy and Strategic Research*: [See Appendix 9]

PERSHING II. NATO's decision in December 1979 to deploy 108 Pershing II MRBMs in West **Germany** significantly altered the global balance of power. The (deliberately misleading) published data suggested a range of 1,800 kilometers, which meant the weapon could not reach Moscow. However, the real figure, known to the Kremlin, was 2,500 kilometers, with an accuracy of 30 meters, carrying an earth-penetrating W-86 warhead. This Moscow's military command bunkers could be destroyed in a surprise attack virtually without warning, within four minutes of a launch, which was a far

more potent threat than that posed by ICBMs launched from the continental United States with a flight time of 30 minutes.

The Pershing II was mounted on a mobile launcher and the first operational battery was established in December 1983 at Mutlangen, followed by two more, at Nau-Ulm and Neckarsulm. The upgrading process was swift as the original Pershing Ia launchers could be modified on site to accommodate the new missile.

The political justification for the deployment of the Pershing II was that it was merely an upgrade of the Pershing Ia, with a range of 740 km, deployed in 1969 to West Germany to three battalions, each equipped with 36 mobile launchers, and to two Luftwaffe wings with 36 each. Also, it was claimed that the Pershing II was a legitimate response to the deployment from 1976 of the SS-20 *Saber* IRBM with a range of 5,000 km, of which 441 were deployed on Soviet territory, each armed with three independently targeted warheads.

The 56th Field Artillery Brigade, based at the Bismarck Kaserne, Schawbisch Gmund, amounted to 1,500 soldiers, and each of the three battalions consisted of four batteries, divided into three platoons, equipped with three missiles and crewed by 44 technicians.

The Soviet response to the Pershing II deployment was to mobilize political opposition in Europe to protest, and issue requirements to the GRU and East German Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung to identify the map references of every NATO nuclear installation and to monitor their state of readiness.

According to Gordon Barrass, the GRU *rezidenura* in Washington, D.C., focused its collection efforts on the Martin-Marietta Pershing II manufacturing plant in Orlando. In addition, on the test facilities at Cape Canaveral, and on the neighboring crew training area in Patrick Air Force Base. Additionally, the intercept site at Lourdes monitored telemetry signals and missile delivery flights to Germany made by Galaxy C5 transported, carrying nine missiles at a time. In recognition of this surveillance, the Pershing II was never tested beyond its declared range of 1,800 km. The GRU also targeted Fort Sill, Oklahoma, where the Pershing II crews underwent conversion training.

At the end of the Cold War, Marshal **Nikolai Ogarkov**'s deputy, General Gelii Batenin, revealed that the GRU knew when NATO was preparing to launch nuclear weapons. We could detect mating of warheads to missiles and uploading of nuclear bombs and artillery. We listened in to the hourly circuit verification signal of your nuclear release communications system and we believed we could recognize a release order.

Karl-Christoph Grossmann, the former deputy chief of the HVA's counterintelligence branch, claimed to have run 500 agents in West Germany dedicated to the task of watching the missile *kasernes*, and there was plenty to see. The pre-launch procedure for the missile was to disperse each mobile unit to a

designated launch site up to 10 kilometers distant, where the 8-wheeled erector-launcher hauled by a 10-ton tractor, control truck towing a generator and two other vehicles prepared for the firing by employing a 15-ton crane to mate the warhead and assemble the other components which were delivered in sealed containers. Each missile crew was protected by two other platoons of infantry, so the requirement to keep track of each missile was a significant, if not impossible challenge for **HUMINT**. The survivability factor of the Pershing II battalions was assessed as high, bearing in mind that the firing platoons would be concealed in woods, camouflaged, and protected by a patrolled perimeter armed with sensors to detect intruders. Communications between the firing units and the battalion's mobile command vans was by cable, to avoid the need for generating any signal traffic. Combat readiness was virtually instantaneous as in peacetime each battalion always had at least one platoon deployed.

PETROV, STANISLAV. Shortly after midnight on September 26, 1983, Colonel Stanislav Petrov received an early warning of a missile attack while on duty at his command bunker, designated Serpukhov-15, 65 miles south of Moscow, which was staffed by 120 watchkeepers. The alert announced the launch of five Minuteman missiles in Montana which had registered on the new **Oko satellite** surveillance system and gave up to half-an-hour's advance notice of impact. After a few tense minutes, Petrov decided this was likely a false alarm, noting that there had been no returns on any ground-based radar, which would be expected to pick up incoming ICBMs as they appeared over the horizon, and that anyway the number of missiles hardly represented the scale of a sneak attack.

A subsequent enquiry concluded that the malfunction had been caused by flashes of sunlight which had bounced off clouds and thereby given the overhead satellites a false reading. Although this was relatively routine, the heightened political tension at that time lent the incident a dramatic edge, especially as the ailing Yuri Andropov was at that moment undergoing kidney dialysis treatment, and might not have been in a fit condition to deal rationally with adverse news, thereby prompting speculation that the episode had nearly created a crisis or worse.

PETROV, VLADIMIR. In February 1950, Vladimir Petrov arrived in Canberra to take up his duties at the embassy, with the rank of third secretary, and was accompanied by his wife Evdokia who would be employed as an account, ambassador's secretary and cipher clerk. However, his true role was to replace Valentin Sadovnikov as the NKVD *rezident* and take over the management of the *rezidentura* which consisted of the TASS correspondent

in Sydney, Ivan Pakhomov, Filipp Kislitsyn, Janic Platkais, Viktir Kovaliev, and Nikolai Antonov.

While under routine surveillance by the **ASIO**, Petrov became a possible candidate for defection, and he was cultivated on ASIO's behalf by his Polish dentist, Michael Bialoguski. Although Bialoguski ASIO handler, Michael Thwaites, could never be certain of Petrov's intelligence status, his instincts proved correct and the *resident* negotiated political asylum and ownership of a chicken farm in return for his cooperation and a briefcase of documents removed from his embassy safe.

Following his defection on April 3, 1954, when he produced a bundle of documents (but no codebooks) Petrov underwent a lengthy interview in which he described to his ASIO debriefer Ron Richards his own career. Born in 1907 in Larikha, Siberia, he had served as a cipher clerk in the navy between 1929 and 1933 when he had been transferred to the NKVD in Moscow to work as a cipher clerk, dealing with overseas communications until 1939 when he was posted to head a Red Army cipher unit in western China. The following year, he was returned to Moscow where he continued his cipher duties, working on internal communications until March 1942 when he was posted to the embassy in Stockholm. He remained in **Sweden** until the end of 1948 and was promoted to Canberra in 1951.

Among Petrov's many disclosures was damaging information about Australia's leader of the opposition, Dr. **Herbert Evatt**, and his secretary **Allan Dalziel**. The latter was unquestionably a Soviet asset, and Evatt seemed to have surrounded himself with communists. The government promptly empaneled a Royal Commission to investigate the evidence of Soviet espionage, with wide terms of reference:

- (a) the information given to the Commonwealth by Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov as to the conduct of espionage and related activities in Australia and matters related to or arising from that information;
- (b) whether espionage has been conducted or attempted in Australia by representatives or agents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, if so, by whom and by what methods;
- (c) whether any persons or organizations in Australia have communicated information or documents to any such representative or agent unlawfully or to the prejudice or possible prejudice of the security or defense of Australia; and
- (d) whether any persons or organizations in Australia have aided or abetted any such espionage or any such communication of information or documents, and, generally, the facts relating to and the circumstances

attending any such espionage or any such communication of information or documents.

The Royal Commission examined Petrov and the documents he had removed from the embassy which were described by Sir Robert Menzies as:

1. A document typewritten in English and marked by the royal commission *Exhibit H*. This document was clearly proved to have been composed and typed by one Fergan O'Sullivan in 1951, when he was a journalist employed in the Canberra Press gallery by the *Sydney Morning Herald*. He had been procured to write it by a Russian overtly representing the TASS news agency, but covertly a temporary MVD *rezident*. The document was photographed, the negative being sent to the Moscow centre.

O'Sullivan became Dr. Evatt's Press secretary in April 1953. When after the 1954 Elections, O'Sullivan admitted to Dr. Evatt that he was the author of the document. Dr. Evatt at once and properly dismissed him.

Exhibit H itself played a large, though perhaps not a very important, part in the inquiry; as will appear.

2. A document typed in English, marked by the Royal Commission *Exhibit J*, composed and typed by one Rupert Lockwood, a self-confessed Australian Communist, at the request of the TASS representative, who was also an MVD worker. It also was sent to the Moscow centre. It was a long document of 37 pages, closely typed. It covered a wide variety of matters deemed to be of interest to the Soviet Union. I will come back to it. All that needs to be said at present is that it was later described by Mr Windeyer, of all advocates the most restrained, as "a farrago of fact, falsity, and filth."
3. The next papers, written in Russian, were letters sent out from the MVD Moscow centre to Petrov. These, of course, had to be translated. For this purpose, the royal commission secured the services of the highly qualified A. H. Birse.
4. A miscellaneous group of documents which were marked *G* by the royal commission and consisted chiefly of letters from Moscow to Canberra.

The Royal Commission sat for 126 days, questioned 119 witnesses, and received over 500 exhibits, and its report, published in 1955, confirmed the authenticity of Petrov and his papers, but no one was arrested or prosecuted for participation in Soviet espionage, even though numerous NKVD agents would be compromised by the VENONA decrypts. Among those investigated by the ASIO were Jim Hill, **Ian Milner**, Rupert Lockwood, and **Wally Clayton**.

Soon after his own defection, Petrov was joined by his wife, who was also an NKVD officer, and they were resettled as Swedish emigrants under the alias “Sven and Maria Allyson” in Melbourne where he worked for the Ilford photographic company. He suffered a crippling stroke in 1974, forcing his retirement, and he remained in hospital until he died in June 1991. Evdokia, seven years younger than her husband, whose sister lived in Moscow and emigrated in 1990, died in July 2002.

POLYAKOV, DMITRI. Following the death of his son, which Colonel Dmitri Polyakov believed could have been avoided if he had received permission for leukemia treatment in America, the GRU deputy *rezident* volunteered in January 1962 to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), who codenamed him TOPHAT, and the **Central Intelligence Agency**, (CIA), who assigned him the codenames DONALD and ROAM. Bitter about the death of his son, and infuriated that his pay had been cut because of his unpopular opinion that sophisticated illegal operations in the United States were a complete waste of money as the environment really did not call for anything more complex than a false passport, spied for almost 20 years. According to the CIA, he was motivated by hatred of the Soviet system and a weakness for very expensive hunting rifles. The KGB later claimed that he had misappropriated \$600 from a colleague and had begged the FBI for the cash.

A graduate of the Frunze military academy, Polyakov was recruited toward the end of his second tour of duty in the United States and was a senior and experienced GRU officer, having spent five years in New York on the staff of the United Nations, returning to Moscow in 1956.

The FBI’s second approach to Polyakov, made by John Mabey, of the New York Field Office, fortuitously coincided with his own decision to offer his services for sale to the Americans. An intermediary introduced Polyakov to an FBI officer at a diplomatic reception and a rendezvous was arranged for the following evening. Thus, Polyakov agreed terms for the purchase of his information and underwent an intensive debriefing at which he revealed that prior to his appointment to the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations he had served in Berlin with Piotr Popov as an illegal support officer. Coincidentally, he had been the GRU conducting officer who had escorted Margarita Tairova to Berlin and introduced her to Popov. At a series of secret meetings held before his departure, Polyakov effectively destroyed the GRU’s operations in the United States. Even after he had left the meetings continued, for Mabey arranged to sail to Europe on the same ship as Polyakov, and he revealed that as an illegal support officer he was currently supervising three illegals who had been infiltrated already into the United States and also disclosed the full KGB and GRU order-of-battle in Washington D.C., New York, and San Francisco.

The first of Polyakov's illegals was a Finn, Kaarlo R. Tuomi, whom he ran with assistance from Anatoli B. Senkin and Lev V. Sosnovski. He also compromised Maria Dobrova, who was abducted by the FBI, and Alexandre Sokolov who was arrested and deported.

After Polyakov's return to Moscow in 1962, he was promoted to the rank of colonel and in late 1965 was appointed to Rangoon as military attaché for a tour of duty lasting four years, during which the CIA reestablished contact with him. In 1973, he was sent to New Delhi, and was back in Moscow in 1976. Each time he went abroad, he signaled his arrival and the CIA assigned a case officer to meet him. His duplicity went unsuspected by the KGB and when he returned to India in 1979, he had achieved the rank of general lieutenant.

In 1977, Polyakov's CIA handler in New Delhi, Paul L. Dillon, taught him to use the Discus squirt transmitter so he could send signals to the deputy chief of station while traveling past the U.S. embassy in Moscow on a bus. By this means, Polyakov, now codenamed CK/BEEP, managed to maintain radio contact with the CIA for two years in the Soviet capital before returning to India as military attaché. In June 1980, apparently undetected and approaching his official retirement, Polyakov returned to Moscow because the GRU had come to suspect him. He was eventually betrayed by **Aldrich Ames**, arrested by the KGB in July 1985, and executed after a brief trial three years later, in March 1988. Reportedly, one of his sons, also a GRU officer, committed suicide soon afterward.

The precise moment that Polyakov came under suspicion, and was arrested, was the subject of a lengthy study by his counterintelligence analyst, Sandy Grimes, as there were conflicting suggestions that he had been exposed in 1980 when he had been recalled from New Delhi following a tip from **Robert Hanssen**. The CIA had been satisfied that Polyakov had retained his freedom after his recall because he occasionally contributed articles about his favorite sport, hunting, to the magazine *Ogonyok*. In addition, his son had been posted to Delhi, another indication that Polyakov was not under suspicion.

POPOV, PIOTR. A GRU officer who volunteered in Vienna in 1953 to spy for the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA), Piotr Popov provided the west with its first postwar glimpse into the Soviet military intelligence structure. Codenamed GR/ALLSPICE he revealed that the GRU had transferred several important departments from Moscow to Schwerin and that the GRU's deputy chief, General Feodor Fedorov, had been given the assignment of expanding the GRU's base in Karlshorst. Popov also reported that in the aftermath of the defection of Nikolai Khokhlov, General Aleksandr M. Korotkov had been appointed *rezident* in Berlin.

Dick Helms later averred that for seven years “Popov, until he fell under suspicion, single-handedly supplied the most valuable intelligence on Soviet military matters of any human source available to the United States.” He also asserted that Popov had a “direct and significant influence on the military organization of the United States, its doctrine and tactics, and permitted the Pentagon to save at least \$500 million in its scientific research program.” Among the items supplied by Popov to his Russian-speaking CIA case officer, George Kisevalter, was a copy of the current *Field Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR* and numerous other manuals. His reporting covered order-of-battle data, nuclear warfare tactics, strategic air operations, and guided missiles. He also had access to technical information about new weaponry, such as the T-10 heavy tank and PT-76 amphibious light tank. Popov also supplied copies of the Soviet military journal *Military Thought*.

Popov’s case was handled in Washington, D.C., by Bill Hood who wrote an account of it in *Mole*. Popov was eventually arrested by the KGB in a Moscow bus in October 1959, in the act of passing a message to his CIA contact, Russell Langelles, and executed by a firing squad in June 1960.

PROXY WARS. Throughout the Cold War, the Kremlin sought to apply pressure on the west by extending its influence into the Third World, and in the aftermath of the Korean War sided with so-called liberation movements in Indo-China, Cuba, Central America, and Africa. The nature of the threat had been studied by **NATO** in April 1963: [See Appendix 10]

Although the Kremlin generally gave unconditional support to anti-colonialist independence movements across the globe, the KGB was opportunistic and, when the Portuguese government was toppled by a military junta in April 1974, the officers behind the coup were backed by the KGB’s local *rezidentura*. During the initial chaos, the headquarters of the secret police, Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado (PIDE), in the rua Antonio Maria Cardoso, was occupied by political activists while the archives were removed to the Soviet embassy, and later to Moscow.

PUEBLO, USS. In January 1968, the U.S. Navy AGER-2 signals intelligence ship *Pueblo*, on her first operational voyage, was captured by North Korean sailors while she cruised in international waters off the port of Wonsan. Commanded by Lloyd Bucher, the lightly armed *Pueblo* was a converted cargo ship, built in 1944, that had been commissioned the previous year as an auxiliary with a crew of 83 under the operational control of the Naval Security Group (NSG) at Kamisaya, Japan. Essentially, the vessel was a sophisticated signals interception platform with a capability to monitor North Korean voice and other communications in the ultra high frequency (UHF) and VHF

spectrums. It was also equipped with the standard WLR-1 electronic intelligence intercept receiver and had positions dedicated to the interception of Soviet **telemetry**.

The *Pueblo*'s mission was to concentrate on low power VHF communications which tended to be line-of-sight and so could not be intercepted by the NSA's shore bases. The ship was to conduct a general search for North Korean Army and Navy transmissions along the east coast, a task that could not be undertaken by aircraft with only limited duration. The NSA's intention was to build an order-of-battle database and locate target emitters such as clear-voice coastal artillery communications and naval single-channel voice links, including ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore channels.

At that time the Korean People's Army relied on manual Morse, radio-telephone, and radio-printer traffic, and there were three specific naval units of particular interest. The NSA priorities were listed as new and unusual unidentified signals, unconfirmed signals, and land-based/shipborne/airborne radars. In addition, there was great interest in transmissions associated with suspected anti-ship cruise missile sites and the activities of any *Komar* guided missile patrol boats.

The **Central Intelligence Agency**'s classified chronology of events reconstructed the exact sequence of the incident:

DETAILED KNOWN CHRONOLOGY ON
THE LOCATION AND SEIZURE OF THE *PUEBLO*

1. **Jan. 11, 6:00 AM Korean Time (102100Z, 1600 EST, Jan. 10)**

Pueblo departed Sasebo under instructions to engage in an intelligence-gathering mission in the Sea of Japan and under orders that the closest point of approach to the North Korean land mass and offshore islands was to be 13 nautical miles²:-

2. **Jan. 12, 11:30 PM Korean Time (121430Z, 0930 EST, Jan. 12)**

Pueblo arrived in her operations area;

3. **Jan. 20, 5:50 PM Korean Time (200850Z, 0350 EST, Jan. 20)**

Pueblo position reported as 39-47-ON/128-25.5E, 15.4 nautical miles from nearest land.³ *Pueblo* sighted a North Korean submarine chaser at 4,000 yards. It showed no interest in the *Pueblo*.

1. Times given are in Korean Time, Greenwich Mean Time (2), and Eastern Standard Time (EST). Greenwich Mean Time is 9 hour behind and EST 14 hours behind Korean Time.

In some cases, this results in events being recorded on different days on Greenwich and/or EST than in Korean Time. The Korean Time makes clear what the actual daylight or night-time conditions were in the area.

For additional clarity, the Korean times are given in AM and PM instead of the 24-hour clock used for military messages,

2. The Pueblo did not thereafter transmit any messages until 10:50 AM Korean Time on January 23 (230150Z, or 2050 EST, Jan. 22). Between that point and 12:52 PM Korean Time (**230352Z**, 2252 EST, Jan. 22) it transmitted all the data set forth through number 12 below on previous events, except for numbers **8** and **11** which are derived from the log of the receiving station on shore.
3. This and subsequent distances from the nearest land were not given by the Pueblo itself but have been calculated by the Navy Department from the position coordinates reported by the *Pueblo*.
4. **Morning of January 22 Korean Time (night of Jan. 21Z and late afternoon Jan. 21 EST)**
Pueblo arrived in area off Wonsan.
5. **Jan. 22, 12:25 PM Korean Time (220325Z, 2225 EST, Jan. 21)**
 Two North Korean vessels were sighted at 10,000 yards. When both had reached a point about 1,500 yards from the Pueblo, one changed course and closed to about 100 yards. The Pueblo identified them as probably North Korean fishing ships. They withdrew to about **9,000** yards.
6. **Jan. 22, 3:00 PM Korean Time (220600Z, or 0100 EST, Jan. 22)**
 The two North Korean vessels made another approach to the Pueblo, closing this time to 30 yards. The *Pueblo* at this time was dead in the water, showing the signal for hydrographic operations, at 39-1^» 8N/128-07.0E (**15** nautical miles from Nam Do). The two vessels finally departed at 4:00 PM Korean Time (220700Z, or 0200 EST, Jan. 22).
7. **Jan. 22j 4:00 PM to Jan. 23, 10:00 AM Korean Time (220700Z, or 0200 EST Jan. 22 to 230100Z, or 2000 EST, Jan. 22)**
Pueblo had 18 different contacts with unidentified vessels, the closest at **3,000** yards.
8. **Jan. 22, 6:25 PM (220925Z, or 0425 EST, Jan. 22)**
Pueblo broke radio silence for first time since leaving port, exchanged call signs with shore station, but sent no messages.
9. **Jan. 22 8:30 AM Korean Time (222330%, or 1830 EST, Jan. 22)**
Pueblo position reported as 39-12N/L28-21.4E, 17 nautical miles from Nam Do.
10. **Jan. 23, 10:00 AM Korean Time (230100Z, or 2000 EST, Jan. 22)**
Pueblo position reported as 39-24N/127-59E, 18.2 nautical miles from Ung Do.
11. **Jan. 23 10:50 AM Korean Time (230150Z, or 2050 EST, Jan. 22)**

The operator succeeded for the first time in establishing communications. He asked if his transmissions could be read, gave *Pueblo*'s position at 39-4N/127-59E (18.2 nautical miles from Ung Do), and reported he had some messages to send.⁴

12. Jan. 23, 10:50 AM Korean Time (230150Z, or 2050 EST, Jan. 22)

The *Pueblo* felt it was no longer under surveillance and reported its intention to remain in the area and go back into radio silence.⁵

13. Jan. 23, subsequent to 11:35 AM Korean Time (230235Z, or 2135 EST, Jan. 22)

The *Pueblo* operator, in operational "chatter" of uncertain time subsequent to the transmittal of the message in (12) above,

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] reported the *Pueblo* had "more company" and intended to keep its circuit open.

(This was the first indication that the *Pueblo* was currently under surveillance.)

4. This call, with its position, was the first information received from the *Pueblo* subsequent to its departure from Sasebo on January 11. A3 indicated in footnote 2, the preceding information was transmitted between this time and 12:52 PM Korean Time (230352Z or **2252 EST on Jan. 22**)

14. Jan. 23t 12:00 noon Korean Time (230300Z, or 2200 EST)

North Korean Submarine Chaser **35** reported by *Pueblo* as arriving on the scene, that is, at 39-25.2N/127-55-0E, where the *Pueblo* lay dead in the water, 16.2 nautical miles from Ung Do.

The *Pueblo* reported that the 35 had hoisted a signal requesting its nationality. The *Pueblo* reported it hoisted the U.S. ensign, then the signal for "hydrographer." The 35 hoisted the signals "Heave to or I will open fire on you." The *Pueblo* signaled: "I am in international waters." The 35 continued to circle the *Pueblo*.⁶

15. Jan. 23 12:10 PM Korean Time (230310Z, or 2210 EST, Jan. 22)

Intercepted message from the North Korean Submarine Chaser **35** first reported contact with and identification of the *Pueblo*, that is, as the GER 2. In a separate message at exactly the same time, it gave its position as **39-26N/127-58E or 18.6** nautical miles from Ung Do.

5. This message was transmitted some time after 11:35 AM Korean Time (230235Z, or 2135 EST on Jan. 22)
6. This message, sent with a "flash" precedence, and in a category indicating a serious situation, was transmitted between 12:52 PM Korean Time (230352Z, or **2252 EST, Jan. 22**) and 1:13 PM Korean

Time 230413Z, or 2313 EST, Jan. 22). Because of its emergency character and flash precedence, this message was retransmitted and cleared communication channels faster than any of the preceding messages and was the first report to reach Washington. All the reports from the Pueblo which follow in this chronology were sent after this report, except the one in (16), which was part of this message.

16. Jan. 23, 12:52 PM Korean Time (230352'Z, or 2252 EST, Jan. 22) (probable time)

Pueblo reported its intention was to remain in the area if feasible if not, to withdraw slowly to the Northeast.

During the subsequent few minutes, the operator reported it was “worse out here” and that the *Pueblo* had “more company.”

17. Jan. 23, 1:15 to 1:18 PM Korean Time (230415 to 230418Z, or 2315 EST to 2318 EST, Jan. 22)

Pueblo reported that the 35 had been joined at 1:00 PM Korean Time (0400Z or 2300 EST, Jan. 2d) by three P-4 torpedo boat) patrol craft. One Korean vessel signaled: “Follow in my wake. I have a pilot aboard.” Two MiGs were sighted circling. One patrol boat with renders rigged was reported backing toward the Pueblo with an armed landing party on board. The party was attempting to board.

The Pueblo reported itself underway, all ahead one-third, right full rudder; departing the area under escort.

18. Jan. 23, 1:26 PM Korean Time (230426Z, or 2326 EST, Jan. 22) to 1:36 PM Korean Time (230432, or 2336 EST, Jan. 22)

At 1:26 PM, the *Pueblo* gave its position as 39-25.5N/127-54.9E and said, “They plan to open fire on us now.” At 1:28 PM, the Pueblo operator repeated that they planned to open fire and said, “We are being boarded.” Then gave a slightly different position (39-25N/127-54.3E). Within the next few minutes, the operator reported: “We are holding emergency destruction” that is, of classified equipment and documents. The operator reported “laying to” at about 1:36 PM Korean Time.

19. Jan. 23, between 1:40 and 1:50 PM Korean Time (230440Z to 230445Z, or 2340 to 2345 EST, Jan. 22)

Pueblo operator reported: “We are being escorted into probably Wonsan.”

20. Jan. 23, 2:00 PM Korean Time (230500Z, or 2400 EST, Jan. 22)

Pueblo operator transmitted at about this time a fuller and somewhat more formal report than the previous “chatter” that the *Pueblo* had been requested to follow into Wonsan, that 3 men were wounded and another

had his leg blown off, that they had not used any weapons nor uncovered the 50 caliber machine guns, and that they did not intend to offer resistance.

21. Jan. 23, 2:30 PM Korean Time (230530Z, or 0030 EST, Jan. 23)

The *Pueblo* operator reported that the ship had been directed to come to “all stop” and again reported “being boarded.”

22. Jan. 23, 2:32 PM Korean Time (230532Z, or 0032 EST, Jan. 23)

Final transmission from the *Pueblo* repeated 4 men were injured, one critically, and said it was going off the air and destroying the radio. (Best available evidence indicates the boarding occurred shortly after this point.)

23. Jan. 23, 2:40 PM Korean Time (230540Z, or 0040 EST, Jan. 23)

The North Korean Submarine Chaser 35 reported its position at 39-24N/L28-01E (19.6 nautical miles from Ung Do) and one of the torpedo boats reported its position at 39-26N/127-58E (18.6 nautical miles from Ung Do).

24. Jan. 23, 3:35 PM Korean Time (230635Z, or 0135 EST, Jan. 23)

At this time came the first position report from a North Korean vessel on the way in from the seizure which placed it closer than 12 nautical miles from North Korean territory. This report, over an hour after seizure and more than 3 hours after the start of the incident, placed the North Korean ship at 39-21N/127-51E, or 11.2 nautical miles from Ung Do.

25. Jan. 23, about 5:00 PM Korean Time (230800Z, or-0300 EST, Jan. 23)

The *Pueblo* was taken into Wonsan Harbor.

26. Jan. 23, 5:36 PM Korean Time (230836Z or 0336 EST, Jan. 23)

Sunset in the Wonsan area.

When the ship was raked by 57-mm cannon fire from North Korean gunboats, mortally wounding one member of the crew, Bucher obeyed an order to surrender and was boarded. The *Pueblo* was then sailed into Wonsan, where the classified compartments were emptied of documents, cipher machines, intercept equipment, and other electronics. According to KGB General Oleg Kalugin, an estimated 792 pounds of this equipment subsequently were delivered to the Soviet Union for scientific analysis. Within hours, North Korean television was broadcasting seized secret documents with the codeword classifications TRINE and SAVIN.

The amount of SIGINT and crypto-equipment taken ashore by the North Koreans amounted to an unprecedented loss, with an estimated 500 documents or pieces of equipment, including 58 technical SIGINT instructions, 37 technical manuals, 33 COMINT technical reports, and 126 collection requirements. In addition, the ship carried about 8,000 messages containing SIGINT

data transmitted over the fleet operational intelligence broadcast which carried large amounts of information on Southeast Asia and China. Worse, the *Pueblo* employed four cryptographic systems, associated keying material, maintenance manuals, operating instructions, and the general communications security publications necessary to support such a large cryptographic operation.

The NSA later estimated that the captured material disclosed “the full extent of the American SIGINT attack on North Korean communications, including call-sign system recoveries, net and communications system reconstruction and diagrams, and the association of communications systems with platforms and transmission systems.”

The NSA later learned that highly competent North Korean electronics experts had submitted the communications technicians to intensive interrogations, focusing on technical principles of the cryptographic equipment, equipment operating procedures, and the relationship of the associated keying material to the equipment, all of which suggested a high level of knowledge. Selected personnel were questioned more than 20 times in interview sessions lasting hours, and inevitably some of the prisoners revealed how to change codes for and operate KW-7 encrypted teletypes, and drew schematics of the KWR-37 used to decipher the fleet broadcast. When the NSA came to draft the damage assessment, the investigators were unaware that the Soviets had been quite familiar with the KW-7, a device that had been compromised by a Signal Corps NCO, Warrant Officer **Joseph Helmich** several years earlier, in January 1963.

The NSA later estimated that this cooperation probably saved the interrogators three to six months of technical diagnostic analysis and concluded that the compromise revealed “the full extent of U.S. SIGINT information on North Korean armed forces communications activities and U.S. successes in the techniques of collection, exploitation, and reporting applied to this target.”

The survivors, including two U.S. Marine linguists who scarcely spoke any Korean, were repatriated on December 23 after 11 months of beatings and interrogation; the ship remains in Nampo, where it has become a tourist attraction. Although commander Bucher was recommended for prosecution by court martial, the secretary of the navy stayed the proceedings, and he remained in the U.S. Navy until his retirement in 1973.

Following the *Pueblo* debacle, the House Armed Services Committee mounted an investigation chaired by Otis Pike. *In camera* evidence was given on March 10, 1968, by the NSA’s director, General Marshall Carter, but his secret testimony was later leaked to the media two days later by Pike. A damage assessment was completed after the crew had been debriefed in San Diego, and the NSA concluded that if the Soviets had been passed the

Pueblo booty, then communications for some of 1967 and 1968 should be considered compromised. However, the damage assessment team no idea at that time of the existence of John Walker, and the likelihood that the Soviets would exploit his crypto material in conjunction with the equipment captured a few months later on the *Pueblo*. As a result of the fiasco, the NSA allowed the *Pueblo*'s sister ship, the USS *Banner*, to make a final patrol against North Korea, and then the entire AGER program was canceled.

The NSA's investigation of the incident, which remained classified until 2014, shed new light on the circumstances of the *Pueblo*'s loss, and highlighted some significant facts, including a reference to a pair of North Korean fishing boats that on January 22 had shadowed the ship for several hours and even approached to within 100 yards, and had probably alerted the North Korean authorities. Certainly North Korean radar stations were shown to have tracked a "target" operating in the same area as the USS *Pueblo*, and a naval radar at Kalgoch latched onto a ship at 1500 local time. Also the radar station at Kukchi-Bong began similar tracking some two hours later. None of these possible warning signs had been interpreted as such.

Q

QUEEN BEE. During the **Vietnam** conflict, the U.S. **National Security Agency** sponsored airborne SIGINT collection missions flown by a pair of specially equipped RC-140 aircraft codenamed QUEEN BEE/CHARLIE and QUEEN BEE/DELTA from Bangkok. These flights were later expanded by the U.S. NSG EC-121 and the EA-3B over the Gulf of Tonkin.

By 1967, four more RC-130s were transferred to Da Nang from Europe, and the larger RC-135s were assigned from the Strategic Reconnaissance Wing to pick up Hanoi voice traffic. Within a year the 699th U.S. Air Force Security Service had expanded into airborne D/F, codenamed PHYLLIS ANN, with some 47 EC-47s based at Da Nang, Pleiku, and Nha Trang. Of particular value was a logistics channel based at Vinh, an assembly area north of the Demilitarized Zone, which allowed the AFSS to predict the infiltration of regulars down the Ho Chi Minh trail.

R

RADAR MAPPING. Before the introduction of SLBMs and overhead **satellite** surveillance systems, Western deterrence strategy depended on the accurate delivery of free-fall atomic bombs. This tactic required detailed mapping of targets, and as the target list increased, so did the intelligence requirement which meant high-risk overflights to collect the necessary data.

Some of these missions were flown by RB-57E Stratojet of the 51st Strategic Reconnaissance Wing operating from RAF Fairford but on May 8, 1954, one such aircraft, on a flight mapping naval sites at Murmansk and Archangel, by MiG-15s and MiG-17s. The intruder escaped by entering Finnish airspace, and the damaged aircraft landed safely, having been refueled while airborne.

REDSOX. The program of recruitment, training, and infiltration of Eastern bloc émigrés back into their home countries was codenamed REDSOX by the **CIA** (CI) which conducted deniable paramilitary operations against **Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Byelorussia, and Ukraine**, drawing upon refugees displaced in Europe as volunteers. Initiated in 1949, REDSOX was an aggressive campaign to foment resistance against the Soviet occupation forces. Ultimately the objective was to force a Soviet withdrawal, but a ubiquitous security apparatus crushed the dissent.

Managed by the CIA's SR (Soviet Russia) Division in conjunction with the British SIS and its Swedish counterpart, REDSOX infiltrate agents into the Soviet Union by air, land, and sea, while a parallel program, REDSKIN, employed "legal travelers" such as American tourists, businessmen, scientists, and journalists, to try to assist in collection operations. In the first phase of REDSKIN, between 1949 and 1954, there were seven "black penetration" projects, being **Latvia** (AECOB), **Lithuania** (Projects AEGEAN/AECHAMP), **Estonia** (Projects AEROOT/AEBASIN), **Byelorussia** (AEQUOR), the Ukraine (AERODYNAMIC), and Russia (AESAURUS/AENOBLE).

Recruited REDSOX agents attended a training course, codenamed AEACRE, at a Domestic operations Base in the United States or at safe-houses managed by the Munch Operations Base located in the McGraw

Kaserne, and designated MOB, first headed by Charles Katek, formerly the CIA station chief in Prague, and then from April 1951 by Harry A. Rositzke.

In 1949, REDSOX operations passed to a new CIA group, the Combined Soviet Operations Base (CSOB) headed by George N. Belic, a Russian linguist who was succeeded in 1951 by David Murphy, later promoted chief of the Berlin Operations Base. Altogether nearly 100 agents are estimated to have participated in the REDSOX program, and most were dropped by parachute from unmarked USAF C-47s and C-54s. The first drop took place on the night of September 5/6, 1949, when a two-man team was inserted into the Ukraine near Lvov. The last mission was completed over Estonia on May 5/6, 1954, but the CIA eventually concluded that “at least 75 percent of the 85 CIA agents dispatched under REDSOX disappeared from sight and failed in their missions.” In 1957, Jack Maury, the SR Division chief, acknowledged that the “black penetration” missions had been “strewn with disaster.”

The REDSOX operations failed largely because they had been based on the wartime JEDBURGH model, designed to liaise with guerrilla groups, which was quite inappropriate for intelligence collection inside the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the rival émigré groups, competing for CIA and SIS cash, were heavily penetrated by the Soviets and generally unreliable, often engaging in criminality, and especially black marketeering. In one case, Myron Matviyenko, the commander of one of three SIS teams dropped into the western Ukraine and Poland on May 14/15, 1951 betrayed all his fellow agents and then revealed on Radio Kiev five months later that he had been a long-term Soviet agent.

ROMANIA. Soviet troops left Romania in 1958, the **KGB**’s advisers followed in 1961, but the government never formally withdrew from the Warsaw Pact. The tension between Bucharest and Moscow, manifested by opposition to the Soviet **invasion of Czechoslovakia** in August 1968, was described in detail in July 1978 by General Ion Pacepa, the most senior Eastern bloc intelligence officer to defect and, at the time, acting chief of the *Departamentul de Informatii Externe* (DIE).

Prior to the chill in relations, the DIE had targeted NATO and in 1962 Mikai Caraman, the organization’s *resident* in Paris since 1958, under first secretary cover at the embassy, recruited **Francois Roussilhe**, then employed as a custodian of classified documents at NATO headquarters. Colonel Caraman also ran a Turkish officer, Colonel **Nahit Imre**, who had been recruited in Ankara but assigned to Paris. Both sources were compromised in 1969 when Caraman’s deputy, Ion Iacobescu, who worked under UNESCO cover,

defected in London. The other spy compromised, **Charles de la Salle**, committed suicide when confronted at his home by the French Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire officers.

In 1983, another DIE espionage case was revealed when the former director of Belgian's Ministry of External Relations, 61-year-old Eugene Michiels, was arrested and charged with espionage. A search of his bank deposit box in Hasselt revealed a large amount of cash and some incriminating microfilms. In his confession, Michiels admitted having sold classified information to his Romanian contacts.

The very independent line taken by Nicolae Ceausescu, the Communist Party leader from March 1965, restricted the DIE's foreign intelligence collection to monitoring the activities of émigré groups hostile to the regime. Accordingly, neither DIE nor its military counterpart Direcția de Informații a Marelui Stat Major (DIMSM) would pose a credible threat to NATO's security and was not found to have collaborated with the KGB. On the contrary, Ceausescu was aware of a Soviet scheme codenamed DNESTR to replace him with a more compliant leader.

ROOSTER-53. An Israeli operation to capture and remove a Soviet P12 SPOON REST radar from Ras-el-Ghareb on Christmas Eve, December 1969. The newly installed station had been located by the Egyptian army in the British-built fortress on the strategically important artificial island constructed in the Red Sea to protect the southern entrance to the Suez Canal. The VHF early warning ground control apparatus, mounted on two Zil trucks, had a range of 200 kilometers and would become closely associated with the SA-2 *Guideline* anti-aircraft missile in Vietnam. Both vehicles were lifted by a pair of CH-53 Sikorsky helicopters and flown back to Israeli territory.

ROUSSILHE, FRANCOIS. In 1962, Francois Roussilhe, a 40-year-old Frenchman, employed by **NATO** as a classified documents custodian, was recruited in Paris by a Romanian intelligence officer, Colonel Mihai Caraman who operated under diplomatic cover at the Romanian embassy. Roussilhe was arrested in January 1969 when Caraman's deputy, Ion Iacobescu, defected.

In his confession Roussilhe, who had joined NATO in 1952 and had been promoted to chief clerk of the document translation center, admitted to having sold some 5,000 classified papers.

RUPP, RAINER. Born in September 1945, Rainer Rupp was an (HVA) agent who was educated at the Free University of Brussels before he joined

NATO in 1969. His English wife Anne-Christine Bowen, codenamed **TURQUOISE**, also worked at NATO's headquarters and had willingly spied for her husband, whom she married in April 1972. In 1986, she gave him an ultimatum, demanding he cease his involvement in espionage, but he continued in secret, without her support, and in 1988 delivered to the HVA the top secret NATO military committee assessment of the Warsaw Pact's strengths and capabilities designated "MC 161."

Rupp was exposed when his name appeared in an HVA file marked **TOPAZ** which was recovered at the collapse of East Germany in 1989. Additional, incriminating information was supplied by an HVA analyst, Dr. Heinz Busch, who defected, and the pair was arrested in April 1993. Anne Rupp received a 22 month suspended prison sentence in 1994 while her husband was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment. He was released in July 2000 and became a journalist.

RYAN. The Russian acronym for *Raketno Yadernoe Napadenie* ("nuclear-missile attack") came into common usage within the KGB and GRU in 1981 when the Soviet leadership began to suspect **NATO** of planning a surprise attack, probably under the guise of routine military exercises. In May 1981, Leonid Brezhnev went to the KGB's headquarters to address a gathering of senior staff led by Chairman Yuri Andropov and warn of a growing threat from the United States. This was followed in November 1981 by the circulation to overseas *rezdienturas* of **RYAN** indicators, receipt of which was reported from London by the Secret Intelligence Service's local source, **Oleg Gordievsky**, who had arrived in England in June 1982, alleged that his embassy had been put on an alert and that all KGB personnel had been instructed to remain vigilant for certain signs of an imminent attack. A checklist of unusual activity was prepared with the intention of instituting a "continual watch" to spot preparations for conflict. East-West tension had been escalating after the shootdown of **KAL 007** in August and the Politburo had been unnerved by President Ronald Reagan's recent rhetoric and the annual **ABLE ARCHER** exercises in the Norwegian Sea when more than 80 NATO warships had sailed north through the Greenland-Iceland-Faroes Gap undetected. When **ABLE ARCHER** began, on November 2, the Soviet chief of the general staff, Marshal **Nikolai Ogarkov**, moved into his underground command bunker. Supposedly, the "war scare" reached such a pitch that nuclear-capable Su-24 *Fencer* strike regiments in East Germany and Poland had been placed at action stations.

Gordievsky's version of events was backed by documents he removed from the *rezidentura*, among them this directive from Moscow dated February 1983;

No 373/PR/52 Top Secret

Copy No 1

Attachment 2 *The Problem of Discovering Preparation for a Nuclear Missile Attack on the USSR*

Uncovering the process of preparation by the adversary to take the decision for a nuclear attack and the subsequent measures to prepare the country for a nuclear war would enable us to increase the so-called period of anticipation essential for the Soviet Union to take retaliatory measures. Otherwise, reprisal time would be extremely limited. For instance, noting the launching of strategic missiles from the continental part of the USA and taking into account the time required for determining the direction of their flight in fact leaves roughly 20 minutes' reaction time. This period will be considerably curtailed after deployment of the "Pershing-2" missile in the FRG, for which the flying time to reach long-range targets in the Soviet Union is calculated at 4-6 minutes.

Another message, addressed to the *resident*, Arkadi Guk Alias "Yermakov," explained what was required:

No. 373/PR/52 17.02.83 Top Secret

Copy No 1

London

(strictly personal)

Permanent Operational Assignment to Uncover NATO Preparations for a Nuclear Missile Attack on the USSR

In view of the growing urgency of the task of discovering promptly any preparations by the adversary for a nuclear-missile attack (RYAN) on the USSR, we are sending you a permanently operative assignment (POA) and briefing on this question.

The objective of the assignment is to see that the *rezidentura* works systematically to uncover any plans in preparation by the main adversary for RYAN and to organize a continual watch to be kept for indications of a decision being taken to use nuclear weapons against the USSR or immediate preparations being made for a nuclear-missile attack. Carrying out this assignment is only one aspect, albeit an extremely important one, of the *rezidentura's* activity in connection with matters of military strategy. Work in this sector must be carried on side by side with the other tasks previously set for obtaining information on military strategy.

As information is obtained on the question of RYAN, the centre proposes to supplement and clarify the permanent assignment indexed I-VN accordingly.

Information obtained by the *rezidentura* relating to the assignments in sections I and II (immediate and future tasks) is to be sent to the centre, indexed I-VN which will provide for distribution of telegraphic information as marked to: heads of service, subsections, information and see that information by bag is transmitted without fail to the information service. In order to specify the line of the official by whom the information was obtained, additional letters (PR, KR, X, and so on) may be shown after the letters I-VN.

The POA (Attachment No 1) must be studied by all operational staff of the *rezidentura*. Specific suggestions and ideas evolved by the *Rezidentura* with a view to carrying out this assignment as efficiently as possible should reach the center by March 31, 1983.

At the *rezidentura* the POA must always be kept in the *rezident's* special file.

Reference no: 373/PR/52 Top Secret Copy No. 1 Attachment 1

POA to discover NATO Preparations for a Nuclear Attack on the USSR
Section 1 - Immediate tasks **of Residencies** - for Collecting **Information** and Organizing their Work

1. Collect data about places where government officials and members of their families are evacuated. Identify possible routes and methods of evacuation. Make suggestions about ways of organizing a watch to be kept on preparation and actual evacuation, Time limit: 3rd quarter [by 30 September 1983]
2. Identify the location of specially equipped Civil Defense shelters or premises which could if necessary be used as shelters (underground garages and depots, basements, tunnels) and arrange for a periodical check on their state of preparedness to accommodate the population at a particular time.

Time limit: 3rd quarter [by 30 September 1983]

Report to center immediately if shelters are being taken out of storage or a start is being made on preparing certain premises for accommodation of the population.

3. One important sign that preparations are beginning for RYAN could be increased purchases of blood, from donors and the prices paid for it and extension of the network of reception centers, since the treatment of bums (the most widespread injury in a nuclear explosion) requires blood transfusions in very considerable quantity. In this context, discover the location of several blood donor reception centers, and find out how they operate and the price of the blood donated, and record any changes.

Time limit: 2nd quarter [by 30 June 1983] If there is an unexpectedly sharp increase in the number of stationary and mobile blood donor centers and in the prices paid, report at once to the centre.

4. Put forward proposals for organizing a watch on individual civil defense installations, Time limit: 2nd quarter [by 30 June 1983]
5. Identify several places which are most frequently visited outside working hours by employees of institutions and installations connected with taking and implementing decisions regarding RYAN, including military personnel. Put forward your views about the possibility of regular observation of the places selected Time limit: 2nd quarter [by 30 June 1981]
6. Keep under regular observation the most important government institutions, headquarters and other installations involved in preparation for RYAN. Send a list of immediate targets of observation to the centre. Ascertain the “normal level of activity” of these targets in and out of working hours, that is, the outward signs of their daily activity in a normal situation (differences in the number of cars collected there in the daytime and the evening, and in the number of lighted windows in and out of working hours, and activity round these targets on non-working days). Find out on the basis of the “normal level” ascertained any changes in the indicators during special conferences, when there is a crisis situation (cars collected there out of hours, an increase in the number of lighted windows at night in comparison with the “normal level,” or increased activity on non-working days).
7. Set a regular watch for any significant changes in the police administration system and the activity of the special [i.e., security and intelligence] services in regard to Soviet citizens and institutions, which may be associated with preparation for RYAN.

On points 6 and 7 inform centre of the existence or absence of any changes of this kind regularly, once every two weeks.

Section II - Principal Prospective Directions for the *Rezidentura* to Pursue its Work of Collecting the Information Needed to Discover the Adversary's Preparations for RYAN

1. Detailed description of the nature of measures being carried out in your country of residence by NATO headquarters and agencies, American representations and military installations located there at a time of immediate preparation by the USA and NATO for RYAN.
2. Analysis of the possibility of co-opting existing agents to work on uncovering preparation for RYAN and of using all available resources for this purpose.

3. Identifying and studying with a view to subsequent co-option for collaboration, a cadre of people associated with preparing and implementing the decision about RYAN, and also a group of people, including service and technical personnel, who might be informed of the fact that this or that measure is being taken in preparation for RYAN, even if they do not know its objective of: purport (the official chauffeurs of individuals involved in the decision about RYAN, those working in the operating services of installations connected with processing and implementing the decision about RYAN, and communications staff involved in the operation and interaction of these installations).
4. Studying the possibilities of organizing systematic observation of persons associated with faking the decision about RYAN and those who might be informed of the preparation of such a decision.
5. Uncovering the lines of communication used for preparing for RYAN, their terminal points, switchboards and system of operating in normal conditions and in an emergency situation, technical characteristics and the possibility of interception.
6. Assessment of opportunities for keeping watch for changes in the pattern of operation of government institutions which are involved in taking political decisions regarding RYAN and are responsible for the country's military preparedness and for contacts with NATO allies.
7. Collecting data about plans, for preparing the special [intelligence and security] services for a particular time and for possible action at that time. Studying facilities for organizing a systematic watch to be kept for changes in the operating routine of the central establishments of the special services.
8. Identifying the places where the country's leading military and political figures, and state institutions, including personnel from, the central apparatus of the special services, are to be evacuated.
9. Identifying possible routes and methods of evacuating military and political leaders and state institutions. Studying the possibilities of discovering promptly when evacuation is in progress,
10. Gathering data about the location of control centers and headquarters of civil defense forces, shelters, depots, and training posts of the civil defense system. Assessment of the possibilities of discovering immediate preparation of the civil defense system for war.
11. Defining the possibility of finding out with present resources, what measures are being taken to bring military installations, which are accessible to our observation into a state of heightened operational preparedness. Collecting information, about the main residential and recreational centers of the services, hospitals and other installations closely connected with military bases and headquarters.

12. Assessing the degree of likelihood that the heads of national churches and of international church organizations, and the leadership and institutions of the Vatican abroad would be aware of preparation for a nuclear attack and clarifying possibilities of obtaining information about RYAN from these circles.
13. Bearing in mind the very considerable knowledge possessed by the heads of international and the larger national banks, examine the possibility of obtaining information about RYAN from such circles.

The Residency must organize its work in a planned manner on the questions which have been enumerated. Please keep the Centre regularly informed as information is obtained.

No, 374/P1/5

Reference No 373/PR/52 Top Secret

Copy No, 1 Attachment 2

The Problem of Discovering Preparation for a Nuclear-Missile Attack on the USSR

In view of the way in which the main adversary (the USA, NATO, the PRC) has stepped up the tempo and scale of military preparations, the need to deal with the central assignment of the KGB's FI service at the present stage—not to overlook the immediate threat of a nuclear attack (RYAN), on the Soviet Union—has acquired a special degree of urgency.

This task lies at the core of military strategy. It was emphasized in the instructions from the heads of the chief Directorate that in contemporary conditions the need to discover specific plans and actions by our adversary connected with his preparation for a surprise nuclear-missile attack on the USSR and other socialist countries is now of particularly great importance. In this context, the primary task is to obtain reliable documentary and other advance information about all aspects and details of military, political, and strategic activity of the main adversary, revealing his secret preparations for war.

The instruction defines in practice the main ways of dealing with our chief task, that is, the need to uncover the adversary's plans and the measures he is taking in preparation for a nuclear-missile attack, above all by exploiting and expanding agent access: to the adversary's installations where secret information about military strategy is concentrated.

Information about strategic and operational plans to use nuclear weapons in war with the Soviet Union is of most serious and urgent significance for discovering the adversary's plans promptly for RYAN. This would include, for instance, such documents as the Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP, of the USA for waging a nuclear war, the "General Defense Plans" of the NATO strategic and subordinate joint commands. NATO's "Nuclear Support Plans - Supplan" and a number of NATO 'Contingency Operations

Plans, or COP,' which anticipate deploying and utilizing various types of forces and arms of service in operations zones in periods of tension or crises and at various stages of war, including nuclear components of these forces.

The intelligence value of the adversary's plans lies in the fact that it enables us to get clear, well in advance the picture of his possible military operations against the USSR and other countries of the socialist community and his preparations for a nuclear-missile strike.

An important element of the adversary's preparation for RYAN is specific action to bring the armed forces and the civilian sector from a peacetime on to a wartime footing, which is seen in implementation of measures which were planned in advance and subsequently ratified. At the stage when the measures are implemented, the most important section of which comes into effect after the adversary has taken the political decision. In principle to go to war, he begins to step up his activity in both military and civilian sectors. Notwithstanding the fact that in order to make sure of a sudden attack, the adversary counts on maintaining secrecy about his preparatory measures, the scale of activity involved in bringing military and civilian sectors from a peacetime on to a wartime, footing entails the appearance of a whole series of revealing signs regarding the nature of the adversary's procedure.

Therefore, one of the chief directions for the activity of the KGB's foreign service is to organize detection and assessment of signs of preparation for RYAN in all possible areas, that is, political, economic and military sectors, civil defense and the activity of the special services.

Our military neighbors [the GRU] are actively engaged in similar work in relation to the activity of the adversary's armed forces. However, the fact that the adversary maintains a considerable part of his strategic forces in a state of operational readiness, capable of proceeding to execute military assignments in the shortest possible time (for instance, all American land-based inter-continental missiles, 70 percent of their naval nuclear facilities and 30 percent of the strategic Air Force are on duty, and in NATO, about 20 percent of nuclear-missile facilities are detailed as duty forces) makes it essential to discover signs of preparation for RYAN at a very early stage, before the order is given to the troops to use nuclear weapons.

Uncovering the process of preparation by the adversary to take the decision for a nuclear attack and the subsequent measures to prepare the country for a nuclear war would enable us to increase the so-called period of anticipation essential for the Soviet Union to take retaliatory measures. Otherwise, reprisal time would be extremely limited. For instance, noting the launching of strategic missiles from the continental part of the United States and taking into account the time required for determining the direction of their flight in fact, leaves roughly 20 minutes reaction time. This period will be considerably curtailed after deployment of the Pershing-2 missile in the FRG,

for which the flying time to reach long-range targets in the Soviet Union is calculated, 4–6 minutes.

Immediate preparation

It is thus fully evident that the problem of uncovering the threat of RYAN must be dealt with without delay, or a nuclear attack begins at the moment, when the other side's political leadership reaches the conclusion that it is expedient to use military force as the international situation becomes progressively more acute, and takes a preliminary decision to launch an attack.

Immediate preparation for a nuclear attack begins at the moment when the other side's political leadership reaches the conclusion that it is expedient to use military force as the international situation becomes progressively more acute and takes a preliminary decision to launch an attack on the Soviet Union.

Analysis of NATO's ideas on military strategy and the organizational procedures adopted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, point to the fact that so-called nuclear consultations in NATO are probably one of the stages of immediate preparation by the adversary for RYAN :

To ascertain in good time the moment when nuclear consultations, begin inside NATO is a most important problem for the information-gathering apparatus of Soviet intelligence, together with discovering the specific plans for RYAN of the individual powers constituting the main adversary and, in the first place, the United States.

Nuclear consultations begin after the NATO agencies (the Planning Council/Committee) have received notification from nuclear power belonging to the grouping, of the intention to use nuclear weapons, or a request from a non-nuclear country in NATO or one of the main commands of the Bloc (Supreme Command of NATO forces in Europe, Supreme Command of NATO forces in the Atlantic or the NATO Command in the Channel) for the use of nuclear weapons. The aim of these consultations is to convey to the nuclear powers concerned, the views of the other members of the Bloc on the questions of launching a nuclear attack, so that it should take them into account before taking its NATO attaches great importance to beginning nuclear consultations at the earliest possible stage of a political crisis in East–West relations which is threatening, to develop into armed conflict.

The forum for consultations, including nuclear ones, would be a meeting of the NATO Council/Defense Planning Committee at the level of permanent representatives of the member countries of the Bloc at its headquarters in Evere (at suburb of Brussels) with the rank of ambassador. Joint meetings may also be called of the Council/Defense Planning Committee and the Military Committee of NATO, attended by military representatives of the member countries of the Bloc.

The alert system serves to ensure military preparedness and provide for the transition of NATO armed forces and the civilian sector from a peacetime to a wartime footing, embracing a series of measures in military and civilian areas which must be implemented according to the degree of world tension and threat of the outbreak of war.

NATO's alert system consists of three mutually dependent and complementary components:

- A state of "military alert" (preparatory measures of a military nature)
- a battle alarm system (an emergency "system of military measures to forestall and break up a possible attack")
- an official alarm system (for putting on a war footing not only the armed forces but also the NATO countries as a whole).

The state of "military alert" includes preparatory and preliminary measures of a military nature which may be implemented over a considerable period of time. It is designed to simplify the transition to a higher degree of preparedness and need not entail aggravation of international tension, since the corresponding measures must be carried out in maximum secrecy. A state of military alert and the corresponding measures which form part of it are not in themselves indications of preparation for RYAN but are largely a reaction to the beginning of complications in the international situation and are countermanded when there is an improvement in this situation. At the same time, it is essential to discover what measures have been taken under the "military alert" in order not to miss the moment of transition to a higher degree of readiness, constituting a threat of RYAN.

The battle alarm system series of purely military measures was implemented within an extremely short time in order to withdraw NATO armed forces from being under attack and maintain their fighting: efficiency for action to carry out a surprise or retaliatory attack. This system comes into operation when owing to increasingly complicated circumstances, measures cannot be implemented as part of the official alert system, and the "enemy attack has already begun: or may begin in the immediate future. It determines the order in which specific measures come into operation after receiving the warning signal of a possible attack."

The battle alarm system envisages two states of readiness for action: an "Orange" alert and a "Scarlet" alert.

"State Orange" is declared when an attack may be expected in the immediate future (within 36 hours) and "State Scarlet" when military action has already begun or is expected to do so within minutes. When this alarm system has been introduced, the Supreme Command and the national authorities

must undertake a series of operations under the official alert system, particularly if there is time to implement civil defense measures.

In view of the fact that the measures involved in “State Orange” have to be carried out with, the utmost secrecy (under the guise of maneuvers, training, etc.) in the shortest possible time, without disclosing the content of operational plans, it is highly probable that the battle alarm system may be used to prepare a surprise RYAN in peacetime.

Following on from this, it appears that the discovery that steps are being taken under a military alarm system, and there is a corresponding state of readiness for action in NATO armed forces, many in combination with a number of other factors pointing to the conclusion that RYAN is in preparation.

The official alert system embraces a series of civil and military measures aimed at switching the armed forces and the NATO member countries as a whole from a peacetime to a war footing and affects all potential fields of preparation for a nuclear attack—military, political, economic, civil defense, special service activity. The official system consists of three states:

Simple alert which is introduced in the initial stage of deterioration in the international situation, but there is no “immediate threat of attack” in the very near future. The steps taken under a simple alert are aimed at ensuring that the NATO armed forces are ready for action, in order that, if necessary measures can be speeded up under a heightened alert and preparation completed to engage without delay in military operations. At this stage, immediate preparation begins to switch the civilian sector to a war footing. Discovery of this stage represents an extremely serious development from the point of view of early warning of immediate preparation for RYAN. The measures taken at this stage are kept secret but their scale and gravity enable signs of their implementation to be detected; Minimum attention must be devoted to ascertaining in good time that a state of simple alert has been introduced.

A heightened alert is declared in order to ensure that the NATO armed forces are in a state of maximum readiness and fully deployed in accordance with operational plans. At this stage, there is a large-scale operation to put the country on a war footing and such measures can no longer be concealed. They will clearly indicate preparation for military operations. If the heightened alert is not called off and is followed by proclamation of a general alert, then this will indicate the commencement of military action. It is a matter of particularly grave significance that a general alert may be declared without previously introducing the first and second stages of the official alert system in the period when states “Orange” and “Scarlet” are in operation.

The NATO alert system thus envisages measures to put not only measures to the armed forces but the country as a whole on a war footing. Opportune discovery of signs indicating implementation of a series of such measures,

especially in conjunction with nuclear consultations, provides grounds for giving the centre early warning of the possibility of RYAN.

The United States has its own system of military preparations, for switching the American armed forces to a wartime footing. This system may be used by U.S. armed forces deployed in NATO countries. It consists of five stages, any of which may be introduced, according to the actual situation. It is also possible to switch the armed forces urgently to a heightened state of readiness, bypassing the intermediate ones.

Operational readiness No 5 is the normal state of the armed forces in peacetime conditions.

Operational readiness No 4 may be introduced *if there is tension in certain parts of the world*. Intelligence and counterintelligence *operations may be stepped up*, with *preparation* for combating possible sabotage. All *measures are carried out in secret*, with no cancelation of leave for *personnel*. Operational readiness No 3 is declared *if tension in a particular part of the world may affect American interests and requires intervention by U.S. armed forces*. A specially detailed contingent of the armed forces is put into this state of readiness. Secret measures are carried out (in the guise of training and maneuvers) to reinforce protection of installations and prepare military equipment and weapons for possible use, and intelligence and counterintelligence *is stepped up*. Personnel are allowed leave or passes at the decision of *the command*.

This stage of readiness corresponds to that of “military alert” in NATO’s alert system.

Operational readiness No 2 is introduced *when a threat of conflict develops which seriously affects the interests of the United States or its allies*. The emerging situation is fraught with possibilities of military action. Operational deployment of selected contingents of *armed forces* begins. Arms and military equipment are put in *a state of wartime readiness*. *Controls are* instituted over the *activity* of the civilian authorities, shipping and airlines. Censorship is *introduced with* safeguards for security of communications, and leave is canceled.

This stage of readiness corresponds in general to that of *simple alert* in NATO’s official system, *including also a number of elements of a heightened alert*.

Operational readiness No 1 is declared when there are obvious indications of preparation to begin military operations. It is considered that war is inevitable and may start at any moment. The armed forces are put into a state of complete preparedness for military action to execute operational plans. All activity of civilian agencies and undertakings is subordinated to military interests.

This stage of readiness corresponds in general to the “Stage Orange” and a heightened alert in NATO’s alarm system, with elements of the State “Scarlet” and the general alert. It immediately precedes the proclamation of a state of military emergency (in the USA), or the “State Scarlet” or a general alert (in NATO), signifying the start of military action.

Combat readiness is stepped up on instructions from the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff and also on orders from the commanders-in-chief of the U.S. armed forces in the zones (theaters of military operations) with the agreement of the Committee. The signals for introducing the corresponding degree of readiness are transmitted on the Committee’s instructions: through the main and reserve, command centers and control points of the armed forces.

When a state of heightened readiness is introduced in the U.S. armed forces or the alert system comes into operation in NATO this must be accompanied also by a series of measures in the civilian sector of the United States to ensure that the country is put on to a war footing and the number of victims of a retaliatory attack is kept down.

One of the important means of safeguarding the process of preparing the decision to use nuclear weapons and controlling their use is provided by the various systems of communications; communications networks of the nuclear powers and NATO’s combined systems of communication.

From a functional point of view, the adversary’s existing communications systems can be divided into general and military systems. However, irrespective of the distinctions laid down for the channels allocated, their subordination, the degree of secrecy and the specified subscribers, both types of communications are used for nuclear consultations.

Intelligence work carried out against the main communications agencies could make it possible to discover the adversary: overall plans for preparation for war. If information is obtained promptly about the activity of executive agencies at headquarters level in carrying out these plans, this may serve as an indication of enhanced readiness on the adversary’s part for military action.

Any instructions which are discovered about rules for using the communication networks and their method of operating are also of practical significance.

In an emergency situation, and when military exercises are taking place, operation of lines of communication may be switched to the “minimize” system, in which the volume of ordinary telephone calls and telegraphic messages is sharply curtailed and channels of communication cleared for transmitting urgent messages.

The “minimized” system may be introduced selectively in certain countries, for example, if there is deterioration in their internal situation or it may apply to U.S. and NATO communications systems. If this system is instituted

in countries which have nuclear weapons, especially if it is on a global scale, it may provide a serious warning signal that the adversary is preparing for RYAN. The fact that “minimize” had been introduced could only be discovered by means of intercepted facilities.

It is of the highest importance to keep a watch on the functioning of communications networks and systems since through them information is passed about the adversary’s intentions and above all, about his plans to use nuclear weapons and practical implementation of these. In addition, changes in the method of operating communications systems and the level of manning may in themselves indicate the start of preparation for RYAN.

Information must be obtained about the organization, location, and functioning mechanism of all forms of communications which are allocated by the adversary for controlling the process of preparing and waging a nuclear war.

No 6282/PR/52

With pressure mounting, Gordievsky warned his SIS contacts that the situation was becoming dangerous, and this was a message supposedly conveyed to President Reagan by Mrs. Thatcher in a bid to have him tone down what the Kremlin apparently perceived as the White House’s belligerency.

On November 8 or 9, 1983, Gordievsky saw a top priority cable from Moscow suggesting that a general mobilization was underway at American airbases, and this marked the apotheosis of the crisis. The assertion was unfounded, and thereafter there was a thaw in relations.

In May the following year, the **Central Intelligence Agency** was commissioned to study what had really happened, and a noted analyst, Fritz Ermarth drafted a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), *Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities*, dated May 18, 1984. In the “Key Judgments,” Ermarth observed:

During the past several months, a number of coincident Soviet activities have created concern that they reflect abnormal Soviet fear of conflict with the United States, belligerent intent that might risk conflict, or some other underlying Soviet purpose. These activities have included large-scale military exercises (among them a major naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, unprecedented SS-20 launch activity, and large-scale SSBN dispersal); preparations for air operations against Afghanistan; attempts to change the air corridor regime in Berlin; and shrill propaganda attributing a heightened danger of war to U.S. behavior.

Examining these developments in terms of several hypotheses, we reach the following conclusions:

We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States. This judgment is based on the absence of

forcewide combat readiness or other war preparation moves in the USSR, and the absence of a tone of fear or belligerence in Soviet diplomatic communications, although the latter remain uncompromising on many issues. There have been instances where the Soviets appear to have avoided belligerent propaganda or actions. Recent Soviet “war scare” propaganda, of declining intensity over the period examined, is aimed primarily at discrediting U.S. policies and mobilizing “peace” pressures among various audiences abroad. This war scare propaganda has reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated through other channels such as human sources. We do not believe it reflects authentic leadership fears of imminent conflict. We do not believe that Soviet war talk and other actions “mask” Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR, although they have an incentive to take initiatives that discredit U.S. policies even at some risk. Were the Soviets preparing an initiative they believed carried a real risk of military confrontation with the United States, we would see preparatory signs which the Soviets could not mask.

Soviet actions examined are influenced to some extent by Soviet perceptions of a mounting challenge from U.S. foreign and defense policy. However, these activities do not all fit into an integrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics.

Each Soviet action has its own military or political purpose sufficient to explain it. Soviet military exercises are designed to meet long-term requirements for force development and training which become ever more complex with the growth of Soviet military capabilities.

In specific cases, Soviet military exercises are probably intended to have the ancillary effect of signaling Soviet power and resolve to some audience. For instance, maneuvers in the Tonkin Gulf were aimed at backing Vietnam against China; Soviet airpower use in Afghanistan could have been partly aimed at intimidating Pakistan; and Soviet action on Berlin has the effect of reminding the West of its vulnerable access but very low-key Soviet handling has muted this effect.

Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intention of speaking with a louder voice and showing firmness through a controlled display of military muscle. The apprehensive outlook we believe the Soviet leadership has toward the longer-term U.S. arms build-up could in the future increase its willingness to consider actions—even at some heightened risk—that recapture the initiative and neutralize the challenge posed by the United States.

These judgments are tempered by some uncertainty as to current Soviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continued uncertainty about Politburo decision-making processes and by our inability at this point to

conduct a detailed examination of how the Soviets might have assessed recent U.S./NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade.

Ermarth was later accused, in a paper entitled *The Soviet War Scare* and prepared by Nina J. Stewart, the acting executive director of the president's FI Advisory Board, of complacency but, as he had pointed out in the SNIE, there was never any evidence that the military either received, or acted upon, faulty KGB reporting.

S

SALLE, CHARLES DE LA. Born in 1914 in Soulac sur Mer, de la Salle graduated from the St Cyr military academy and was posted to the 121st Infantry Regiment in September 1938 but transferred to Air Force and in September 1940 was assigned to the 1/8 Groupe de Chasse. He was demobilized in November 1942 and joined a resistance network in May 1943 operating in the area around Toulouse. In November 1943, he crossed into Spain and made his way to Casablanca where he volunteered to join the Normandie-Niemen, a Free French unit fighting with the Red Army on the Eastern Front. Promoted to command the 3rd Squadron Cherbourg he returned to Paris in June 1945 in his Yak-3 fighter. Between 1947 and 1949, he flew with the 3rd Fighter Wing in Indo-China and in May 1954 was placed in command of the airbase at Romilly-sur-Seine. He was transferred to the Air Defense Command at Versailles in 1956 and later served in various Allied posts in Metz and Ramstein. He was injured in an air accident in March 1961 and was moved to staff duties at Fontainebleau in October 1963 but was suspended on leave in August 1965. He committed suicide by jumping out of a window at his home in Ivry-sur-Seine in August 1969, just as he was being arrested by the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire.

During his period at Fontainebleau, de la Salle passed classified information to his GRU contact, the naval attaché Viktor Lyubimov, having been recruited by a Romanian intelligence officer, Ion Iacobescu in 1965. When Iacobescu defected in 1969 he identified de la Salle as a source codenamed MURAT he had passed on to the GRU.

SATELLITES. The loss of F. Gary Powers' U-2 over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960, threatened to close down a valuable source of photographic and electronic intelligence, but the U.S. intelligence community moved almost seamlessly to reliance on an entirely new source, the CORONA satellite system which from August 1960 was controlled by the U.S. **National Reconnaissance Office**. The imagery collected by CORONA, distributed as KEYHOLE provided an invaluable insight into the Soviet order-of-battle, deployment, and missile strengths.

Broadly, satellite intelligence collection systems harvest imagery and communications, and the U.S. invested heavily in the technology, especially when Admiral Stansfield Turner was the director of Central Intelligence during the period between 1977 and 1981. Having lost confidence in **HUMINT**, he opted to develop advanced real-time downlinked high-resolution imagery to meet current Cold War intelligence requirements. To ensure 24-hour, world-wide coverage, ground stations were constructed in the other “Five-Eyes” countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and United Kingdom) and the product shared in return for the real estate. The resulting network provided an unprecedented global capability, unmatched by anything available to the Warsaw Pact.

Kosmos 1, the first Soviet intelligence satellite, was launched in March 1962 with a low-altitude photo-reconnaissance mission with a duration of up to three weeks. Throughout the Cold War an average of three intelligence *Kosmos* launches were undertaken, but the technology adopted required film canisters to be ejected and then recovered, a somewhat primitive procedure long abandoned by the West. Concealed within the *Kosmos* program was a military satellite, *Zenit*, which were placed into short-term orbits of up to 15 days from the Baikonur Cosmodrome. *Zenit* collected imagery and radar signals, and remained operational until 1970 when it was replaced by the *Zenit 4M*, equipped with an improved camera. The final generation was the *Zenit 8*, introduced in 1984 for mapping.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT). As a direct legacy of what had been accomplished during World War II, with both the Allies and the Axis relying heavily on signals intelligence, they entered to Cold War with a heavy bias toward the collection and analysis of communications, in preference to **HUMINT**. The British and American intelligence communities had come to rely on cryptographic sources, having achieved great success with solving the enemy’s wireless traffic encrypted with the Enigma and Geheimschreiber machines, and been broken the German Foreign Ministry’s one-time pad (OTP) system, codenamed FLORDORA and some of its derivatives.

In 1943, work had begun on Soviet cable traffic, initially codenamed BRIDE, and later VENONA, and the task was shared between Government Communications Headquarters, based at Eastcote, and the Army Security Agency (ASA) at Arlington Hall. This project would continue until 1979 and provide valuable counterintelligence leads, compromising hundreds of NKVD and GRU staff and their assets. However, the source dried up on “Black Friday” in June 1948 when the Soviets introduced a new cipher system, having been tipped off to the compromise by a Russian-born ASA linguist, William Weisband. Although the NKVD was warned about the exploitation of a flaw

in the encryption procedures by Weisband, and again by Kim Philby in September 1949 when he was indoctrinated into the program just before he was posted to Washington, D.C., the Soviets failed to act quickly. It took a long time to withdraw the compromised OTPs and distribute a new system, and the changeover happened over a period and did not occur on a single date, as suggested by “Black Friday,” October 29, 1948. Although the supply of new traffic ceased, the ASA’s successor organization, Armed Forces Security Agency and GCHQ were able to recover substantial quantities of encrypted Soviet cable traffic dating back to March 1940. Accordingly, the Soviets were powerless to prevent study of the received 2,900 messages which, though only a tiny fraction of the total number of telegrams exchanged with Moscow, inflicted great damage on the NKVD and GRU.

Though gradual in its effect, Black Friday caused consternation at ASA and GCHQ, especially when in November 1948, GCHQ drew attention to the dramatically improved security procedures adopted by the Soviets. GCHQ offered four possibilities: (1) preparation for war; (2) methodical drive to improve communication security; (3) temporary pulling off the air to remedy defects; and (4) reaction to a leak. GCHQ ruled out the first possibility but could not confirm or deny the last three.

Nobody was sure what had prompted the changes, and while ASA suspected a leak, the naval component thought it more likely that the improvements were probably nothing more sinister than a natural development. At a conference held on January 2, 1949, the Committee on Security advised that during 1948 the Russians adopted various successive communication security measures that for reasons which cannot be positively determined but which could have resulted from leakages information [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

By April 1949, when the impact was undeniable, with entire Soviet military systems closed down entirely, GCHQ recommended a total separation of Russian operations, noting that added security would be obtained by the “complete separation of work on Non-Russian from that on Russian,” excluding the early stages of intercept, intercept control, and traffic handling, but incorporating “all phases of traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, translation, publication, evaluation, distribution, dissemination, intelligence appreciation within both the processing and consumer agencies, and exchange of information between the technical agencies.” Some of the suspended systems would later re-emerge in 1952, but experience had been chilling for the SIGINT professionals who were only too aware of their role as a trip-wire to give early warning or mobilization or unusual activity.

In parallel with BRIDE, the U.S. Army Security Agency had attacked all types of Soviet traffic in a program codenamed **BOURBON** which took advantage of captured German wartime equipment. For three years,

this source, and the associated traffic analysis, provided a comprehensive order-of-battle for the Red Army and acted as a trip-wire to alert the Western powers to unexpected deployments. When BOURBON was terminated, which was not unexpected as the Soviets improved their communications infrastructure, Western intelligence agencies were obliged to look elsewhere for new sources, and this led to investment in overhead reconnaissance and what became the **Berlin Tunnel**.

As a generally reliable source of information, as demonstrated during World War II, SIGINT became the foundation of Western intelligence collection and considerable investment was devoted to collection, including the deployment of airborne and naval platforms, covert ground stations and eventually **satellites**.

In contrast to the massive commitment made in SIGINT collection and analysis by the west, the Soviet SIGINT program, conducted by what became the KGB's 16th Department of the FCD, lacked the same scale of investment but nevertheless was taken very seriously by its western counterparts, although there was never much evidence of any particular success. In 1947, Op:20:G warned:

It would appear that the Russians are probably able to read certain [American] Hagelin traffic, uninterrupted-strip-cipher traffic, and a large part of code-book traffic. . . . These conclusions are based on the premise that: (a) the Russians are at least as good as the Germans [who apparently were reading such American communications] and (b) that the Russians in their invasion of Germany obtained much the same information about the enemy's communication intelligence efforts that we secured when we invaded Germany.

Relatively little is known of the 16th Department apart from the details provided by Victor Sheymov who defected in 1980 and was exfiltrated from the Soviet Union with the help of the **Central Intelligence Agency**. Sheymov's own career had been in the FCD's 8th Department, responsible since its creation in 1953 for cryptography and the KGB's internal communications. The 8th Department, known as the *vos'myorka*, had been headed first by Seraphim Lyalin and then by Nikolai Yemokhonov until 1971 when he was succeeded by General G.A. Usikov who oversaw a re-organization and the establishment of a 16th Department under the veteran cryptanalyst Nikolai Andreyev to develop foreign intercept operations, leaving the 8th Department restricted to the field of communications security. Originally manned by some 80 "Line RP" *radioperekhvat* staff, the 16th Department deployed operators to overseas *rezidenturas* and manage ZENIT tactical intercept facilities. These monitoring stations, codenamed IMPULSE, maintained a watch on local hostile security agencies in a support function for the *rezidentura*'s operations but initially did not engage in large-scale SIGINT collection until

suitable microwave intercept equipment was installed in Washington, and in the consulate-general premises in New York and Los Angeles. The success of this unit may be judged by the KGB's annual report in August 1967 which listed 168 systems in 72 capitalist countries that had been solved by Soviet cryptographers. The CIA would later estimate that the 16th Department grew to some 2,000 personnel, partly to handle agents with cryptographic access. Some human sources, such as the U.S. Navy spy **John Walker** and GCHQ's Geoffrey Prime, were managed by 16th Department case officers who were compartmented from the rest of the FCD and, in the *rezidenturas*, acted with an unusual latitude, but their separation provided an added level of security. Internal security within the 16th Department, located Samotechnaya 9, was tight and effective, as demonstrated by the fact that neither Walker nor Prime was betrayed by FCD leaks or defectors. During the Cold War the only 16th Department defector was Viktor Makarov who was released in 1987 after 10 years in the Perm-35 prison camp on a charge of having passed information to the British Secret Intelligence Service. Makarov subsequently was resettled in England.

In August 1975, General Usikov was replaced at the 8th Department by General Andreyev, and Usikov's deputy, Igor V. Maslov, was promoted to run the 16th Department, a post he held until the end of the Cold War.

Soviet SIGINT collection expanded significantly when the GRU built some overseas sites, such as Lourdes in Cuba, codenamed TROSTNIK, and Taurus in Syria. The GRU's 6th Directorate headquarters at K-500, on Moscow's Volokolamskie Chaussee, was headed by Valentin Kudriashev who was succeeded by Vladimir Rogovoy.

The major Soviet investment in SIGINT was made by Naval GRU which became a vital component in Moscow's nuclear strategy. The only practical Soviet counter-measure to the threat posed by Polaris SLBMs was to maintain the closest possible surveillance on the NATO fleet, which required physical observation on the major nuclear-capable forward submarine bases at Holy Loch and Faslane in Scotland, Rota in Spain and Apra Harbor, Guam. Other vessels were stationed off Norfolk, Virginia; Groton, Connecticut; Charleston, South Carolina and Pearl Harbor. The means was the Red Banner Fleet's flotilla of AGIs trawlers which were deployed to monitor SLBM arrival and departures. They may not have been able to track individual NATO patrols, usually of 70-day duration, but the tactic gave an indication of how many submarines were at sea, and thereby defined the potential threat.

SOFT TOUCH. The first nine U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, flown from Lahore in Pakistan and authorized by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in May 1957, were codenamed SOFT TOUCH and was intended

to collect imagery of the railway system and likely ICBM test launch sites at Tyuratam, Kapustin Yar, and Saryshagan. Other approved targets for the photo-reconnaissance missions included facilities at Omsk, Novobirsk, Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk, and Semipalatinsk identified by the **DRAGON RETURN** interrogation program.

The U-2 development project, codenamed **AQUATONE**, had commenced in earnest in June 1956 when Carl Overstreet flew the aircraft into Polish airspace. This was followed on July 4 when Hervey Stockman who took a route over Moscow and Leningrad. The following day, Carmine Vito flew from Wiesbaden over Moscow.

In May 1956, the British prime minister Anthony Eden withdrew his permission for the U-2 to operate from RAF Lakenheath, having been embarrassed by the Buster Crabb episode the previous month when the diver disappeared while on a clandestine mission in Portsmouth Harbor, inspecting the hull of a Soviet warship.

SQUILLACOTE, THERESA. Aged 39, Theresa Squillacote was a retired Defense Department analyst when she was arrested in October 1997 and charged with having engaged in espionage for the East Germans for the previous two decades.

Born missing a leg and with a deformed hand, Terry Squillacote had been recruited by her husband, **Kurt Stand**,

STAND, KURT A. A trade union lawyer, married to **Theresa Squillacote** since 1980, Kurt Stand was recruited by the East Germans in 1972 and arrested by undercover FBI special agents in October 1997 while attempting to pass information to men they believed were South African intelligence officers. In 1976, Stand had recruited a friend, **James Clark**, who worked as a private detective, to join the spy-ring, but he later entered a plea agreement with the Department of Justice.

Stand had been indoctrinated into communism by his father, Maximilian, whose family fled Nazi Germany before the war. He was a chemical engineer who settled in the Bronx and served as a paratrooper in the U.S. Army during the war. In 1965, Stand had been sent to a youth camp in East Germany where, aged 9, he was converted into a Marxist zealot. In 1972, Stand was introduced by his father to Lothar Zierner, East German intelligence officer working for the HVA's Department XI. In 1976, he accompanied Clark, a fellow radical at the University of Wisconsin, Clark, to East Germany, where he was recruited by the HVA and was sent back to graduate school in the United States with instructions to become a mole inside the U.S. government.

In 1980, Stand recruited his wife, Terry Squillacote and in later years all three made some 30 trips abroad to meet with their HVA handlers who taught them camera tradecraft and communication skills employing a shortwave transceiver to receive messages from Cuba. They referred to their HVA controllers as FAMILY, the Berlin headquarters as TANTE, with Stand known as JUNIOR. According to the prosecution,

Squillacote and Stand also moved to Washington, D.C., and she went to law school at the HVA's suggestion. Squillacote first followed in her father's footsteps by becoming an attorney for the National Labor Relations Board. When she realized that she had taken a career path that was not "in the best direction," she began trying to "move [her] professional work more in line with the commitments that [she] had made." To that end, Squillacote used her father's connections to obtain an unprecedented temporary detail from the NLRB to the House Armed Services Committee. In 1991, Squillacote obtained a permanent job as an attorney in the Department of Defense, eventually becoming the director of Legislative Affairs in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform), a position that required a security clearance and provided access to valuable information. During her tenure with the federal government, Squillacote applied for numerous government jobs, including positions with the CIA, the NSA, United States Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Departments of State, Commerce, Energy, and Treasury. Apparently it was not until she began working for the Department of Defense that Squillacote gained access to the kind of information sought by her handlers.¹ However, by that time, East Germany had collapsed.

After the fall of the **Berlin Wall**, Ziemer began working with the KGB, the Soviet Union's intelligence agency. Ziemer maintained his relationships with Stand, Squillacote, and Clark during this time, and they, too, became involved with the KGB. Stand, Squillacote, and Clark each traveled overseas to meet with Ziemer during the period after the collapse of East Germany. Ziemer instructed the conspirators to purchase Casio digital diaries with interchangeable memory cards. The conspirators, Ziemer, and their KGB contacts communicated with each other by exchanging memory cards.

In April 1992, Ziemer and another former HVA official were arrested and ultimately convicted for their post-unification intelligence activities with the KGB. Stand, Squillacote, and Clark became understandably concerned about their personal safety after Ziemer's arrest. They knew that "western services" were looking for two men and one woman operating out of Washington, D.C., and that the western services were aware of code names they had used. However, they believed that Ziemer and other former HVA officials would not compromise their identities. When Ziemer was released from prison in September 1992, Stand, Squillacote, and Clark reestablished a system

of communication with him, one purpose of which was to keep everyone informed about any threats to their safety.

From the beginning of their involvement with the HVA, Stand, Squillacote, and Clark operated independently of each other and generally were unaware of the others' activities. After Ziemer's arrest in 1992, however, the three began talking in detail about their activities and precautions needed to maintain their security. They began discussing the possibility of future intelligence work, perhaps for Vietnam or Cuba. Squillacote also talked to Clark about her interest in South Africa's Communist Party.

In 1994, Squillacote, as part of her search for "another connection," went to Amsterdam to speak to David Truong, whom she had met in college. Truong, who had been convicted of espionage on behalf of North Vietnam, was intrigued but took no further action.

In 1995, Squillacote went to great lengths to obtain a post office box under the name of "Lisa Martin." In June 1995, Squillacote, as Lisa Martin, sent a letter to Ronnie Kasrils, the deputy defense minister of South Africa. Kasrils was a Communist Party official, and had received training in East Germany, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. The letter, which took Squillacote months to write, was primarily devoted to Squillacote's explanation for the collapse of socialism that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and her views on how the communist movement should proceed in the future. The letter was an attempt by Squillacote to make a connection with Kasrils, whom Squillacote hoped would "read between the lines." Stand and Clark were aware of the letter, but Clark apparently doubted its effectiveness.

In February 1996, Squillacote received a Christmas card from Kasrils addressed to L. Martin. In the card, Kasrils thanked "Lisa" for "the best letter" he had received in 1995. Stand and Squillacote were thrilled that they received the note, and they began to think that perhaps a connection could be made. In September 1996, Squillacote found another letter from Kasrils in her Lisa Martin post office box. The letter stated that "you may have the interest and vision to assist in our struggle" and invited Squillacote to a meeting in New York City with a representative of "our special components."

Squillacote and Stand, however, were unaware that, for many years, they had been the subjects of an intense FBI investigation. As part of its investigation, the FBI in January 1996 obtained authorization to conduct clandestine electronic surveillance, which included the monitoring of all conversations in the appellants' home, as well as calls made to and from their home and Squillacote's office. Through its investigation, the FBI had learned of Squillacote's letter to Kasrils and the appellants' response to the February 1996 note from Kasrils. The September 1996 Kasrils letter in fact was written by the FBI as

part of a “false flag” operation intended to uncover information about the prior espionage activities of Stand, Squillacote, and Clark.

When designing the false flag operation, the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Program Team prepared a report “to examine the personality of [Squillacote] . . . and based on this examination, to provide suggestions . . . that could be used in furthering the objective of this investigation—to obtain evidence regarding the subject’s espionage activity.” The report (the “BAP report”) was based on information the FBI had learned during its extensive investigation and surveillance of the appellants.

The BAP report traced Squillacote’s family background, including the suicide of her older sister and her mother’s history of depression. The report stated that Squillacote was suffering from depression and listed the antidepressant medications she was taking. The primary focus of the BAP report, however, was Squillacote’s emotional makeup and how to tailor the approach to her emotional characteristics.

The report described Squillacote as having “a cluster of personality characteristics often loosely referred to as ‘emotional and dramatic,’” J.A. 2060 and recommended taking advantage of Squillacote’s “emotional vulnerability” during her period of grieving over the then-recent end of her affair with Ziemer, using an undercover agent “who possesses the same qualities of dedication and professionalism as her last contact” and structuring the undercover agent’s “pitch” to mirror her relationship with Ziemer. The BAP report also made very specific recommendations about how the false flag operation should be designed:

The following scenario has been developed upon an analysis of the subject’s personality and includes suggestions designed to exploit her narcissistic and histrionic characteristics. It is believed that [Squillacote] will be susceptible to an approach through her mail drop based on her recent rejection by her long-term German handler, and her thrill at receiving a Christmas card from the South African official. The report suggested the use of a letter from “the object of [Squillacote’s] adulation in South Africa.” It recommended that the letter instructs Squillacote to travel a circuitous route to the location of the first meeting to “add a sense of excitement and intrigue to the scenario.” The report recommended the use of a mature male undercover agent, who should “capitalize on [Squillacote’s] fantasies and intrigue” by making a “friendly overture,” and “act [ing] professional and somewhat aloof yet responsive to her moods. The initial meet should be brief and leave [Squillacote] beguiled and craving more attention.”

The false flag letter received by Squillacote in September 1996 served its intended purpose. Unaware of any FBI involvement, Squillacote and Stand

were thrilled about the letter, and Squillacote began enthusiastically making plans for a trip to New York City to meet the South African emissary.

In October 1996, Squillacote met with an undercover FBI agent posing as a South African intelligence officer. She had face-to-face meetings with the agent a total of four times, including one meeting where she brought Stand and her two children. Several letters were also exchanged, including a letter that Squillacote wrote at the request of the undercover agent describing her previous activities with Ziemer. In these meetings and letters, Squillacote expressed her enthusiasm for her new South African connection and her hope for a productive collaboration.

Throughout her association with the undercover agent, Squillacote discussed the possibility of bringing Ziemer and other former East German contacts into the operation. In December 1996, she contacted Ziemer to see if he was interested in the operation. According to Squillacote, Ziemer's response was "[y]es, yes, yes, yes, yes!"

At the second meeting with the undercover agent on January 5, 1997, Squillacote presented the agent with four classified documents she had obtained from the Department of Defense. Although the agent had never requested any documents or classified information from Squillacote, she explained that one day when she and her secretary were alone in her office and she decided to "score what [she] could score." In fact, she had obtained one of the documents even before her first meeting with the undercover agent. The documents Squillacote gave to the undercover agent were: (1) "Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Year 1997 through 2001," a numbered document, classified "secret," with restricted dissemination; (2) "Defense Planning Guidance Scenario Appendix" for 1998 through 2003, a numbered document classified at the "secret" level, which forbade reproduction or further dissemination without authorization; (3) "Defense Planning Guidance, Fiscal Years 1996 through 2001, Final For Comment Draft," which was classified "secret," with restricted dissemination; and (4) an untitled CIA intelligence report classified "secret," with restricted dissemination. Three of the documents Squillacote gave to the undercover agent were copies; the "Scenario Appendix" was an original that Squillacote said would not be missed. These documents formed the basis of the charges against Squillacote and Stand.

Shortly after this meeting, Squillacote quit her job with the Department of Defense, a political maneuver she hoped would put her in position for a more prestigious job. Nonetheless, Squillacote continued meeting and corresponding with the undercover agent for several more months, until she and Stand were arrested in October 1997. A search of their home uncovered a wealth of incriminating evidence, including a miniature camera, a Casio digital diary and memory cards, and an extra copy of two of the documents given to the undercover agent.

Clark eventually pleaded guilty to a single charge of conspiring to commit espionage, and he testified for the government at the trial of Squillacote and Stand. At trial, the government introduced certain HVA records, including “true name” cards showing the names and addresses of Stand, Squillacote, and Clark, as well as documents listing some of their code names and the names of the operations to which they were assigned. The HVA records listed Squillacote as a “[d]evelopmental agent” whose target was the “U.S. central government” and described Squillacote as trustworthy. The records described Stand as reliable, and listed him as a “[s]ource with direct access,” with a target of “U.S. union/organization, direct/upper level, IBFG union, U.S.A.” Clark was listed as a “[s]ource with direct access,” whose activities were targeted against the “Defense Ministry NATO Country FRG USA.” The records also described Clark as reliable. Other than the four documents passed to the undercover agent, the government presented no evidence establishing that Squillacote or Stand had previously supplied classified documents or information to Ziemer or anyone else.

Squillacote and Stand were convicted of conspiracy to transmit information relating to the national defense, attempted transmission of national defense information, and obtaining national defense information. Squillacote was also convicted of making false statements.

In January 1999, Stand was sentenced to 17 years’ imprisonment.

STARWARS. On March 23, 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a plan for a ground- and space-based, laser-armed antiballistic missile system that, if deployed, would create a shield for U.S. land-based missiles. The proposal was instantly dubbed “Star Wars” by the media. As an innovation with profound strategic implications, SDI threatening to render the Soviet ICBM arsenal impotent, it became a priority target for intelligence collection.

STEALTH. The challenge of reducing the radar profiles of aircraft preoccupied Cold War airframe designers who recognized the desirability of burying jet engines, using absorbent materials, minimizing control surface size and deflection, and eliminating emissions. The objective was eventually achieved with the Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk fighter which flew first in 1981 and became operational two years later.

The U.S. Air Force’s commitment to develop aircraft with very low contour radar profiles had the potential to alter the balance of power at the latter end of the Cold War, as was explained by the **Central Intelligence Agency’s** Special National Intelligence Estimate dated August 1985 entitled *Soviet Ractions to Stealth*.

This SNIE is an effort to assess at the national level the Soviet capability and intention to respond to the U.S. challenge. It presents our evaluation both of the defensive methods and technologies we believe the Soviets will employ to counter the U.S. deployment of Stealth systems and of their technical capabilities to develop indigenous offensive low-signature and Stealth vehicles. The SNIE is restricted to discussing only aerodynamic and ballistic missile systems over a 10-year period. It also identifies collection and analytic gaps that must be filled in order for the Community to provide broader, more detailed studies in the future.

Soviet Counter-Stealth

The Soviets are well aware of U.S. plans to develop Stealth aerodynamic vehicles; nevertheless, we judge that their air defenses will remain vulnerable to penetration by Stealth aerodynamic systems for at least the next decade. This judgment is based on a number of factors that include:

- The limitations of existing Soviet sensors and information-processing systems, which were designed for use against high-signature vehicles.
- The massive and capital-intensive nature of Soviet air defenses, which necessitates incremental modification rather than wholesale replacement.
- The Soviets' lack of sophisticated measurement ranges, which inhibits their development of counters to the threat posed by Stealth.
- The length of the Soviet R&D cycle, which almost certainly will delay the introduction of totally new defensive systems until after 1995.

In the near term, the Soviets almost certainly will place a higher priority on developing defenses against U.S. Stealth vehicles than on developing offensive Stealth systems of their own. Indeed, the Soviets already have made certain incremental modifications to currently available defensive systems in reaction to the U.S. deployment of cruise missiles, which naturally have the low radar cross-section, low infrared signature, and low electronic emission characteristics typical of a Stealth vehicle.

The critical factor in determining the degree of success that Soviet air defenses will enjoy against low-signature and Stealth targets is the availability of adequate and timely warning information. Therefore, we expect the Soviets' near-term responses to include:

- Upgrading the sensors and signal processors in current systems.
- Increasing the depth of their defenses by extending ground-based and naval radar and fighter coverage offshore using Mainstay AWACS

aircraft, aerial refueling, and a new generation of more capable interceptor aircraft.

- Further pairing of dissimilar types of radars to fill altitude and range detection gaps.
- Increasing the numbers of selected detection and defensive systems.
- Adding mobile surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to the inventory to complicate penetration planning.
- Increasing decentralized decision-making to counter overloading of their existing command-and-control system.
- Additional netting of early warning, ground-controlled-intercept, and SAM radars.

In the longer term, the Soviets are likely to seek technological solutions to the deficiencies in their air defenses that will persist despite the near-term improvements. We believe these will include developing:

- High-power, low-frequency conventional radars incorporating new signal processors and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM).
- Multistatic radars.
- Laser radars.
- Acoustic detection systems.
- Improved infrared search and track sets (IRST).
- Long-range air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles with multi-mode terminal seekers.
- Fully automated command-and-control systems connected by digital data links.

Soviet Stealth Developments

The Soviets have an excellent theoretical knowledge of electromagnetics and traditional signature-reduction technologies. However, achieving Stealth is dependent on the integration of shaping and other signature-reducing technologies into a weapon system. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX] we doubt that Soviet designers have as yet decided on an overall conceptual approach to any Stealth design. Therefore, while the Soviets probably will begin within five years to modify existing designs to reduce their external signatures, the length of the development cycle makes it unlikely that they could field an unmanned Stealth vehicle before 1995 or a manned Stealth platform before 2000. To prolong the service life of existing aerodynamic systems—and to control the risks associated with Stealth development—their initial attempt to produce a Stealth vehicle is likely to be an

considered in order to penetrate future Soviet defenses. Among these future considerations are acoustics, contrails, and reflected light.

2. Developing a Stealth vehicle requires that all of these factors be considered from design inception. Shaping to reduce radar cross-section is the most critical factor in designing a Stealth vehicle; reducing infrared emissions from the vehicle's propulsion system without degrading performance is also a major design challenge. Because a vehicle's electronic emissions can be tracked by SIGINT systems, passive electronic subsystems or those designed to have a low probability of intercept must also be developed.

3. The Counter-Stealth Potential of Current and Near-Term Soviet Systems

The Soviets are well aware that the United States plans to improve its capability to penetrate future Soviet air defenses by developing aerodynamic vehicles with reduced external signatures, although they almost certainly consider the impending introduction of Stealth technology as only the latest of a number of technical and tactical changes that have forced the Soviets to react (see inset). Moscow perceives the United States to have a significant lead in the applicable technologies and probably has committed substantial resources to research efforts devoted to counter the U.S. systems.

4. Over the last two decades, the Soviets have spent roughly as much on developing and deploying a strategic defense-in-depth as they have their offensive forces. They have established an air defense system using a layered concept that compensates for the shortcomings of the individual elements, but this approach has resulted in an air defense network so massive and capital-intensive that we believe their near-term response to any new threat will be limited to system improvement by incremental modification. The modifications already begun by the Soviets in response to the U.S. deployment of the cruise missile—a system that inherently has a low RCS and low IR signature—constitute their initial response to Stealth deployment. In the longer term, we expect Moscow to develop new technologies and operational concepts that better match the increased penetration threat of U.S. follow-on systems, but for the next five to 10 years, the Soviets will be forced to rely on defensive systems already in place or expected to enter their inventory soon.

Early Warning Radar Systems

5. The critical factor in determining the degree of success that Soviet air defenses will enjoy against low-signature and Stealth targets is the

availability of adequate sensors and signal processing. The existing Soviet air defense network is alerted by an extensive network of ground-based acquisition radars. The Soviets will have several thousand early warning radars of some 13 types in service by 1990. Although some of these have an excellent theoretical capability to detect small targets under controlled conditions, detection ranges would be severely degraded by low-level penetration tactics, background clutter approximating the return of Stealth vehicles, and other operational considerations.

6. In the near term, we expect the Soviets to deploy combinations of these systems in order to maximize their detection capabilities. VHF radars, such as the Tall King C radar, also used as the acquisition radar for the SA-5 surface-to-air missile and for ground-controlled intercept have some capability to detect low RCS targets operating at high altitudes but are less effective against such targets at low altitudes. We believe the Soviets are more likely to pair the Tall King with more effective low-altitude sensors, like Big Back, Tall Rack, and height finders, that are already available rather than invest in a major modification to the Tall King itself.
7. Lower frequency radars (i.e., VHF) are more effective against low RCS targets because the radar wavelength approximates the length of the platform. They are, however, more susceptible to ground clutter. The Soviets have a new VHF early warning radar, the Tall Rack, under development. We expect this system, which uses an antenna mast about 30 meters high, to be effective against low RCS vehicles operating at both high and low altitudes. If this new system is developed successfully, it could be deployed in the late 1980s.
8. In addition to ground-based early warning assets, the Soviets are deploying their new IL-76 Mainstay AW ACS aircraft, which will be used to improve their offshore early warning capability. The radar on this aircraft has a fair-to-good capability against low-signature targets and a poor capability against Stealth targets at high or low altitudes, over land or over water. The Mainstay's detection, tracking, and command-and-control capabilities will be an excellent adjunct to interceptors and SAM batteries facing conventional and, to a lesser degree, low-signature threats. Target track data will be relayed from Mainstay to ground, naval, and airborne defensive systems through data links, thereby alleviating some of the operational problems imposed by low-signature and Stealth targets. We expect 27 to 36 Mainstay aircraft to be in the Soviet inventory by 1990.

SUBMARINES. Because of the close association between the doctrines of nuclear deterrence, first-strike survivability and the deployment of

nuclear-powered SLBMs, underwater operations played a major role in the Cold War, both in terms of clandestine patrols and the nature of their assignments which could be categorized as covert missions to maintain the deterrent; intelligence collection in support of sensitive SIGINT programs, and anti-submarine activity designed to find and, if necessary, eliminate, an adversary.

In this environment, anti-submarine tactics and equipment became key factors in the protection of the deterrent, and they were always preoccupied with Soviet strategy **CIA** and developments. NATO relied on a policy of identifying Red Banner Fleet submarines either as they sailed from their bases to reach their patrol areas or to catch them on the SOSUS lines as they attempted to transit the Greenland–Iceland–Faroes gap. Unable to counter the SOSUS arrays, the Soviets deployed surface escorts to mask the sound of the submarines and deter NATO's shadow vessels.

The SOSUS technology proved highly effective and was never matched by any Soviet equivalent. Reassuringly, while SOSUS could detect the relatively noisy Soviet targets at very long distances, it fared poorly in the identification of American submarines.

A NATO intelligence collection priority was the strength, deployment, and capability of the Red Banner submarine fleet, and in 1972, the CIA assessed the fleets as Northern Fleet at Severomorsk as 97 (being 1 Alpha, 1 Bravo, 9 Charlie, 14 Echo, 31 Foxtrot, 12 Juliet, 9 November, 1 Papa, 9 Romeo, 10 Victor); the Baltic Fleet at Kaliningrad: 6 (4 Foxtrot and 2 Romeo); the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol: 4 (1 Bravo, 3 Romeo); and the

Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok (2 Bravo, 19 Echo, 16 Foxtrot, 4 Juliet, 5 Novembers). NATO's task was to assess Soviet naval intentions, in terms of the Kremlin's naval construction program which indicated future strengths, provide certainty over current strength levels, and evaluate readiness, weaponry, and efficiency. Given a high degree of Soviet secrecy and the inability of foreigners to visit closed military zones, the challenge was considerable, but a combination of technical sources, such as overflights, peripheral aerial reconnaissance, satellite imagery, SIGINT, and submarine surveillance, supplied most of the answers with a high degree of accuracy.

Soviet Naval GRU was responsible for monitoring the development of NATO's formidable submarine force and was obliged to rely on open sources, of which there were plenty in the west, including well-informed news items, specialist magazine articles, service journals, naval contractor company annual reports, and Congressional budget appropriations. These sources could not provide deployment details, so the Red Banner Fleet developed a large flotilla of intelligence-gathering vessels equipped with **acoustic** and communications interception apparatus to be stationed near NATO

naval bases to monitor arrivals and departures. This strategy enabled Naval GRU analysts to assess on a daily basis the number of submarines at sea and observe the duration of their patrols.

In relative terms, the Soviets enjoyed an advantage in the recruitment of U.S. naval personnel who sold classified data, including some cryptographic material, among them Michael H. Allen, Nelson Drummond, Wilfredo Garcia, Bruce L. Kearn, Robert J. Kim, Gary L. Ledbetter, Jeffrey L. Pickering, William Remington, **John A. Walker**, Michael L. Walker, Jerry A. Whitworth, and Glen Souther. Such HUMINT resources were largely unavailable to NATO because, quite apart from the usual restrictions on foreign travel and emigration, anyone who had undergone military service were automatically banned from even applying for permission to go abroad. Accordingly, those emigrants with military experience only possessed obsolete information to offer Western debriefers, with the sole exception of the naval defector **Nikolai Artamonov** who would be employed by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency to give expert advice on the Red Banner Fleet.

SWEDEN. At the end of World War II, Sweden came under sustained pressure from the Soviet Union and experienced considerable agitation from the Communist Party which won 15 seats in the lower house, out of 230, and two in the upper house, out of 150. By 1952, the Party's elected presence was reduced to just eight in the lower house but four in the upper.

The Swedish Security Police (SAPO) was primarily a counter-subversion organization but had encountered its first case of espionage when clandestine signals were intercepted by the Forsvarets Radioanstalt (FRA) in July 1941, resulting in the arrest of Bertil Eriksson, codenamed ERIK, in the Midsommarkransen suburb of Stockholm. His accomplice was Albert Elming, codenamed JIM, and their Soviet contact was Pavel Formenko. Soon afterward, another network was discovered in Gothenburg, led by Karl Franzen, codenamed SVANTE, and Sven Rydstedt, codenamed GUSTAV. Also arrested was Anton Strand, codenamed MAX, who acted as a courier for Stefan Astimiev, based at the Soviet embassy. An analysis of the spy-ring's activities suggested that the members had reported on German railway traffic transiting through Sweden.

As a matter of wartime expediency, SAPO developed links to their German counterparts and came under pressure from the Sicherheitsdienst to tackle, in particular, émigré saboteurs. During SAPO's 1942 investigation of the notorious German Communist Ernst Wollweber, who was sentenced to three years' imprisonment and was deported to Moscow at the end of the war, some 50 other suspects were implicated in his network in Luleå, among them his

wife Ragnhild Wiik, and a Norwegian, Martin Hjelmen. Subsequent SAPO enquiries in May 1942 caught two Norwegians in May 1942, Karl Frantzen, codenamed SVANTE, and Robert Hansen-Nygaard, codenamed FRED, who were arrested in May 1942, together with a trade union organizer, John Wivegh, codenamed BERTIL and Hans-Erik Rydman. Then in August 1942 Lennart Katz was rounded up, and his Soviet contact was identified as an embassy employee named Scheptkov. Also detained was a married couple, Ture Georg Eriksson and Signe Eriksson.

Because of this extensive background, SAPO was well-placed to pursue leads from the VENONA material supplied by GCHQ which comprised of 390 partially decrypted messages exchanged between Stockholm and Moscow during the period December 1939 and April 1946 which the FRA had copied but not solved, although much work had been undertaken on the task from 1947, with some limited success on 53 fragmented messages decrypted between 1952 and 1959.

In 1952, SAPO broke up a spy-ring managed by the GRU *rezidentura* at the embassy headed by Fritiof Enbom. Two years later, the defection of Vladimir Petrov in Australia gave SAPO numerous espionage leads as he and his wife Evdokia had served at the *rezidentura* during the war and had only returned to Moscow in early 1948. In addition, the FRS received assistance from GCHQ to read some of the *rezidentura*'s wartime cable traffic with Moscow which revealed the extent of Soviet intelligence operations run from Stockholm.

During the Cold War, successive Swedish governments juggled the country's geographical proximity to the Soviet Bloc, and its liberal democratic interests, and so was a target of intelligence collection by the KGB, illustrated by Colonel Stig Wennerstrom who was arrested in June 1963 after decades of espionage.

Although ostensibly non-aligned, the Swedish general staff and the intelligence community enjoyed considerable autonomy within the government and pursued two policies without official endorsement. One was tacit participation in the British nuclear deterrent plan which, until the introduction of Polaris in 1968 enabled the RAF's V-bomber force to make emergency landings on Swedish airfields after having completed a nuclear raid on Soviet targets. The range of the Victor, Vulcan, and Valiant aircraft would not allow them to reach their designated targets deep in enemy territory and return home, so diversionary destinations in Iran and Sweden had been discreetly surveyed and the coordinates included in the strike force operational scheme.

The second covert aspect was Swedish involvement in contingency arrangements for a **stay-behind** resistance organization intended to be activated in the event of a Soviet invasion. The network was modeled on

Norway's wartime experience which, during the German occupation, had developed a sophisticated wireless infrastructure covering the entire country and linked to the government-in-exile in England. The project, created under the auspices of NATO's Clandestine Planning Committee, sponsored jointly by the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA), provided infiltration, sabotage, and tradecraft training at SIS's facility near Gosport, while the CIA station in Stockholm, headed by Bill Colby, a former wartime JEDBURGH guerrilla, supplied the materiel to be searched at hideouts in the countryside which were kept hidden by carefully vetted anti-communists with a military background.

Sweden's covert Cold War cooperation with NATO extended to SIGINT operations and the loan of airborne platforms in the Baltic painted in Swedish Air Force livery. Once such aircraft, a DC-3 on a routine FRA flight from Bromma, was shot down in June 1952 by Soviet MiG-15 fighters, with the loss of the three aircrew and five intercept operators. A second plane, a Catalina on a rescue mission, was also attacked, although the crew survived.

In another incident, in October 1981, *S-363*, a Soviet diesel-electric Whiskey-class submarine armed with nuclear-tipped torpedoes ran aground near the Karlskrona naval base while on a reconnaissance mission. The vessel remained stranded, well inside Swedish territorial waters, for nine days before negotiations with the commander, Pyotr Gushchin, allowed it to be towed by a Swedish tug outside the 12-mile limit.

T

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union sought to compensate for its industrial and technology inadequacies by adopting the prewar policy of wholesale industrial espionage. During World War II, the Soviets had acquired the secrets of radar, sonar, proximity-fuzes, and many other advanced techniques through agents, often **Communist Party of the United States of America** members or sympathizers, and in the post-war era, the radar experts Al Sarant and Joel Barr, both members of Julius Rosenberg's spy-ring, had moved to Leningrad to develop a microelectronics industry.

There were other blatant examples of technology transfer, such as the Tupolev-4 which was an exact copy of the Boeing B-29 Superfortress. Introduced into service in 1949, the aircraft had been reverse-engineered from a U.S. 20th Air Force bomber which had made a forced landing in Vladivostok in July 1944 while returning from a mission from Chengtu in China to hit targets in Japanese-occupied Manchuria. Although the pilot, Captain Howard R. Jarrell and his crew had been repatriated eventually through Iran, their plane was impounded, flown to Izmaylovo and dismantled so the parts could be re-engineered. Nearly 850 copies and variants were eventually manufactured, and one of the early models was selected to drop the first Soviet atomic bomb on the test range at Semipalatinsk in August 1949.

Another case of reverse-engineering was the Rolls-Royce Nene jet engine which, having been sold to the Soviets between 1945 and 1947, was copied and produced as the Klimov RD-45 which subsequently powered the MiG-15 *Fagot* fighter. Introduced in 1949, some 12,000 of the fighter were manufactured and flew combat missions in **Korea** and Vietnam.

In January 1983, having been alerted to the scale of illicit KGB-sponsored technology transfer operations, President Ronald Reagan signed off on National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75, entitled *U.S. Relations with the USSR* to reverse, and not just contain, Soviet expansionism. The policy was to control technology and led the administration to promote the

Strategic Defense Initiative which was intended to threaten the Kremlin with a spending completion that Mikhail Gorbachev could not possibly win, given the already unsustainable Soviet military budget.

TELEMETRY INTELLIGENCE (TELINT). When in March 1959 responsibility for the interception and analysis of telemetry moved from the Department of Defense to the NSA, the National Technical Processing Center on Nebraska Avenue became the principal U.S. non-communications signals analytical facility, concentrating chiefly on radar, electronic intelligence and what was termed Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT). This discipline had its origins in the collection of Japanese radar transmitted from the Aleutian Islands during World War II but developed to encompass the EA-2B SEABRINE flights undertaken during the Vietnam War to monitor SA-2 guidance radars, and then the GRAB and POPPY satellite systems constructed to collect Soviet air defense radar traffic.

Throughout the Cold War, the telemetry signals transmitted from test missiles provided valuable information about the performance of particular weapons, and the NSA developed a program, codenamed **HARDBALL**, to monitor Soviet activity on the Kamchatka peninsula range from a site designated **ANDERS** located on Shemya Island in Alaska. Other ground stations included a network centered at Black Sea coast at Samsun, Trabzon, and Sinop to monitor telemetry transmissions from the Soviet launchpads at Kapustin Yar. Other sites, at Belbasi and Anadolu Kavak, outside Istanbul, and at Pirinclik, near Diyarbakir kept a watch on space launches from Tyuratam, Plesetsk, and Baikonur. Signals intercepted by satellites were relayed by the **STONEHOUSE** system which depended on large 150-foot diameter dish antennas, such as the facility at Asmara in Ethiopia, which closed in 1975. Additionally, the NSA invested in a pair of maritime platforms, the USS *Observation Island* and *General H.H. Arnold* equipped with **COBRA JUDY** which monitored Soviet tests in the Pacific.

Once intercepted, the signals were processed digitally by computers, first **TELLMAN** and then **RISSMAN**, and the results conveyed to Nebraska Avenue.

The principal TELINT target during the Cold War was the Soviet ICBM program which began with a test in 1957 and was followed by the employment of a similar R-7 rocket to insert the first *Sputnik* into orbit later the same year. In 1972, the SALT 1 agreement banned the encryption of telemetry, and this was confirmed in 1979 by SALT II. TELINT collection was undertaken by several different platforms, including three modified Stratejets, designated EB-17Es which from 1958, participated in **IRON WORK**, the monitoring of Soviet missile tests at Baikonur, Tyuratam, and Kapustin Yar.

Soviet surveillance of American and British ballistic missile tests, mainly from Florida with a downrange splashdown in the Atlantic, depended on a fleet of vessels designated by NATO “Auxiliary, General, Intelligence” (AGI) which monitored the telemetry and sought to retrieve any rocket debris for analysis. The ships of the *Primor’ye* class were designed on trawler hulls, whereas the *Balzam*, and the larger *Vishnya* class were purpose-built and designed to operate at sea independently for extended periods.

During the Cold War, the Red Banner Northern Fleet’s 10 AGIs conducted 400 long-range patrols, with the *Lotlin* remaining at sea for a record 201 days. The AGI permanently stationed at Malin Head, off the Clyde, monitored submarine transits to and from Faslane, would undertake patrols with a typical duration of three months. A covert inspection of the AGI’s hull conducted by HMS *Osiris* in 1971 revealed that the ship was armed with an underwater torpedo tube.

The first generation of AGIs consisted of converted 500-ton trawlers, the *Izmeritel* and the *Protraktor*. In 1956, however, the 370-ton *Gals*, *Sekstan*, and *Vizir*, each with a crew of 35, were purpose-built in Finland, albeit on the original design of the 370-ton Larga-class trawler. Between 1950 and 1955, East Germany was contracted to build a total of 720 Svednyi Rbolovnyi Trawler (“medium-sized fishing trawler”). Twelve were fitted out as dedicated AGIs (the *Noringa*, *Izvalta*, *Bug*, *Giroskp*, *GS-34*, *GS-36*, *GS-41*, *GS-43*, *GS-46*, *GS-47*, *GS-55*, and the *GS-59*). A second East German contract for more AGIs, double the size of the Leutra-class, was placed in 1958 and continued until 1961, producing the 500-ton Okean-class *GS-242*, *Alidada*, *Ampermetr*, *Barograf*, *Barometer*, *Deflektor*, *Ekholot*, *Gidrofon*, *Krenometr*, *Linza*, *Lotlin*, *Reduktork*, *Teodolit*, *Traverz*, and *Zond*. Between 1962 and 1967, a Ukrainian shipyard built 170 refrigerator trawlers, the 500-ton Svednyi Rbolovnyi Trawler Moroshechik, of which 10 (the *GS-239*, *GS-242*, *Aneroid*, *Gidrorulevoy*, *Khersones*, *Kurs*, *Krograf*, *Ladoga*, *Mius*, and *Mayak*) were AGIs. In addition, five factory ship hulls in the 3,400-ton Mayakovskiy-class (the *Kavkaz*, *Krym*, *Primorye*, *Zaporozye*, and *Zakarp’artye*) came into service between 1971 and 1972, but without retaining the design’s distinctive stern ramps, which suggested to NATO analyst that their purpose was probably not fishing,

TOKAEV, GRIGORI. A lecturer in jet engine technology and rocket propulsion at the Zhukovsky Air Force Academy in Moscow, 39-year-old Colonel Grigori Tokaev was an Osset who had spent much of his career at the elite Institute of Engineers and Geodesics. Born in October 1909, and having graduated from the Moscow Higher Technical School in 1932, he underwent training at the Zhukovsky Military Air Academy. However, at the end of

World War II, he was transferred to Berlin with instructions from General Ivan Serov to recruit as many German scientists with knowledge of missile research he could find. In this context, the NKVD's reference to recruitment meant kidnapping, and when Tokaev discovered that Professor Kurt Tank, Focke-Wulf's chief aircraft designer in Bremen was listed for abduction, he underwent a crisis of conscience.

While serving as a scientific adviser to the Soviet Control Commission, under the direct command of Marshals Georgi Zhukov and then Vasili Sokolovsky, Tokaev was called to the Kremlin in April 1947 to assess the work of the German experts and complete an evaluation of a rocket-powered bomber designed by Eugen Sänger. For the first time, Tokaev was indoctrinated into a Soviet missile development program to be targeted against the West.

Appalled by the ruthlessness of the NKVD, Tokaev was also preoccupied by the fear that he himself might be kidnapped by an emigré organization and by the worry that the NKVD had learned of his support for Leon Trotsky. Unable to bear the pressure any longer, Tokaev crossed into the British sector with his wife Aza Baeva and their daughter Bella in early November 1947 and surrendered first to the military authorities, and then to the Secret Intelligence Service, the organization then headed in Berlin by John Bruce Lockhart, who had him flown to RAF Northolt, to be installed with the initial codename STORK in a Kensington safe-house.

The British received Tokaev with enthusiasm and elaborate arrangements were made to exploit the coup. The head of the RAF's security branch, Owen de Putron, assigned a linguist, Molly Sasson, to act as case officer and a senior Air Intelligence officer, Christopher Hartley, was given the task of supervising the defector's resettlement and collating his information. The family, accompanied by Sasson, continued to live in their safe-house under MI5's protection until a suspected assassin was detected outside the building, an incident that prompted a swift evacuation to an isolated farmhouse in Kingsbridge, Devon, owned by a retired SIS officer, Fred Winterbotham, who had previously headed the organization's Air Intelligence section.

As well as the valuable technical information Tokaev was willing to disclose, he revealed when questioned a further dimension, claiming to be in contact with a reliable source inside the Politburo's secretariat. From SIS's viewpoint, the prospect of this additional recruitment was an added bonus and the source was tentatively identified as a Central Committee official, Petr I. Dubuvoi. When pressed by his interrogator, Tokaev named an intermediary as one Yarotsky, and mentioned involvement with a subversive underground group active across the Soviet Union.

At the end of November 1948, MI5's deputy director-general, Guy Liddell, discussed STORK with a senior RAF officer and recorded the conversation

in his diary: I had a word with Air Marshal Lawrence Pendred about STORK the Russian defector from the equivalent of RAE Farnborough. He said that a lot of extremely valuable information had already been obtained. He seemed to have the answer to everything. I asked Pendred whether previous estimates about the potentialities of the Russian Air Force were confirmed. He said that from what he had been able to gather so far, the Russians were not nearly so far as we thought they were.

Tokaev also played a role in April 1948 in the defection of Colonel Yuri D. Takoiev, head of the Soviet Reparations Committee in Bremen whom Tokaev had recommended as an agent several months earlier. A period of cultivation followed, codenamed Operation HOUSE PARTY, and then a meeting was convened at which, quite unexpectedly, Tasoev, codenamed CAPULET, asked for political asylum.

Contact with Tasoev had been effected initially through an American intermediary, the local U.S. director of G-2 military intelligence, General Robert Walsh, and the final meeting took place on April 23 at the home of the director of Bremen's US Port Operations, Stanley A. Clem when, against Tokaev's advice, delivered in their native Ossetian language, Tasoev decided there and then to defect. They drove to Hamburg, where they spent the night together, sleeping in the same room, and then, after sharing a midday meal, drove to a British aircraft for a flight to England. The plane, on temporary loan to SIS, was the personal transport of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Montgomery, and had flown Tokaev to Bremen the previous day.

Tasoev's meeting with Tokaev had been arranged apparently in the hope that both men could boost each other's morale and demonstrate SIS's capacity to attract and protect defectors. It was also hoped that the operation would "loosen Takaev's tongue" as he had become increasingly capricious. However, the encounter was not a success and each accused the other of being a traitor. While Tokaev appeared very shaken by the episode, Tasoev's confidence was completely undermined and on May 7, at the first opportunity, fled his safe-house, a six-roomed flat at 19 Rugby Mansions, in Bishop King's Road, Kensington, managed by SIS's Betty Wiggins, and asked a patrolling constable to take him to the Soviet embassy. Tasoev was then escorted to Hammersmith police station where he was incarcerated while embarrassed Foreign Office staff arranged for him to be repatriated to Gatow on May 20 to the Russian *kommandantura* in Berlin. SIS concluded that CAPULET's change of heart had been prompted by his fear of retribution against his 20-year-old son Vasili, a student in Moscow.

The Tasoev debacle proved extremely awkward, especially when the matter was raised in the House of Commons and the TASS news agency reported

that the officer had been abducted by Tokaev and British intelligence personnel. On July 7, a Foreign Office minister, Kenneth Younger, who had himself served in MI5 during the war, had the delicate task of fielding mischievous questions from radical backbenchers, among them Geoffrey Bing MP. The SIS Chief, Sir Stewart Menzies, came in for particular opprobrium and was privately accused of having bungled the affair, his line that SIS had no suitable facilities in Germany in which to hold and question Tasoev seemed very thin. He certainly acted outside the JIC's guidelines on the handling of defectors and the ensuing inter-agency spat drew in MI5 too, with the Security Service highly resentful of SIS's behavior, and its failure to understand that even foreign nationals could not be locked up indefinitely without any legal grounds. To make matters worse, General Lucius Clay expressed his disapproval of the way American personnel had been drawn into the affair. In the aftermath, it emerged that Menzies had orchestrated Tasoev's recruitment largely to placate Tokaev, and that SIS had really intended to support Tokaev's grandiose schemes for establishing and sustaining an underground anti-Soviet movement. By humoring Tokaev, Menzies had sought to extract yet more technical data from the defector who was expressing signs of resentment toward his hosts.

According to his file, Tokaev was much chastened by the fiasco and became considerably more cooperative, evidently conscious that the Soviets turned the entire event to their advantage, alleging that Tasoev had been assaulted and kidnapped. Both MI5 and SIS could agree that the incident would have a negative impact on future attempts at defection from the Eastern bloc.

In London Tokaev, who adopted the Ossetian version of his name, Tokaty, was codenamed EXCISE and debriefed by a Russian-speaking SIS officer, Wilfred Dunderdale (alias "Mr Douglas"), at the Special Liaison centre in Ryder Street where his trenchant political opinions were given wide circulation by the newly created **Information Research Department** (IRD), resulting in a series of articles published by the *Sunday Express* in January 1949. However, his controversial views caused considerable adverse comment in Whitehall where his analysis was largely unwelcome, and there had been widespread dismay concerned a press conference called in September 1948 which had been intended to introduce Tokaev to selected newspaper journalists. Instead the ill-prepared event, hosted by his literary agent, Cyrus Brooks at A.M. Heath & Co, descended into a bitter argument between the Russian correspondents and the other attendees. Photographers were not allowed to take his picture, communists tried to monopolize the proceedings, and the whole affair was regarded as a colossal flop, causing SIS, and Robin Brook in particular, much anxiety.

While SIS regarded Tokaev as a valuable asset, and IRD saw the immense propaganda advantages of publicizing his anti-Stalin treatises, the Foreign Office's Northern Department, responsible for Russian policy, became increasingly alarmed at his potential impact on Anglo-Soviet relations. IRD had been created by Christopher Mayhew MP to counter Moscow's growing influence, and he had the support of the virulently anticommunist foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, who was entertained to tea by Tokaev, but the day-to-day management of the small group was in the hands of Ralph Murray, who was not then a senior figure. Accordingly, IRD and its activities were never especially popular in King Charles Street, and even the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, William Hayter, would express reservations about Tokaev's perceived volatility. As Tokaev became increasingly restless at his confinement and continuing interrogation, he spent much time drafting slightly eccentric memoranda on such diverse topics as Soviet meddling in Palestine, the split with Tito and Stalin's policy toward Mao. He also wrote numerous pamphlets, supposedly for clandestine distribution in the Soviet Union by White Russians, but these initiatives led to him being described by one official as "becoming a little unbalanced." Astonishingly, in mid-July 1948, there was speculation in the Foreign Office that Tokaev might be "a very long-term plant and may be wishing to reassure Moscow." Hayter was especially critical, remarking "the more I see of EXCISE's products the more difficult I find it to regard him as a serious character." Nevertheless, apart from his somewhat odd political views, Tokaev answered questionnaires assiduously and drew up personality profiles of the leading Soviet personalities he had known. These in turn served to enhance SIS's reputation for gathering accurate military, political, and technical information.

Undeterred, Tokaev continued to submit unsolicited reports and commentaries on current events for the prime minister and the foreign secretary. Discontent about him even extended to his protection SIS employed a single retired, unarmed Special Branch detective, Inspector Dew, to act as Tokaev's sole bodyguard, but by any standards, this provided inadequate coverage.

Another SIS project was the recruitment of yet another putative defector, Colonel Tyupanov, might be persuaded to seek political asylum, but Tokaev was doubtful about his motives, and the scheme was shelved.

Tokaev's interviews subsequently formed the basis of his two autobiographies, *Betrayal of an Ideal*, published in 1955, and *Comrade X*, released the following year. They also attracted adverse comment which resulted in libel actions being brought against the Communist publications *Daily Worker* and *Russia Today*.

Tokaev subsequently pursued a distinguished academic career at Imperial College, Cranfield College, and London's City University. He also

participated in NASA's Apollo lunar project and returned from City University in 1975 following allegations that he had given illicit assistance to some of his students. Tokaev died in Cheam in November 2003.

TOLKACHEV, ADOLF. Codenamed SPHERE and VANQUISH by the CIA, Adolf Tolkachev was an electrical engineer employed by Phastron who in January 1977 volunteered to become a spy and supply information concerning Soviet aircraft and their advanced avionics. Initially reluctant to respond to Tolkachev's increasingly desperate attempts to pass information to the CIA station at the Moscow embassy, he was eventually contacted in March 1978 and run by John Guilsher. The CIA's Office of Technical Services had analyzed his handwritten letters in May 1978:

The writer is intelligent, purposeful, and generally self-confident. He is self-disciplined, but not overly rigid. He has well above-average intelligence and has good organizing ability. He is observant and conscientious and pays meticulous attention to details. He is quite self-assured and may plow ahead at times in a way which is not discreet or subtle. All in all, he is a reasonably well-adjusted individual and appears intellectually and psychologically equipped to become a useful, versatile asset.

Tolkachev's material was militarily significant because he had been responsible for redesigning the MiG-25 avionics compromised by the defection of the fighter pilot Viktor Belenko in September 1976.

In April 1979, Tolkachev provided a lengthy explanation of what had driven him to contact the CIA:

I can only say that a significant role in this was played by Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, even though I do not know them and have only read Solzhenitsyn's works which were published in *Noviy Mir*. Some inner worm started to torment me; something has to be done. I started to write short leaflets that I planned to mail out. But, later, having thought it out properly, I understood that this was a useless undertaking. To establish contact with dissident circles which have contact with foreign journalists seemed senseless to me due to the nature of my work. (I have a top secret clearance.) Based on the slightest suspicion, I would be totally isolated or liquidated. Thus was born my plan of action to which I have resorted.

. . . I have chosen a course which does not permit one to move backward, and I have no intention of veering from this course. My actions in the future depend on [my] health, and changes in the nature of [my] work. Concerning remuneration, I would not begin to establish contact for any sum of money with, for example, the Chinese Embassy. But how about America? Maybe it has bewitched me, and I am madly in love with it? I have not seen your country with my own eyes, and to love it unseen, I do not have enough fantasy or

romanticism. However, based on some facts, I got the impression that I would prefer to live in America. It is for this very reason that I decided to offer you my collaboration. But I am not an altruist alone. Remuneration for me is not just money. It is, even to a greater extent, the evaluation of the significance and the importance of my work.

Tolkachev was arrested in June 1985 in Moscow, having been betrayed by the CIA officer Edward Lee Howard, and executed.

TREHOLT, ARNE. Identified as a long-term Soviet mole by **Oleg Gordievsky**, Arne Treholt was head of the press section of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry when he was arrested by Ornulfe Tofte in January 1984 at Oslo airport carrying 66 classified documents to a rendezvous with Gennadi Titov in Vienna. A search of his home revealed a further 6,000 pages of classified material, and evidence that he had received \$7,000 from the KGB. In June 1985, Treholt was convicted of espionage after a trial lasting 11 weeks, and he was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. He would be released in July 1992, having served nine years, and moved to Russia and then Limassol, Cyprus. Following a serious illness in 2006 Treholt returned to Norway where he now lives.

According to the lengthy investigation conducted by the Norwegian Security Service which lasted seven years, Treholt had been recruited by the KGB sometime before 1974 when he was employed in the Ministry of Commerce. He would later be promoted to the Ministry of Ocean law and then appointed counselor to Norway's mission to the United Nations. After three years in New York, when he was handled by the KGB's Vladimir Zhizhin, he returned to Oslo to join the Foreign Ministry. During his period in Manhattan, he was under constant FBI surveillance from September 1980 and was befriended by neighbors "Jim and Barbara Glennon" who were actually both undercover FBI special agents supervised by the FBI case agent, Tim Almon.

TROFIMOFF, GEORGE. The arrest of 73-year-old Colonel George Trofimoff, the highest ranking U.S. Army officer ever charged with espionage, in June 2000 at the Tampa Hilton Hotel came as a result of information supplied by the KGB retiree Vasili Mitrokhin. His espionage dated back to 1969 when Trofimoff, born of Russian émigré parents in Germany, borrowed money from a childhood friend, Igor Susemihl, who was an Orthodox priest and a KGB spy codenamed IKAR (who was later to become Archbishop of Vienna). He had become a naturalized citizen in 1951 and served as a civilian intelligence analyst before joining the 66th Military Intelligence Group and being posted to the **NATO** Joint Interrogation Centre in Nuremburg where Soviet Bloc refugees were questioned by Allied intelligence personnel

collecting information about the Warsaw Pact. Trofimoff had enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1948 and was commissioned into the U.S. Army Reserve in 1953. His active service ended in 1956 and he retired from the reserve with the rank of colonel in 1987. He later said that he had taken documents from his office when requested to do so by the KGB but decided against using them because it was “too dangerous” and instead took the papers home where he copied them with a double-frame camera, passing the undeveloped exposed films to his contacts.

In December 1994, after he had been identified by Mitrokhin as a former KGB spy codenamed ANTEY, MARKIZ and KONSUL, Trofimoff and Susemihl were arrested in Germany, but the charges against them were dropped because the offenses had occurred in the Federal Republic where there was a five-year statute of limitations on espionage, with Trofimoff explaining the money he had received from Susemihl as personal loans. The following year Trofimoff and his fifth wife Jutta moved to Florida where **Dmitri Droujinski**, posing as a Russian intelligence officer, approached Trofimoff and pretended to re-establish contact with him. The resulting encounter in February 1999, in a hotel room in Melbourne, Florida, near his retirement home in Viera, was videotaped, and later used as evidence. In the six-hour recording, Trofimoff boasted of his espionage over a period of 25 years explaining how he had routinely removed classified files on interviews given by Eastern bloc refugees and then photographed them overnight and claimed he had been awarded the coveted Order of the Red Banner.

Trofimoff was arrested in June 2000 when he went to the hotel to meet his “Russian” contact Dmitri and received a requested special payment of \$30,000. Instead of being given the money, he was taken into custody, and was later sentenced to life imprisonment after expert evidence had been given by a Secret Intelligence Service officer about Mitrokhin’s information. Trofimoff’s co-conspirator, Susemihl, had died in 1999.

U

U-2. The U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft provided the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) with the technical means to collect imagery from within the Soviet Union, and 12 overflights, codenamed AQUATONE, were completed successfully until Francis Gary Powers was shot down near Sverdlovsk on May 1, 1960, having photographed a secret plutonium processing plant at Ozersk. This setback terminated plans for further incursions into Soviet airspace, but technical collection of imagery continued with the CORONA **satellite** system. During the **Cuban missile crisis**, it was a U-2 mission undertaken on October 14, 1962, which provided the first imagery of established SAM sites and MRBM launch bases. The U-2 remains in service with the U.S. Air Force and has been deployed in various role, equipped with a variety of sensors in the camera bay.

In 1998, the CIA released an official history of the OXCART project from 1954 to 1974, *The CIA and the U-2* program, and in March 2016, a further redacted volume of 355 pages assembled by the CIA's Directorate of Science & Technology (DST), *History of the Office of Special Activities (OSA) From Inception to 1969* was declassified. These documents revealed the strategic background to the aircraft's development:

Surprise Attack

During the year 1954, as for some years previous to that time, the urgent problem of defense against surprise attack by the Soviet Union continued to occupy the attention of all those in Washington who bore the responsibility for the nation's security. High-level commissions, whose memberships represented the best minds in the country, continually met in Washington to study every facet of Cold War strategy and advise the president. There was no lack of brainpower available for this task, but there was one shortage which was recognized by all concerned and which came to be known as the "Intelligence Gap."

The existence of the Iron Curtain and the growing hostility of the Soviet Union toward the West had made it increasingly difficult to mount classic

intelligence collection operations against the USSR. How, then, was the United States to obtain the vital intelligence on major military, political, and economic activities within the Soviet Union which it must have to maintain its own national security? In the summer of 1954, the U.S. Intelligence Community had come around to the view that the only prospect of gaining this vital intelligence was through systematic aerial reconnaissance over the USSR.

The Special Study Group of the Hoover Commission set up under the chairmanship of General James H. Doolittle to investigate CIA's covert activities, in its report of September 30, 1954, expressed the belief that every known, technique should be used, and new ones developed, to increase our intelligence by high-altitude photographic reconnaissance and other means and that no price would be too high to pay for the knowledge to be derived therefrom.

Land Panel Proposal

On November 5, 1954, Dr. Edwin H. Land, chairman of the "Project 3" Technological Capabilities Panel, wrote to Mr. Allen W. Dulles, director of Central Intelligence, proposing a program of photo-reconnaissance flights over the USSR, and recommending that CIA, with Air Force assistance, undertake to carry out such a program. The Land Panel's proposal, entitled "A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence," recognized the risk of provocation toward war that such an intensive program of overflights might run, as well as the dangers involved should one of our military arms engage in such activities, especially in view of the tense political situation existing vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

"On the other hand," the proposal continued, "because it is vital that certain knowledge about industrial growth, strategic targets, and guided missile sites be obtained at once, we recommend that CIA, as a civilian organization, undertake (with the Air Force assistance) a covert program of selected flights. Fortunately, a jet-powered glider has been carefully studied by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for overflight purposes. This manufacturer proposes to take full responsibility for the design, mock-up, building, secret testing, and field maintenance of this extraordinary and unorthodox vehicle, making it feasible for a CIA task force to undertake this vital activity. The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of reach of present Russian interception and high enough to have a good chance of avoiding detection. The plane itself is so light (15, 000 pounds), so obviously unarmed and devoid of military usefulness, that it would minimize affront to the Russians even if through some remote mischance it were detected and identified.

Appended to the Panel's proposal were photographs that demonstrated the great information content of pictures taken from extreme altitude. The proposal affirmed that a single mission of the Lockheed vehicle with cameras employing the most recently developed optical designs could photograph in revealing detail a strip of the Soviet Union 200 miles wide by 2,500 miles long, clearly identifying roads, railroads, power lines, industrial plants, airfields, parked aircraft, missile sites, etc. and detailing concentrated areas down to objects as small as a man.

In Dr. Land's letter to Mr. Dulles submitting the proposal, he made clear the Panel's belief that this activity was appropriate for CIA (always with Air Force assistance) and was "the kind of action and technique that is right for the contemporary version of CIA; a modern and scientific way for an Agency that is always supposed to be looking to do its looking. Quite strongly, we feel that you must always assert your first right to pioneer in scientific techniques for collecting intelligence and choosing such partners to assist you as may be needed. This present opportunity for aerial photography seems a good place to start."

The Panel's recommendation was for immediate action, through CIA covert means, to procure the aircraft and equipment and set up a task force. The opportunity for safe overflight was estimated as only a few years since the Russians were expected to develop radars and interceptors or guided missiles which would reach to the 70,000 foot region.

Lockheed Profile

The aircraft proposal by Lockheed, which was the basis for the Land Panel recommendation, envisaged a modification of the F-104 (Lockheed Starfighter) with long, glider-like wings, powered by a single jet engine. (The Pratt & Whitney J57/P37 was later chosen as the power plant and was provided through an existing USAF contract.) The drawing board concept of this aircraft, designated by Lockheed as the CL-282, originated with Mr. Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson, chief design engineer and head of Lockheed's Advanced Development Projects group.

It was submitted to the Air Force early in 1954 along with several other design proposals, some of which were accepted; however, the CL-282 was shelved by the Air Force at that time.

Later in 1954, when the Land Panel was searching for a technical capability for collecting intelligence on the USSR, the CL-282 proposal was reviewed with Mr. Johnson and the Panel concluded that such a program was feasible and should be pursued by the U.S. Government. In presenting their recommendation to the CIA the Panel noted that no proposal or program

that they had investigated appeared to hold as much promise for acquiring as much vital intelligence information at so little risk and at so little cost. They believed that the proposed aircraft could go where it was needed to go efficiently and safely and that no amount of fragmentary and indirect intelligence could be pieced together to be equivalent to the positive photographic evidence obtainable by this reconnaissance system.

Optics Research

For some years prior to the Land Panel's establishment, optical systems and photographic techniques had been the subject of intensive study by specialists in the armed services as well as those in civilian organizations engaged in research and development and fabrication of photographic systems. Dr. Land, president of the Polaroid Corporation, and Dr. James G. Baker, Professor of Physics at Harvard University, both as members of civilian organizations thus engaged and as members of the United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, had continuously reviewed all the advances made, the possible course of future developments, and the application of these to photo-reconnaissance overflights.

Dr. Baker pointed out in a paper summarizing the types of photographic equipment to be built that camera configuration "A" would be made up from standard equipment already available, in accordance with the desire of all concerned to make use of cameras with proven reliability, as well as to make sure of having some equipment ready to meet the program's deadline. The other configurations, "B" and "C," were being specifically designed for the vehicle and missions contemplated and would not duplicate other developments. Dr. Baker emphasized that these new developments would be welcome and readily taken over by the Air Force. In some cases, they were years ahead of present research and development, but, on the other hand, these systems were the outgrowth of many years of experience gathered from Air Force sponsorship of basic research and development programs and were therefore implicitly Air Force products. This was particularly true with regard to achievements in the electronic computing of optical systems by a joint research effort between the Air Force and the Perkin-Elmer Corporation of Norwalk, Connecticut. The development of the "C" configuration, for instance, would have taken years using the old German methods or months using desk calculators. With the IBM CPC computer, however, Dr. Baker and his co-workers were able to do their computations in about 16 days.

When the Land Panel proposal was submitted to CIA, the design results obtained by Dr. Baker were considered by him to be adequate for providing

satisfactory pictures, but seeking the ultimate in quality, he continued his research and computations as the program developed.

UKRAINE. During the Cold War, the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) mounted numerous operations designed to undermine the regime and promote the interests of anticommunist emigres. AEDOGMA and AEBATH, conducted between 1947 and 1961, supported the activities of the Michael Korzhan, who was assigned the task of collection counterintelligence information on two Ukrainian nationalist groups in Germany, and details of other Ukrainian groups in Germany and Western Europe. He was also instructed in 1947 to detect Soviet penetration of the Orthodox churches. In 1959, he was transferred to Paris to report on Soviet activity among emigre groups and to act as a talent-spotter for potential recruits into the REDSKIN program. Korzhan was eventually cut loose in 1961.

Other CIA operations included AERODYNAMIC (formerly CARTEL, ANDROGEN, AECARTHAGE) which ran from 1949 to 1970 in support of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, codenamed ZP/UHVR, an organization founded in 1949 by the British to sponsor émigré opponents of the regime. As part of the project in 1953, the CIA established a front company, Prolog Research & Publishing in New York City, codenamed AETENURE, to fund a business in Munich which distributed periodicals, books, and pamphlets printed in the Ukrainian language which undermined the Soviet occupation. In 1967, the operation expanded to include *Suchasnist*, a nationalist periodical and to sponsor the Ukrainische Gesellschaft fur Auslandstudien. AEAERODYNAMIC personnel were codenamed AECASSOWARY and were active in New York. They also targeted the 1959 Vienna World Youth Conference where they cultivated young Ukrainians in an operation code-named LCOUTBOUND.

British activity in the Ukraine was accomplished through the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), headed by Stefan Bandera, who would be murdered with a cyanide gun by Bogdan Stashinsky in Munich in October 1959. The assassination would go undetected until Stashinsky defected and confessed in 1961. British support for OUN-B was the cause of some friction with the CIA as the organization never received U.S. State Department approval.

The CIA's psychological warfare program suffered a setback when some of its front organizations were exposed by the American radical magazine *Ramparts* in 1968. Referred to as MHDOWEL, *Ramparts* ran a campaign to expose secret CIA sponsorship of various publications such as *Prolog* through phoney non-profit foundations, and so in 1970, AERODYNAMIC was renamed QRPLUMB and deployed in Canada to recruit couriers within

the substantial émigré community who would be willing to carry subversive literature into the Ukraine. This project, managed by the CIA's Political and Psychological Staff's Soviet/East Europe Division, would be distributed in New York, Munich, London, Paris, and Tokyo. Eventually, QRDYNAMIC would encompass similar schemes into China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, **Yugoslavia, Afghanistan**, Soviet Central Asia, and the Soviet Far East. Additionally, QRDYNAMIC would subsidize journalists and other agents of influence across the globe.

V

VENONA. The close of the Cold War resulted in the so-called “peace dividend” and in 1995 the declassification and release of a collection of Soviet decrypts dated between 1940 and 1948. This material, amounting to some 2,900 texts sent on commercial cable systems such as Western Union between 1940 and 1948 consisted of trade, consular, diplomatic, NKVD, GRU, and Naval GRU traffic encrypted on one-time pads, some of which had duplicated pages. This unintended repetition was exploited by Anglo-American cryptanalysts who had access to the original trade messages and could reconstruct small samples of the other channels, including some of the NKVD messages which proved highly revealing. The project was terminated in 1979, by which time dozens of NKVD and GRU agents in the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Sweden, and Mexico had been compromised, among them the physicists Ted Hall and Klaus Fuchs, and the Cambridge mole Donald Maclean, although few of those identified were actually prosecuted (apart from Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Harry Gold and David Greenglass).

VENONA was the western counterintelligence community’s principal weapon during the Cold War and provided the evidence needed to remove suspects from access to classified information and provide leads to espionage investigations. Although Moscow was alerted to the source by the Armed Forces Security Agency linguist **William Weisband**, and again in 1949 by the Secret Intelligence Service mole Kim Philby, causing the Soviets to change their cipher system, much of the earlier traffic remained vulnerable to cryptologic attack.

Over a period of 36 years, British and American agencies devoted considerable resources to reconstructing the NKVD messages and after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc were able to authenticate the texts by comparison with the originals examined in Moscow, for example, at the Central Committee’s archives.

VETROV, VLADIMIR. A **KGB** Line X officer based in Paris, Vetrov was pitched, apparently unsuccessfully by the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) and later, while serving in Ottawa in 1978, by the Royal

Canadian Mounted Police Security Service which gave him \$2,000. Both supplied him with third country contact addresses so he could indicate his willingness to develop a relationship.

Upon his return to Moscow, Vetrov changed his mind and in early 1981 contacted the DST by having his brother-in-law send two postcards to an engineer working for Thomson Electronics in France. The DST's director, Marcel Chalet, was reluctant to hand the case over to the Service de Documentation de Exterieur et Contre-Espionage, as protocol required, because he was concerned about Soviet penetration, so he requested permission from President Francois Mitterand for the DST to run Vetrov in Moscow. This was granted, and soon afterward Vetrov was passed the name of Xavier Amiel, a Thomson-CSF employee based at their office in Moscow, but when he turned up unexpectedly carrying copies of 2,000 classified documents, his contact was appalled and although he agreed to smuggle the material back to France through Thomson's regular pouch, he refused to have anything further to do with Vetrov.

Accordingly, Patrick Ferrant, a French officer under military attaché cover was assigned the task of establishing contact with Vetrov, whose behavior became increasingly reckless. He had started an affair with Olga, a KGB secretary, and was drinking to excess. Nevertheless Vetrov held several meetings with the Frenchman, who was very distinctive, being six feet three inches tall, and unprepared for his harrowing encounters with Vetrov who drove him around Moscow at breakneck speed and even took him into sensitive KGB compounds by flashing his KGB pass. Even more alarmed was Ferrant's wife Madeleine who received Vetrov's packages in brush meetings but refused to participate any further when she found he had accidentally tossed an artillery fuze into her shopping bag by mistake. Ferrant subsequently suffered a nervous breakdown brought on by the stress of handling Vetrov.

The material supplied by Vetrov was very extensive and proved the extent of illicit Soviet technology acquisition operations conducted in the west. He revealed the names of more than 200 Line X officers stationed in 10 KGB *rezidenuras* in the West and provided more than 100 leads to individual agents recruited by Line X. President Mitterand used Vetrov's information to obtain a negotiating advantage with the United States and shared the product widely. As a precaution, Chalet had assigned Vetrov the codename FAREWELL so that if it was ever discovered, it would be assumed that the spy was either British or American.

The CIA sought to exploit Vetrov's treasure trove by peddling dud information and materiel through the channels compromised by him and, according to the CIA's Gus W. Weiss,

contrived to introduce altered products into KGB collection. American industry helped in the preparation of items to be “marketed” to Line X. Contrived computer chips found their way into Soviet military equipment, flawed turbines were installed on a gas pipeline, and defective plans disrupted the output of chemical plants and a tractor factory. The Pentagon introduced misleading information pertinent to stealth aircraft, space defense, and tactical aircraft. The Soviet Space Shuttle was a rejected NASA design.

Vetrov fell silent in November 1982 and the CIA learned that he had been convicted of stabbing a fellow KGB officer and had been sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for manslaughter. However, while in prison, Vetrov was betrayed by a KGB mole inside the DST codenamed DIAMOND, and he was executed.

W

WALKER, ARTHUR. A U.S. Navy submariner, Arthur Walker had joined the service in 1952 and subsequently had conducted an affair with his sister-in-law, Barbara. His own wife Rita had an affair with his brother John.

Walker claimed that he had only engaged in espionage in 1981 and 1982 when he had been employed as a defense contractor in Chesapeake, Virginia, and that the three compromised documents were classified as confidential and concerned ship construction. He was arrested on May 29, 1985, and in October of the same year was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of \$250,000. Walker died of kidney failure in April 2014 in a federal prison at Butner, North Carolina.

WALKER, JOHN. A retired U.S. Navy warrant officer, John Walker was a KGB spy who was indicted in May 1985 on six counts of espionage, along with his son Michael. Born in Washington D.C., in 1937, and the son of an alcoholic, bankrupt father, Walker had a burglary conviction as a youth and joined the U.S. Navy in May 1955 as an alternative to prison. Thirty years later, he was accused of having spied for the Soviets for 18 years, during which period he had held top secret crypto clearances, served on two ballistic nuclear submarines, the USS *Arthur Jackson* and *Simon Bolivar*, and had handled the most sensitive coding equipment, including the key cards used to alter the daily settings on the 37 Series, 14 Series, and 7 Series cipher machines. He also used the KY-8 voice scrambler. After having served on the USS *Razorback* as a radio operator, Walker had attended a school to learn repair skills for mending faulty cryptographic equipment until he was posted as the crypto-custodian to a combat supply ship, USS *Niagara Falls*, for duty in Vietnam. As the CMS custodian Walker was in charge of security for the ship's cipher systems and regulating the security procedures. At that time, the U.S. Navy employed the same cipher systems across the various commands, so compromising the Pacific Fleet's communications, even retrospectively, enabled the Soviets to read Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleet traffic, and even signals from the Navy's sensitive shore research and development bases in San Diego. It is believed that Walker's information was relayed to

the Vietnamese and compromised American battleplans in the region and enabled them to anticipate B-52 air raids.

Walker had experienced financial difficulties in December 1967 and had even contemplated suicide before he had visited the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C., where his offer to sell information had been accepted by the KGB *rezident*, Boris Solomatin, who had interviewed him for two hours. A month later, he met Yuri Linkov in a shopping mall in Alexandria, Virginia, and was promised a salary of \$4,000 a month, given a Minox camera, a schedule of dead-drops and a rotor reader for a KL-47. At the time, Walker's Navy salary was \$725 a month. He would not hold another personal meeting with a Soviet contact for 10 years, but over the 17 years of his espionage, he made some 30 drops. Walker remarked that he had always been curious that the KGB had expressed no interest in the KG-14 cipher machine, which he interpreted to mean that the Soviets already had another source for that material.

Anticipating his retirement in 1976, and a new career as a private detective, Walker had recruited his son who, at the time of his arrest, was a petty officer serving on the carrier USS *Nimitz* and was found to have 15 pounds of classified material in his locker. In addition, John Walker had recruited his brother, Lieutenant Commander Arthur Walker, and another navy friend, Jerry Whitworth. In October 1985, father and son pleaded guilty and received two life terms plus 10 years imprisonment, and 25 years' imprisonment, respectively, in return for John Walker's testimony against Whitworth, who surrendered to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in June 1985.

The damage assessment took five years to analyze the scale of the loss, and eventually the Stilwell Commission concluded that more than a million classified U.S. Navy messages had been intercepted and decrypted by the Soviets, many of them in real time. In return, Walker had received sufficient cash to buy two yachts, a houseboat, a plane, and a home in Norfolk's upscale Algonquin Apartments.

In 1984, John Walker participated in a television profile on the *PM* Magazine show which identified him as a Norfolk private investigator, and the owner of CounterSpy Inc. On May 15, 1985, a wiretap recorded Walker stating that he would be unable to attend an aunt's funeral the following weekend, which prompted a large FBI surveillance operation involving 50 Special Agents and two aircraft.

On the day of his arrest, he had attempted to deliver 149 classified documents, some six months old, from the USS *Nimitz* to the KGB, but he had been unable to find the package of money which was to be left for him by Alexei Tkachenko. He spent four hours trying to find the cash until he returned to the hotel in Rockville, Maryland, where he was arrested by Bob

Hunter and Jim Caluch. When taken into custody, Walker had claimed to have spied for the French.

Walker's son Michael had joined the U.S. Navy in December 1981. Born in November 1962, he had been 17 years old when his mother Barbara had disclosed that his father was a spy. After he had been recruited he removed classified documents, including secret battleplans, from burnbags and smuggled them off his ship in a laundry bag to sell to his father for a total of \$1,000. When he was arrested on the USS *Nimitz* in May 1985, 15 pounds of classified documents were found in his locker. He was flown to Andrews Airforce base and then driven to the FBI's Baltimore Field Office to be confronted with his wife Rachel who persuaded him to confess.

Walker is serving his sentence at a prison medical facility at Butner, North Carolina. *See also* SIGINT.

WARSAW PACT. Established in September 1955, the Warsaw Pact was intended to act as a counter-balance to **NATO**, which the Federal Republic of Germany joined in May of the same year. The mutual defense pact included **Albania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania**, and the Soviet Union. The military alliance's unified command structure was headed by Marshal Ivan Konev and only undertook one major military campaign, which was the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968—an intervention competed without the participation of Albania, Romania, and East Germany. Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact did not incorporate an integrated intelligence component, and all collection and analysis was undertaken by the KGB and GRU which distributed weekly bulletins to its partners.

With the benefit of information supplied first by **Piotr Popov** and then **Oleg Penkovsky**, Western analysts developed an accurate picture of Warsaw Pact strengths, capabilities, and weaponry, but in the absence of any similar source following the arrest of Penkovsky in October 1962, there was a gap in knowledge, which included details of the Warsaw Pact's war plan, until the CIA was almost overwhelmed with disaffected personnel volunteering to act as sources after the 1968 **invasion of Czechoslovakia**. Among them, in 1972, was Colonel **Ryszard Kuklinski** whose access to Warsaw Pact planning material was unsurpassed and served to rectify a large hole in the reporting and assessments. The revised estimates revealed hitherto unsuspected shortfalls in the Pact's training and readiness and highlighted the differences in quality among the various member Warsaw forces. As a consequence of Kuklinski's material, and the development of more technical sources, the Western appreciations became increasingly sophisticated, culminating in the 1979 National Intelligence Estimate: *Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO*

(NIE 11-14-79). During the nine years of Kuklinski's operational activity, the CIA produced more than 60 documents, manuals, or lecture notes from the Soviet General Staff Academy and other higher military institutions, exposing the current doctrine and all its flaws.

Years later, after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, evidence emerged from the archives that Warsaw Pact doctrine during the dry period between 1963 and 1968 changed markedly, and adopted the view that only sudden and unexpected surprise attack on NATO would succeed, and that anyway NATO's defensive posture was simply an elaborate sham. During those five years, Warsaw Pact planners drafted war scenarios based on these two very dubious assumptions.

WEISBAND, WILLIAM. Born in Odessa in 1908, although his American passport showed him to have been born in Alexandria, Egypt, Volodya Weisband had been taken by his parents Isadore and Sarah to the United States in 1924 with his elder brothers Mark and Harold, where he had become a naturalized citizen in 1938. Isadore had left Odessa first, reaching Egypt via Turkey, with his wife following five years later with Volodya. A jeweler by trade, Isadore eventually owned three shops in New York City, while his wife ran a restaurant in Alexandria when the family had been reunited.

Fluent in Russian, Volodya adopted the name William and attended the American University in Washington, D.C., and also worked at the Statler Hotel in New York. He had been drafted into the U.S. Army in 1942 and had served with the Signals Security Agency in North Africa and Italy and briefly had acted as a liaison officer with the Red Navy in Naples. All his posts gave him access to highly classified information, and he served as a cryptographic control officer, and at the end of service in Europe, as a liaison officer with the Free French. Upon his return to the United States, he had been posted to Arlington Hall as an interpreter, working in the Russian Section where he had constant contact with Meredith Gardner and the other Army Security Agency cryptographers attempting to solve the Soviet ciphers.

Although Weisband had no direct official contact with the team handling **VENONA**, his sideline of selling jewelry to the Arlington Hall staff had given him considerable freedom of movement, visiting restricted areas, gossiping with the typists, and showing them his wares which included several good pieces from Harry Winston, inherited from his brother Harold who had run the family business after Mark's death in the war.

Weisband's role as a Soviet spy was not directly disclosed by a **VENONA** text, although a message from Pavel Klarin of the New York *rezidentura* dated June 23, 1943, about the travel movements of **LINK**, are thought to be the only reference to him, although it was not fully translated until

1979. However, he was interviewed by the FBI on May 9, 1950, and was suspended by the Armed Forces Security Agency (which had been created by an amalgamation of the Army Security Agency the previous year) four days later.

Weisband, who died of a heart attack at the wheel of his car in Washington D.C., in May 1967 was never charged with espionage, but he was convicted of contempt in November 1950 and sentenced to a year's imprisonment for having failed to turn up for a grand jury enquiry in his **Communist Party of the United States of America** membership, but the clue that led the FBI to him came from Jones Orin York, a Soviet spy who did appear in several VENONA texts, codenamed NEEDLE. Thereafter, Weisband was the subject of intermittent FBI surveillance at his home Arlington, where he operated as an insurance agent, collecting subscriptions door to door in a poor, predominantly black, community.

Weisband was almost certainly responsible for alerting the NKVD to the VENONA program and very possibly provided wider information that compromised **BOURBON** and led the "Black Friday" in 1948.

WHALEN, WILLIAM. Arrested at his home in Dewey Drive, Alexandria, Virginia, in July 1966, 50-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Whalen was identified as a spy by **Dmitri Polyakov**, a source run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Whalen, who had retired from working for the Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon in 1961, had been recruited originally in 1955 at a shopping centreparking lot in Alexandria by Mikhail M. Shumaeve, listed as the embassy's first secretary who had later passed the case on to his GRU colleague, Colonel Sergei A. Edenski, the assistant military attaché who returned to Moscow in February 1960. Edenski would later be promoted and posted to the Soviet embassy in London. According to the indictment issued on July 12, 1966, the Soviets had received information pertaining to atomic weaponry, missiles, military plans for the defense of Europe, estimates of comparative military capabilities, military intelligence reports and analyses, information concerning the retaliation plans by the United States Strategic Air Command and information pertaining to troop movements.

Evidence from the U.S. Army's deputy chief of staff asserted that Whalen had "seriously but not critically degraded the capabilities of the U.S. and the Allies to successfully wage general or limited war." He was alleged to have received \$5,500 at five meetings held between December 1959 and March 1961 was convicted and in March 1967 sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment with the minimum of publicity, and died in prison, survived by his wife Bernardine and daughter Kathy. When polygraphed by the FBI in September 1963, Whalen had broken down and signed a series of confessions, citing his

behavior on financial problems, which he later attempted unsuccessfully to suppress.

Whalen had joined the U.S. Army in 1940 and in 1948 was assigned to an intelligence staff post, first in Europe, participating in PAPERCLIP, the recruitment of Nazi scientists to work on defense projects in the United States, and then in Japan. In 1951, he was transferred to the Army Security Agency, and eight years later, moved to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Intelligence Objectives Agency as deputy director. He suffered a severe heart attack in July 1960 which led to his retirement in February 1960, by which time he had sold his Soviet contacts 17 classified military manuals. Although Whalen's usefulness as an espionage asset ceased upon his disability retirement, he had been active over a period of five years when he had been in a critical position with access to precisely the categories of material the Soviets most valued.

WIELE, ROBERT VAN DE. On January 25, 1963, Robert van de Wiele, a Frenchman employed by **NATO** between May 1952 and September 1961, in the Documentation Section of the International Secretariat, was indicted on charges of treason and espionage on behalf of **Romania**. He had served as a clerk in NATO's Central Registry, and had been questioned about his contacts with a Romanian diplomat some 16 months after he had left his NATO job. At his interview with the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, van de Wiele denied any wrongdoing, and he was placed under surveillance. Just five days later, he was caught while holding a rendezvous with the very same man and was arrested. He was later sentenced to a years' imprisonment, suspended, and a fine of 3,000 francs.

Six years later, more incriminating evidence about van de Wiele was disclosed by a defector, Colonel Ion Iacobescu, who had been the *Departmentul de Informatii Externe's* (DIE) deputy *rezident* in Paris, and consequently he was re-arrested in September 1969. According to NATO's 13-page damage assessment, based on his confession, the material he passed at two meetings with his DIE handler in 1960 amounted to about 40 items and included unclassified international air agreements and documents relating to the International Air Transport Association; a 30-page classified copy of NATO's budget; secret documents relating to "NATO manpower, infrastructure, food and agriculture." In August 1961, he sold a NATO "staff directory – indications on the nationality, family status, material conditions and, where possible, the political opinions of the staff members known" to him.

The conviction of van de Wiele, after the cases of **Francois Roussilhe** and **Charles de la Salle**, marked the end of the DIE's HUMINT collection program against NATO.

WISNER, FRANK. A Wall Street lawyer, Frank Wisner was appointed the Office of Strategic Services's (OSS) X-2 representative in Istanbul in October 1943 and was a witness when the OSS SI branch's principal network in **Hungary**, codenamed CEREUS, was rounded up when the Germans invaded in March 1944. Chastened by this experience, Wisner worked closely with his British Secret Intelligence Service colleagues to develop sources across south-east Europe and in March 1945 was transferred to the OSS station in Wiesbaden. At the end of the war, he returned to his law practice in New York, but in 1949, he joined the State Department as undersecretary with responsibility for Allied occupied countries, and in September 1948, was selected by Secretary of State George Marshall to become the first chief of the **Office of Policy Coordination** (OPC) an independent organization associated with, but not subordinate to, the newly created **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA). OPC's remit was political, economic, and psychological warfare directed against the Soviet Union, with the handling of **HUMINT** and covert sources reserved to the CIA's Office of Special Operations. Eventually, in October 1951, the OPC would be absorbed into the CIA's Directorate for Plans under another OSS veteran, Allen Dulles. In August 1952, OPC and OSO were merged under Wisner's leadership, Dulles having been promoted deputy director of Central Intelligence. Wisner's own deputy would be Dick Helms, a former newspaper correspondent who had served in OSS.

An early OPC project was fostering subversion in **Albania**, a target that in 1948 was acquiring strategic significance as the Soviets developed a naval base at Pashaliman on Valona Bay, directly opposite the Italian port of Otranto to support a flotilla of four Whiskey-class submarines. Codenamed BG/FIEND by OPC and VALUABLE by the British Secret Intelligence Service, the plan was compromised from the outset by the employment of volunteers drawn from heavily penetrated groups of émigrés and was terminated in 1953.

Meanwhile, Wisner's subordinate George N. Belic, who had been born in Odessa and had worked with him in Istanbul during the war took charge of the Baltic operations where **REDSOX** was arranging the infiltration of émigrés back into their Soviet-occupied homelands.

Wisner found the strain of running a large organization difficult and suffered from severe strain, so much so that Helms was forced to take on much of the burden. The refusal of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration to approve Wisner's ambitious proposals for covert intervention during the **Hungarian uprising** left him severely depressed.

In 1958, Wisner was posted to London as Chief of Station, and he retired in 1961. He took his own life in October 1965.

X

XY REZIDENTURA. The wartime decision of Lavrentia Beria to combine the activities of the NKVD and the GRU to create a third organization, for the sole purpose of collecting atomic intelligence, would have a lasting effect on Soviet espionage and undermine the intrinsic compartmentation that had afforded the two services so much protection. Prior to the amalgamation, scientific information was channeled through the NKVD's 10th Section of the Fifth Department, which had been given responsibility for the collection of scientific and technical intelligence in 1938. In May 1940, this office had headed by Leonid R. Kvasnikov, a graduate of the Institute of Chemical Engineering who had worked in the security *apparat* since 1939 and had just returned from a mission to Poland, lasting several months. In his new role, Kvasnikov had monitored the scientific developments in the atomic field and, seeing the military potential, had prepared a questionnaire to collect the relevant information which was dispatched to the countries he considered most likely to be engaged in the military application of atomic power, with the exception of the United States. The omission was because the local *rezident*, Gaik Ovakimyan had been detained by the U.S. authorities.

The first to react to Moscow's questionnaire was the London *rezidentura* and on September 25, 1941, Anatoli V. Gorsky reported that a meeting had taken place in London of the Uranium Committee, a Cabinet subcommittee which had decided to contract Imperial Chemical Industries to develop a uranium bomb. Gorsky asserted, on information supplied by John Cairncross that "the Chiefs of Staff, at their meeting on 20 September 1941, had taken the decision to start on the construction of a plant in Britain for the manufacture of a uranium bomb." On October 3, 1941, Gorsky dispatched another message on the work of the Uranium Committee which contained details on the proposed magnitude of the critical mass of uranium in the bomb, and the problems connected with the industrial separation of Uranium-235 by gas diffusion. The subsequent encoded reports to Moscow were prepared by Vladimir B. Barkovsky, then aged 28.

In March 1942, the NKVD prepared a memorandum for Stalin on the west's development of an atomic bomb, and apart from the descriptive element, this paper contained proposals for what the Soviets should do next,

suggesting that a consultative body on atomic problems should be set up and attached to the State Committee for Defense and that prominent experts should be allowed to study the NKVD's material so it could be evaluated and exploited.

On November 26, 1942, a special questionnaire was sent to New York, and another went to London two days later, containing instructions to assess the chances of acquiring new sources. The day after receiving it, Gorsky reported that Professor James Chadwick, together with three young scientists, had left for Canada to work on the atomic project.

In order to carry out their new task, the NKVD set up a special substation in New York, designated "XY" for scientific and technical intelligence and headed by Kvasnikov who was posted to Amtorg from March 1943 to October 1945. His position in Moscow was taken by Lev Vasilevsky and the project, codenamed ENORMOZ, was supervised by the Head of the 3rd Department of the NKVD's First Directorate, and later by the Deputy Head of Intelligence, Gaik Ovakimyan, while a staff intelligence officer, Major Yelena M. Potapova, was given responsibility for processing and translating the agent material. At certain stages, she was assisted by Andre Graur, a 3rd Department officer who had been implicated in an espionage case in **Sweden** before the war and had fled to London in June 1943 following the arrest of Douglas Springhall, a Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) activist and one of his key sources in London. According to the NKVD archives, Yelena Modrzhinskaya, Dmitri F. Ustinov and an aide named Cohen were initiated into certain purely operational aspects of the case, and Ovakimyan reported on all operational questions and intelligence material received directly to the Head of the First Directorate, Pavel Fitin. Either through him, or the Head of the NKVD, Vsevolod N. Merkulov, all the material reached Beria, who coordinated the entire operation.

The concentration of the NKVD's efforts brought its first results in the beginning of 1943 when Barkovsky established contact with a valuable source, codenamed ERIC, of information on atomic research in Britain. The centre had learned of ERIC in December 1942 when the *rezidentura* had reported that a Communist sympathizer had passed a detailed report on atomic research in Britain and America. The Austrian physicist, Engelbert Broda, intended to send the material to the CPGB but it had been relayed to the NKVD. With ENORMOZ in mind, Gorsky had asked the centre for permission to establish direct contact with this scientist, and when approval had been given, Gorsky asked his contact to meet the scientist again and have him to agree to a meeting with a Soviet intelligence officer. In a letter to the centre dated March 10, 1943, the *rezidentura* reported on the meeting with ERIC, recalling that

At first he hesitated, saying that he would have to think it over and that he saw no need for meeting anybody since he had already written all he knew about the atomic problem. Later in the conversation his attitude changed and he said that he hoped it would not be an Englishman since his English comrades were very careless. Finally, after assurances that everything would be properly organized, he said that he would be glad to meet our comrade.

The meeting took place in January 1943 at a London tube station, and after the usual signs and passwords had been exchanged, the scientist was judged to be straightforward and friendly, although obviously nervous. He verified all the arrangements for the meeting and it lasted more than an hour and a half, during which nothing was called directly by its name, but “ERIC knew with whom he had agreed to cooperate” concluded the *rezidentura*. Barkovsky remembers that when he met his new source for the first time he had been asked whether he understood nuclear physics and, upon receiving an unsatisfactory reply, the scientist said that he wanted his contact not to be just a transmitting channel but to understand what it was all about. He urged the intelligence officer to study *Applied Nuclear Physics* by Pollard and Davidson, and Barkovsky took his advice, and was grateful to ERIC for insisting on this as the American textbook turned out to be a great help to him in running his source. “He told me, ‘we’ll go through the book together, and then it will be considerably easier for you to deal with me.’ I also did not see any other way out. I was completely swamped with work, but I started poring over the textbooks.” Barkovsky proved to be the key figure in the London *rezidentura* where he served from 1940 to 1946. He was posted to Washington from 1956 to 1963.

Broda had arrived in England as a refugee in April 1938 and was employed at the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge where he recruited a young colleague and fellow CPGB member, Alan Nunn May, but when May was posted to Canada as part of the Manhattan project, he was handled in Ottawa by the GRU *rezidentura* headed by Nikolai Zabotin.

This cross-fertilization, between the NKVD and the GRU would prove fatal. When in 1949, another of Broda’s colleagues, Klaus Fuchs, was eventually identified in the **VENONA** decrypts as a Soviet spy, he was able to pick out his New York contact, Harry Gold, from a collection of FBI surveillance photos. Initially a GRU asset, Fuchs had been run in England from August 1941 by the GRU *rezident*’s secretary, Semyon Kremer, but had been passed to Semyon Semyonov of the NKVD’s New York *rezidentura* when he traveled to the United States in December 1943. Semyonov would be recalled to Moscow in September 1944. The transfer of Fuchs from one supposedly compartmented organization to the other served to compromise both.

When questioned, Gold named his source in Los Alamos as a junior technician, David Greenglass, who promptly revealed that he had been recruited by his own sister, Ethel Rosenberg. Once the Rosenbergs had been compromised, the dominos fell quickly, and atomic espionage became a feature of the early Cold War. May, Fuchs, Gold, Greenglass would be imprisoned, and the Rosenbergs were executed. Others in the Rosenberg ring were questioned and the investigations would last for many years, with two of the conspirators, Morris and Lona Cohen, escaping arrest until January 1961 when they were detained in London. Altogether, the Federal Bureau of Investigation prepared 45 individual cases for prosecution, although most escaped that fate for a variety of evidential reasons, with only Morton Sobell serving a long prison sentence of 17 years.

At the heart of the XY *rezidentura* in New York was Aleksandr Feklisov, alias Fomin, who operated under consular cover between 1940 and 1946. He was at the London *rezidentura* from 1947 to 1950, and was posted to Washington, D.C., for four years from 1960. His *resident* in New York had been Anatoli Yakskov, alias Yakovlev, who had handled Julius Rosenberg, Harry Gold, Al Sarant, and Joel Barr personally and employed Leontina Cohen as a courier.

The removal of the compartmentation between the GRU and NKVD networks, combined with the **VENONA** decrypts, had a disastrous effect on postwar Soviet intelligence operations which were required to devote considerable time and resources to the protection of compromised agents, exfiltrating vulnerable personnel, rebuilding disrupted networks, and negotiating the release of convicted spies. Two atomic spies, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were executed, and among those sentenced to terms of imprisonment were Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, Morris and Lona Cohen, Morton Sobell, Harry Gold, and David Greenglass. Other suspects, such as Joel Barr and Al Sarant, were assisted to escape to the Soviet Bloc before they could be arrested.

Y

YUGOSLAVIA. Under the leadership of the wartime partisan guerrilla Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia left the Soviet Bloc in 1948 and thereafter pursued a non-aligned foreign policy and experienced minimal, if any, interference from Western powers which encouraged Tito's independence. However, his regime was dependent on exercising strict discipline and internal security within the federal state's five component countries, and the principal instrument of repression was the feared security apparatus, the Kontraobveščevalna Služba (KOS), which acquired a ruthless reputation. Created in 1946, KOS was under the direct control of President Tito's nominee, Aleksandar Ranković, until he was removed from his post in 1965. KOS also established a foreign counterintelligence capability which was directed against emigre groups overseas.

In 1950, the U.S. **Central Intelligence Agency** circulated National Intelligence Estimate 7, entitled *The Current Situation in Yugoslavia* and assessed a significant Soviet threat to the country:

The Tito regime in Yugoslavia, the only Communist regime not subservient to Moscow, has steadily, although cautiously, improved its relations with Western governments. This trend represents mainly an attempt at self-preservation rather than any basic change in political philosophy and reflects the appreciation of the principal Yugoslav Communist leaders that they cannot heal the breach with the USSR and be sure of continuing to hold power.

In order to widen its support among the Yugoslav people, the overwhelming majority of whom are opposed to communism, the Tito regime has inaugurated a number of ostensibly liberal changes in the political and economic system. These changes, however, have not changed the basic structure of the Tito regime, which remains an anti-democratic, dictatorial, and repressive Communist regime dependent on its police power for continued existence.

The USSR's objective in Yugoslavia is the elimination of the Tito government and its replacement by a regime subservient to Moscow. Soviet policy for the time being seems to call for the continuation of economic, political, psychological, and subversive pressures short of open military action either by to call for the continuation of economic, political, psychological, and

subversive pressures short of open military action either by Soviet Satellites or by the USSR.

Without substantial outside logistic support, the Yugoslav armed forces would be unable to withstand a combined Satellite attack, and even if given such support, their capacity for sustained resistance would be questionable. They could not in any circumstances withstand a serious Soviet attack.

The extensive drought of the summer of 1950 materially reduced Yugoslav agricultural production and contributed to an economic crisis that may threaten the stability of the Tito regime. Substantial outside aid is essential to meet the basic requirements of the Yugoslav people until this crisis is past.

The USSR will spare no effort to exploit this crisis by increasing the efforts of its agents in the related fields of espionage, subversion, sabotage, fomentation of labor unrest, and possibly attempted assassination of Yugoslav leaders.

For several months at least, the Yugoslav security police probably will be able to maintain internal control even if the economic crisis is not alleviated by Western aid.

While it is impossible to make a firm estimate of the longer-term effects under these circumstances, the probability is that Tito's police regime can survive the period of crisis, although in weakened condition.

In this event, a softening of Yugoslav defensive capabilities and will-to-resist might occur and might be a factor in bringing on a direct military attack. This factor alone, however, will not be decisive in Soviet strategy, which will be dictated mainly by the Soviet estimate of the world balance of power and of Western reaction to an attack on Yugoslavia.

If Tito should obtain substantial aid from the West, his position both as party and national leader would remain comparatively secure.

The current Yugoslav economic crisis has provided an opportunity for the United States to seek further gains in exploiting the Yugoslav-Soviet break in behalf of the West. In addition to the opportunity to strengthen Tito's position as a deviationist, the granting of US aid would create a situation favorable to effecting more active Yugoslav support of the aims of the Western world.

The CIA analysts went to consider Soviet intentions toward Belgrade:

The USSR's objective in Yugoslavia is the elimination of the Tito government and its replacement by a regime subservient to Moscow. Apparently unwilling to launch a military attack against Yugoslavia, either by its satellites or by itself, Moscow has applied strong economic, political, and psychological pressures short of war for elimination of the Tito government and its replacement by a regime subservient to Moscow. Apparently unwilling to launch a military attack against Yugoslavia either by its Satellites or by itself, Moscow has applied strong economic, political, and psychological

pressures short of war in an effort to weaken the Yugoslav regime and isolate it from the Soviet orbit. Although the possibility of a Soviet and/or Satellite attack against Yugoslavia cannot be dismissed, Soviet policy for the time being seems to call for continuation of all previously used pressures against Yugoslavia, either separately or in concert.

The Soviet Union's objective in Yugoslavia is the elimination of the Tito government and its replacement by a regime subservient to Moscow.

Moscow has shown that the elimination of Tito remains a constant goal. The Soviet radio at present devotes more time to broadcasts to Yugoslavia than to any other country. The only Cominform meeting held since the expulsion of Tito in June 1948 was convoked in November 1949 to announce the tactics to be used against Tito and against any Titoism in the world Communist movement.

Apparently unwilling thus far to launch a military attack against Yugoslavia either by its Satellites or by itself, Moscow has applied strong economic, political, and psychological pressure short of war in an effort to weaken the Yugoslav regime and isolate it from the Soviet orbit. The USSR and its Satellites have established an economic boycott against Yugoslavia and have inspired and encouraged sabotage and subversive activity against the Tito regime. The Soviet Bloc countries have renounced their mutual assistance treaties with Yugoslavia, virtually suspended diplomatic relations, and harassed and intimidated Yugoslav diplomats abroad. The Yugoslavs also complain that their national minorities in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Eastern Germany have suffered intimidation and discrimination. Moscow has maintained a constant threat of military operations by means of border incidents and a military build-up in neighboring countries, and through repeated charges of Yugoslav aggressive intentions against the Soviet Bloc countries. The USSR has secured the expulsion of Yugoslavs from international Communist front organizations and has maintained an intense propaganda campaign to prove that the Tito regime is "fascist" and subservient to the West.

Although the possibility of a Soviet and/or a Satellite attack against Yugoslavia cannot be dismissed, Soviet policy for the time being seems to call for the continued application of all previously used pressures against Yugoslavia, either separately or in concert. Moscow undoubtedly is trying to exploit a situation, such as the present serious drought, which gives it the opportunity for increased political leverage both among the masses of the people and the hierarchy of the Party.

At the end of the Cold War Yugoslavia was dissolved into the newly independent states of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia.

Z

ZENIT. During the Cold War, Soviet intelligence agencies invested heavily in technical sources, and in particular ZENIT, a satellite collection program designed to capture imagery with four cameras and some signals. The first successful ZENIT launch took place in March 1962 and *Cosmos-7* ejected a film capsule that was recovered on the ground. Subsequent ZENIT satellites included RESURS-F and KOMETA series with flight durations lasting up to eight weeks. The final ZENIT flight was in 1994.

Appendix 1

Soviet Antisubmarine Warfare: Current Capabilities and Priorities

INTRODUCTION

During World War I, the attack submarine emerged as a serious threat to surface ships on the high seas, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) became an important component of naval operations. Until the recent advent of the ballistic missile submarine, the object of ASW was the protection of warships, troopships, and cargo vessels from attack. Success in ASW meant the maintenance of a sufficient level of security at sea to preserve the strength of the fleet and ensure the transport of ground forces and war materiel. Some losses—frequently large ones—could be accepted, and destruction or neutralization of every enemy submarine was not essential.

The nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine has radically altered the dimensions of the ASW problem. First, nuclear submarines, because of their speed and endurance and their capacity to remain completely submerged for long periods, are much harder to find and destroy than were older submarines. Second, ballistic missile submarines need not approach hostile forces to carry out their mission, and in fact purposely evade other forces. Third, and most important, ballistic missile submarines have a far greater destructive potential—a factor which has drastically altered ASW requirements. In past wars, the limitation of damage was an acceptable goal, but in a nuclear war, failure to destroy all ballistic missile submarines—leaving even a few—could mean catastrophe. A single U.S. Poseidon submarine, for example, is capable of delivering approximately 160 nuclear warheads. The consequences of allowing even one such submarine to launch its missiles could be severe.

The beginning of the Soviet effort in open-ocean ASW coincided with the post–World War II venture of the Soviet Navy from the coastal waters onto the high seas. The development of ASW defenses for the fleets at sea has occupied much of the Soviet effort since that time. The emergence of the nuclear attack submarine, moreover, has increased the Soviets' longstanding concern for the security of their coastal areas and intracoastal shipping. Consequently, they initiated efforts to develop ASW defenses in coastal areas as well as on the open ocean.

A Soviet ASW response to the development of ballistic missile submarines has been less evident. Although Soviet writings since the late 1950s have indicated awareness of the threat posed by Polaris submarines, the Soviets probably had enough experience and understanding by the mid-1960s to realize that the problem of Polaris would not readily yield to conventional naval forces.

This report evaluates the spectrum of Soviet ASW operations, including present ASW methods, the ships and aircraft employed, ASW organization, and command and control of Soviet ASW forces. Soviet operations are also examined to discern possibilities that previously undetected ASW systems are being employed.

SUMMARY

Soviet capabilities for ASW fall far short of the minimum requirements for protection of the surface navy and represent an almost negligible threat to the U.S. ballistic missile submarine fleet. The low level of effectiveness results primarily from the lack of an open-ocean surveillance system and from inadequate sensors. Soviet ASW weapons appear adequate, but delivery platforms are too few in number and are not optimized for the ASW mission. Although research and development on ASW systems are being pursued, prospects for improvement are confined principally to defense against submarines in Soviet coastal waters.

Soviet statements suggest that strategic offensive ASW—directed against ballistic missile submarines—is a major concern of the Soviet Navy. Analysis of Soviet naval operations presents a contrary view. Almost all observed ASW activity supports fleet defense and coastal ASW missions. The dominant theme in naval exercises is the defense of the ocean approaches to the USSR, especially against Western carrier strike forces.

The Soviets have two avenues of approach to strategic offensive ASW, either through open-ocean surveillance or through submarine trailing. Analysis of Soviet ASW operations, [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] and assessment of Soviet ASW-related technology indicate that the Soviet Navy does not now have an effective capability for broad ocean surveillance to detect submarines.

[XX] The Soviets have conducted several coordinated submarine transits involving Y class ballistic missile submarines and attack submarines through the Norwegian Sea. These operations suggest that the Soviets are primarily concerned with the protection of their own SSBN force. Observation of these and other Soviet

operations and the units involved suggest that the Soviets have not developed the tactics and the submarines to trail effectively the quieter U.S. units.

The command-and-control system of the Soviet Navy probably is adequate to direct surface and air forces in large-scale, coordinated ASW exercises. Command and control is, however, a potential constraint on Soviet submarine operations against other submarines. At present, the Soviets cannot maintain the continuous direct two-way communications between headquarters and trailing submarines that would be necessary for near-simultaneous destruction of an enemy ballistic missile submarine force.

Analysis of Soviet production of naval aircraft, surface ships, and submarines from the late 1950s onward indicates that no large-scale specialized ASW construction program was undertaken during that period. Although the Soviets have produced about 100 surface warships since 1958, these ships are multiple-purpose units whose ASW weapons and sensors are designed for self-defense. They also produced attack submarines—considered by the Soviets to be appropriate for ASW—at a low but steady rate. In the late 1960s, the Soviets began series production of a new generation of ASW aircraft, primarily for use in coastal defense but also including some longer range aircraft for a tactical capability against hostile submarines in the sea approaches to the USSR.

Despite a continuing effort to build ships capable of defending themselves from enemy submarines, the Soviets still are unable to protect their forces from submarine attack. The prognosis is not optimistic. Their surface forces for the near term are likely to remain vulnerable to submarines.

The Soviets have recently begun to pay increased attention to ASW operations in the sea approaches to the USSR. Without a broad-area ASW surveillance system, they have little hope of success except with operations incorporating concentrated submarine barriers augmented by air and surface ASW forces.

Even in these operations, the technical deficiencies of Soviet sensor systems are likely to prevent the Soviets from developing effective ASW defenses in their sea approaches in the near future.

Except in the waters within a few miles of naval base entrances, Soviet ASW forces have little capability to protect the coastal areas from submarine intrusions. Lack of effective detection systems and the apparent low state of crew training owing to the unchallenging nature of Soviet ASW training are largely responsible for this inefficiency.

The inadequacies of the ASW sensors—especially sonars—are a major factor limiting Soviet ASW capabilities. About 90 percent of the major ASW surface ships have sonars which provide little detection capability, even under favorable conditions. Fewer than 20 Soviet ships are equipped with

the latest model sonars with range potentials similar to those of currently operational Western sonars. Even for these, however, the Soviets apparently lack the signal-processing techniques used by the West and thus cannot fully exploit the potential of the sonars.

Similarly, despite steady efforts to improve them, the latest passive sonars on Soviet submarines have detection ranges of only about one-half those of modern U.S. nuclear submarines. The difference is due in part to the greater noise generated by Soviet submarines, but probably also to technical deficiencies in the sonars themselves.

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] The Soviets are known to have nuclear warheads for torpedoes, but it is uncertain whether these are ASW torpedoes and, if so, how they would be delivered. They probably are developing improved acoustic homing torpedoes and may be developing a missile capable of delivering a torpedo to a range of 30 nautical miles.

Major ASW concerns of the present are likely to influence the shape of Soviet efforts in the next several years. Requirements for coastal defense and for defending naval forces in distant deployments against Western submarines will motivate Soviet production of ASW equipment and the development of ASW forces. The Soviet coastal defense posture may be moderately improved with the development of shallow water, medium-range detection systems and improved surface ships and submarines.

The quest for a counter to the Polaris threat will involve research and development on sensors and the development of trailing capabilities. Without a major advance in ocean surveillance technology or substantial improvement in trailing capabilities, however, Soviet anti-Polaris capabilities probably will not be substantially improved over the next five years.

* * *

THE SUBMARINE THREAT CONFRONTING THE SOVIETS

Western Ballistic Missile Submarines

The Polaris and Poseidon forces of the United States and the United Kingdom present a combined threat of 45 ballistic missile submarines. [XXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX] More than 20 of these submarines are on station at any time in the Pacific, the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Norwegian Sea.

By 1976, a total of 31 of the U.S. ballistic missile submarines will be converted to launch the Poseidon C-3 missile. The Poseidon missile delivers from 6 to 14 independently targeted warheads. Poseidon warheads further complicate the threat because of their small size and greater reentry speeds,

rendering interception by ABM more difficult. The remaining [XX] U.S. and [XX] U.K. submarines will carry the A-3 Polaris missile. The greater range of the A-3 and C-3 missiles has expanded the previous operating area for the U.S. SSBNs by a factor of more than four.

Soviet Perception of the Ballistic Missile Submarine Threat

Soviet military writers began to consider the Western ballistic missile submarine threat early in its development. The Soviets may have had more confidence about dealing with the Polaris threat in 1960 than they have today. The Polaris A-1 missile of that time had a range of about 1,200 nm and carried one warhead which slowed to subsonic speeds after reentering the atmosphere. In their long-range planning, the Soviets may have envisioned that a large ASW program, supplemented by widely deployed ABM defenses, would effectively limit damage from a Polaris strike.

The Soviets probably underestimated the complexity of combating the Polaris system. Early attempts to develop a means for locating and destroying Polaris submarines were probably important lessons to the Soviets in the realities of offensive ASW. The advent of the longer range A-3 Polaris and the announcement of the Poseidon program complicated the problem even more.

To support a Soviet “bolt-from-the-blue” first strike or to weaken the U.S. ability to strike the USSR, Soviet forces would have to conduct successful preemptive ASW attacks against large numbers of on-station submarines shortly after receipt of the order.

U.S. analyses of such hypothetical warhead exchanges, however, show that there is no rational incentive for the Soviet Union to strike U.S. strategic attack forces unless the Soviets possess a capability to destroy nearly all of the Polaris fleet simultaneously.[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

The Soviets apparently decided, in view of the risks inherent, in such a strategy, that their response to the U.S. Polaris fleet should not be a defensive reaction with anti-Polaris forces but rather a ballistic missile submarine force of their own.

Western Attack Submarines

The development of the attack submarine into a fast, concealed warship of high endurance and independence has had a profound influence on the world’s major navies. ASW weapons and sensors are now apparent on the decks of modern major warships. These ASW armaments rank in importance with anti-air and anti-surface ship systems. A warship, however potent its offensive capabilities may be, is of dubious value if it cannot detect and at least evade the attack of submarine. The old tactic of holding a hostile submarine

down until its deteriorating battery and atmosphere forced it to face destruction on the surface has become obsolete. The nuclear submarine is free to run, possibly faster than its pursuer, and reattack from a new direction.

The U.S. fleet has 54 nuclear attack submarines and it plans to increase that figure to about 90 by the end of the 1970s. The British Navy has nuclear attack units. The United States now has 40 and the United Kingdom [XXX] diesel-electric submarines, but most of the U.S. submarines probably will be phased out by the end of the decade. About 65 diesel-electric submarines of other NATO countries operate within range of the coastal areas of the European USSR.

Soviet Perception of the Attack Submarine Threat

In recent years, the Soviet Navy has increasingly exposed its forces for political and military effect in distant areas, such as the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean. The credibility of these forces as instruments of Soviet foreign policy and their viability in hostile circumstances are dependent on their defensive capabilities. The Soviets probably consider cruise missile armaments on most of their surface forces to be adequate against the surface threat. But experience has probably taught them to be less than complacent about their abilities to deal with attack submarines. They have taken measures to bolster their defenses in particularly vulnerable areas, such as the Mediterranean, through the use of surface, air, and submarine barrier forces. The Soviets are concerned that their relatively concentrated centers of naval and maritime activity along the Soviet littoral would be particularly inviting to Western submarines in war. These areas are also sensitive in peacetime as Soviet forces conduct exercises and advanced systems testing.

The Soviets regard the nuclear attack submarine as the greatest threat to their own fleet of ballistic missile submarines. They have written that they would expect to confront Western submarine barriers in areas on the routes to the open seas. The Soviets have read and discussed U.S. proposals for trailing and escorting ballistic missile submarines. These concerns may have led them to escort some of their Y class missile submarines with their attack submarines.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR SUBMARINE

Detection, Localization, and Destruction

The Soviets have recognized that they must develop systems and tactics to solve each of the three elemental tasks in ASW: detection, localization, and destruction of the target submarine.

Submarine Detection Capabilities

Detection has become more complex with the advent of ballistic missile submarines. The chief problem is the vast ocean area which must be searched. The more traditional problems of coastal ASW and fleet defense required the search of restricted areas along coastlines or those areas immediately surrounding deployed forces. Mobile detection systems aboard modern surface ships, submarines, and aircraft developed for these limited area searches and for localization of targets are not adequate to the task of searching open-ocean areas.

A surveillance system capable of conducting open-ocean searches is a necessity for combating the ballistic missile submarine in any strategy which does not rely on trailing tactics. It is also a significant aid in other forms of ASW. For example, an ocean surveillance system can warn deployed forces or coastal defense units of the approach of hostile submarines.

Ocean surveillance systems could conceivably be attached to the seabed, located in satellites, positioned ashore, or carried by conventional naval forces. Such phenomena as acoustics, magnetics, wake turbulence, communications interception, infrared, and nuclear activation could possibly become the basis for an ocean-wide detection system. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

Detection Systems for Ocean Surveillance

There is no evidence that the Soviets have produced mobile or fixed detection devices useful for long-range detection of submerged submarines. Present Soviet sensors aboard ships and aircraft have short range and are designed for localization or small-area search.

Soviet fixed acoustic detection devices [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] are passive systems of short range. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]. The Soviets have not attempted a large-scale acoustic undersea surveillance system such as the U.S. SOSUS system.

Capabilities for Localization

Soviet production programs, tactics, and training have concentrated chiefly on the localization phase of ASW.

Once a submarine has been detected by an ASW force, its position and movements must be determined with sufficient accuracy to launch a weapon. One of the greatest obstacles to the development of effective ASW sensors is the effect of environmental conditions which limit the performance of the sensor in locating a submarine. Sonar, the most widely used ASW sensor, is

affected by water temperature and salinity, the depth of the target, the topography of the ocean floor, and other factors. The uncertainties involved depending on a single type of sensor have led both the United States and USSR to develop other shorter range ASW sensors, such as magnetic detection systems, that are not as susceptible to these particular environmental conditions.

Sonar can detect the presence of a submarine either passively by detecting the sound generated by the submarine or actively by transmitting a sound pulse and detecting its echo. Surface ships ordinarily utilize active sonar, but submarines can employ either mode effectively. Sonar performance depends on its ability to discriminate the submarine noise or returning echo from the sonar's electrical noise, the platform's noise, and the ambient noise of the sea. In the active mode, a sonar's capabilities are also degraded by sound energy reflecting from the ocean surface and the bottom and by the scattering and absorption of sound energy in the ocean.

The adverse effects of some natural phenomena can be reduced by using sonar which operates at lower frequencies [XXXXXXXXXXXXX]. A lower frequency signal results in less absorption of sound in the ocean. A larger acoustic array is required, however, to obtain directional accuracy at low frequencies.

Magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) devices, the second most widely used ASW sensors, measure the disturbance in the earth's magnetic field generated by a submarine. MAD sensors are usually installed only aboard aircraft because surface ships and submarines create disturbances in the earth's magnetic field which would interfere with MAD system operation.

Radar, optical, infrared, and radio direction-finding equipment are used by ships and aircraft to detect submarines at or near the surface. These systems are of limited utility in localization because of the capability of the submarine to deny their use. For example, current radar and optical systems are ineffective against submarines operating at great depths.

Soviet Surface Ship Sonars

Soviet surface ship sonar development has gone through four recognizable stages since World War II. Many of the sonars presently deployed on Soviet major surface ships are limited-capability systems of the first and second generations.

First-generation sonars, the Tamir and Pegas, were installed on the majority of Soviet surface ships constructed during the 1950s and are still on about 40 percent of the operational Soviet major surface ships.

The high frequencies (24–30 kHz) and the low power input limit the active detection range of those early sonars to about 4,000 yards. They have little detection capability even under favorable conditions. The availability of only

preselected discrete operating frequencies renders these models susceptible to countermeasures.

The Soviets introduced second-generation sonars in the early and mid-1960s which are still in operation on about half of the major surface ships. Separate sonars for search and attack were installed on the ships, enabling the Soviets to make better use of the other technical improvements. The capability of the sonar was increased through the use of lower frequencies (15–23 kHz) and a higher power source—extending the range to about 5,000 yards under ideal conditions. An improved automated fire-control system enabled the Soviets to make better use of sonar information in directing ASW attacks.

Two third-generation sonars became operational in the late 1960s. They are the 8-kHz hull-mounted sonar on the *Kanin* and *Kresta II* and possibly *Krivak* destroyers, and the 8.5-kHz variable-depth sonar (VDS) installed on some *Petya* escort ships, the *Moskva* helicopter carrier, and the *Krivak* destroyer. The VDS enabled the Soviets to fill gaps in sonar coverage resulting from layers of water at varying temperatures. Fewer than 20 ships are known to have been equipped with any of these sonars to date. Maximum range from these systems is about 10,000 yards under ideal conditions.

The fourth, and latest, generation of Soviet sonars is installed on the *Moskva* helicopter carrier and possibly the *Krivak* destroyer. [XXXXXXXXXX] achieve substantial improvements in detection ranges. Direct-path ranges of about 15,000 yards and convergence-zone ranges of up to 80,000 yards are possible with these sonars under ideal conditions. [XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

Submarine Sonars

Soviet submarine sonars have undergone three identifiable stages of development. Despite steady improvement, however, Soviet capabilities remain inferior to those of the United States.

The first postwar Soviet sonars, installed in some W, O, and Z class submarines, were relatively ineffective as their power levels were low and their frequencies high [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]. Although some of these submarines are still operational, with the exception of the Z class, they seldom deploy to the open ocean.

Soviet submarines of the J, H, E, N, P and F classes were outfitted with the second generation of sonars, featuring lower frequencies and greater power. Available evidence suggests that second-generation sonars achieve passive detection ranges less than half those of modern U.S. units.

Soviet submarines which have become operational since 1966—the C, V, Y, and possibly the P—are equipped with powerful active sonars of the third generation. [XXXXXXX]

Although a number of improvements have been incorporated into this generation of sonars, experience of U.S. forces indicates that Soviet passive detection ranges are now perhaps half those of modern U.S. nuclear submarines. Some of this difference probably results from the noise generated by Soviet submarines.

Airborne ASW Sensors

Airborne ASW sensors are capable of localizing submarine contacts when provided with initial position information. They are also employed, like submarine and surface ship sensors, for small area searches and barrier operations.

Soviet ASW aircraft are equipped with surface-search radars, expendable sonobuoys, MAD gear and, in the case of the *Hormone* helicopters, dipping sonars for submarine search. In addition, an infrared search device may be nearing operational use.

Sonobuoys

The Soviets have been producing passive sonobuoys since at least 1956. Improved electronics and acoustic system reliability, observed in captured models, have not substantially increased sonobuoy detection capabilities.

[XXX]

Radars

Soviet airborne surface-search radars are capable of detecting surfaced submarines at ranges of up to about 100 nm and exposed masts and periscopes of submerged submarines up to about 25 nm. None of the Soviet radars is capable of reliably detecting wake effects from submerged submarines. Aircraft carrying the latest Soviet airborne radar, the *Weteye*, apparently make some limited area searches. The *Weteye* radar also selectively determines the new BM-1 sonobuoy's position.

Dipping Sonar

A dipping sonar carried by the KA-25 *Hormone* helicopter operates in active or passive modes. In the active mode, it can make detections at ranges of 6,000 yards or more, and in the passive mode, up to 2,500 yards. Range and bearing accuracies of the dipping sonar [XXXXXXXXXXXXX} within 100

yards range and one degree of bearing are superior to many other Soviet sonars, which are accurate to within 200 yards and 2 1/2°.

During the early deployments of the *Moskva* class helicopter carriers, operations suggested that the Soviets were attempting to conduct bistatic sonar sweeps using the *Moskva* hull-mounted sonar as the transmitter and the *Hormone*-dipping sonar as receiver. The *Hormone*-dipping sonar probably was designed to operate in this fashion. Bistatic operations have not been observed during the past two years. Difficulties encountered with the *Moskva* sonar or with data transmission probably are responsible for the stand-down, rather than shortcomings of the dipping sonar.

If the Soviets were to develop an effective bistatic sonar operation, the *Hormone*-dipping sonar could operate in the first convergence zone, about 30 miles from the ship. At present, *Hormone* helicopters based on the *Moskva* class helicopter carrier conduct sonar operations both independently and in coordinated groups of four or more.

Magnetic Anomaly Detection

Soviet ASW aircraft, except Tu-142s, use magnetic anomaly detection equipment for target localization and for limited area search. Since introducing this equipment in about 1960, the Soviets have deployed several MAD systems.

The latest Soviet ASW aircraft, the *Hormone* helicopters and the Il-38 May patrol aircraft, are probably equipped with a new MAD system. The *May* aircraft operate their system at about twice the altitude of earlier patrol aircraft, and tenuous evidence from helicopter operations indicates that the new MAD system has a detection radius about half again that of the earlier systems. The improved radius is estimated to be between 1,500 and 1,800 feet—large enough to justify small area searches by MAD-equipped aircraft.

Similar area searches at these higher operating altitudes have also been noted during recent Mail aircraft MAD operations, suggesting that some of these older aircraft may have been refitted with the new equipment.

Other Airborne Sensors

There is some circumstantial evidence that some Soviet aircraft may be equipped with an experimental detection device, possibly an infrared wake sensor. These aircraft have conducted searches at altitudes beyond the ranges of the most recent MAD systems. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]. At the present time, however, Soviet technology has probably not advanced

sufficiently to support more than the development of a basic infrared localization device.

Capabilities for Destruction

ASW weapons in use in the Soviet Navy consist of acoustic homing torpedoes, standard depth charges, and small rocket-propelled charges (the MBU) fired in salvos from surface ships. [XXXXXXXXXXXXX] their capabilities against evasive Western tactics and countermeasures are not known. In addition to these ASW weapons, the Soviets have mines which are believed to have ASW applications.

The Soviets are continuing to develop improved ASW weapons. A missile was observed in 1969 on the Moskva's forward dual-arm launcher during a weapons readiness test. This missile has been estimated to have an antisubmarine role and has been designated the SUW-N-1 [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

PRODUCTION OF ASW-CAPABLE SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT

Analysis of Soviet naval aircraft, surface ships, and submarines produced since the late 1950s indicates that no specialized large-scale ASW construction program was undertaken during that period. There were, however, surges in the construction of submarines armed with ballistic missiles and cruise missiles which reflected Soviet emphasis on strategic strike and anti-carrier capabilities.

Major Surface Ships

Since 1958, the Soviets have produced about 100 multipurpose major surface ships. These ships were designed primarily to counter Western naval surface forces and also were armed with anti-air and antisubmarine defensive systems. The Soviets have been building three basic types of oceangoing surface warships: cruise missile armed destroyers, destroyers, and small coastal escorts. In the mid-1960, they built two special helicopter carriers of the *Moskva* class intended for ASW but have since built no more of that type.

The Soviets continue to build multipurpose ships with improved ASW capabilities at a rate of about 10 units per year. The current program consists of the *Kresta II* class cruise missile armed destroyer of about 6,800 tons displacement, a larger follow-on cruise missile destroyer, the *Kara* class of about 9,000 tons, and the *Krivak* class 3,800-ton cruise missile armed

destroyer. In addition, they are producing the *Grisha* class 900-ton coastal subchaser at the rate of about four per year.

Submarines

The Soviets have been producing three types of nuclear submarines since the late 1950s: torpedo attack, cruise missile attack, and ballistic missile submarines. These types were built in two consecutive generations, the first ending about 1963 and the second still in progress.

During the first generation, the cruise missile attack submarine program was predominant in terms of units produced. Cruise missile submarines are designed primarily for attacking surface ships. During the production of the second generation, the Soviets have concentrated more on ballistic missile submarine construction. According to the Soviets, nuclear-powered torpedo attack submarines, such as the V class, are the appropriate submarines for ASW. Since 1963, these have been produced at about a constant rate of two per year. The Soviets clearly have not given a high priority to building a submarine force with a primary ASW mission.

ASW Aircraft

The Soviets began series production of their first all-weather coastal ASW patrol aircraft, the Be-12 *Mail*, in 1965. At about the same time, they temporarily converted about 15 Tu-16 *Badger* medium bombers for ASW operations as an interim measure. Prior to the deployment of these two aircraft, the only Soviet ASW patrol aircraft were flying boats, which were unable to operate during the several months of winter ice conditions.

In late 1967, the Soviets began series production of their first medium-range ASW patrol aircraft, the Il-38 *May*. In late 1969 or 1970, the Soviets also began making an ASW version of the Tu-95 *Bear* heavy bomber, the Tu-142. The Il-38 continues in production, but at a rate of only about 10 aircraft per year. The status of the Tu-142 program is uncertain—by mid-1972, fewer than 15 of these aircraft had been identified. Production may be continuing at the low rate of about five aircraft per year [XXXXXXXXXX]

About 1967, the Soviets began producing the KA-25 *Hormone* ASW helicopter for use aboard the *Moskva* class ASW cruisers and a few other ships. The Soviets had employed land-based MI-4 *Hound* helicopters for coastal ASW missions since the mid-1950s but did not make any significant use of shipborne helicopters until the appearance of the *Hormone*. The ASW *Hormone* is produced at the modest rate of about 25 aircraft per year.

In sum, the Soviets in the late 1960s began series production of a new generation of ASW aircraft. Two types—the Il-38 and the Tu-142—were marked departures from past patterns but most simply replaced older aircraft for coastal ASW.

ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF SOVIET ASW-EQUIPPED FORCES FLEET ORGANIZATION

There is no known formal organization for control of ASW forces in the Soviet Navy. Seagoing naval forces of all types are subordinate to one of the four fleets. Within the fleets, ASW-equipped forces are subordinate to the fleets' major commands, as follows;

FLEET COMMAND ASW-EQUIPPED UNITS

Major Surface Forces helicopter carriers large destroyers destroy escorts

Offshore defense forces escorts patrol ships

Submarine forces all submarines

Fleet air forces all ASW aircraft

Within these commands, the forces are further grouped into brigades and divisions by types. These organizations are charged with training and administration.

Task organizations are established temporarily for major fleet undertakings such as exercises, transits, and other operations involving numbers of ships and aircraft. These organizations may include ASW elements when appropriate.

COMMAND-AND-CONTROL IMPLICATIONS FOR ASW

The Main Naval Staff in Moscow is ultimately responsible for all naval operations, including ASW. The four fleet commanders are directly responsible for ASW, anti-carrier warfare, and all other operations in their areas of responsibility except SSBN operations. The fleets do not have deputy commanders specifically for operational control of ASW forces as do the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific fleets. These command-and-control arrangements

suggest that the Soviet Navy does not view the ASW mission as operationally distinct from other naval missions.

The Soviet naval command system is characterized by highly centralized operational control of ships and submarines at sea vested in the Main Naval Staff in Moscow. The chief impetus for centralization has apparently come from the need for positive control of nuclear weapons and naval forces in close proximity to Western naval forces on the high seas. The Main Naval Staff has the capability for direct control of Soviet ships and submarines in the Mediterranean and Norwegian Seas and in the North Atlantic and Indian Oceans. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]. The main Naval Staff relies on Pacific Fleet headquarters in Vladivostok for operational control of naval forces in the Pacific.

The general command-and-control system of the Soviet Navy probably is adequate to direct Soviet surface and air forces in large-scale coordinated ASW operations. Limited communications capabilities, however, may be a constraint on Soviet submarines operating submerged against other submarines.

SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS

The Soviets have developed both short-and long-range communications systems for submarines, which are generally adequate for other than anti-SSBN operations. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

Theoretically, a surface ship or another submarine could accompany a trailing submarine to act as a communications relay point and to assist in maintaining contact with a hostile submarine. Among other problems in this procedure, the submarine and surface ship would have to communicate through the thermal layer often present in the water, which tends to deflect the acoustic energy of communications systems.[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

For one-way communications from a submerged submarine to an aircraft, the Soviets have a communications buoy, designated the RBM-200 [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

SOVIET ASW OPERATIONS AND MISSION CAPABILITIES

The following sections review ASW-related operations conducted by Soviet naval forces and assess the capabilities demonstrated for destroying Western ballistic missile nuclear submarines, protecting Soviet SSBNs from Western

submarines, defending deployed surface forces, and guarding the ocean approaches and coastal areas of the USSR.

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ASW

Published Soviet statements suggest that strategic offensive ASW operations directed against ballistic missile submarines is a major concern of the Soviet Navy. These writings over the last 10 years have emphasized strategic ASW priorities through discussion of the Polaris problem. They have placed little stress on the more traditional ASW tasks of fleet and coastal defense. Yet operationally, the emphasis is reversed—almost all observed ASW activity supports fleet defense and coastal ASW missions. Although major fleet exercises have had a larger ASW component in recent years, only a few appear to be related to possible anti-SSBN operations.

Classified Soviet writings from 1959 through 1962 suggested an intent to develop defenses against the U.S. Polaris force projected for the 1960s. The authors proposed using ABMs, surface ships, special ASW submarines, and ASW aircraft. The Soviets produced some of each type of system, but not in numbers sufficient, to challenge the Polaris force.

POSSIBLE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The two *Moskva* class ASW helicopter carriers built in the 1960s probably represent early hopes for an offensive strategic ASW ship. There is no evidence to indicate, however, that either of the two *Moskva* class ships has located or tracked patrolling ballistic missile submarines. The *Moskva* class ships have normally operated in ASW defense of the Mediterranean squadron.

The *Moskva*'s performance as a strategic ASW system has probably been disappointing to the Soviets and may account for their decision to build only two ships of the type. As shown in the chart at left, the *Moskva* class ships have operated at a relaxed pace. Activity since 1970 suggests that their mission has been expanded to include other operations, such as air defense and command ship roles, in addition to ASW tasks.

Both the Il-38 and the new Tu-142 have conducted independent ASW operations in areas distant from the USSR. Il-38s have twice been observed operating in the Norwegian Sea in a possible anti-SSBN role during exercises, and they have operated in the sea approaches to the Pacific and Northern fleet areas and in the Mediterranean. Most activity of the Il-38s and Tu-142s, however, has occurred within the fleet operating areas remote from potential Polaris patrol areas.

The majority of the Il-38 exercises observed in the first half of 1971 [XXXXXXXXXX] involved only aircraft, indicating that these aircraft may work independently of other forces much of the time. From analysis of exercises, it appears that Northern and Pacific fleet ASW exercises are planned to respond to detections from ASW barrier forces in the fleet approach areas and the coastal areas.

The role of the four Il-38s stationed until recently in Egypt was less clear. Their mission in case of war was probably ASW support of the Mediterranean squadron. Routine independent Il-38 operations in the Mediterranean may have been tactical exercises with Soviet submarines or searches for NATO submarines in the eastern basin. The observed ASW operations of those aircraft reflected some limited capability to react to detections made by other means, such as radio direction finding.

SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES

The Soviets have conducted two forms of surveillance against ballistic missile submarines. Soviet intelligence collection ships (AGIs) often monitor Polaris bases. In addition, Soviet attack submarine patrols in the Philippine and Norwegian seas and near the British Isles may be partly responsible for collecting information concerning Western ballistic missile submarines. Intelligence collection ships observe Polaris deployment rates and collect tactical intelligence on ballistic missile submarines. They probably have determined the general schedule of Polaris operations and communicate any changes to Moscow which might indicate differences in U.S. strategic readiness.

Soviet submarines, among other tasks, reconnoiter the Polaris training areas and suspected patrol zones, possibly in anticipation of chance encounters. Given the capabilities of Soviet and U.S. submarines, the best chance the Soviets have of accomplishing surveillance is in lying quietly in wait for a fast transiting Polaris submarine. [XXXXXXXXXX]

As noted in an earlier section, no indications of an effective ocean surveillance system exist. Without an open-ocean detection system, trailing remains the only possible anti-Polaris tactic available to the Soviets.

TRAILING CAPABILITIES

An alternative to an ocean surveillance network might be the use of attack submarines which gain contact on enemy submarines at a narrow strait or base area and then trail them. The Soviet naval leadership has been aware

for several years from open sources that the United States has considered this tactic as an ASW measure.

Current Soviet submarines, however, do not have a capability for continuous trailing of U.S. SSBNs. Although the speed and active sonar capabilities of the V class probably are adequate for overt trailing of a nonevading submarine, the requirements inherent in trailing escorted SSBNs or SSBNs employing technical or tactical countermeasures exceed the potential of the V class submarine. Even if the Soviets believed the V class submarine were adequate for trailing, they probably would calculate that a minimum of 100 submarines would be necessary to maintain a force sufficient for initial detection and trailing of the Polaris force. As of early 1972, the Soviets had only about 10 V class submarines. They are building new ones at a rate of only two per year.

Soviet plans to trail more than one Polaris submarine actively would have to account for the defensive reaction by the United States or the United Kingdom. Not only would assisting forces be sent to the aid of the trailed submarine, but those deploying subsequently would be given extensive delousing to remove potential trailing submarines. The Soviets might expect to trail one submarine for a short time to intimidate or embarrass the West, but active trailing against a number of Polaris submarines would probably be viewed as a risky and unworkable scheme.

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE ASW

Coordinated Submarine Transits

The Soviets may be developing methods for protecting their Y class ballistic missile submarines from being trailed by Western nuclear submarines.

Since December of 1970, the Soviets have conducted [XXXXX] coordinated submarine transits of the Norwegian Sea. [XXXXXX] involved Y class ballistic missile submarines proceeding to missile stations accompanied by C or V class submarines. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

Historically, the Soviet Navy has been more inclined to operate submarines in consort with other forces, including other submarines than Western navies. The merits of coordinated submarine operations were noted by Admiral Pantaleyev in 1961 in a classified Soviet publication. Two submarines operating together made the first Soviet submarine fleet transfer around Cape Horn. Groups of about six submarines transit in company from the Barents to the Mediterranean and back about every six months.

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

Judging from Soviet sensitivities, probable requirements, and force capabilities, the transit activities are probably defensive in nature. The Soviets may have reacted to Western ASW threats by escorting some of their deploying SSBNs, believing that a second submarine could deter or counterdetect a trailer.

Although the coordinated transits could be trailing practice for offensive ASW, it seems likely that they are part of a program for the defense of Y class SSBNs. Even if the primary purpose of the coordinated transit is defensive, however, the tactical experience gained is directly applicable to trailing.

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES

Escorting Y class ballistic missile submarines could be an effective measure for discouraging or detecting potential covert trailers. If the escort is far enough behind the Y class, the trailer might interpose itself between the two, possibly subjecting itself to counterdetection by the escort. Trailing the escort is an alternative approach, but in that case, contact with the Y class probably would be broken, sacrificing the mission objective.

Once the presence of a trailing submarine is disclosed, the escort could assist the Y class in attempting to evade by the use of countermeasures and evasion tactics or both might simply elect to outrun the trailer, using their speed advantage.

DEFENSE OF THE FLEET

The new Soviet naval strategy of the 1960s increased operations in distant ocean areas and brought with it a requirement for fleet defense against submarine attack. Shore-based ASW systems were not available in the new operating areas.

The forces had to be able to fend for themselves in distant operations. Naval construction programs were influenced—self-defense against submarine attack was emphasized sometimes even in preference to offensive striking power. Since 1960, no new class of Soviet major surface ships has been built without ASW systems.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The tactical commander of a Soviet task group in distant waters is normally responsible for ASW protection of the group. When ASW aircraft operate

with surface forces, the ASW surface commander designates an ASW ship to coordinate the aircraft tactics with the surface forces.

OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES

In Soviet naval operations, major combatants generally do not use ASW screens defensively. (Screen-type formations are used to broaden the width of offensive ASW sweeps.) These ships operate most of the time either in small groups of two to five ships or independently and must rely on their own defense capabilities. There appears to be no important place in Soviet operational doctrine for escorting combatants or their support ships on the high seas, although the Soviets practice the escorting of merchant and amphibious group convoys.

In Mediterranean operations, where there are normally about 15–20 surface combatants, the Soviets generally do not employ ASW screening forces even during exercises. They have, however, practiced forming surface ship and submarine barriers across the Sicilian Straits and to the south of Crete to seal off the central and eastern Mediterranean from submarine attack. The four Il-38 aircraft formerly stationed in Egypt practiced fleet defensive roles against their own submarines both in airborne ASW barrier operations and in general reconnaissance missions.

FLEET DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Although fleet defense is simpler in concept than strategic ASW, the Soviets still lack a generally effective defense for their ships against Western nuclear submarines. Modern submarine weapons have effective ranges well beyond the potential direct path ranges of almost all Soviet sonars. Moreover, Western submarines have operated within sonar range of Soviet forces in the Mediterranean usually without reaction. This may be explained by such factors as environmental effects, inferior signal-processing equipment in the sonar system, or sleepy sonar operators.

Despite a continuing, concentrated effort to build ships which can defend themselves from enemy submarines, the Soviets have little chance for an effective fleet defense. Improving tactics, weapons, and acoustic sensors will probably at best keep pace with submarine weapons development. The Soviet fleet is far from secure from submarine attack.

DEFENSE OF SEA APPROACHES

The Soviets probably are becoming more concerned about the capabilities of Western attack submarines in the sea approaches to the USSR. Soviet naval operations have recently begun to reflect increased ASW interest in such areas, probably related to a concept for forward ASW defense of the USSR's coastal shipping lanes and naval concentration areas. The Soviets may also have a heightened desire to protect surface ships and submarines deploying to distant areas through these waters.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The control of forces engaged in ASW in the sea approaches is the responsibility of the fleet commander. Forces used in ASW operations in the Norwegian Sea and the Pacific approaches include the ASW-equipped ships of the major surface forces, submarine forces, and long-range ASW aircraft. The Northern Fleet headquarters at Severomorsk and, in the east, Vladivostok provide the control points for their operations. The Main Naval Staff in Moscow is capable of controlling ASW operations of surface ships in the Norwegian Sea. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

The tactical organization for forces in the approaches is not well defined. When combined operations occur, the officer in tactical command of the surface forces exercises immediate tactical authority over ASW surface ships and an undefined measure of control over cooperating submarines and aircraft.

Control of independent ASW operations by submarines in the Norwegian Sea is probably shared by the Main Naval Staff in Moscow and Northern Fleet headquarters. Similar arrangements probably exist between Moscow and Pacific Fleet headquarters for control of submarines in the Pacific. Independent ASW aircraft operations are controlled by the respective fleet aviation headquarters.

EXERCISES

Almost every year, the Pacific and Northern Fleets each conduct a major exercise [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]. The ASW aspect of these exercises has grown to include what probably are combined ASW barrier and search operations off northern Norway or near the Kurile and Japanese island chains.

Although the Soviets apparently devoted, some training time in Exercise Ocean to ASW defense in the ocean approaches to the USSR, over three-fourths of the defending forces were principally involved in anti-carrier and anti-shipping operations.

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

ASW training operations in the Norwegian Sea in defense of the ocean approaches are still small. The trend suggests, however, that the Soviets plan to commit ASW forces there in time of war rather than to defend against submarines only near the coasts of the USSR.

The situation is somewhat different for the Pacific Fleet. There the exercise forces deploy along the Japanese and Kurile island chains, making use of the natural geographic features. The barrier thus formed serves as a forward defense against both submarine and surface threats to the Soviet Far East south of the Kamchatka Peninsula.

In the last year or so, the Pacific Fleet has begun to conduct air ASW operations in the sea approaches to the far eastern USSR. Judging from the trend in the Northern Fleet, where the earlier Il-38 ASW units were formed, the Pacific Fleet ASW patrol aircraft will probably provide support to other ASW forces operating in the sea approaches.

APPROACH DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

The Soviet capability to determine the presence of transiting Western submarines through the sea approach areas depends on ASW barriers. Because of the deficiencies of Soviet sensor systems, overall detection capabilities would not be much improved in the Norwegian and Barents sea areas even if all of the barrier forces were devoted to ASW rather than to countering surface ships. In the Pacific, although the force size and disposition during exercises would otherwise seem adequate to detect transiting submarines, sensor deficiencies render effective ASW defense there unlikely for the near future.

Without an ocean surveillance system, the Soviets probably will continue to rely on barrier forces for detection in the sea approaches. These barriers will require large numbers of forces—more than they have used in the past—consisting of submarines, surface ships, and aircraft.

DEFENSE OF COASTAL AREAS

The Soviet Navy has continued to maintain a concern for the security of the USSR's coastlines. This concern for an element of naval warfare which has

exercises occur there. The most active of the ASW exercise areas are near the Northern and Pacific Fleet base areas.

The majority of these exercises are conducted by forces of coastal defense types, suggesting a substantial commitment to coastal ASW [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

COASTAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Except in the waters within a few miles of naval base entrances, Soviet ASW forces have little capability to protect their coastal areas from submarine intrusions. The lack of reliable submarine detection systems and the low caliber of the crews—owing to the unchallenging character of Soviet ASW training—are largely responsible for this inefficiency. [XXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXX]

OUTLOOK FOR SOVIET ASW

Major ASW concerns of the present are likely to influence the shape of Soviet efforts in the next several years. Requirements for coastal defense and defending naval forces in distant deployments against Western submarines will probably continue to motivate Soviet production of ASW equipment and development of ASW forces. The quest for a counter to the Polaris threat will involve research and development, on sensors and development of trailing capabilities. Without a major advance in initial detection technology, or a substantial improvement in trailing capabilities, the anti-Polaris program will probably not result in the development of large forces in the next five years. The Soviets will continue their efforts to develop capabilities required in all ASW for localization and destruction. They will also expend efforts on developing systems capable of conducting limited area search in restricted areas.

Improvements in platforms will include further development of specialized ASW systems, such as the Il-38 aircraft, and the continued incorporation of ASW capabilities in their multipurpose ships, such as the Krivak. Programs such as the A class submarine probably represent efforts to improve platform capabilities.

The quest for a trailing capability is likely to lead to improvements in sensors. Current Soviet test and evaluation programs for improved magnetic detection equipment, sonars, and other sensors indicate that the Soviets will probably make considerable improvements in the next few years in their capability to carry out the localization phase of ASW. Similarly, ongoing

development programs for ASW weapons over the next few years should improve Soviet capabilities to carry out the destruction phase of ASW.

The Soviets will continue to deploy their surface forces to distant areas, and this will probably lead them to seek better tactics and defensive procedures against submarine attack. The coastal defense posture may be moderately improved with the deployment of shallow water, medium-range fixed ocean detection systems and improved surface ships and submarines. The Soviets can also be expected to continue to emphasize the extension of ASW defenses beyond the coastal areas into the Norwegian Sea approaches and the waters along Japan and the Kuriles.

Only a breakthrough in the ocean surveillance technology or in trailing capability would allow the Soviets to begin to come to grips with the Polaris and Poseidon problems. Considering the magnitude of the task and the current state of Soviet programs, they will probably not achieve any significant open-ocean surveillance capability or fully develop trailing capability within the next few years.

[XXX] To achieve an effective ocean surveillance system, the Soviets would probably have to mount a complex, costly, large-scale development program extending over several years. Such a program would probably be detected, but it is less certain that it would be readily identified as an anti-Polaris program.

Development of an effective trailing capability also would be a major undertaking. It would require development of a large force of submarines, improvements in sensors and communications, and extensive training.

Less ambitious strategic ASW objectives—the ability to locate and destroy a few U.S. SSBNs—may appear to improve Soviet capabilities, but analysis shows that the Soviets would have purchased little security with such a program in a full-scale war because of the destructive capability of the remaining forces. The Soviets probably also recognize that the acquisition of a capability to neutralize some Poseidon submarines might be considered by the United States as undermining its deterrent credibility and result in an upgrading of the U.S. ballistic missile nuclear submarine force.

* * *

ANNEX A, TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL ASW DETECTION METHODS

This annex describes certain physical phenomena which are associated with the operation of nuclear submarines and which might be exploited to develop

ASW detection systems. The current Soviet potential for developing ASW detection systems based on these phenomena is examined in the light of the experience of U.S. research and development in these areas and what is known of Soviet research and development progress.

The results of this analysis, along with the findings of other analyses developed in the main part of this report, sustain the judgment made in the report that the Soviets do not now have effective broad area ocean surveillance systems. In this context, only systems with a potential for searching at least several hundred square nautical miles of ocean per hour are defined as ocean surveillance systems, lower search rate systems being more applicable to the localization problem than to the initial detection problem.

Any effective Soviet ocean surveillance system would be complex and costly, and its development would likely extend over several years. If the Soviets were to undertake such a large program, however, considerable delay might ensue before intelligence identified it correctly, although evidence that some large program was under way would probably be obtained soon after its development began.

SYSTEMS BASED ON ACOUSTIC PHENOMENA

Passive Fixed Systems

The Soviets are aware that the United States has had success with fixed passive acoustic undersea surveillance systems. They realize that this has been the most straightforward and successful approach to the ocean surveillance problem.

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

The Soviets have done much theoretical work on low-frequency sound propagation and have conducted at-sea propagation experiments in the appropriate frequency regions. There are, however, five factors which limit the Soviet potential for exploiting acoustic techniques to detect U.S. submarines.

One main limitation is a fundamental geographic problem—long-range, passive acoustic detection systems work only in deep water—in most areas of the world at considerably more than 1,000 feet. Except for certain areas in the Pacific, such regions lie at great distances from the Soviet coastlines. Moreover, the Soviets do not have allies which are strategically located for the emplacement of such systems.

Complementary to the geographic problem is an apparent Soviet deficiency in cable technology. The most recent evidence indicates that the Soviets are several years behind the United States in low-impedance underwater

cable technology.[XXXXXXXXXX] to build a SOSUS-like detection system, they would need to make cable runs on the order of 1,000 nautical miles or to develop a satellite readout capability.

A third constraint is the apparent Soviet lack of a low-frequency signal-processing capability. Such a capability is notably lacking in current Soviet naval equipment and would be necessary in the development of a detection system of the SOSUS type.

A fourth factor that may be hindering the Soviets in perfecting detection systems of this type is their proclivity for using rigid hydrophone arrays in acoustic systems. The BM-1 sonobuoy is the only known Soviet acoustic device which uses a flexible array of hydrophones. Even in this case, the Soviets probably designed this multiple hydrophone set for reliability rather than as a first attempt at flexible arrays. Flexible arrays are a practical necessity for a deployable SOSUS type of system.

The quietness of U.S. nuclear submarines is perhaps the most intractable of the problems the Soviets are encountering in ASW. Although SOSUS can detect Soviet submarines fairly reliably, these targets are an order of magnitude noisier than modern U.S. ballistic missile submarines. SOSUS cannot reliably detect U.S. submarines. The Soviets would have to exceed the capabilities of SOSUS to a marked degree to detect U.S. nuclear submarines on patrol in the open ocean.

The Soviets have developed short-range, passive acoustic detection devices which they use to protect harbors and ports. A few passive acoustic systems such as the Ingul device have probably been emplaced in the Pacific to monitor areas of straits and entrances to ports. These are apparently in relatively shallow water and probably are of limited range—less than 100 nm. Ingul devices are thought to be located off Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok.

In the Northern Fleet area, the Soviets have experimented with moored buoy detection devices and may be deploying them at strategic points. The earliest installation was probably near Russkaya Gavan, and [XXXXXXXXXX] it may have become operational in 1967. The most recent activity is off North Cape, where the Soviets may have emplaced a few of these moored buoys connected by cable to shore. If cable laying did occur, it involves the longest cable run to date by the Soviets—over 100 nm. These installations, if beyond the experimental stage, are probably intended to provide early warning of incursions of foreign submarines into areas close to Soviet naval bases in the Barents Sea area.

In addition, the Soviets have been working since the early 1960s to develop a passive surveillance system to monitor the Arctic Ocean region under the ice cap. Some of this work has been in support of under-ice operations by Soviet nuclear submarines and has involved underwater communications

research. Equipment shipments and other evidence indicate that work is also being done on passive acoustic, under-ice detection systems. Relatively simple systems could monitor significant areas in the Arctic Basin owing to the natural ducting effect occurring at the interface between the cold, stable water and the bottom of the ice cap.

PASSIVE MOBILE SYSTEMS

An alternative approach to obtaining broad area surveillance with a passive acoustic system involves the use of a mobile sensor, such as a towed array. The Soviets have used towed single hydrophones in seismic work in the Pacific and clearly understand the theory involved. A few W and Z class submarines in the Pacific have been observed with winches and other suspect devices on their stern areas, but there is no confirming evidence that the Soviet Navy has ever used a towed array. (A towed system, however, could go undetected for some time.)

The Soviets could, potentially, make important gains through the use of towed arrays, which greatly increase low-frequency detection capabilities. Their submarines could use towed arrays to detect trailing submarines. Because a towed system moves the sensors away from the high noise level of the towing submarine, the Soviets could use this approach in an attempt to overcome their relative noise disadvantage and prevent U.S. submarines from trailing them. Surface ships could use towed arrays to increase their ASW search areas. This approach would be particularly useful in the Mediterranean, where strong thermal gradients in the water and high background noise are problems.

There are some constraints which may be hindering or preventing Soviet development of towed-array submarine detection systems. They may have problems with transducer quality and with the necessary signal-processing equipment to take advantage of this approach. The greatest potential for the towed array appears to be in the low-frequency region. But the Soviets have displayed little ability to produce systems in this frequency range.

ACTIVE ACOUSTIC SYSTEMS

Low-frequency active acoustic systems have been proposed in the United States for monitoring extensive ocean areas. High-frequency active systems have been proposed for monitoring small areas or straits.

There is no evidence that the Soviets have any system of this type under development. Limitations on their transducer capability and overall cable technology probably prevent their development of active low-frequency area surveillance systems. High-frequency systems are possibly within their capability, but the cable runs necessary to connect to any areas of strategic significance would be prohibitive. Satellite readout is possible but expensive [XXXXXXXXXXXX] Providing power to the devices would still be a problem. Active systems are especially susceptible to countermeasures. There may be some application for harbor defense, where the active capability overcomes the high background noise that limits passive systems in such areas.

INFRASONIC PHENOMENA

The band of acoustic energy below 10 Hz is generally termed the infrasonic region. [XXXXXXX] In addition, turbulent wake decay may generate infrasonic signals. Some recent Soviet publications show considerable interest in propagation of sound at these frequencies in the ocean. The Soviets have indicated that they believe there may be a propagation “window”—a narrow frequency region where propagation loss in the ocean is very low—in the vicinity of 5 Hz.

The principal problems that would be involved in attempting to build a system to exploit sound in the 5-Hz region involve the high ambient noise in this region from shipping and wave action, coupled with the low level of these signals originally and the limitations on attainable array gains due to the extremely long wavelengths involved. Calculations indicate that the energy radiated by a submarine in this region would be virtually undetectable at any reasonable range. There is no evidence of actual Soviet efforts to develop an operational system of this type.

MAGNETIC DETECTION SYSTEMS

The magnetic field of a submarine results from the magnetization of ferrous materials in the hull and internal equipment. A net magnetic moment is produced by a combination of the permanent magnetization caused by the magnetic history of the submarine and the moment induced by the magnetic field of the earth.

The magnetic anomaly produced is small in comparison to the intensity of the earth’s magnetic field [XXXXXXXXXXXX]

Presently, operational saturable-core magnetometers are sensitivity limited and can provide detection ranges of 1,000 to 1,400 feet under favorable conditions. The newest optically pumped magnetometers have a sensitivity of .01 gamma and can obtain detection ranges of 2,000 feet under good conditions. Signal-processing and information handling problems, however, generally constrain the practical ASW application of magnetometers with sensitivities greater than .01 gamma. The earth's magnetic field in comparison is approximately 50,000 gamma, and anomalies in this field must be rejected by processing. There is no evidence of Soviet use of any techniques more sophisticated than simple correlation and coincidence signal processing in the frequency ranges appropriate to the more advanced magnetometers.

There are several methods by which improved sensitivity may be obtained but none appear to have any detection potential beyond a mile or two. An optically pumped magnetometer should be capable of a sensitivity of .001 gamma, and zero-field resonance cesium magnetometers could theoretically obtain a .0001 gamma sensitivity. Superconducting magnetometers using the Josephson effect could yield a sensitivity better than .00001 gamma. Inhomogeneities in the ambient magnetic field are much greater than this and reduce the potentially achievable range. Even these more sensitive magnetometers, unless employed in extensive grids, would be appropriate only for localizing previously detected submarines.

The Soviets are actively engaged in an extensive program to improve their MAD capability. The success of their efforts is evidenced by their being the first to develop a self-oscillating, metastable helium magnetometer. Research being carried out at a magnetics laboratory for the electronics directorate of the Soviet Navy involves cesium and may be aimed at development of a magnetometer. In addition, some classified Soviet work in superconductivity may have application to the development of superconducting magnetometers.

Present Soviet aircraft MAD gear is estimated to have a detection range of 1,500 feet. The Soviets' extensive effort in MAD sensor technology should allow them to extend this somewhat. Evidence from recent naval aircraft operations indicates that improvements have been made. Their weakness in signal and data processing will probably limit them to at most a 50 percent increase in range in the near future.

Fixed magnetic detection systems are principally limited in range by variations in the ambient magnetic field. They are quite useful in constricted areas, such as in harbors. The Soviets have used magnetic loop detection systems for harbor defense for several years. The [XXXXX] system located across the approaches to the harbor at Petropavlovsk is one example. This system is backed up by an acoustic system to discriminate against surface shipping. Some of the work being conducted at the magnetics laboratory at Krasnaya Pakhra may be for further development of such magnetic detection systems.

Broad area magnetic surveillance systems, however, require automatic monitoring of, and compensation for, changes in background noise. The information processing requirements for such systems exceed those of any of the presently realizable systems. In addition, the physical extent of such a system—laying a grid across the floor of a whole ocean—makes this approach unlikely. There is no evidence that the Soviets are developing any large area coverage systems based on magnetic detection principles.

ELECTROMAGNETIC SYSTEMS

The electromagnetic signature of a submarine includes extremely low-frequency electric and magnetic fields due principally to modulation of the galvanic currents which flow between the hull and the propulsion shaft. This modulation results from variations in the resistivity of the current paths produced by the rotation of the shaft and produces an electromagnetic field oscillating at a frequency corresponding to the shaft rotation rate. Theoretical work to date indicates that detection ranges of up to about 3,000 feet could be obtained by arrays of fixed sensors using this principle.

Another source of electromagnetic radiation from submarines is the energy radiated at ship's service turbine-generator frequencies by radiation through the hull and through leakage paths at hull penetrations. Studies indicate that detection ranges up to about one mile could theoretically be obtained by exploiting this phenomenon.

Electromagnetic detection techniques, therefore, have some potential applicability for ASW. Their very short range, however, limits their applicability to barrier operation in shallow water in constricted areas. Platform self-noise would restrict their usefulness on a mobile platform.

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

The motion of a submarine through the water can cause scattering of natural and artificial electromagnetic fields. Potentially, this scattering phenomenon could be used in a submarine detection system. Theoretical studies indicate, however, that the maximum achievable range against a modern nuclear submarine would be less than 500 feet.

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

RADAR DETECTION SYSTEMS

Radar can be used to detect submarines in two ways. First, masts such as periscopes, antennas and snorkels which protrude above the surface of the water can return a radar signal. Second, it is sometimes possible to detect surface effects caused by a submarine's wake or by its trailing communications wire.

MAST DETECTION

The vulnerability of a submarine to detection is increased whenever it extends a mast above the surface.

The main physical problem encountered in searching for an exposed mast of a submarine is in discriminating the target return from the background sea clutter. High-resolution radar technology using short pulses and pulse compression techniques which improve the discrimination capability of the radar is being pursued by the Soviets. The principal problem which they face is that of adequately processing the information obtained.

Mast detection is not completely reliable because a submarine can control its mast exposure to reduce the risk of detection. Moreover, a high sea state greatly reduces or prevents detectability.

TRAILING WIRE DETECTION

When there are no masts or antennas extending above the surface, a submarine may still be vulnerable to detection by radar if it has extended a trailing wire communications antenna. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] the principle is well known, and similar techniques may have been used in recent Soviet efforts to map ice fields using side-looking infrared sensors.

SURFACE EFFECTS DETECTION

Even when there are no protrusions through the sea's surface and no trailing wire, a submarine may be detectable by radar because of the surface effects caused by the motion of the submarine through the water. These effects are subtle and difficult to detect using conventional radars. The development of ultra-high-resolution radars and synthetic aperture radars may make this detection technique useful. The deeper and the slower the target, the smaller are the surface effects produced. In addition, when the sea is rougher than about State III, the surface effects are masked by the sea turbulence.

The development of advanced ASW radars may represent one of the more promising approaches for the Soviets in developing improved ASW sensors. The communications wire trailed by U.S. SSBNs makes them vulnerable to radar detection, as does the occasional exposure of masts and periscopes. Soviet technical literature [XXXXXXXXXXXXX] indicates that the Soviets are working on such experimental advanced radars, perhaps with a view on ASW applications. Radars designed for wake detection, however, are probably

farther in the future because the wake signatures of submerged submarines are less distinguishable than those of exposed masts and trailing wire antennas. Problems with signal processing to overcome sea state masking will probably continue to hamper efforts in this area.

NUCLEAR DETECTION PHENOMENA

Neutrons

The reactor of a nuclear-powered submarine produces an intense neutron flux which cannot be completely shielded. When the submarine is submerged, direct detection of the escaping neutrons is possible only at short ranges—on the order of tens of feet—and only with sophisticated equipment, because water is an excellent neutron moderator. [XXXXXXXXXXXXX]

ANTINEUTRINOS

The operation of a fission reactor produces prodigious quantities of antineutrinos—essentially massless particles which have extremely small absorption cross sections. These particles cannot be shielded by any means; in fact, the vast majority of the neutrinos produced by a nuclear reaction could pass through the earth without being absorbed. Although the absorption cross-section is exceedingly small, the number of antineutrinos produced in a reactor is so large that a workable submarine detection system based upon antineutrino detection is conceivable.

There are two possible approaches to building such a system. A mobile system could detect the increased presence of antineutrinos as a platform approached an operating nuclear submarine. The detector would have to be very large, however, probably larger than an aircraft. The size necessary to obtain any reasonable range rules out this approach for a mobile ASW sensor.

In an alternative approach, a fixed detector could be built to monitor an area of ocean. This would require a detector that could indicate the direction of the momentum vector of the original antineutrino to provide a bearing indication. The physical dimensions of a detector which would preserve momentum and have a reasonable capture cross-section would probably rival the U.S. Navy's Project Sanguine in size. Although nothing is known about Soviet work in this area, the development of detectors of this type would be difficult to conceal because of their great size. Also, no known nuclear

reaction with a reasonable antineutrino capture rate preserves momentum. This approach to ocean surveillance would therefore appear to be infeasible.

ACTIVATION RADIONUCLEIDES

The radiation escaping from an operating nuclear submarine can cause stable elements present in seawater to become radioactive. Of these, radioisotopes of sodium and chlorine appear most likely to be detectable. It is possible to build detectors which can sense the trace quantities of such radioisotopes in the wake of a submarine, but there are no indications that this is a reliable detection technique. [XXXXXXXXXXXX] a gamma ray spectrometer designated Vityaz used for detecting, analyzing, and recording radioactive emissions from trace quantities of radioisotopes in seawater. The Soviets had reportedly had success in detecting their own nuclear submarines [XXXXXXXXXXXX] with such a system.

There have been no conclusive experiments indicating detection of the wakes of U.S. submarines by such techniques. Even if workable detectors were developed, these techniques would probably always be inferior to acoustic techniques and could easily be defeated by countermeasures.

OPTICAL DETECTION METHODS

Submarines can be detected optically by both active and passive systems, but only short ranges have been achieved to date, even in clear water. In bright sunlight, submarines have been seen and photographed from aircraft at depths as low as 150 feet. The employment of low light level television could possibly match this capability for night-time search operations. Ranges of present passive sensors, therefore, would not be sufficient for search operations.

Soviet passive optical capabilities appear to be limited. Whereas they are just beginning to outfit their ASW aircraft with searchlights for night work, U.S. ASW aircraft are removing their searchlights in favor of low light level systems. The Soviets are known to be working on high-energy lasers operating in the blue-green region of the spectrum where attenuation in the ocean is the least. No foreseeable improvements in technology, however, would make underwater laser or optical systems competitive with acoustic systems or an aircraft-mounted optical system competitive with MAD gear. Similarly, no foreseeable improvements could make optical systems competitive with radar systems for detecting masts and periscopes, nor could projected optical

systems be competitive with IR and radar techniques for detecting trailing wires. There may be some advantages in optical systems for wake detection over IR and radar systems, but the information processing problems are beyond the capabilities of any existing systems.

One other application of optical detection techniques is the use of optical interference sensors to detect the turbulent wake left by a submarine. This appears to be one of the most promising approaches for detecting turbulent wakes. Because of the dissipation of wakes, lack of classification capability, and directional ambiguity, these techniques would be useful in trailing situations but would probably not be of much value in area search.

DETECTION THROUGH WAKE EFFECTS

The passage of a submarine through water produces a wake with physical properties which are slightly perturbed in comparison with the surrounding water. Also present within the wake are minute quantities of materials left behind by the submarine. A variety of sensors are capable of detecting this wake. Some of these sensors show promise as aids to submarines for trailing other submarines.

REFRACTIVE INDEX CHANGES

The passage of a submarine through water causes changes in both temperature and salinity. These changes produce a change in the local refractive index of the water. Optical interference systems can detect these changes, and thus allow the submarine's wake to be localized. A localization system based on this technique, capable of detecting wakes up to several hours after the passage of a submarine, could theoretically be built now.

TURBULENCE

A submarine passing through water leaves behind it a turbulent wake which can be sensed with adequate pressure transducers. U.S. sensors of this type have provided detections of wakes up to one hour behind a target submarine.

Of the possible systems discussed above, development of a pressure transducer turbulence detection system seems the most likely.

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] The problems of limited search rate, high false-alarm rate, lack of classification capability, and susceptibility to countermeasures appear to preclude the development of any area search system based upon wake sensing devices. However, the application of such devices for maintaining covert trailing of a submarine once initial detection has been accomplished is a likely Soviet development, either now or in the near future.

REVERBERATION

Remote wake sensing may be possible using ultrasonic or optical sensors to detect the volume reverberation of the turbulent wake. This could allow a trailing submarine to operate with a depth separation of up to a few hundred feet, a valuable aid in trailing,

CHEMICAL DETECTION

Trace amounts of various chemicals are introduced into the ocean from a submarine, some continuously and some intermittently. Corrosion and erosion products such as minute quantities of antifouling paint from the hull, copper and nickel from the piping which carries coolant water, and zinc from sacrificial anodes are introduced into the water continuously. In addition, when a modern submarine is submerged while operating, the by-product hydrogen gas from the oxygen generators is discharged continuously. These chemicals are the most likely candidates for a chemical-based detection system because they are continuously produced.

The concentrations of the chemicals in a submarine wake are typically only a few tenths of a part per billion above the background levels in the ocean, and their detection would require extremely sensitive instruments. Chemical detection techniques will probably always be inferior to wake turbulence detection techniques because the physical wake is much more stable and defined.

There are several indications that the Soviets are working in various areas with potential application to wake detection systems. These research programs include development of lasers operating in the blue-green spectrum, detailed turbulence studies, experiments with optical and ultrasonic interference measurement systems, and sensitive chemical detectors. Some of the various devices protruding from the hulls of certain Soviet submarines may be experimental wake-detection devices.

ELINT DETECTION

The Soviets have a large system of fixed land-based HF intercept sites backed up by mobile systems and by installations in collaborating communist countries. They also have a growing Sigint satellite program.

The usefulness of a Soviet intercept system is circumvented by the ability of a submarine to conduct a patrol in radio silence. The Soviet intercept effort, therefore, does not constitute a comprehensive and effective submarine surveillance system.

INFRARED PHENOMENA

An operating submarine, particularly a nuclear submarine, produces changes in the thermal reflectivity and emissivity microstructure of the sea surface above it. This can be caused by temperature changes in the water due to heating effects from the submarine, particularly if the submarine is shallow or hovering. It can also be caused by the anisotropic distortions of the sea surface caused by the wake left by objects which protrude through the surface such as masts and periscopes or by a trailing wire. Even when there are no protrusions, a submerged submarine leaves a trail of surface microstructure anomalies owing to wake effects which rise to the surface. Perhaps the most effective means of searching for these microscopic discontinuities is by analyzing infrared radiation which is reflected from the sea surface.

Infrared sensors appear to have significant potential for airborne ASW systems, as they can provide a greater area coverage than MAD gear although they entail a higher false-alarm rate, demanding signal-processing requirements. For any sort of broad ocean surveillance application, however, it appears necessary to use a satellite-borne system. The high atmospheric absorption of infrared energy is a major limiting factor for satellite-borne systems.

An operating submarine continually introduces heat into its environment, primarily through its use of seawater as a coolant. In large nuclear submarines, the rate of coolant flow can be several thousand gallons per minute, with an increase in temperature of 10°C or more. A submarine which is operating very shallow, as in the case of an SSN copying or sending communications, or one which is hovering at greater depths, as in the case of an SSBN about to fire its missiles, causes a measurable rise in the temperature of the sea surface immediately over its position because of convective flow of the heated water. This greatly enhances the detectability of the submarine.

Masts or periscopes protruding through the sea's surface produce linear thermal discontinuities which can persist for hours in a low sea state. Such tracks have been observed stretching for miles behind submarines.

Trailing wire antennas generate a linear thermal discontinuity on the sea surface which can also persist for hours in a low sea state. This form of the discontinuity is somewhat different from that left by a mast or periscope and is much broader.

Some of the perturbations which produce the wake effects discussed earlier rise with time to the sea surface where they produce a trail of anisotropic disturbance of the infrared microstructure of the sea surface. This effect is much more subtle than the others mentioned and far more difficult to detect.

Analyses of these phenomena indicate that an effective infrared ASW sensor system would have to be capable of monitoring a range of wavelengths, with sensitivities of 0.01°C or better, and with narrow instantaneous fields of view.

The Soviets have developed and operated airborne IR sensors for such applications as mapping of ice fields. [XXXXXXXXXXXX]

Soviet research and development on IR sensors is well advanced. The Soviets have shown considerable interest in developing sensors with high sensitivities in the short wavelength region necessary for atmospheric transmission. Their technical publications indicate that they are specifically interested in the development of sensors capable of monitoring the microstructure of the sea surface.

Even with the development of the necessary sensors and satellite vehicles, an enormous signal-processing problem remains, greater than any thus far encountered. Detection of submarines from a satellite using IR sensors with an acceptably low false-alarm rate would require an extremely sophisticated automatic pattern recognition capability even with the best of sensors. It is unlikely that the Soviets now have or will have within the next few years, an operational broad area IR detection system. They have, however, probably begun testing and evaluation of airborne IR sensors for limited area ASW search and localization. IR systems will always be hampered by problems with rough water—sea states higher than State III—and rain or fog, which absorb IR radiation.

Appendix 2

CIA Country Plan for Albania

APPENDIX I
to Annex C

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TASK ORGANIZATION

(All Strengths Approximate)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>COMPOSITION</u>	<u>NO. UNITS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>METHOD OF DELIVERY</u>
Combined Headquarters	(allied supreme headquarters. Remains initial location)		*	
**Support Command South	(US/UK sponsored)			
Support Command Hqs	encl. 1			
Air Support Command Headquarters		1	30	
Main Support Base		5 - 10	(Decentralized)	
Staging & Loading Areas		1	256	
Air Group	encl. 1	1		
Training Area(s)	(Decentralized as required)			
Marine Support Command Headquarters		1		
Staging & Loading Bases		3 (Decentralized)		
		(or more)		
Marine Transport Group	encl. 1		189	
Training Areas	(Decentralized as required)			
Ground Support Command Headquarters		1	12	
Staging & Supply Areas	(Decentralized near borders)			
Training Area	(Decentralized as required)			
TOTALS			487	(including indigenous personnel only)
Support Command North	(Yugoslav sponsored)		462	
	(Organized generally same as Support Command South)			
<u>JOINT FIELD FORCES</u>				
Joint Headquarters	encl. #3	1	150	A
Central Field Command				
Central Field Hqs.	encl. #3	1	75	A
				Task Force A

* Note: Combined Headquarters composed entirely of US/UK/Yugoslav personnel.

** Only indigenous personnel shown (Consists primarily of support personnel who must enter Albania)

TS 86525

Copy 2 of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>COMPOSITION</u>	<u>NO.</u> <u>UNITS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>METHOD OF</u> <u>DELIVERY</u>
Central Field Command (Cont'd)				
Task Force A				
Headquarters	*(same as Central Field Hqs. initially)			
Intel. Ron. Teams	encl. 4	7	49	A 28 S 21
Mil. Liaison Task Ops.	encl. 5	6	300	A 200 S 100
Police Liaison Task Ops.	encl. 6	7	98	A 56 S 42
Civil. Res. Task Ops.	encl. 7	7	42	A 24 S 18
Combat Battalions	encl. 8	8	4000	A 2000 S 2000
Mil. Govt. Tirane	encl. 9	1	17	A
Service Support Command	encl. 10	1	330	A 100 S 230
Military Forces (Central Sector)	(Come under command as rapidly as defection can be accomplished)			
Civilian Res. Forces	(Come under command as soon as liaison established)			

TOTAL (Joint HQ and Central Sector) 5061 A 2650
S 2411

Southern Field Command				
Southern Field Hqs.	encl. 3	1	75	S
Task Force E				
Headquarters	*(Same as Southern Field Hqs. initially)			
Intel. Ron. Teams	encl. 4	6	42	S
Mil. Liaison Task Ops.	encl. 5	3	150	S
Police Liaison Task Ops.	encl. 6	5	70	S
Civil Res. Task Ops.	encl. 7	4	28	S
Combat Task Op.	encl. 11	1	250	S
Task Force F				
Headquarters	*(Same as Southern Field Hqs. initially)			
Intel. Res. Teams	encl. 4	3	21	L
Mil. Liaison Task Ops.	encl. 5	6	300	L
Police Liaison Task Ops.	encl. 6	2	28	L
Civil. Res. Task Ops.	encl. 7	4	24	L
Combat Task Op.	encl. 11	1	250	A (2nd ech)

*Note: Task Force Headquarters personnel for strike phase provided by detail from appropriate Field Command headquarters as required.

Task Force E

TP 86525

Copy 4 of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>COMPOSITION</u>	<u>NO.</u> <u>UNITS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>METHOD OF</u> <u>DELIVERY</u>
Southern Field Command (Cont'd)				
Task Force E				
Headquarters	(Same as Southern Field Hqs. initially)			
Intel. Rcn. Teams	encl. 4	3	21	L 7
				S 14
Mil. Liaison Task Op.	encl. 5	6	300	L 150
				S 150
Police Liaison Task Op.	encl. 6	4	56	L 28
				S 28
Civil. Res. Task Op.	encl. 7	4	24	L 12
				S 12
Combat Task Op.	encl. 11	1	500	S 250
				L 250
Military Forces	(Come under command as rapidly as			
(Southern Sector)	defection can be accomplished)			
Civilian Resistance Forces	(Come under command as soon as liaison			
	established)			
TOTAL (South Sector)			2145	S 1068 L 827 A 250
Northern Field Command				
Northern Field Hqs.	encl. 3	1	75	
Task Force C	(Same approx. organization and strength as			
	Task Force E)			
Task Force D	(Same approx. organization and strength as			
	Task Force E)			
Military Forces	(Come under command as rapidly as defection			
(Northern Sector)	can be accomplished)			
Civilian Resistance Forces	(Come under command as soon as liaison			
	established)			
TOTAL (North Sector)			1321	A 250 S 250 L 821
General Reserve				
Intel. Rcn. Teams	encl. 4	6	42	As appropriate
Mil. Liaison Task Ops.	encl. 5	5	250	" "
Pol. Liaison Task Ops.	encl. 6	6	94	" "
Civil. Res. Task Ops.	encl. 7	7	42	" "
Combat Battalions	encl. 8	3	1500	" "
TOTAL (Reserve)			1928	

Free National Govt.

TS 86525

TOP SECRET

Copy 1 of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>COMPOSITION</u>	<u>NO. UNITS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>METHOD OF DELIVERY</u>
Free National Govt. and National Police Force	encl. 2	1	150	
TOTAL			11,554	

RECAPITULATION:

Joint Field Forces

delivered by air	-	3,150	
" " land	-	1,648	
" " sea	-	3,729	
reserve	-	1,928	
		<u>10,455</u>	* 10,455

Support personnel	949
Provisional government	<u>150</u>

GRAND TOTAL	11,554
-------------	--------

* NOTE: Total striking forces to be infiltrated into Albania. See para. 3 a (1) pages 3 and 4, annex C, in which these approximate strengths were stated in round numbers.

TOP SECRET


- 4 -

TS 86525

Copy ✓ of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET**ENCLOSURE 1****TASK SUPPORT ORGANIZATION**

1. **Mission:** To provide complete logistical support to forces to be infiltrated into and generated within ALBANIA.
2. **Functional Organization**



3. **Approximate Strengths** (Indigenous Only - See note below)*

	<u>South</u>	<u>North</u>
Air Liaison Group	30	30
Air Support Command	256	300
Marine Support Command	189	180
Ground Support Command	<u>12</u>	<u>12</u>
	487	562

4. **Equipment****

	<u>South</u>	<u>North</u>
Air Liaison Group	12	12
Air Support Command	64	75
		C-47
Marine support Command	47	32
		LCA
	4	2
		LCU

* Maintenance of equipment, commo facilities, warehousing, and house-keeping functions will be performed by sponsoring agencies.

**This equipment is "on-loan" basis and will revert to control of sponsors upon completion of campaign.

TS 86525

TOP SECRET

ENCLOSURE 2

FREE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

1. **MISSION:** Assume initial direction and control of key posts of the national government and occupy office and headquarters facilities.
2. **FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION:**
 - a. Group of government officials to include, but not to be limited to the following (nucleus group for each ministry concerned):
 - Prime Ministry
 - National Defense Ministry
 - Ministry of State Control
 - Ministry of Communications
 - Finance Ministry
 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 - Ministry of Justice
 - b. Group of commo specialists to operate internal commo facilities of the government offices.
 - c. Police escort and guard group of approximately 100 armed men.
3. **APPROXIMATE STRENGTH:** 150, to be augmented by local recruitment in target area.
4. **EQUIPMENT:** Small arms and ammo.

TOP SECRET


- 6 -

TS 86525
Copy 2 of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET**ENCLOSURE 1****JOINT FIELD HEADQUARTERS
(and * Field Command Headquarters)**

1. **MISSION:** Command operations of all task forces and local resistance forces*, from time of arrival in target areas. Assume command and control of the national military establishment or parts thereof as rapidly as the situation permits.

2. **FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION:**



(Skeletonized organization to be augmented by personnel recruited in the target area.)

3. **APPROXIMATE STRENGTH:** 150
4. **EQUIPMENT:** Individual small arms and equipment
- 3 machine guns
 - 3 rocket launchers
 - 8 RS-1 radios
 - 6 Liaison type aircraft

(To be supplemented by commo facilities and transportation seized in target area.)

* Note: Each Field Command and Hqs. will be similar in organization and about half the strength of Joint Hqs.

TOP SECRET

TS 86525


Copy 4 of 5 copies

TOP SECRET

ENCLOSURE ▲

INTELLIGENCE RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS

1. MISSION: To collect and report tactical intelligence operating from OP's located strategically throughout ALBANIA.
2. ORGANIZATION:



3. EQUIPMENT: Leader and team equipped with submachine guns, knives, ammunition and attendant equipment. Special equipment to include: Radio Set RS-1 with allied equipment, field glasses, maps of areas applicable with compasses, medical kits.

No resupply intended.

4. STRENGTH: 7, not to vary.

TOP SECRET

TS 86525

Copy 4 of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET**ENCLOSURE 1****MILITARY LIAISON TASK GROUP**

1. **MISSION:** To penetrate, neutralise, and assume control of major Headquarters, installations and units of the armed forces, arresting military leaders loyal to Communist regime, and defecting balance of forces to actively participate in the coup.
2. **FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION:**



3. Approximate strength per regimental team: 50

10 officers
6 commo personnel
34 M.P.'s

(Approximately half this strength per separate battalion or equiv.)

4. **EQUIPMENT:** Individual weapons and grenades. Demolitions, wire cutters, etc., as required to gain or force entry into military camps and installations.

2 radios RS-1/RS-6 type with spare batteries
1 Kit, tool, portable for switchboard and wire line sabotage and/or maintenance.

TS 86525


TOP SECRETCopy 4 of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET

ENCLOSURE 6

POLICE LIAISON TASK GROUP

1. **MISSION:** To defect local police forces where possible and direct their efforts. Otherwise, to attack and capture police headquarters and occupants and take over essential duties of local police.
2. **ORGANIZATION:**



3. **EQUIPMENT:** Leader and team equipped with submachine guns, knives and ammunition and attendant equipment. Special equipment to include: Radio Set RS-1 with allied equipment. Demolitions and tools for penetration of installations and special operations, commo repair kit. (No resupply intended.)
4. **STRENGTH:** 14 (may vary with size of city or town as target)

TOP SECRET

TS 86525


Copy 4 of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET

ENCLOSURE 7

CIVILIAN RESISTANCE TASK GROUPS

1. MISSION: To foment and organize resistance among local populace. To direct the resulting irregulars under orders from appropriate Field Command Headquarters. To conduct liaison with Field Command Headquarters and arrange for securing supply and resupply.
2. ORGANIZATION:



DZ Personnel and Bodyguard to be drawn from resistance group when organized.

3. EQUIPMENT: Leader and team equipped with submachine guns, knives and ammunition with attendant equipment. Special equipment to include: RS-1 with allied equipment, flashlights with I/R filters, flare piston with flares; signal mirror, barter items (aureomycin, etc.), Radio Set AN/URC-4, medical kits, compasses.
4. STRENGTH: 6 (not to vary)

TS 86525

Copy 1 of 5 Copies


- 11 -
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

ENCLOSURE 7

CIVILIAN RESISTANCE TASK GROUPS

1. MISSION: To foment and organize resistance among local populace. To direct the resulting irregulars under orders from appropriate Field Command Headquarters. To conduct liaison with Field Command Headquarters and arrange for securing supply and resupply.
2. ORGANIZATION:



DZ Personnel and Bodyguard to be drawn from resistance group when organized.

3. EQUIPMENT: Leader and team equipped with submachine guns, knives and ammunition with attendant equipment. Special equipment to include: RS-1 with allied equipment, flashlights with I/R filters, flare piston with flares; signal mirror, barter items (aureomycin, etc.), Radio Set AN/URC-4, medical kits, compasses.
4. STRENGTH: 6 (not to vary)

TS 86525

Copy 4 of 5 Copies

- 11 -
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

ENCLOSURE 2

COMBAT BATTALION

1. **MISSION:** Attack and eliminate hard core communist security forces and perform all types of combat missions required in support of the coup.
2. **ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT:** Comprises the combat elements only of a standard U.S. Infantry Battalion or equivalent with similar arms and equipment.
3. **APPROXIMATE STRENGTH:** 500

TS 86525

TOP SECRET

Copy 4 of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET

ENCLOSURE 8

COMBAT BATTALION

1. **MISSION:** Attack and eliminate hard core communist security forces and perform all types of combat missions required in support of the coup.
2. **ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT:** Comprises the combat elements only of a standard U.S. Infantry Battalion or equivalent with similar arms and equipment.
3. **APPROXIMATE STRENGTH:** 500


TS 86525

Copy 4 of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET
- 12 -

TOP SECRET**ENCLOSURE 2****MILITARY GOVERNMENT TEAM**

1. **MISSION:** To assume control and direction of key offices in municipal government.
2. **ORGANIZATION:**



3. Technical expert to accompany director of each principal department in city government (5).
3. **EQUIPMENT:** All to be armed with submachine guns, knives and necessary ammo.
4. **STRENGTH:** 17 (not to vary, this group necessary only for TIRANE.)

Note: This group to be supplied bodyguard from local combat task force.

TOP SECRET

- 13 -

TS 86525


Copy 4 of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET

ENCLOSURE 11

COMBAT TASK GROUP

1. **MISSION:** Perform combat-type mission as required to restrict movements and activities of hostile security forces, support friendly task forces, and provide a nucleus for rallying civilian resistance.
2. **FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION:**



3. **APPROXIMATE STRENGTH:** 250

(This is a skeletonized organization to be augmented by civilian, resistance personnel recruited in target area.)

4. **EQUIPMENT:** Individual arms plus:

- 6 60-mm mortars
- 6 Machine guns
- 2 Sets demolitions equipment for road blocks
- 2 AN/URC-4 radios
- 2 RS-1 radios
- 10 SCR-300 radios
- 10 SCR-536 radios
- 10 Rocket launchers

(To be augmented where practicable by motor transport seized in target area.)

TS 86525

Copy 4 of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET

Appendix 3

The Berlin Tunnel

PBJOINTLY (the Berlin Tunnel project) came into being in 1952 (the exact date cannot be established) and ceased as an active operation in the summer of 1956. The writer served as Headquarters case officer on the project from the winter of 1952–1953 until the summer of 1954 and then as the field case officer until February 1955.

[XXXXXXX] a senior Office of Communications officer in the project; Mr William K Harvey, Chief, Berlin Operating Base 1952–1958 and [XXXXXXX] F/1 Division D, 1952–1958, were intimately associated with the planning and implementation of the project at policy level and very kindly offered suggestions for the preparation of this manuscript. Their comments have been incorporated and are greatly appreciated. Several other individuals [XXXXXXX] who were in a position to offer valuable advice were absent from Headquarters during the period the paper was being prepared and thus unavailable to assist.

When this project was first discussed with the then director of CIA, Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles, he ordered that, in the interests of security, as little as possible concerning the project would be reduced to writing. It is probable that few orders have been so conscientiously obeyed, and yet there are a great many cubic feet of files connected with this project. These files mainly concern technical and administrative matters. Only those details which, in the opinion of the writer, are necessary to a broad understanding of the manner in which the project's objectives were accomplished have been included in this paper. Those interested in additional data may wish to consult the files.

In addition to setting forth significant developments, the writer has attempted to provide insight into the reasons for certain course of action. All this required a speculative approach. The judgments derived from such speculation were shared by all those actively concerned in the management of the project, and it is the writer's hope that they are accurately expressed in the following chapter. Any error in this respect, however, is the sole responsibility of the writer.

I. I Introduction

The exact moment when the idea emerged of digging a tunnel to intercept Soviet and East German communications is somewhat obscure. A number of factors may be considered, among them the following:

- a) As early as 1948 U.S. intelligence officers became interested in the benefits to be derived from tapping Soviet and Satellite landlines on a scale not previously considered necessary. The loss of certain sources during this period created gaps in our intelligence coverage which were particularly unfortunate during this period of Cold War escalation. It became evident that the tapping of certain selected landlines might produce the information needed to fill a number of the gaps in our overall intelligence picture.
- b) In the late 1940s and the early 1950s the United States, through the debriefing of “returnee” German scientists (those who were taken by the Soviets after World War II to work in Russia) and other sources, became aware of a new Soviet voice secrecy device which the Soviets referred to as “VHE CHE.” It soon became evident that the Soviets planned [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]
- c) In the late 1940s, the Office of Communications, in the course of continuing efforts to provide secure communications for the Agency, became aware of a principle which, when applied to target communications, offered certain possibilities. Plans to exploit this technique were immediately formulated.

These factors then served as additional incentives (above and beyond our normal collection requirements) to focus attention on Soviet landline targets. In mid-1951, exploratory discussions were held in Washington to plan the mounting of an attack on Soviet landlines in East Germany with special emphasis to be placed on the Berlin area. As a result of this conference, [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] an agent network was set up which was successful in penetrating the East Berlin office of the East German Posts and Telecommunications network.

Vital information [XXXXXX] first came available [XXXXXX] during the latter part of 1951, and by March 1953, all of the pertinent technical material had been assembled and sufficiently analyzed to permit the pinpointing of the most important Soviet circuits. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] Subsequent events proved this information to be completely correct.

Various methods of tapping these circuits were explored, and one sampling operation was run in the East Zone, unfortunately with negative results. By January 1953, however, the effectiveness of the penetration network

[XXXXXX] had become such that a 15-minute sample was obtained of the prime target circuit. This was accomplished by [XXXXXX] cable pair to the West German Post Office where it was recorded. This operation continued for some six months [XXXXXX] for a total of almost two hours. The longest continuous sample obtained was 29 minutes and most samples were of two to three minutes' duration. Special mention should be made of the fact that it was necessary to maintain a 24-hour watch over a six-month period on "our" end of the cable to record these samples [XXXXXXXXXX]

Meanwhile, collateral collection effort continued on the communications system involved, and the Office of Communications developed techniques for recovering the text from the magnetic tape recordings of the target signal. Somewhat ironically, the first actual material recovered proved to be a recording of a student teletypist practicing on the "home keys." While perhaps disappointing from the standpoint of intelligence content, this material served to prove the technical possibility. [XXXXXX]

At this point (mid-1953), we knew it could be done; the next step was the problem of installing a permanent tap on the target lines.

Precisely at that point, the idea of a tunnel, for the purpose of tapping the target cables began to come into focus, cannot be pinpointed. In 1961, the British advised CIA that they had for some years been tapping Soviet cables through a system of tunnels in the Vienna area and offered to share the take with the United States. The suggestion was made by the British at the time that similar opportunities that might be present in the Berlin area. While it should perhaps be possible to credit one individual with the initial concept, it appears to be a bit difficult to do so. At any rate, the British and CIA continued to pool collateral information, and by May 1953 [XXXXXX], the idea of a tunnel to tap the target cables began to take definite shape.

II. Planning

- a. The location of the permanent water-table (which is normally relatively high in Berlin) was ascertained to be 32 feet below ground service. It was considered that this fact would obviate the necessity for use of compressed air, watertight locks, and watertight construction with a corresponding reduction in the attendant engineering problems.
- b. The strength of the tunnel was considered to be not impractical although it far exceeded anything which has been done by the British in Vienna.
- c. Land was available on which to construct an installation from which to begin the tunnel.

- d. Complete collateral information on the area was available, including the target cable plans, aerial photographs, and the plans for all utilities serving the area.

At this point, the following major questions remained unanswered:

- a. Was it indeed possible to dig a tunnel of this magnitude (approximately 1,500 feet) clandestinely, considering the fact that the border at this point was heavily and constantly patrolled by the East Germans, and hit the targets?
- b. If the answer to the above was favorable, what was to be done with the spoil (reckoned at approximately 3,000 tons of sand)?
- c. What type of cover installation could be built in such a remote area (this portion of Berlin was at that time a “squattersville” of shacks and hovels constructed from rubble by refugees from the East German Zone)?

In retrospect the first question, “could the tunnel be dug?” was never really debatable one—those concerned more or less decided that given sufficient money and personnel, the job could be done. (This judgment fortunately proved sound.) The second question, Where do we put the dirt?, haunted the minds of the project personnel for many weeks, and a great many ingenious ideas were brought forth for one reason or another until the suggestion was made facetiously that we “dig a hole and put the dirt into it.” This in effect was the solution. At this time, no convincing story had suggested itself and the current consensus favored making the cover compound an element of the Quartermaster Corps with a rather vague mission of housing items that should be dispersed for one reason or another in a remote area of Berlin. Space requirements for the recording and associated equipment were such that a building of warehouse proportions was needed; so it was decided to build a two-storey warehouse. Local engineers were told that it had been decided to experiment with a new type of warehouse, one of which would be half above the ground and half below with a ramp suitable for running fork-lift trucks from the basement to the first floor. Berlin had been selected as the site for this warehouse because (a) construction would be cheap due to low labor rates and (b) the work would benefit the Berlin economy. So the basement was dug under the eyes of the local border guards and we had our “hole to put the dirt in.”

While the warehouse cover was adjudged sufficient to solve the temporary problems of construction, it was not deemed solid enough to carry the project for an extended period. At this particular time, the intelligence community was becoming increasingly interested in the potential of [XXXXXX]

[XXXXXX] For example:

- a) Excuse was provided for maintaining extraordinary physical security and tight Compartmentation. [XXXXXX] in the Top Secret category by this period in its evolution.) [XXXXXX]
- b) [XXXXXX]
- c) Legitimate targets [XXXXXX] existed in the area. [XXXXXX] at the site provided the opposition with an explanation for the site's existence. In spite of the fact that any form of [XXXXXX] presents a priority target, it was argued that presenting the opposition with a reason for the site's existence would make it a less prominent target than leaving it a "mysterious something." The site did in fact [XXXXXX]. In addition, the sight of the Soviets and the East Germans standing on top of the tunnel with binoculars focused [XXXXXX] on the roof of the installation provided considerable amusement to personnel at the site.

Joint U.S.–U.K planning for the project continued throughout 1953, and in December of that year, the Director of Central Intelligence approved the terms of reference which covered formal negotiations with the British for the implementation of the project. A series of conferences in late 1953 and early 1954 led to the following decisions:

- a) The United States would:
 - 1) Procure a site, erect the necessary structures, and drive a tunnel to a point beneath the target cables;
 - 2) Be responsible for the recording of all signals produced [XXXXXX] and
 - 3) Process in Washington all of the telegraphic material received from the project.
- b) The British would:
 - 1) Drive a vertical shaft from the tunnel's end to the targets; (2) effect the cable taps and deliver a usable signal to the head of the tunnel for recording; and (3) provide for a jointly manned U.S.–U.K center in London to process the voice recordings from the site.

It was jointly agreed that each side would keep the other advised in detail on all aspects of the project. It should perhaps be said here that the bilateral aspects of this operation (with one notable exception which will be discussed later) caused few, if any, problems. The skills developed by the British during the Vienna operations stood in good stead and the distribution of effort and expense proved in the end to be reasonably equitable.

Activity thus proceeded on three fronts—in Berlin steps were taken to lease the necessary land and right-of-way easements for the site and a contract was let with a German contractor. The compound, which was roughly the size of an average city block, was fenced with a chain-type high-security fencing and contained the main operations building (the one-storey with basement type warehouse, previously described, combined kitchen-dining facilities and barracks, and another building which housed three diesel-driven generators to provide power for all facilities. Sanitary provisions consisted of a cesspool). (The logical placement of the cesspool was such that it was situated only a few feet from the tunnel site. It later developed when the tunnel was dug that this was quite unfortunate because the working conditions in the sector adjacent to the cesspool were, to say the least, highly unpleasant.) Planning called for the completion of the work on August 27, 1954.

For assistance in actually digging the tunnel it was decided to request help from the Army Corps of Engineers, and to this end the Chief of Staff and the G-2, U.S. Army, were briefed on the project. The initial contact with the Army was made personally by Mr Allen Dulles to General Matthew B. Ridgway. Fortunately General Arthur Trudeau, a trained engineer, had been appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. From the first moment he learned of the operation, General Trudeau was an enthusiastic supporter of the concept. The Army selected Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie W. Gross (the only available member of the Engineering Corps with any experience in tunneling) to lead the project. This proved to be an excellent choice for Lieutenant-Colonel Gross turned in an outstanding job. By mid-summer of 1954 he had firmed up the engineering plans, selected a crew of engineering personnel and actually constructed a mock-up tunnel some 150 yards long working under operational conditions at a highly secure base [XXXXXX].

Some mention should be made of the actual method of constructing the tunnel. Studies of the soil structure in the Berlin area showed a high percentage of sand. For this reason it was decided that the tunnel should be lined with steel. The same sand content contributed greatly to the danger of cave-in at the face of the tunnel, and to eliminate this risk a shield was devised with horizontal “blinds” so arranged across its face that should even dry sand be encountered the danger of cave-ins was virtually eliminated. The tunnel liner was formed of sections of heavy steel plate so constructed that, when bolted together, five sections formed a steel ring approximately six feet in diameter and 15 inches long. Provision was made for bolting these sections together to form a continuous tube of solid steel. The men worked under the cover of the shield described above (which was slightly larger in diameter than the steel liner) and when sufficient material had been excavated, the shield was forced forward with hydraulic jacks and a new section of liner was bolted in place. Since this method left a void of approximately one and one half inches around the liner (remembering that the liner) screw-type removable plugs were built into every third section of the tunnel liner. This permitted removal of the plugs and the forcing of grouting

material under high pressure to fill the void after the liner was in place. It was calculated (and subsequently proved to be true) that this method of construction would not permit settling of the soil and detection of the tunnel from the surface.

Meantime in the U.K. British engineers constructed a mock-up of the tunnel's terminal end and fabricated an ingenious device which worked in principle like the tunnel "shield" described above, with the difference, of course, that the blinds (which closely resembled a conventional venetian blind) were horizontal but so hinged as to permit vertical excavation. This permitted excavating cautiously across the upper face of the vertical shaft in small areas and then jacking the entire structure up at the optimum rate. Available plans indicated that the cables were buried some 27 inches deep along the side of a heavily traveled highway. The top of the vertical shaft then needed to be approximately 12–14 inches below the surface of the highway in order to give the tapping crew room to work below the ceiling of the shaft, and the whole structure had to be capable of supporting the weight of heavy trucks since the tunnel and tap chamber lay directly beneath the highway. Considerable care was devoted to insulating the chamber to prevent it acting like a huge drum. In spite of the insulation, it was a weird sensation to be in the chamber when an iron-shod horse trotted across it. We also suffered some anxious moments one foggy morning when the microphone in the tap chamber gave forth with a continuous series of dull thuds. After the sun burned away the fog, visual observation showed that the East German police had set up a temporary automobile checkpoint directly over the chamber. The "thuds" the microphone picked up were caused by the police officer in charge stomping his feet on the road surface to keep warm.

Considerable thought was given to the quantity and content of the material available from the target and the manner in which it was to be processed. It was in this field, perhaps, that we experienced some of our greatest problems. It had been decided very early in the project's planning stages to maintain the strictest possible security measures. As a minimum precaution security checks were made on each individual who in any way became knowledgeable of the project's mission, and the same standards in force for clearances for Special Intelligence were utilized. A list of briefed personnel was maintained, special secrecy agreements were executed, and special briefings were given to all knowledgeable personnel, it was in the assemblage of a processing team that we experienced our greatest problems in maintaining security standards. Since the material to be processed was largely Russian voice, it was thought that we would need linguists with near native fluency in Russian. It is axiomatic that native fluency is usually available only in natives, and natives were not clearable for the project. Although we were never successful in obtaining as many linguists as we needed, we were successful, through careful screening and intensive language training, in assembling minimum crew for the job. This necessitated screening each personnel file in the Agency of those individuals who claimed any knowledge of German or Russian, arranging interviews and language tests, and negotiating transfers to the project. The Agency's language capabilities then

were considerably less than now and some of the negotiations proved, to say the least, difficult.

III. Implementation

By August 17, 1954, things were beginning to take shape and the situation was as follows:

- a. The German contractors had completed the compound and we were in possession.
- b. All of the base supplies, equipment, and personnel were in Berlin ready to start construction on the tunnel. This in itself involved transporting 125 tons of steel tunnel liner from the ZI to Berlin. The initial shipment across the East Zone to Berlin consisted of one-and-one-half freight trains, the loss of any package of which could have blown the project. For security purposes, all sensitive liens, such as the tunnel liner, were double crated and banded and subjected to severe drop tests before they left the Z1; Similar items were differently packaged for deception purposes.
- c. Space at Headquarters was secured and the Office of Communications had assembled a crew and wag well under way in fabricating the unique equipment necessary to process the anticipated telegraphic traffic.

Initial personnel had been selected and were being processed for both the Main Processing Unit (MPU) in London and the Technical Processing Unit (TPU) in Washington. It should be noted that personnel and equipment were programmed initially to exploit approximately 10 percent of the anticipated take. In retrospect, perhaps this could be considered overly cautious. In justification of this decision, it should be said that no one had ever tunneled 1,476 feet under clandestine conditions with the expectation of hitting a target 2 inches in diameter and 87 inches below a main German/Soviet highway. There were those who manifested certain reservations on the feasibility of so doing, and it is greatly to the credit of those senior officials, both civilian and military, that, in spite of these reservations, the project was permitted to proceed.

In late August a vertical shaft some 16 feet in diameter was started in the warehouse basement floor and ground water was encountered at 5 feet instead of at the predicted 32 feet. Such examination as could be safely undertaken under the steady observation of East German border guards and Soviet officials indicated that a clay lens existed in this particular spot, creating a “perched water table”—the magnitude of which was unknown. Available information indicated that the clay lens possibly sloped down in the direction

of the target and it was decided to proceed with the tunnel even though the top cover was to be less than half what had been anticipated.

Careful visual observation was maintained and tunneling operations stopped each time the German guards walked over the tunnel on their regular patrols. Pumps were installed to take care of the excess water. Observation logs were maintained, and since the highway under observation was the main road from East Berlin to the Schocnfeld Airport, considerable Order of Battle information was obtained. It was also possible to estimate quite accurately the relative importance of individuals visiting East Berlin by observing the security precautions taken by the East Germans and the Soviets.

Both sides of the tunnel were lined with sand in bags as the tunnel proceeded and the excess spoil was hauled back to the basement of the warehouse. To facilitate movement, a wooden track was laid on the floor of the tunnel and a converted electric fork lift was used to pull a string of rubber-tired trailers back and forth in the tunnel. Cool air was supplied to the face of the tunnel through duct work from an air conditioning unit located in the warehouse; the tunnel was completed on February 28, 1955. Construction of the tap chamber commenced March 10, 1955 and was completed, with the three target cables exposed, on March 28, 1955.

To appreciate this accomplishment, it is necessary to remember that the tunnel was 1,476 feet long (roughly the length of the Lincoln Memorial reflecting pool) and that the first half sloped down and the second half sloped up. The lack of an adequate base line made the surveying problem especially difficult. The engineers decided at one point that an object of known size in the East Zone would be useful as a reference point, so a baseball game was organized with the objective of knocking a baseball as far into the East Zone as possible. This scheme was frustrated by the friendliness of the East German guards who kept returning the baseball. Nonetheless, the engineers expressed confidence that they knew their position when the tunnel was completed to a point which could be contained in a six-inch cube. They were correct.

Excess humidity is probably one of the greatest enemies of electronic equipment. To guard against this problem, the section of the tunnel immediately adjacent to the tap chamber was insulated and sealed with marine-type plywood to form, in effect, a closed room. Vapor barriers were erected and, in addition, a heavy "anti-personnel" door of steel and concrete was constructed to seal off the tunnel about 13 yards from its terminal end. From the beginning, it was realized that the duration of this operation was finite. Considerable thought was given to the posture the U.S. Government would adopt upon the tunnel's discovery and to those measures which would be taken at the site. The following position was finally approved:

- a) The posture of the United States would be one of flat denial of any knowledge of the tunnel.
- b) The tunnel was mined at the point it crossed the East-West Zone border with demolition charges capable of caving in the tunnel liner should the soviets attempt forcible entry into the cover installation. The “anti-Personnel” door described above was installed. This door bore the following inscription neatly lettered, in German and Cyrillic: “Entry is forbidden by order of the Commanding General,” it was reasoned that this sign might give pause to Soviet and/or German officials and gain time. As a matter of fact, there were those Communist individuals who considered the posting of this sign as one of the most audacious aspects of the entire undertaking.
- c) It was agreed that the installation would be defended against forcible entry with all means at hand.

The three cables were tapped on May 11, 1955, May 21, 1955, and August 2, 1955. All equipment for isolating and preamplifying the signals and passing them down the tunnel for recording was in place before each tap was made so that monitoring of each pair could begin as soon as it was tapped. Careful check was kept of the temperature and humidity in the tap chamber to prevent the possibility of the introduction of moisture into the target cables thus causing faults. The moisture in the air caused by the breathing and perspiration of the technicians doing the tapping operation forced the suspension of the operation several times to permit the air conditioning equipment to dehumidify the chamber. All the components in the electrical isolation networks were individually selected and subjected to rigorous tests to insure maximum reliability, and the lead-away cables were constructed of the best available materials, sheathed in lead, and handled in accordance with the highest telephone company standards. The strictest possible visual watch was maintained with the tap crew. In short, in this, as in all aspects of the operation, every effort was made to guarantee success even though in many instances it meant delay in achieving the objective.

IV. Termination

The tunnel was discovered on April 21, 1956, after 11 months and 11 days of operation, a memorandum prepared on August 15, 1936 (reproduced in its entirety as appendix A) examines in detail all evidence available as of that date as the reasons for the discovery. The conclusion reached was that the loss of this source was purely the insult of unfortunate circumstances beyond our control—a combination of the fact that one of the cables was in very poor

physical condition (this was known from the beginning) and a long period of unusually heavy rainfall. It appeared that water entered the cable in sufficient quantity to make it inoperative thus necessitating digging up sections of the cable and causing discovery of the tap.

Subsequent developments offer an alternative reason for the demise of the operation. In April 1956, MI-6 discovered that George Blake, case officer in their service, had been recruited by the Soviets while a prisoner in North Korea in 1952 and had continued under Soviet control. Blake was privy to all aspects of the tunnel from the earliest planning stages. Blake stated that he had informed his Soviet contact of the planned tunnel at the time the final decision was made on its location in the latter part of 1953. The question then arises as to why the Soviets permitted the tunnel to be dug and to operate for nearly one year. Many theories have been advanced, but it is most probable that we will never know the exact rationale behind the Soviet moves.

V. Production

The following statistics may be of interest in evaluating the project:

- a) Three cables were tapped. They contained 273 metallic pairs capable of transmitting a total of approximately 1,200 communications channels. The maximum number of channels in use at any one time approximated 500. On the average 28 telegraphic circuits and 121 voice circuits were recorded continuously. Approximately 50,000 reels of magnetic tape were used—some 25 tons.
- b) The London processing center employed a peak number of 317 persons. Twenty-thousand Soviet two-hour voice reels containing 368,000 conversations were fully transcribed. In addition, 13,500 German two-hour voice reels were received and 5,500 reels containing 75,000 conversations were processed. Seventeen-thousand of these conversations were fully transcribed.
- c) The Washington center employed 350 people at its peak. Eighteen-thousand six-hour Soviet teletype reels and 11,000 six-hour German teletype reels were completely transcribed. It should be borne in mind that many of these reels contained as many as 18 separate circuits, some of which utilized time-division multiplex to create additional circuits. The potential of any given six-hour teletype reel was approximately 216 hours of teletype messages. Both plain text and encrypted traffic was received. The daily output was about 4,000 feet of teletype messages. Printed in book form, these messages would have filled a space 10 feet wide, 15 feet long, and eight feet high.

- d) A small processing unit (two to four persons) was maintained at the Berlin site to permit on-the-spot monitoring of engineering circuits for the protection of the project and scanning of the more productive circuits for the “hot” intelligence. Daily reports of sufficient value to warrant electrical transmission to Washington and London were produced.
- e) Processing of the backlogged material continued until September 30, 1958 and resulted in a total of 1,750 reports plus 90,000 translated messages or conversations.
- f) The total cost of the project was \$6,700,000. The information from this material was disseminated in a closely controlled system called “REGAL.” Appendix B consists of a summary of the value of the material received together with typical customer comments. Despite our knowledge of the fact that certain elements of the Soviet Government were aware of our plans to tap these cables, we have no evidence that the Soviets attempted to feed us deception material through this source.

VI. Aftermath

As previously noted, considerable thought was given during the entire life of the project on the result its discovery would bring. In retrospect, it is probably correct to say that, among those most actively concerned with the project’s management, a consensus developed that the Soviets would probably suppress knowledge of the tunnel’s existence rather than admit to the world that Free World Intelligence organs had the capability of successfully mounting an operation of this magnitude. In other words, it was felt that for the Soviets to admit that the United States had been reading their high level communications circuits would cause the Soviets to lose face. Perhaps fortunately, fate intervened, and as a possible consequence, the Soviet course of action was exactly contrary to expectation.

The Commandant of the Soviet Berlin Garrison, who would normally have controlled the handling of the Situation when the tunnel was discovered, was absent from Berlin, and the Acting Commandant, Colonel Ivan A. Kotsyuba, was in charge. There is some reason to believe that he (for whatever reason) was forced to make a personal decision on a course of action without benefit of advice from Moscow. At any rate, his reaction was unexpected, in that he invited the entire Berlin press corps to a briefing and tour of the tunnel and its facilities. As a result, the tunnel was undoubtedly the most highly publicized peacetime espionage enterprise in modern times prior to the “U-2 incident.” Worldwide reaction was outstandingly favorable in terms of enhancement of U.S. prestige. Non-Soviet Bloc sentiment can be generally summarized as follows:

- a. There was universal admiration (and this included informed Soviets) on the technical excellence of the installation and the imaginative nature of the undertaking.
- b. The non-Communist world reacted with surprise and unconcealed delight to this indication that the United States almost universally regarded as a stumbling neophyte in espionage matters was capable of a coup against the Soviet Union, which had long been the acknowledged master in such matters.
- c. Coupled with regret that the Cold War necessitated such measures, thoughtful editorial comment applauded this indication that the United States was capable of fulfilling its role of Free World leadership in the struggle.

NOTE: This assessment was prepared by the PBJOINTLY staff immediately after the discovery of the tunnel and is based on pertinent information available. At the time the report was prepared, Blake's activities had not been surfaced.

August 15, 1956

Discovery by the Soviets of PBJOINTLY

Analysis of all available evidence—traffic passing on the target cables, conversations recorded from a microphone installed in the tap chamber, and vital observations from the site—indicates that the Soviet discovery of PBJOINTLY was purely fortuitous and was not the result of a penetration of the U.S. or U.K. agencies concerned, a security violation, or testing of the lines by the Soviets or East Germans. A description of the events leading to these conclusions is contained in this chapter.

Following heavy rains in the Berlin area, a number of telephone and telegraph cables were flooded and began to fault between Karlsborst and Hahlow on the night of April 16, 1956.

The first major fault was discovered on cable FX 151 at Wassmannsdorf on April 17. The fault was repaired by cutting the defective stretch of cable and replacing a 3,000 meter length with a temporary replacement cable. Between 17 and 22 April, when the tap was discovered, cables 150, 151, 153, and 157 were inoperative at various times. During this period, Soviet signal troops and East German Post and Telegraph technicians worked frantically to re-establish and maintain communications. Telephone lines serving Marshal Grechko, the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), and General Kosyakin, Malyl, Tsarenko, and Dudokov failed—temporarily

depriving these officers of communications. Faults on cable FK 150 put the Main Soviet Signal Center in Germany out of communications with Moscow, and the Soviet Air Warning Control Center in East Germany similarly lost its communications. German technicians began a testing program based at Karlshorst and Mahlow and working north from Mahlow. A major fault on FX 150 was discovered and repaired at Wassmannsdorf on 18–10 April, and on 19 April, a second major fault on the same cable was discovered at Schoenfeld only two kilometers south of the tap site. It appears that the faulty section of cable was replaced with a new stretch during the early hours of April 20, but communications remained unsatisfactory, particularly on FK 150, and the testing and repair program continued. FK 150 caused project personnel considerable concern from the day that the cables were reached. It was physically in very poor shape, with brittle and cracking insulation.

The actual tap of FX 150 was delayed almost three months in deference to its poor physical condition.

This general situation was noted by personnel at the site who checked the tap on the morning of April 19 and found it to be in good condition but with DO faults present. Berlin notified Headquarters of this fact on the evening of April 20, noting, “available precautions taken including primary one of crossing fingers.”

Throughout April 20, Soviet operators at Karishorst, the Mahlow cable chamber, and Zossen/Wunsdorf checked FK 150 pairs carrying circuits serving high ranking officials and made switches where necessary or possible, nothing was said concerning the testing being conducted to discover the faults or work being done by a Soviet labor force lent to the Germans to assist in digging up bad stretches of cable. On April 21, a Karishorst technician told a colleague in Zossen/Wunsdorf the FK 150 had not yet been repaired and that another two days’ work would probably be necessary to clear up the trouble. Testing and rerouting of circuits were stepped up during the evening of April 21, and the Soviets showed considerable concern over the failure of the Moscow-GSFG Air Warning telegraph channel which had been transferred to FX 150 on April 17. Lt. Colonel Vyunik, Chief of the GSFG Signal Center at Wunsdorf, telephoned Major Alpatov, Chief of the Karlshorst Signal Center, at his apartment to inform him of the failure of the Air Warning circuit. They agreed that communications had to be established before morning and Alpatov left for his duty station.

There is no significant information available on the actual progress of the testing and repair program proper from 0300 hours on April 20 to 0050 hours on April 22. On the basis of available information, however, it seems probable that (a) the testing program continued north until a fault was located near the site and a decision was made to replace an entire section of cable which

embraced the tap site; or (b) the repeated faulting coupled with the age and physical condition of FK 150 led the opposition to the conclusion that the only effective remedy was to replace the cable, section by section, and that this program was inaugurated somewhere south of our site and continued northward until the tap was discovered.

At approximately 0050 hours on April 22, 40 or 50 men were seen on the east side of Schoenefelder Allee, deployed along the entire area observable from our installation, digging at three to five foot intervals over the location of the cable and, incidentally, the tap chamber. At approximately 0200 hours, the top of the tap chamber was discovered, and at 0210, Russian speech was heard from the microphone in the tap chamber. The first fragments of speech indicated that the discovery of the tap chamber aroused no suspicion among those present. A small hole was broken in the tap chamber roof permitting limited visual observation of the chamber, and a Soviet captain brought to the spot. This was presumably Captain Bartaah, an engineer who later received an unspecified award from Marshal Grechko for the discovery of the tap. After some discussion, all agreed that the discovery was a manhole covering a repeater point, and the working crew began enlarging the hole to gain access to the "repeater point."

While the working party were uncovering the tap chamber, Major Alpatov and Lt. Colonel Vyunik discussed the communications situation in a rambling telephone conversation at approximately 0230 hours. They indicated relief at the restoration of Air Warning Communications with Moscow and Vyunik went on to express suspicion about the continued trouble on FK 150. In context, it appears that this suspicion was directed at the failure of the Germans to clear up the difficulties on FK 150 once and for all. In any event, Alpatov clearly did not share his colleague's doubts. The general tone of this conversation was relaxed and casual, completely in keeping with the character of the two men, both of whom we know well. The conversation appears to be a clear indication that, as of 0230 hours on April 22, neither of these responsible officers was aware of the existence of the tap.

Meanwhile back at the site, the work of enlarging a hole to give full access to the tap chamber continued. At approximately 0250 hours, an unidentified Soviet Colonel arrived on the scene, presumably in response to a request for guidance by the working party. The Colonel did not appear to be a signal officer since he took no active part in the investigation and remained on the scene only for a short time. Having enlarged the hole in the tap chamber roof, the workers saw for the first time the cables and the trap door on the floor of the chamber; they assumed the trap door to be "some sort of box" and had no suspicion of the true nature of the installation. At approximately 0300 hours, barriers were erected to keep inquisitive onlookers away from the excavation

and it was suggested that someone had sent to the Signal Directorate, presumably to obtain relevant cable data. At the same time, the first German voice was heard, in conversation with a German-speaking Russian. The German stated that two trucks must have passed the spot without locating it. The Russian answered that “Soviet troops are coming as well,” and added that they must wait “until morning” for the decision as to what further work would be undertaken.

While these developments were taking place, Vyunik held a telecon with the Air Warning Center in Moscow in which he referred to the move of the GSFC Air Warning Center and discussed, in detail, communication arrangements necessitated by this move. This revealing teleconference tends to support other evidence indicating that as of 0300 hours the true nature of the installation had still not been established.

The work of excavation continued, and fragments of conversation connected with it were picked up by the tap chamber microphone. A German-speaking Russian commented that “somebody has come from there and there are fewer workers there,” suggesting that similar work was in progress at another point. The Russian gave instructions that nothing in the installation was to be touched. A German remarked that the chamber might be connected with sewage work and proposed that plans of the sewage system be obtained from the responsible authorities.

The Russian answered that they already had this information and that the plans showed “that chamber” to be 120 meters away from this point. At about 0320 hours, when still more of the tap chamber was revealed, and a better view of the interior obtained, those present began to speculate vaguely about its exact nature and the time of its construction. One of the Soviets, probably an officer, suggested that it might have been built during the war, possibly for “Vhe Che” (Russian abbreviation for “high frequency transmission” but used loosely to denote anything connected with secure communications.) Shortly after 0330 hours, the Soviets left the site by motor vehicle, presumably to report their findings. For approximately one-and-one-half hours—from 0330 to 0300—no sounds or voices were recorded.

At approximately 0415 hours, Vyunik telephoned Alpatov’s apartment in Karlshorst and asked Alpatov if he had spoken with General Budakov, Chief Signal Officer, GSFG. Alpatov said that he had, that he was getting dressed, and that he would go to his signal center as soon as possible. Vyunik told Alpatov to telephone him at the GSFG frame room at Zossen/Wunsdorf, adding, “When we speak we must do so carefully. We know what the matter is, so we will speak carefully.” This indicated clearly that by 0415 hours the GSFG Signal Directorate and General Budakov, the Chief Signal Officer, had been informed of the discovery of the BJOINTLY chamber, viewed it

with extreme suspicion and planned to reroute circuits passing over the target cables. This coincides neatly with the departure from the tap site of the Soviets at 0330. At 0630, Vyunik telephoned Alpatov at the Karlshorst Signal Center and informed him that Lt. Colonel Zolochko, Deputy Chief of the Lines Department, GSFG, had left Wunsdorf at 0625 to go “there.” Vyunik, in a resigned tone, then added that all that remained for him and Alpatov to do was to sit and wait.

In due course, Lt. Colonel Zolochko arrived at the site, accompanied by an unnamed Colonel and Captain Bartash, the commander of the working party. By this time, the Soviets apparently had brought circuit diagrams to the site and were aware of the pair allocations on the affected cables. There was considerable discussion of the discovery, and one of the crew actually entered the chamber and made a superficial and inconclusive examination. Shortly afterward the statement, “the cable is tapped,” was made for the first time on the scene.

At about this time (0635 hours), Lt. Colonel Vyunik telephoned Major Alpatov and asked whether he had received the “task” and whether its meaning was clear. Alpatov replied that he had received and understood the assignment. Speaking in unusually vague terms, Vyunik instructed Alpatov to take over two low-frequency channels, presumably provided by the KGB signals organization. (These channels would provide telephone communications between Berlin and Wunsdorf via overhead line and would by-pass the tapped cables.) Vyunik added that they could continue necessary technical discussions on the new facilities.

Although teletype traffic continued until the tap wires were cut—at 1535 hours on Sunday afternoon—the last telephone call of any interest was placed sometime between 0800 and 0900 hours on 22 April, when an agitated General speaking from Marshal Grechko’s apartment attempted to contact Colonel Kotsyuba, who was then acting for General Dibrova, Berlin Commandant. Unable to locate Kotsyuba, the General talked to Colonel Pomozanovsky, Chief of Staff of the Berlin Garrison, stressing the urgency of the call, Pomozanovsky promised to find Kotsyuba at once and get him to return the call. The return call was not intercepted, but there appears to be no doubt that Marshal Grechko had by this time been informed of the discovery and wished to discuss it with Colonel Kotsyuba. A few telephone calls were attempted after this, but the operators refused to place the calls, and in one case, a Karlshorst operator said, “I won’t put you through to anyone. Don’t ring, that’s all, I won’t answer you anymore. It’s in the order.”

Between 0700 and 0800 hours, a number of additional Soviet officers arrived at the excavation, including Colonel Gusev of the KGB Signals Regiment. A Russian-speaking German was heard remarking that a “commission”

was expected, and a Soviet officer said that they would await the arrival of this commission before making a decision as to what the next step would be. In answer to a question as to whether anything should be disconnected, the same officer stated that nothing should be done beyond making motion pictures of the chamber. He added, however, that the hole providing access to the chamber should be enlarged and a detailed inspection should be carried out.

The general discussion continued, and the possibility of some form of explosive booby-trap in the chamber was discussed at some length. There was widespread belief that the trap door, which in fact provided access to the tunnel proper, was a “box” or “battery box” possibly involving a booby-trap. One of the Soviet officers, probably Zolochko, suggested that, after everything had been carefully noted and recorded, a grappling iron could be attached to the “box” in order to tear it away. “If there is no explosion,” he said, “then we can calmly go ahead and deal with it.”

Several individuals, presumably German cable splicers, agreed that the cables were fully tapped and discussed the method employed. They agreed that it must have been done in such a way as to render the tap undetectable by measurements, although one of them failed to understand why the actual cutting of the cables was not detected. He added that at that time “everyone must have been quite drunk.” The Germans continued to speculate on the nature of the “box” and about the method of access to the tap chamber. One of them said, “They themselves must have some means of entering this place, but naturally it’s highly improbable that they have constructed a passage for getting from here to there.”

Some of those present apparently believed that the tap was an old one and had been abandoned due to recent faults on the cable. During this discussion, the microphone was twice noted but was not recognized for what it was. In the first instance the speaker said, “That is not a microphone.” and in the second it was described as “a black ball.”

The general discussion continued with speculation as to the nature of the “battery box” and with several comments that it should be possible to identify the tappers “from the make of the materials” and the techniques employed. While the Germans began work enlarging the hole around the tap chamber, the Soviets discussed in some detail the order in which technical experts and administrative representatives would carry out their inspection. The Soviets identified the lead-off cable as “not ours,” indicating that after the inspection they planned to disconnect the lead-off cable and to “check how far it goes from here”—probably by means of electrical measurements. It is evident that at this time (approximately 1130 hours) the Soviets and Germans were still unaware of the existence of the tunnel, the means of access to the tap chamber, or those responsible for the tap.

At approximately 1145 hours, one of the German crew was heard to exclaim, "The box is an entry to a shaft!"

From the tenor of the ensuing conversation it would seem that a small hole had been made near the still-intact trap door. The Germans debated the removal of the trap door but continued to work at and around it despite the alternate suggestion that "we should open up the road opposite until we reach the cable or the shaft." By approximately 1230, they had removed the hinges and entered the lower part of the tap chamber, the padlock which secured the trap door from below was examined and was identified as "of English origin." Failing to open, the door separating the tap chamber from the equipment chamber, the Germans, after approximately 20 minutes, broke a hole through the wall and gained visual access to the equipment chamber, which they described as "a long passage." By 1300, they evidently had enlarged the access hole and described "a completed installation—a telephone exchange . . . An Installation for listening in [abhorranlager]"

Additional notion pictures were made and frequent exclamations of wonder and admiration were heard. At 1420 a Soviet colonel, probably Zolochko; a person addressed as Nikolai Ivanovich, probably Major Alpatov; and a captain, presumably Bartash, entered the chamber and discussed the method used by the tappers in gaining access to the cables. Zolochko evidently still believed that this was done "from above." Conversations indicated that the joint Soviet-German commission, mentioned earlier, had already visited the site and established the nature of the installation without going into technical details.

Measurements of parts of the interior were then taken, discussion of the installation became general, and the participants clearly indicated that the means of access and full implications of the operation were finally appreciated. Conversations reflected that all present realized that the planning of the tunnel approach to the cables might have necessitated a very detailed study of relevant maps and plans. The stress to which the roof of the chambers would be subjected and the necessity of preparing the lead-off cables beforehand were mentioned, and a German was heard to exclaim, "It must have cost a pretty penny." A Russian-speaking German added, admiringly, "How neatly and tidily they have done it." It was decided that work on the tunnel must have been carried out during the day when the sound of the street traffic would drown any noise, whereas the actual tapping was done "during the night, between one and two o'clock, when the traffic on the cables is slight." One of the Germans rather indignantly exclaimed, "What a filthy trick. And where you would least expect it," — to which another replied, "Unless one had seen it for oneself, nobody would believe it."

Between 1515 and 1930 hours, the tap wires were cut, and at about 1545 the attention of the Germans began to concentrate on the microphone itself.

One of them assumed it to be an “alarm device—probably a microphone, to give warning of approaching motor traffic, and added that it ought to be photographed.” At 1550 hours, work began on dismantling the microphone. Shortly afterward, the microphone went dead and, after 11 months and 11 days, the operational phase of PBJOINTLY was completed.

APPENDIX B

Recapitulation of the Intelligence Derived

Set forth below are a recapitulation of intelligence derived from the REGAL material and some typical consumer comments.

General

The REGAL operation provided the United States and the British with a unique source of current intelligence on the Soviet Orbit of a kind and quality which had not been available since 1948. Responsible U.S. and British officials considered PB JOINTLY, during its productive phase, to be the prime source of early warning concerning Soviet intentions in Europe, if not world-wide. Following are examples of items of intelligence for which REGAL was either a unique or most timely and reliable source.

Political

Throughout the life of source (May 11, 1955–April 22, 1956), we were kept currently informed of Soviet intentions in Berlin; REGAL provided the inside story of every "incident" occurring in Berlin during the period—a story which was in each case considerably at variance with account of the sum incident as reported by other sources. REGAL showed that contrary to estimates by other sources, the Soviets at that time did not intend to relinquish their prerogatives vis-a-vis the other three occupying powers despite continually increasing pressure from the East Germans to assert their sovereignty in East Berlin as well as in the rest of East Germany. REGAL provided a clear picture of the unpreparedness, confusion, and indecision among Soviet and East German officials whenever an incident occurred in East Berlin involving citizens of one of the Western powers.

The Soviet decision to implement the establishment of an East German Army was disclosed by REGAL in October 1958, in time to notify our representatives at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva to that effect.

REGAL provided a detailed account of the Soviet program for implementation of the decisions of the 20th Party Congress, including measures to suppress unrest among Soviet nuclear scientists resulting from a too-literal interpretation of the new theory of collective leadership and the denigration of Stalin.

The progress of Marshal Zhukov's attempt to curtail the influence of the political officer in the Soviet Armed Forces (which led to his subsequent downfall) was traced in REGAL material from the autumn of 1955 to mid-April 1956.

REGAL provided considerable intelligence on the relationships between various key military and political figures of the Soviet hierarchy and on relations between the roles and the Soviet Military forces stationed in Poland.

Military

General

- a. Reorganization of the Soviet Ministry of Defense.
- b. Soviet plans to implement the Warsaw Pact by increasing Soviet–Satellite military coordination.
- c. Implementation of the publicly announced intention to reduce the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces.
- d. Identification of several thousand Soviet officer personnel.

Air

- a. Development of an improved nuclear delivery capability for the Soviet Air Army in East Germany.
- b. Re-equipment of the Soviet Air Army in East Germany with new bombers and twin-jet interceptors having an airborne radar capability.
- c. Doubling of the Soviet bomber strength in Poland and the appearance there of a new fighter division.
- d. Identification and location of approximately 100 Soviet Air Force installations in the USSR, East Germany, and Poland, including a number of key aircraft factories.

Ground Forces

- a. Order of battle of Soviet ground forces within the USSR not previously identified or not located for several years by any other source.
- b. Soviet training plans for the spring and early summer of 1956 in East Germany and Poland.

- c. Identification of several thousand Soviet field post numbers (used by G-2 to produce Soviet order of battle intelligence).

Navy

- a. Reduction in the status and personnel strength of the Soviet Naval Forces.
- b. Organization and administrative procedures of the Headquarters of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and Soviet Kauai Bases on the Baltic Coast.

Scientific

Identification of several hundred personalities associated with the Soviet Atomic Energy (AE) Program.

Association of certain locations in the USSR with AE.

Organization and activities of Wiswuth SDAG (mining uranium in the Aue area of East Germany).

Operational

Organization, functions, and procedures of the Soviet Intelligence Services in East Germany; identification of several hundred Soviet Intelligence personalities in East Germany and Moscow,

Typical Consumer Comments on March 1956

ACSI/Army: "REGAL has provided unique and highly valuable current information on the order of battle, training, organization, equipment, and operations of the Soviet and East German Ground Forces. In addition, the scope and variety of the types of information found in REGAL have confirmed that it is our best source of early warning of Soviet attack."

ACSI/Air: "The numerous productions received from the REGAL project have been an extremely valuable contribution to the Intelligence Community in our common problems." February 7, 1956

CIA/OSI: "REGAL has provided valuable information on atomic energy activities in East Germany, including organizational relationships, personalities, procurement details, and uranium ore shipment data. The number of hitherto unknown atomic energy localities, personalities, and activities disclosed in REGAL traffic is impressive."

CIA/ORR: "In referenced memorandum we indicated our great interest in financial material of all kinds which was available in REGAL material. Thanks to your cooperation we are exploiting the material with great success."

Appendix 4

MI5 Study of Soviet Defectors, August 1948

The object of this chapter is to draw certain general conclusions about the subject of defection. For this purpose, the records available to us of Russian defectors have been studied. It is often dangerous to deduce generalities from the study of particular cases, but in our opinion, common factors do emerge clearly from the stories of the defectors.

For the purpose of this chapter, a defector is assumed to be one who abandons the Russian service and who offers the information in his possession to a foreign power.

The cases of the following Russian defectors have been studied:

Eugene PIK Defected	1927
Grigori BESSEDOVSKI	1929
George AGABEKOV	1930
Walter KRIVITSKY	1937
Alexandre BARMIN	1937
Leon HELFAND	1940
Ismail AKHMEDOV	1942
Victor KRAVCHENKO	1944
Igor GOUZENKO	1945
Constantin VOLKOV	1945
Kiril ALEXEEV	1946
Michel KORIAKOFF	1946
YURCHENKO	1946
Mikhail DENISOV	1946
Vera TAKACS	1946
Andre JURACHOW	1947
Alesander KRAVCHENKO	1947
“S”	1947
Vasili SHARANDAK	1947
Grigori TOKAEV	1947

It will be seen from the above list that the period of time covered is twenty years, 1927 to 1947. We must point out that we are unable to say definitely that all important cases of defectors have been studied by us. For example in 1931 according to newspaper reports of the time, the defector BESSEDOVSKI had founded in Paris an "Association of Non-Returners" or defectors' club of which the membership was said to be about 100. We have no information about these men nor do we even know if they ever existed.

The summaries of information about all the defectors listed above, with the exception of JURACHOW and "S", can be found in the appendix to this chapter.

It may at first appear that twenty cases in twenty years is a small number. In this connection, it should be remembered that for many years, the frontiers of Russia have been virtually sealed, and nobody has been allowed to leave the country until a careful investigation has been conducted into his political reliability. All the defectors studied were serving abroad at the time of their defection. Furthermore, within the USSR and Soviet citizens abroad, so rigid a watch is maintained upon each individual that the majority of those who are at all discontented with the regime are almost certain to be arrested or recalled to Russia before they have a chance of developing into even potential defectors.

II. Reasons for Defection

The examination of a defector's reasons for his action is by no means a simple matter. It will usually reveal however an immediate cause such as his having been recalled to Russia from his post abroad shortly before he defected. Further scrutiny of his case shows in many instances a more deep-seated reason, often of long standing. These long-term reasons are in some instances caused by disillusionment with the increasing discrepancy between the Stalinist regime in Russia and the original conception of the USSR or by a realization of the contrast between life at home and life in a democratic country. Such a disaffected state of mind may lead to the thought but not always to the action of defection, and if it should become known to the Soviet authorities, it may be the cause of the recall to Russia which impels a man to take the decisive step. Not all defectors have latent feelings of disaffection, though nearly all, however strong their desire to break with the Soviet system, receive some outside stimulus before they defect.

It is often said in disparagement of defectors from the Russian service and their motives that as they are already under sentence of recall, fear is the true reason for their action. Should their recall be due to their having fallen under

suspicion because of their dissident views or because of some breach of discipline, the best they could expect on their return to Russia would be disgrace or imprisonment; execution or exile to Siberia would be the more likely fate. We do not consider however that the existence of an immediate cause of defection should necessarily be regarded as a reflection upon the validity of the long-term reasons described below, a Russian who openly breaks with his government not only exposes himself to mortal danger—TROTSKY, AGABEKOV, Ignace REISS, KRIVITSKY and probably VOLKOV paid with their lives—but may also suffer throughout his future life from misgivings as to whether in breaking with his government he has not also been a traitor to his country. A Russian with a real love of Russia must feel that in defecting from his government he renounces his country for ever, and in order to do this the requirement of an outside stimulus to push him over the brink is understandable; also any defector who has left members of his family behind him in Russia must realize that his defection places them in danger.

BESSEDOVSKY, KRIVITSKY, BARMIN, HELFAND, AKHMEDOV, GOUZENKO, ALEXEEV, KORIAKOV and TOKAEV are known to have been recalled to Russia immediately before they defected, making nine out of a total of twenty.

Our records of some of the others are not complete, and it may well be that the number of those recalled is even larger.

The very nature of the USSR as a totalitarian police state holding rigid ideological and economic tenets from which no divergence is tolerated is bound to foster dissatisfaction among those who must suffer from its implementation. From about 1923, the year of the second Soviet constitution, the ideological split between Stalin and Trotsky became increasingly marked until it culminated in 1929 with Trotsky's banishment from the USSR. In 1937 with the great purge of the Red Army and the Intelligence Service directed against so-called Trotskyist elements it became clear that nobody whose views were suspect or whose abilities, real or imaginary, offered a threat to the Soviet system, would be spared. Thirty-five thousand Red Army officers were purged at this time. Walter KRIVITSKY and Ignace REISS who expected to be affected by the purge fled from the Soviet Intelligence Service as a result of this KRIVITSKY to become a defector but REISS to meet his end at the hands of Soviet assassins in Switzerland. BARMIN who defected in the same year said that the recent Moscow trials had filled him with horror. HELFAND, who broke with the Soviet in 1940, said in the letter which he wrote to Molotov at the time that the old revolutionary pioneers to whom he claimed to belong had been liquidated in every sense of the word. The Russo-German pact of 1939 had further disillusioned him; he felt that the

Stalinist Government no longer stood for the aims to which he had devoted his life. TOKAEV, the most recent defector, also expresses strong dissatisfaction with the regime. He defected just in time to avoid arrest.

TOKAEV further states that there are many people with his views in the USSR and that conspiratorial groups exist to some extent. Though we have not enough evidence to confirm this there are signs that a purge is in progress and sudden recalls of Russians from Germany are fairly frequent. If the Soviet Security efforts are not completely successful, therefore, we may hope to receive other defectors of this type and should expect some of them to be of considerable importance.

In addition to the purges and repressive measures described above, resulting in the complete lack of freedom of the individual, the economic difficulties of the USSR have necessitated harsh measures which have affected successive classes of the population and have kept the standard of living of the majority of the people exceptionally low. Such measures as the collectivization of farms have caused misery and suffering to the entire peasant class. As a result, to avoid general discontent, Soviet propaganda has painted an entirely false picture of Western Democracy and the position of the worker. Both Victor KRAVCHENKO and GOUZENKO, who defected on their first visit to a foreign country, have emphasized their amazement on discovering the contrast between the Western Democracies as they are and the account given of them by Soviet propaganda and between the standard of living at home and abroad. GOUZENKO has expressed this attitude of mind admirably in his statement before the Royal Commission, which is given in full in the Appendix.

TOKAEV has also said that while in Berlin, where he got to know the British, American, French and other Western Europeans, he realized the utter falseness of Russian propaganda. This realization seems to have been the initial factor in shaking the faith in the Soviet system of those Russians who were paying their first visit to a foreign country.

AGABEKOV and TAKACS and DENISOV defected because the exigencies of Russian service interfered with the course of their love affairs. AGABEKOV had fallen in love with an English girl, and for her sake he abandoned his post and openly broke with the Soviet government. TAKACS and DENISOV, both of whom worked for the Russian Intelligence Service, were refused permission to marry, and finally when they were even forbidden to meet they decided to defect together. In addition, SIARANDAK, who was not anxious to return to Russia as he was able to enjoy a much more comfortable life in Hungary, was confirmed in his desire to desert by the fact that he had fallen in love with a Hungarian girl whom he wished to marry.

It is interesting to note that in not one of these cases have we any evidence that the defectors had been recalled to Moscow or otherwise threatened in any way.

Our information about KORIAKOV is scanty, but we have been told that he had been planning for some time to abandon his post owing to his religious convictions. He escaped from the Russian Embassy in Paris in 1946 after he had been recalled to the USSR.

III. METHODS OF DEFECTION

After he has made up his mind to defect, the defector is faced with the very difficult problem of how best to carry out his intention. Seven of the defectors studied have chosen countries other than the one where they were employed for their action, as they presumably thought that they could thus reduce the risk. Only one minor character successfully carried out his intention of defecting to the British. Three others attempted to do so, but one was recalled to Moscow before negotiations were completed and the other two were handed over to the Americans. TOKAEV, who chose the Canadians, in fact found himself in British hands. Four defectors therefore chose the British, of whom only one was handled by us; we know of no defections in British territory. The comparative unwillingness of defectors to approach the British may be explained by the fact, pointed out by SHARANDAK and TOKAEV, that there is a general impression among Russians, fostered by Soviet propaganda, that the British hand back defectors. This impression may have been confirmed by the Russian interpretation of the Yalta Agreement.

TOKAEV, who chose the Canadians in Berlin as the recipients of his defection, has given his reason for doing so as follows: first, he is violently opposed to the Potsdam Agreement; second, he had heard that the British hand defectors back; third, he was opposed to the "materialistic"¹ outlook of the Americans; fourth, among the French there are "too many people like Thorez and Duclos." He therefore chose the Canadians as being ideologically closest to the British and as not having been signatories of the Potsdam Agreement.

Of the remaining defectors, six defected in Paris, three in America, three in Germany, two in Austria, two in Czechoslovakia, one in Canada and one in China.

Having selected the recipient and the locality most suited to his purpose, a defector, in most cases already under surveillance, must first succeed in eluding watchers; secondly, he has the by no means easy task of persuading someone to accept and protect him. and of convincing then that his story is a

true one. He is not often able to plan his action a long enough in advance and must therefore trust to luck as to whether he will be well received.

As a rule a defector does not know whom he should best approach, which makes his task difficult. Five men defected in France, and were helped in their initial approaches to the French government by the White Russian colony in Paris; ALEXEEV in America was also assisted in establishing himself by a White Russian organization; AKHMEDOV throw himself on the mercy of the Turks,

Victor KRAVCHENKO and GOUZENKO both decided to approach the American and the Canadian Press respectively with their stories. They were not as successful as they had hoped they would be; KRAVCHENKO had to tell the newspapers far more than he had intended to do before they would take any interest in him, and GOUZENKO had no success at all with the Canadian newspapers he approached.

VOLKOV approached the British Embassy in Istanbul with a sensational catalog of information which he proposed to provide in return for protection and remuneration. He was however recalled to Moscow before a decision was made about him

TAKACS and DENISOV offered themselves to a British representative in Prague who arranged for their handling by the Americans.

Since the end of the war the majority of defections, as would be expected, have taken place in the field. The defector's task is a much easier one under such conditions. His problem consists not so much in finding anyone to accept him, but simply in reaching territory where he can make contact with Western Forces, and once he has reached such territory the risk of his being assassinated or arrested before he can carry out his intention is small.

GOUZENKO and Alexander KRAVCHENKO share the distinction of being the only two defectors known to have made careful preparations to bring with them information and documents of value to offer to their protectors. During the last few weeks before his departure from the Russian Embassy in Ottawa, after he had made up his mind to defect, GOUZENKO selected a number of documents from the files which he took: with him when he left.

Alexander KRAVCHENKO deferred his defection for some months so that he might have an opportunity to obtain more information about Russian Intelligence Service activities to give to the Americans as a proof of good faith.

IV. RECEPTION

From the defector's point of view it is clearly desirable that he should be received into protective custody as soon as he raises his approach, otherwise

he runs the risk of being removed or liquidated in the interval which may elapse between his first contact with foreign representatives and the completion of negotiations. Disadvantages to the recipients in accepting a defector at face value certainly exist, and in particular a British Liaison abroad, such as the Embassy at Istanbul approached by VOLKOV, rarely has the machinery necessary to cope with immediate acceptance and evacuation. In VOLKOV's case the delay which was necessary before a decision could be reached proved too long and the opportunity was missed. Although the British representative in Prague was not able to handle the evacuation of TAKACS and DENISOV he could and did put them in touch with the Americans who, as their zone of Germany borders upon Czechoslovakia, were able to make the necessary arrangements,

Field conditions would seem to be the most satisfactory for the reception of defection. Facilities are usually available for evacuation if necessary, and the keeping of a defector under close control until his story has been checked and the avoidance of political repercussions through premature publicity are also far easier to arrange in the field.

In GOUZENKO's case we have an interesting example of the reaction of the public to a defection. After the difficulties he encountered from the Press and Canadian government Departments, he was forced when his situation became desperate to turn to ordinary Canadian citizens who were his neighbors. They accepted his story, gave him shelter from his pursuers and then sent for the police to whom he was at last able to give his information.

Reception arrangements must of necessity depend upon political expediency, the expectation of a worthwhile return in valuable information, and upon facilities available to the recipient; but it is clear that while delay in acceptance may not necessarily be fatal, an expeditious decision is certainly desirable.

V. REACTION OF THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES

The attempt made by the Soviet authorities to repair or counteract the harm which a defector may do is usually rapid and forceful. To this end, kidnapping and assassination were frequently used expedients in the early days. There the physical recovery of the defector dead or alive has proved impracticable, some form of defamation of character is the most common alternative. This may serve several purposes - as an effort to retrieve the defector, as in the attempts made to use the accusations of stealing brought against GOUZENKO and ALEXEEV as a reason to demand that they be handed over to be tried by the Soviet authorities, and as a means of discrediting him personally both in the eyes of his protectors and of the Russian people. The TAKACS and DENISOV case shows an interesting development of this

discrediting technique in which an attempt was made by means of a planted document to persuade the British that they had simulated defection on the instruction of the Russian or Hungarian Intelligence Service.

TOKAEV was asked what measures the Russians would be likely to take to prevent defection. He said that the authorities would never allow the public to know that there were people who would be willing to cross the frontier, consequently nothing would be done to oppose it openly. As already explained, however, constant vigilance is maintained with a view to preventing the possibility of defection, and it is one of the tasks of the Russian Intelligence Service to keep an ever-open eye on such matters.

VI. SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF DEFECTORS

It is hardly necessary to point out that the solution of a defector's future can never be an easy one. He cannot feel that he is safe from the fear of assassination, and security precautions to avoid murder are hardly compatible with a normal working life. To avoid the dangers which threaten him he is forced to use such expedients as the adoption of a false name and a life of strict seclusion. He is also faced with the necessity of making a living for himself and his family; this is not an easy matter. Those responsible for his disposal must consider the fact that if he is not adequately protected the fate which may befall him will discourage those who might have followed his example. If he is left with no resources he presents a security risk.

The stories given in the Appendix will show the various attempts to solve this problem. It is not surprising that a number of defectors have found the most satisfactory solution to their material difficulties in the writing of their memoirs, either as articles for the Press or as books. PIK, BESSEDOVSKY, AGABEKOV, BARMIN, KRIVITSKY, Victor KRAVCHENKO, GOUZENKO and KORIAKOFF have all taken this course.

VII. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY DEFECTORS

Of the twenty defectors who form the subject of this paper, eleven can be said to have been reasonably fully exploited from our point of view. These are AGABEKOV, KRIVITSKY, AKKMEDOV, Victor KRAVCHENKO, GOUZENKO, ALEXEEV, DENISOV, TAKACS, Alexander KRAVCHENKO, "S" and TOKAEV. Of the remaining nine, PIK was regarded as an unsatisfactory and dishonest informant; BESSEDOVSKY's newspaper articles were of some use to us and it is not thought that he possessed much additional information of interest to an Intelligence Service.

BARMIN's information was never seen by us. In view of the fact that he had been engaged on Intelligence work from 1919 this seems unfortunate. HELFAND was seen by British representatives at various times since his defection and has produced a good deal of valuable information about Russian Intelligence activities. Constantin VOLKOV was of course only able to offer a tempting catalog; in the case of KORIAKOV and YURCHENKO we have seen no product.

In the eleven exploited cases we do not think that there can be any doubt that the dividend was a very valuable one. Even where it was more of historical than current interest it has been of the greatest assistance in giving us a picture of the development of the Russian Intelligence Service and the Soviet regime, AGABEKOV, KRIVITSKY, AKHMEDOV, GOUZENKO, DENISOV, TAKACS, Alexander KRAVCHENKO, SHARANDAK and "S" were all in a position to know at first-hand about the particular sections of the Russian Intelligence Service in which they worked, and in several cases had a far wider knowledge. The more spectacular results of information provided by KRIVITSKY and GOUZENKO were the trial and sentence of a Foreign Office cypher clerk for espionage on behalf of the Russians and the breaking up of a Russian Intelligence Service network in Canada. Twenty persons, one of them a Canadian Member of Parliament and many holding positions in connection with Canadian administration and atomic research, were tried for supplying; information to a foreign power, and GOUZENKO's evidence also led to the trial and conviction in this country of Dr. Allan Nunn MAY.

AGABEKOV and AKHMEDOV provided information on Russian activities in the Middle East and Turkey and the latter has recently given information which even after six years may lead to a spy ring which recently came into operation in the Western Hemisphere; DENISOV, TAKACS and SHARANDAK on Hungary, and Alexander KRAVCHENKO and "S" on Germany. TOKAEV, as a high-ranking aircraft expert, is in a position to provide both technical information and accounts of the intentions and methods of the Politburo.

There are inherent dangers in the acceptance of information from defectors, particularly where the information cannot be checked and is not supported by documents. There is a great temptation for a defector both to over-state his own position and to embroider and color his facts to suit himself, but not as many defectors as would be expected seen to have succumbed to this temptation. There is also a temptation for the subsequent users of the information to be too much impressed by it and to regard later material which may reach them from a different source as incorrect because it does not coincide with the defector's story.

In spite of these and other drawbacks, there is no doubt that the defectors whose cases form the material for this study have provided information of enormous value to us. They have been, in fact, a major if not the chief source of our knowledge of the Russian Intelligence Service, and in the absence of other sources they are likely to be so for some time to come.

VIII. THE FALSE DEFECTOR

Those responsible for handling defectors have generally, we think, adequately borne in mind the dangers of an agent being planted in this guise. It has been pointed out that the "arranged defection" of a Russian official fortified with a quantity of true information and documents might be accompanied by a story of sympathizers still in the Diplomatic and Intelligence Services of the USSR. The country which gives such a defector shelter might be touted to use him not only as a short-term source of information but also as a long-term agent, and the latter case might provide a penetration opening for the Russian Intelligence Service. Also, a skilled Russian agent posing as a defector would be likely in the course of his interrogation to learn a good deal about the methods, targets and personalities of the Intelligence Service handling him, and the knowledge already in its possession.

We know of no proven case of the acceptance of a defector who later proved to be false and in the lack of any information about an operation of this nature it is not possible to say how it would be organized or to estimate the likelihood of its success. Recently there was a suspicion that an attempt was being made to introduce to us a false defector, but we have few details and cannot comment upon the story.

Clearly precautions should be taken in each case, including a careful check of the defector's story against all other sources. It is felt that the risk of a false defector being undetected or, if undetected, of his do in-; any serious damage can be made very small by proper handling. In our opinion the existence of such risks should not unduly influence us against receiving a defector since we stand to gain much more than we may lose. whii

IX. TREATMENT OF DEFECTORS

It seems clear to us from all the cases we have studied that the quality of the information provided by a defector, and consequently the advantage to be gained from him, is to a large degree affected by the way in which he is handled. The Security Service, however, has had very few direct dealings with any of the defectors whose cases have been studied and has therefore practically no first-hand experience of handling them. Defectors are a vital

source of information and as sources of information they present a unique psychological problem. Only if considerable attention is given to the psychological aspects of each case can a defector acquire that feeling of trust in his interrogator which is of such assistance in the future conduct of the operation.

It should be remembered that almost any man who has defected, whatever may have been his reasons for doing so, has been through a period of intense and often prolonged nervous strain. There is bound to be a reaction after the defection has been successfully completed and for some time such a man is likely to be in an abnormal state of mind,

Some defectors have abandoned the service of their country and come to us because of a genuine conviction that loyalty to the Stalinist government is no longer compatible with the best interests of Russia and the world. With such men, every effort should be made to confirm in them the feeling that in giving us all the information in their possession they are actively attacking the Stalinist regime and furthering the interests of their countrymen. They are bound to suffer from doubt and recriminations as to whether they have acted rightly and should these doubts persist they may materially affect the amount of information which a defector may give. They may even lead to a complete revulsion of feeling and a desire to return to his masters. Furthermore, it would appear that in most cases, whatever may have been his real reasons for defecting, the subject will want in self-justification to convince his interrogators and incidentally himself that his true motive was selfless and ideological. In our opinion nothing should be done to prevent his taking this view; it is important that he should mint a in his self-respect, since we are largely dependent upon his goodwill and gratitude in obtaining information from him.

There has been a notable absence of cynicism among some of the most important Russian defectors and it is felt that cynical approaches should be avoided as they are distasteful and incomprehensible to those who are not of a cynical turn of mind. Many defectors have an exaggerated sense of their own importance; it is felt that allowances must be made for this in appropriate cases, and the defector should be treated, so far as possible, as a person of importance and integrity. Some care may have to be taken to make the defector feel that he is meeting men of high status, but it is not suggested that action along these lines should mount to over-indulgence. Indeed this would be disastrous since the relationship between the defector and his questioners should, at any rate on the surface, be one of mutual respect. A show of firmness, when this is necessary, can only do good.

Consideration must also be given to other matters. There is a marked contrast between the feverish activity which leads up to a defection and the comparative idleness which often follows it. It would seem inadvisable to leave

a man too much alone and with too much time to think in the early stages after his defection. If he can be kept busily employed writing his story and talking to his interrogators he is less likely to indulge in dangerous recriminations and second thoughts. Besides, the feeling that he is doing useful work is exactly what is required to help him to justify his action to himself.

Steps should of course be taken to minimize the worries a defector may have about the safety of his family and himself, and the problem of his future.

The remarks above are intended to apply primarily to such defectors as have or can believe that they have a disinterested and respectable motive for their action. Men who throw themselves on our mercy only because they fear for their personal safety are unlikely to present such a complicated problem, since all they are likely to expect or receive from us is asylum and protection, and since if they threaten to prove intractable we can simply withdraw our protection without much loss to ourselves.

Our opinions on the handling of defectors are not intended to advocate in any way the least relaxation of security precautions to establish whether a defector is genuine, and efforts to ensure that even if he is not he can do little harm. A genuine defector will expect and appreciate that to protect ourselves we must go to considerable lengths to establish his reliability; but there is a difference between this and giving a man the impression that he is constantly regarded with suspicion. Sooner or later the investigations into his reliability should be presumed to have been completed and from his point of view he should cease to be treated as a suspect. This of course does not mean that those handling him will forget the possibility that he may have been planted; it is plainly a question of a change of attitude in interrogating him. A risk always exists in the acceptance and exploitation of Russian defectors; the defector may be a brilliant plant, or he may at a much later date resume work for the Russians. This risk can be minimized by reasonable security precautions, but it cannot be eliminated. A too great insistence upon the risk may, by antagonizing a genuine defector, destroy all the value which might have been gained from the operation.

X. Summary

In this paper we have illustrated by the stories of the defectors studied the points which we consider to be relevant to the subject of defection. They can be recapitulated briefly as follows

1. The repressive measures introduced in the USSR in the course of the past twenty years have affected successive classes of the Russian people and have given then cause for that dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime which engenders the desire to defect.

2. Defectors are almost unanimous in claiming that dissatisfaction with the regime was the main reason for their action. An additional impetus however is almost always present in the form of fear, love, or a desire for the western way of life.
3. The possible consequences to a man's family should they be in Russia are a considerable deterrent to defection - and worry about the' may affect his value after defection.
4. It is most important that, if he is to be accepted at all, a defector should be received with dispatch and given immediate protection. Otherwise the opportunity of taking advantage of his offer may be missed, and his failure should it become known will be a deterrent to other potential defectors.
5. The reaction of the Soviet authorities to a defection is prompt and energetic. In the early days they resorted to kidnapping and assassination to recover the body before much harm could be done, and also preferred criminal charges with requests for extradition. This latter expedient, which has become the most common in recent years, also served the purpose of an attempt to discredit the defector both in the eyes of his protectors and if necessary of his compatriots.
6. The solution of the defector's future is bound to be a difficult problem. He fears assassination or kidnapping and is faced with the necessity of earning a living. Those responsible for his disposal must consider the fact that if he is not adequately protected the fate which may befall him will discourage those who might have followed his example. If he is left with no resources he presents a security risk.
7. The information provided by defectors has been of a very high quality and of the greatest value to us. Though the danger of a penetration agent disguising himself as a defector must, of course, be borne in mind, adequate security precautions and careful checking of his story should prevent him from doing serious damage even should he remain undetected. Where there is reasonable expectation of advantage to ourselves, our decision as to the acceptance of a defector need not be unduly swayed by the fear of attempted penetration.
8. A great deal depends on the way in which a defector is treated. An attempt must be made to anticipate his fears and worries and to eliminate them when possible. Many difficulties such as those which have marred the late stages of past defections can be avoided if firmness and understanding are used from the start, and if an atmosphere of mutual respect can be established between the defector and those who are handling him.

Appendix 5

BfV Annual Report, 1963

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IN 1965

General Situation

In 1963, the Federal Republic also was one of the main targets of Soviet Bloc intelligence services. According to Soviet Bloc intelligence terminology, the Federal Republic, as well as the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan, is a “main enemy.”

Consequently, the activity of Soviet Bloc intelligence services did not slacken. Espionage activities were again directed against almost all fields of public life. No essential changes were noticed with regard to targets. All services' interest continued to be specifically concentrated on the procurement of military and political information.

As previously, the hostile services paid greatest attention to the careful selection and training of their agents and equipped them with highly qualified technical aids for maintaining the connection and for communication.

The decrease of recognized recruitment cases, which we noticed after the erection of the Berlin Wall, did not continue further. The figures remained the same as last year.

I. EXTENT OF ACTIVITY

A total of 1,432 agent recruitments or recruitment attempts made by Soviet Bloc intelligence services were discovered in 1963 in the Federal Republic (1962: 1,450). These again included quite a number of cases in which training, infiltration, and equipment with intelligence side already permitted the conclusion as to the agent's or resident agents' value and qualification. Agent couples appeared rather frequently.

Of the 1,432 recognized cases, 1,214 persons, that is, 64 percent, were approached by the Soviet Zone intelligence services. This number again emphasized the danger which the Soviet Zone Intelligence services constitute for the Federal Republic.

The other cases can be broken down as follows:

Soviet intelligence services	84
Polish intelligence services	59
Czech	35
Yugoslav	16
Hungarian	10
Rumanian	4
Bulgarian	2
Unidentified hostile intelligence services	9

The Soviet zone of Germany continued to remain an operational base for the intelligence service activities against the Federal Republic. As in previous years, cooperation between the Soviet Zone and the Soviet Union services was the closest. Again a few cases became known where agent handling was transferred from the Soviet Union to the Soviet service and vice versa. Furthermore, the Soviet Bloc States missions in the Federal Republic continued to be used as cases of hostile activity which enabled the individual intelligence services to carry out espionage under the guise of diplomatic cover or commercial relations.

A comparison of the activity of the individual services with the above-mentioned starting points does not give a uniform picture. The gravity center of the Soviet Zone intelligence services is naturally with the handling agencies in East Berlin. The Soviet intelligence services carry out their activities against the Federal Republic mostly through their operational offices in the Soviet Zone. Besides, the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet Trade Mission developed Intelligence activities to quite a considerable extent. The Yugoslavs appear to primarily use their missions for intelligence activities against the Federal Republic.

As regard intelligence activities, the other services probably equally operate from their intelligence bases in East Berlin and their handling agendas in their own countries, while the missions of these countries in the Federal Republic appear to be primarily concerned with tasks of a preparatory and supporting nature.

II. TARGETS OF SOVIET BLOC INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

In 1965, a total of 4,025 espionage cases were recorded. As compared with the number of the previous year (4,64\$), this means a decrease of 15 percent.

In view of the same number of recruitments, this fact is of no decisive importance, neither with regard to the hostile services' activity nor to the counterintelligence results. During the period under review, the most important espionage targets hardly changed. The following survey makes this evident (in parenthesis the percentage of the 1962 results).

Assignments of a preparatory

and supporting nature	1,704 – 42.95 (40.8%)
Political Espionage	636 – 16.0% (16.8%)
Economic Espionage	216 – 5.4% (6.6%)
Military Espionage	1,311 – 32.2% (30.9%)
Counterespionage	155 – 3.85 (2.2%)
Acts of violence	5 – 0.1% (0.1%)

Of the total of 4,025 recognized assignments, 1,992 were completed (= 49%) namely:

685	assignments = preparatory and supporting assignments
320	political assignments
66	Economic Espionage
637	Military Espionage
84	Counterespionage
0	Acts of violence

Also last year, the greatest numerical shares of recorded espionage assignments were directed against military targets in the Federal Republic. Besides the FRG Armed Forces and all their installations, the allied forces stationed in Germany were again the subject of espionage activities.

The targets of the Soviet Bloc services primarily were the spheres of foreign and domestic politics. About 10 percent of all political assignments were directed against the democratic parties.

Almost all fields of economic life in the Federal Republic were covered by hostile economic espionage. The Soviet Bloc intelligence services' special interest was German industry. The greatest numbers of assignments were recorded in the field of electrical industry, followed by the chemical and armament industries and other branches of industry having almost an equal share. Assignments against institutes of scientific research were also continuously issued. The agents of eastern intelligence services in 1963 also received assignments to furnish public opinion reports and the views expressed by West German residents with regard to certain political events or current political questions. Through this type of espionage, the Soviet Bloc continued

to pursue the aim of procuring in an intelligence manner, documents and material for infiltration, subversion, as well as for agitation and propaganda against the Federal Republic.

During the year under review, one case was recorded in which an agent group was engaged in sabotage preparations upon instructions of a Soviet Bloc intelligence service. The agents as a rule had the assignment to select concealment possibilities for weapons, explosives and food and to detect sensitive points for destruction in important plants whereby the entire manufacture could be paralyzed. The sabotage measures concerned were only to be realized on X-Day, in part by members of the agent net, in part by infiltrated saboteurs. The agents believed that X-Day was the day of the outbreak of a war or the day which appeared suitable for a violent overthrow of the democratic order in the Federal Republic.

III. RECRUITMENT METHODS

The Soviet Bloc Intelligence services' methods to recruit agents also did not change in 1963.

a. Recruitment Occasions

The Soviet Bloc intelligence services continued in their previously recognized practice to recruit Federal Republic citizens while visiting in their sphere of power. The same applies to resettlers from these states and immigrants from the West. The situation for an approach in their own sphere of power is so favorable for these services that they can accept a recruitment failure or a possible disclosure after return to the Federal Republic. They obviously are of the opinion that of the great number of recruited persons, at least some will become active as agents.

Although the majority of recruitments effected in the hostile intelligence services' own sphere of power, they do not hesitate effect recruitment attempts in the Federal Republic territory. These approaches usually are only made after the recruit has been thoroughly vetted in all detail and compromising information on him is available, which means a certain prospect of success and a safety guarantee for the recruiter.

b) Recruitment Aids

In making their recruitment attempts, in 1963, the Soviet Bloc intelligence services again used all the previously known aides:

Financial promises or other advantages, compromise, or threat,
 Use of constrained position (former activity as a spy, etc.), and
 Use of character weaknesses, ideological ties.

A total of 207 of the recognized recruitments concerned women (15%).

IV. HANDLING OF AGENTS: COMMUNICATIONS

The methods of the hostile intelligence services actually remained the same.

The most important means of handling continued to be the meeting between agent and handling person. Most of the meetings were held in the eastern sphere of power and also in Western countries, however, preferably in East Berlin, if circumstances permitted. Quite a number of piloting methods were developed for crossing the sectorial border, which excluded the agent's identification by the People's Police.

Furthermore, for the maintenance of intelligence connections, as well as for the completion of limited vetting assignments, the Soviet Zone and also the other Satellite services employed courier and instructor agents. Beyond this, the connection with the agents was maintained via cover addresses, secret writing, and radio traffic. That the hostile service always uses all technical possibilities and innovations for this purpose is shown by a case in which radiotelephone connections were established and used by means of infrared rays.

B. Soviet Zone Intelligence Services

1. Recruitment Methods

1. Share of Soviet Zone Intelligence Services

In spite of a decrease of recognized recruitments since August 13, 1961, the Soviet Zone services' share of almost 85 percent in the total number of recruitments equaled last year's.

While in 1960, still 2,543 cases,

and in 1961, 2,149 cases

could be recognized and evaluated; in 1963, a total of 1,432 cases were recorded which is almost the same number as in 1962 (1,430).

In the 2nd year, the total number of recruitments already shows a decrease by at least one-third. In spite of this decrease in the total number since 1960 the Soviet Zone services held a constant share of 64 percent in the recruitments.

2. Recruited Persons' Place of Residence

In 1963, 23% of the total of 1,432 recognized agents at the time of their recruitment had their residence outside the Federal Republic. In 18 percent of the cases, the residence at the time of the recruitment was in the Soviet Zone. The share of persons who at the time of recruitment lived outside the Federal Republic (excepting the Soviet Zone) consequently was 9 percent in 1963.

While this share (residence of recruited persons in the Soviet Bloc outside the Soviet Zone) has almost remained the same since 1960, the portion of persons who at the time of recruitment lived in the Soviet Zone, has steadily decreased.

in 1960, this still was over 46%	
in 1961,	40%
in 1962,	23%
in 1963,	8%

This may lead to the conclusion that the events around August 13, 1961, forced the Soviet Zone services to reduce the recruitment and subsequent infiltration of persons living in their sphere of power into the Federal Republic (often disguised as refugees).

It is noteworthy to what extent this development is reflected by the figures of the preliminary examination groups and by cases investigated at the emergency admissions camps.

In 1960, the Berlin preliminary examination group alone established 411 cases of recruitment by a Soviet Bloc intelligence service, for intelligence activities against the Federal Republic. Besides, there were

74 cases recorded in Uelsen
60 cases recorded in Giessen
23 cases recorded in Friedland
Total: 575 persons

In 1961, this total figure was 466.
In 1962, it decreased to 107 cases.

Last year in Berlin, only 27 cases.

In Giessen, 29 cases, and

In Uelsen, 4 cases

were recorded, a total of 60 cases.

Of all the cases recognized in 1963, at the time of recruitment by the Soviet Zone Intelligence services, 952 persons lived in the Federal Republic.

3. Recruitment Occasions

- a) In the case of persons, who at the time of recruitment lived in the Federal Republic, the recruitment occasions are manifold. The most important groups established are the following:

emigrants to the Soviet Zone 246

private travel to the Soviet
Zone (visiting relatives, etc.) 202

official stay in the Soviet Zone 18

visit to Fairs 20

stay in the Soviet Zone
for political reasons 18

controls in East Berlin 85

use of roads between
Berlin and the Federal Republic 46

- b) The recruitment occasions in case of persons who at the time of recruitment lived in the Soviet Zone are not quite so varied.

personal or official West contacts 69
returnees 12

official trips to the Federal Republic 6

4. Recruitment Aids

As compared with last year, no noteworthy changes could be established with regard to the recruitment aids. Extortion and threat frequently connected with all kinds of promises, continued to be the most frequently used recruitment aid.

The Soviet Zone intelligence services estimated to make reckless use the fear of considerable personal or financial disadvantages. Frequently, criminal offenses were used as a pressure aid. Federal Republic citizens were then assured that the offenses they had committed would not be reported to the West German authorities.

This is an example:

On January 22, 1965, auxiliary waiter Dieter C. of West Berlin committed burglary in Berlin–Hernsdorf. On this occasion, among other things, he took a camera, jewelry, and cigarettes. On his way home, he was controlled and searched by the People's Police at the Friedrichstrasse RR Station and arrested after they had discovered the stolen items. Soon a MfS member

interfered with the interrogation, he placed G before the alternative of either working “for the East” or being handed over to the West Berlin Criminal Police. Under these circumstances, G signed a pledge. After the receipt of new intelligence assignments, he was permitted to return to West Berlin. He could keep the stolen items.

Other occasions for an intelligence approach are minor violations of Soviet Zone export regulations which Federal Republic citizens usually commit in ignorance of the pertinent directives. Such violations are liable to severe punishment.

These cases are noteworthy in which Federal Republic government service members were confronted with this recruitment practice of the Soviet Zone intelligence services.

On the occasion of a baggage control at the Soviet Sector of Berlin Verwaltungsoberinspektor (administrative official)

N of Hannover came in contact with the MfS on his return from a visit to relatives in Spremberg the end of September 1963 he had to change trains in Berlin.

In his wife’s suitcase, the controllers found two sets of new bed-linen, a present they had received from the mother in Spremberg. The couple was interrogated separately at first both by Border Troop officers, N also by a MfS member. With reference to the violation of Soviet Zone export regulations, N was requested to carry out intelligence activities. For fear of being detained, N pretended to accept the offer.

From the end of July until mid-August 1965, Zollinspektor A (Customs official) Claus-Peter SCH and his wife Helga (also a Zollinspektor) stayed in Leipzig to visit their grandparents. On the return trip, at the customs control in Vsrtha, objections were raised that they had with them theft table linen and some records, which were wedding gifts from their relatives and friends. As a result, SCH was handed over to a MfS member who questioned him as to his agency and his activity and finally requested him to currently furnish him information from his office. SCH allegedly refused to render information. After he had promised to keep the interrogation secret before third parties, he and his wife were permitted to continue on their trip.

He had to send the presents which had caused the trouble back to Leipzig.

Recruitment of Federal Republic citizens on the basis of merely ideological arguments were effected only in exceptional cases. They can basically only be applied if the vetting of the person revealed indication that the recruitment candidate sympathetically views communist ideas or at least does not agree with the political and economic conditions in the West.

In the last six months of 1963, within a rather short period, several cases became known in which Federal Republic citizens received replies from the Soviet Sector of Berlin to work advertised in West German newspapers which in style and content clearly revealed the intelligence background.

The great number of these cases, during the above-mentioned period, permits the conclusion that the Soviet Zone intelligence services (at least during this period) were increasing with the use of the wanted ads in West German newspapers, for their approach attempts.

The following examples characterize this working method;

In reply to a position wanted ad in an engineers' technical magazine, an engineer of Mannheim received the following letter from a certain F, Berlin-Kahledorf/Waldesruh, Kleinstrasse 30

G. Franks 1 Aug 1963

Berlin-Hahledorf/Waldeeruh Kleinstrasse 30

Dear Sir

With reference to your ad of 22 May 1963 under No. 103326, we wish to make you an offer. We offer you a position of trust and the possibility of asking a good salary. In our opinion, it would be advisable if you came to Berlin for a personal interview.

All expenses incurred by you on the trip and your stay in Berlin, will be reimbursed by us. Please inform us immediately what you think of this offer. Further details will be discussed during the personal interview.

Very truly yours,

By Orden G. Franks signature

In July of this year a student placed a wanted ad in the Koelner Stadt-Anseiger. He requested employment during the summer vacation, if possible in a hotel.

In reply hereto among others a certain Heinz R., Berlin C 2, Koligien Park 4 a, wrote to him:

Reitz

Berlin C 2 Berlin 1 August 1963

im Koellnigen Park 4

To Freesahaus Koeln

Koeln

Breite Straee 70

Dear Sir

Subject: Ad in Eoelner Stadt-Anseiger of 20/21 July 1965\

With reference to your ad in the Eoelner Stadt Anseiger I can offer you such hotel employment (but not in a hotel).

This is in regard to cooperation at an extensive cultural political history on Northrhine-Westphalia.

Payment will naturally be made in your currency. Should you be interested in such cooperation, please so inform me by telegram not later than 8 August 1963. I will be prepared to receive you for a personal interview in Berlin at a time convenient to you which, however, must be between 8 and 10 August 1963. On the day you suggest, I will await you at the Press Cafe at the Friedrichstrasse RR station between 10 and 1200 hours (please ask at the checkroom for me). You will certainly know that you can enter the democratic Berlin via the Friedrichstrasse RR Station without encountering difficulties.

Travel and other expenses will fully be reimbursed.

Very truly yours,

sgd. Reitz

II. HANDLING OF SOVIET ZONE AGENTS

In 1963, MfS handling agencies West Berlin, Magdeburg, Leipzig, Erfurt and Rostock played a particularly important role. The majority of all intelligence operations against the Federal Republic was started from East Berlin.

As previously, the personal contact between agent and handling officer was mainly the Soviet Zone Intelligence services' handling method. This contact primarily was maintained by meetings in West Berlin and in neutral foreign countries, as well as by sending couriers and instructors who after previous conspiratorial agreement, called on the agent in the Federal Republic.

The evaluation of these cases brought about conclusive knowledge as to the conspiratorial courier service prior to and after the Soviet Zone blockade measures of August 1961.

Prior to August 13, 1961, the MfS frequently employed Soviet Zone relatives or friends of the agent (whom it pledged for secret cooperation for this purpose) as couriers. The Soviet Zone citizens usually entered the Federal Republic under their true names. They were in possession of a travel certificate PM 12a and to disguise their Intelligence assignment, stated that they wished to pay a visit in the Federal Republic.

After the Soviet Zone blockade measures, the MfS developed new methods for the conspirators' courier service. The use of falsified West Berlin personal papers or Federal personal identity cards, which previously had only been used in exceptional cases, now became the rule. All courier agents from the Soviet Zone, whom the MfS recorded after August 15, 1961, were provided with falsified personal identity cards in the name of persons living in the Federal Republic or West Berlin. No falsifications of the new Federal identification in book-form were discovered to date. The MfS devoted particular attention to the falsification of a Federal person's identity card for courier

agent BOEHME. His assignors wished that he travel with a Federal identity card in the name of his friend Herbert K of Hagen/Westphalia. BOEHME had to call on K Dr. Hagen in August 1956 for the purpose and under some pretext made him show his personal identity card on which occasion he was to note the number of the form. Besides, he had passport photographs made of himself in Hagen and brought them along. He made this trip with a travel certificate in his true name. In the fall of 1960, K moved from Hagen to a nearby village. Thereupon K had to call again on him, make him again show his personal identity card and note whether the entry in the identity card had been filled out by hand or by a typewriter. In accordance herewith, the MfS later on provided the falsified identity card with a remark of the move and the pertinent stamp of the Ennepo-Ruhr-Krela.

In addition to the falsified personal papers, the equipment for courier trips to the Federal Republic regularly included Western clothing and items for use on the trip. As a rule, the agents were permitted to purchase these items at the MfS's cost, when they were on trial assignments in West Berlin or in the Federal Republic. After the completion of every assignment they had to be returned. Often the first trips to the West (which were to enable the future couriers to get acquainted with the conditions in the Federal Republic) were connected with the assignment to collect confidential information on the true holder of the identity card. In case of possible controls, they had to be in a position to answer pertinent questions accordingly.

It was the couriers' primary task to hand over money and receive treasonous material. Beyond this, they were to supply their meeting partners with new instructions of the handling agency, to encourage them to better cooperation and possibly influence them politically, as well as to give them advice for a useful completion of their assignments. In this respect, they frequently took on the tasks of instructors.

In selecting couriers, the MfS applied rigid standards to the political attitude of the recruitment candidate, because of the danger of "breaking away"; almost all courier agents recognized during the past years were SED members.

III. QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL AGENTS

Also during 1963, the Federal Republic security organs succeeded in neutralizing a number of specifically qualified agents who had carried out intelligence activities in the Federal Republic for several years. Their assignment to the Federal Republic principally was preceded by thorough intelligence training, primarily on the following subjects:

- A. deciphering of radio messages;
- B. preparation of latent writing by way of contact paper and the use of chemical inks.

The use of infrared rays for the transmission of information was recognized for the first time. In case of one agent, a portable radiotelephone was secured which was destined for the receipt of intelligence assignments. The assignments of these agents concerned the following:

- a) Military and economic targets in the Federal Republic
- b) Western security organs.

The below examples of these agents' intelligence activities are specifically noteworthy:

1 As a result of investigative intelligence work accomplished by the Protection of the Constitution, on March 17, 1963, the couple Reinhard and Elizabeth BOTH could be arrested.

B had lived in West Berlin since war's end. His mother brought him up in the Communist ideology. As a pupil, he was a FCJ member. In 1956, he joined the SED. In 1957, he married Elizabeth who came from the Soviet Zone. The couple was unable to gain a financial footing in West Berlin therefore in the summer of 1959 they decided to move to the wife's parents in the Soviet Zone. However, in spite of numerous visits to the returnees agency and the SED Central Committee in East Berlin, they did not receive their residence permit for the Soviet Zone since "a SED comrade must stick to his post."

On the occasion of a visit to the returnee agency in the Soviet Sector, B was introduced to a MfS member who stated his name was "Waldemar." "Waldemar" promised B to give him financial support should he regularly furnish him political public opinion reports from West Berlin. B did not hesitate to accept this offer. Every three to six weeks, he met "Waldemar" in a tavern in the Soviet Sector, and on these occasions handed him the desired public opinion reports for which each time he received amounts between DM-West 30 and 150.

In the summer of 1959, Elisabeth B had received employment with the railroad repairshop (SAW) in Treptow (Soviet Sector) with the help of SED offices. The end of 1960 she was contacted there by two MfS members and requested to secretly cooperate. At a meeting at a conspiratorial apartment in the Soviet Sector in January 1961, which was attended by the couple, detailed agreements were made. Gerhard and Elizabeth both were to make full-time "observations" for the MfS and in return draw a firm salary. After a trial period of approximately three months, during which they had been briefed as to their future tasks at numerous meetings, they were pledged in writing by the MfS. At the same time, B's reporting activities for "Waldemar" were discontinued.

On May 2, 1961, the B couple entered “service” with the MfS. As permanent quarters the MfS placed an office in Prenslauer Berg District, Enackatraase 8 (Soviet Sector) at their disposal which was disguised as “Surveying Office of Waldeaar Schulz.” To give the cover-story a solid basis, B had to subscribe to the Soviet Zone magazine *Die Verseangsteehnlk*. Possible customers were to be given new appointments with the excuse that the chief was not present at the moment. Anything further was to be personally settled by MfS handling officer “Horst.”

Since the couple was to be full-time at the MfS’ disposal, the MfS saw that they received fictitious employment contracts. They were to tell relatives and friends in West Berlin and in the Soviet Zone that Gerhard B was a buyer for the Deutsche Beiohsbahn in Berlin–Bummelsburg and Elisabeth B worked as a controller with Mitropa at the Friedrichstrasse U Station.

After August 13, 1961, a new cover-story was required since the MfS assumed that occupational activities in the Soviet Sector might attract attention in West Berlin. Upon Horst’s urging

B had to find himself a position as an independent sales-agent in West Berlin. The most important reason was that the independent activities would leave him sufficient time for his intelligence activities. At the time of his arrest, he was a sales-agent for automobile accessories.

After the blockade measures, Frau B was no longer to work.

As per their instructions, the couple gradually let their connections with the SED and other political organizations die out. They had to hand their membership books (SED, SSP, DFB, and FDJ) to “Horst” who continued to pay contributions for them in East Berlin.

For the purpose of transmitting the observation results to “Horst” and to receive new assignments in the summer of 1962, a radiotelephone connection on the basis of infrared rays was established. A prerequisite for this two-way radio connection was both’s home:

From the window of his home at Goersallee he directly looked at a house located on the bank of the Treptow Canal which belonged to the Soviet Sector. The distance was approximately 700 meters. That is where the MfS had established the counterpart of this connection.

This instrument was used for two-way radio traffic in plain text as previously arranged times, which was absolutely safe from being overheard.

Other ways of communication between handling office and agent couple were:

- dead letter-drop,
- information in latent writing by use of contact paper to cover-address in East Berlin,
- enciphered radio message. (A-3),
- meetings in East Berlin.

After the blockade measures of August 13, 1961, “Horst” used to await the meeting partners at the Friedrichstrasse subway station, at the previously agreed time and personally pilot them through the controls.

The first observation orders which “Horst” gave the agents concerned East Berlin residents exclusively. If necessary, the observation was to be extended to West Berlin. After August 13, 1961, primarily West Berliners were assignment targets. All target persons received cover-names. “Horst” usually gave them a description of the target person which he sometimes supplemented by presenting a photograph. He explained where and when the target person was to be picked up and how long the observation had to last. In some cases, B also knew the target person’s true name. Under the cover-designation “Graz” the B couple early in 1961 repeatedly had to shadow employees of the Land Agency for the Protection of the Constitution about 1630 hours (close of business) in order to find out where they lived, all observation results had to be reported in writing—after the establishment of two-way radio connection, also verbally. At the start of their intelligence activities, both Gerhard and Elisabeth B received DM-West 500 and DM-East 100 per month, also reimbursement of expenses in East and West Marks.

In September 1961, their salary was increased by DM100 a month, and from November 1961 on, their assignors paid them DM-West 450 per month. In addition, they sometimes received a special bonus for certain cases and once an “advanced salary payment” of DH-West 600, which later on, was not deducted.

According to the present investigation results, handling officer “Horst” was probably MfS Leutnant Horst Leiding who served with Section 1 of Department VIII of the MfS District Administration of Greater Berlin.

2. Office Employee Bruno Willuhn

was employed as an oberreferent (section chief) with the Ministry of External and Internal German Trade in East Berlin until 1956. His wife Dora was sales-shop branch chief of Konsum in Eastbestsee near Berlin. Since at her place of employment accusations were raised against Dora V, the couple fled to the Federal Republic in June 1956 and settled down in Hamburg. Early in 1957, they returned to the Soviet Zone since their effort to establish a business failed. When attempting to again find a footing in the Soviet Zone, W came into contact with the MfS and committed himself to carry out intelligence activities. During the four weeks, W received theoretical and practical training from the MfS handling officer “Manfred” on the following subject:

conspiratorial conduct
photography

enciphering and deciphering
use of contact paper

His wife attended some of the meetings. The MfS had assigned her the task of supporting her husband's intelligence activities. Furthermore, it was being considered to employ Frau Erna Richter for intelligence tasks in the Federal Republic, together with the couple. Erna R, who had already lived at her sister's home for several years, agreed to it.

Early in September 1957, V "fled" to West Berlin, provided with his Federal personal identity card (which was issued in Hamburg), a camera, a writing-pad with contact-paper, code keys and DM-West 1,000, and according to his instructions, immediately went on to Duesseldorf. He did not request emergency admission. Four weeks later, Dora V joined her husband who had in the meantime found work and accommodation in Dusseldorf as per her instructions, Ema Richter joined her sister in Dusseldorf in July 1958. Until the spring of 1959 she had worked as a technician for electrical technic with the Deutscher Innen und Aussenhandel (DIA, German Internal and External Trade) in East Berlin. In order to attract as little attention to her flight as possible in East Berlin, upon "Manfred's" orders she had to change to a new place of employment with a rather unimportant East Berlin enterprise for the last few months prior to her assignment to the West. Dusseldorf at first worked as a typist with an underground construction firm, however, after a year, already changed jobs and accepted employment with the Technical Association for Metal Plate Wrappings. In reply to a wanted ad in a Cologne daily newspaper, in the summer of 1961, she obtained employment as secretary with the Bundeevereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (BOA, Federal Organisation of German Employers' Associations) in Cologne. She hereby completed what the MfS had instructed her to do, to get access to a central economic association in the Federal Republic.

After Bruno W had found employment with a Cologne branch firm of the Oetker Combine about the same time, he moved to Cologne together with his wife and sister-in-law.

Bruno W's first assignment was to vet certain persons and to collect information on pipeline routes which had been described to him. His investigations extended to intermediate stations, security measures, ground conditions, control, etc. B furnished sketches of partial routes of the pipelines.

The MfS displayed particular interest in the Vertaghalfen (Economic Association Iron and Steel) in Dusseldorf. W was to report among other things on names, addresses, daily habits and primarily on events of a compromising nature with regard to persons employed there.

After his move to Cologne, W allegedly was primarily instructed to pass on the information to East Berlin which his sister-in-law had procured from the BDA.

W informed his MfS handling agency on the results of his intelligence activities either at East Berlin meetings or at meetings with MfS instructors in the Federal Republic and also through reports in latent writing to cover addresses in East Berlin. Furthermore, he deposited treasonous material in various dead letter-drops which he had established in the Dusseldorf/Cologne area. Moreover, he received instructions from his handling office through coded radio messages. His wife helped him when receiving the messages. Frau W repeatedly traveled as a courier to East Berlin and from these trips always brought back money and new instructions. For an emergency, all the three agents had been issued falsified Federal identity cards which they were to be used on their flight to the Soviet Zone.

In the spring of 1962, a resident agent assigned by the MfS took over the handling of this agent group. This was Johann Scheer, an identified economist of Ginweller/Siegbkreis who in 1956 had moved from the Soviet Zone to the Federal Republic without having received emergency admission. Since about 1950 he had carried out intelligence activities for the MfS. Prior to his employment as resident agent in 1962, he had been subject to thorough intelligence training at a villa in East Berlin. That extended among others to the following subjects:

- establishment of dead letterdrops;
- receipt and deciphering of radio messages via A-3 traffic; and
- preparation of Nitrate and latent writing.

For the completion of the intelligence tasks SCH also was equipped with a special micro-camera and a radio set.

He received the news destined for him, from his assignors via radio transmissions. Besides, he also received assignments for sources Willuhn and Richterl handled by him, from an “instructor” whom he met in Cologne and Dusseldorf at least 8 to 10 times up until the spring of 1963. Willuhn knew him as “Jupp.” He maintained connection with him through meetings held in Cologne at regular intervals of one or two weeks. He forwarded the intelligence material which the agent group had procured, in compliance with his instructions, to his assignors via dead letter-drops in the Cologne–Dusseldorf area.

His wife helped him. The dead letter-drops were emptied by a MfS courier, BCH reported on his activities at meetings with his assignors in East Berlin.

The Willuhn couple, Scheer and Erna Richter, as well as the MfS courier were arrested in the fall of 1963.

3. *Karl-Heinz Langner. Former Oberwachmeister of the People's Police*

fled to West Berlin in 1949, early in 1950, he returned to the Soviet Zone. In May 1950, a Soviet Zone military court sentenced him to 25 years penitentiary for alleged espionage. At a later date, the punishment was reduced to 12 years.

While serving his sentence, Langner was contacted by the MfS. In July 1956, a co-worker of the Soviet Zone State Security Service promised him a premature discharge should he be willing to cooperate with the MfS. Langner agreed and committed himself in writing to cooperate. He received the cover-name "Juno." On August 27, 1958, he was discharged from prison.

Langner's pledge was preceded by a meeting with one of his former school-mates some months previously, who called on him at the Torgau penitentiary introducing himself as "a co-worker of the Soviet Zone Ministry of Interior." He simultaneously emphasized that he was a member of a commission checking the premature discharge of prisoners. In reply to a pertinent question asked by Langner he hinted that he would also speak for him should he be prepared to cooperate with the Ministry of Interior.

According to the circumstances, the school-mate was a MfS worker. He had instructions to pave the road for Langner's planned recruitment.

A few weeks after his discharge, Langner "fled" to West Berlin and requested emergency admission. On October 6, 1958, he received permission to permanently stay in the Federal Republic. At first he worked as a sales-agent and later on, as an independent book-keeper in Reutlingen where he had moved in 1957 with the MfS's approval. His mother lived in Beutliagea. Until his final legalization, Langner did not receive intelligence assignments. Thereafter, he furnished public opinion reports of a general nature until 1960. Until 1960, Langner maintained contact with his handling agencies in writing through the cover-address:

Heinz Jasz, Berlin NO 55, Lippennerstrasse 18

and through meetings in East Berlin. The meetings, among others, were held at the café Zenner and at conspiratorial apartments.

In the spring of 1960, Langner was subordinated to MfS handling officer "Hans-Werner."

He received the assignment from him to "closely befriend" himself with the husband of his cousin, a co-worker of a western intelligence service who lived in Berlin at that time and attempted to win his confidence. Langner happened to meet him at the Berlin Emergency admission and already in 1956 and later on, due to the family relations, repeatedly visited at his house and the MfS knew this.

Upon orders of the MfS, Langner now identified the contact with his cousin and her husband. He reported the conversations they had to “Hans-Werner.” Subject of his reports also were the experiences of a vacation they had together in Spain. During the period from 1960 to 1962, Langner met his handling agent approximately 13 times at a villa on Miegelaslee in East Berlin. Langner traveled in his car or by plane to attend these meetings. For his air trips, he received a falsified passport in the name of

Herbert Wolff, born on 22 May 1932 in Nuernburgl living in Munich, Koper-nikusstrasse 5.

[XXXX] exist. Once when he drove through the Soviet Zone, Soviet Zone border organs retained his passport for a short period.

Langner received orders in writing to attend meetings, and after his training in A-3 traffic, via radio message, he announced his arrival by telegram to the previously mentioned cover-address.

In March 1963, he received the assignment to install a so-called “radio pick up device-transmitter” at the home of his relative who meantime had moved to Munich. The transmitter had the following dimensions: 40 × 7 × 5 cm. Langner took it in his car from East Berlin to Munich.

On May 17, 1963 he overnighted at his cousin’s home. On this occasion, he affixed the transmitter underneath the living-room cupboard. He reported to his assigner on the completion of the assignment. At irregular interval, the transmitter was operated by means of a remote control. There also was a device to keep it in permanent operation. This was to start operating when the remote control failed. By turning a button at the front side of the transmitter, it could be put into such operation.

No information has yet been learned as to the counterpart of the transmitter.

According to Langner’s statements, the MfS intended to win over the number of the western intelligence service or his wife for cooperation. Transmission of possibly embarrassing conversation by the transmitter was to supply the required compromising information for an approach. On June 2, 1963, the transmitter was discovered by chance. Langnen had received treasonous monies in the amount of approximately DM 5,000.

Langnen was arrested on June 10, 1963.

IV. INFORMATION AS TO THE ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET ZONE SERVICES

During the year under review, valuable information regarding the organization of Soviet Zone intelligence services was obtained through the statements of several defectors.

1) Integration of the intelligence section of the Soviet Zone Border Troops into the MfS (Ministry for State Security).

On May 7, 1963, Lieutenant Werner Pretzler, then a member of the MfS's HA I, defected to the FRG.

According to his statements (which were confirmed by a second defector), the intelligence section of the Soviet Zone Border Troops was placed under the control of MfS and integrated into HA I - Berlin, Schnellertrasse, as early as 1960/1961. HA I which formerly was exclusively concerned with counterintelligence tasks by now was divided into a counterintelligence section and an intelligence section. Both sections have their central office at the HQ of the HVA Border Troops in Berlin-Pestz.

The intelligence and counterintelligence sections have sub-sections, at the Border Brigades of the Soviet Zone border which, in turn, have operational groups with the Border Regiments. No intelligence missions are conducted at the Soviet Zone border in the East.

Since early 1960, two operational co-workers of Section XV of the respective MfS District Administration are assigned to each "operational intelligence group."

a) Responsibilities

According to Pretzler's statement, Main Department (HA) I supervises the subordinated sections, sub-sections and operational groups and controls their activity and also endeavors are made for close cooperation between the counterintelligence and intelligence section. Work conferences and an exchange of information (however without mentioning sources) take place regularly.

The counterintelligence section is responsible for the internal and external security of the Border Troops, and for this purpose, it employs a number of unofficial co-workers within and without the Border Troops. The main purpose is to detect and if possible turn agents of western intelligence services. Besides, the mood and morale of soldiers and Border Troops who are "opposed to the regime" are kept under constant observation.

A set of unofficial co-workers serves for the security protection of the 500 protective belt.

The intelligence Section has taken over the tanks of the former sub-section "West," geographically as well as technically, namely in particular, the collecting of information on military and "semi-military" organizations stationed in the vicinity of the border on the FRG side (Customs Service, Federal Border Police, Bavarian Border Police, German Armed Forces, Allied Troops).

B\ Working Methods

Illegal Border Crossing

A special officer is assigned to each operational group whose exclusive task is to organize the infiltration of agents into the FRG and conduct such illegal border crossings in both directions. This applies to secret co-workers of HA I and other MfS Main Departments and Departments. No agency is permitted to infiltrate agents on its own. The only person participating in the illegal border crossing operation are the special officer, the competent operational co-worker, and the person to be infiltrated.

The special officer is to reconnoiter suitable points for the illegal border crossings; for this purpose, he uses unofficial co-workers who are familiar with the terrain on both sides of the borders and who can give a plausible reason for their presence in the western border area.

The special officer is to ensure that the border guards are withdrawn from the border section in which the border crossing point is located and this point is only revealed to the handling agent of the person to be infiltrated en-route to the demarcation line. Should difficulties arise during the operation, the use of the respective border crossing point is completely or temporarily discontinued.

b) Uniforms, Identification Passes

The members of the operational intelligence and counterintelligence groups wear the same uniforms as the other Border Troops soldiers; occasionally they also wear civilian clothing.

The members of the counterintelligence and intelligence sections have uniform service passes. A stamp MG on the second page authorizes the holder of the pass to freely move about in the border area.

c) Border Crossers

Border crossing coming from the West are apprehended by Border Troops soldiers after they crossed the demarcation line. Documents or items found in their possession are kept in custody without prior control or examination. Border Troops soldiers are not permitted to interrogate border crossers (this includes questions as to personal data), thereby preventing the unmasking of possible recruitment candidates.

Border crossers are immediately referred to the competent operational intelligence group.

C) Organization and Tasks of the MfS Main Department VIII **Organization**

The MfS Main Department VIII, headed by Lt. Col. Albert Schubert, consists of six departments, each of which is subdivided into three sections. The tasks of Department VIII at present are still performed by Department I. Department VI supposedly does not yet exist.

D). Tasks

a) Department 1 (Chief Captain Gittner)

- 1) Section 1 with 6 observer groups is responsible for observations in the Soviet Sector of Berlin. Targets of each observations are:

visitors from the West and Soviet Zone citizens who are suspected of “working for the enemy”

visitors from the West who are considered for possible recruitment, because of their occupation or hometown location

unofficial co-workers of MfS (IM – inoffizielle Mitarbeiter) for the purpose of checking their reliability.

Such observations, if necessary, may also extend to GDR territory.

- 2) Section 2 also conducts observations in the Soviet Zone and Soviet Sector of Berlin. This section is exclusively staffed with MfS co-workers.
- 3) Section 3, in addition to observations also conducts executive measures. Besides 9 technical co-workers this section also employs People’s Policemen.

b) Department II (Chief: Major Kurt Zimmermann)

- 1) Section 1 is responsible for investigations in the Soviet Sector of Berlin.
- 2) Section 2 is also responsible for “conspirative searches.” The co-workers of this section must be familiar with lock-technics (i.e. they must be able to open locks of various systems with master keys or other means). Master locksmiths are preferably recruited for this section.
- 3) Section 3 is responsible for the “isolation” of prominent persons who emigrated from the West to the Soviet Zone. “Isolation” as practiced by MfS means the accommodating and providing care for such persons in conspirative buildings.

- c) Department III (Chief: Lt. Col. Fred Schubert) and
Department 17 (Chief: Captain Bestie)

Both departments conduct observations and investigations in the FRG and Berlin (West). These Departments primarily employ secret co-workers residing in the target areas.

- d) Department V (Chief: Major Plasch)

The responsibilities of Department V include the handling of all technical and financial questions within the scope of HA VIII such as procuring technical aids for operational purposes (radio sets, listening devices, optical equipment, etc.), purchasing furniture for conspirative apartments (buildings) and administrative operational funds.

Section 8, which is attached to this department, procures documents, passes, stamps, letterheads for cover firms, signboard for such firms, etc.

- e) Department VII (Chief; Major Lindeer)

Since early 1963, Department VII was staffed with specially selected co-workers from throughout the entire Soviet Zone. They were to ensure an intensified control of visitors to the Soviet sector at the control points the of Berlin Sector border.

- f) Personnel Composition of an Observer Group

An observer group, in addition to the group leader, consists of group members (Brigadiers) and unofficial co-workers (IM). The required strength of a group is 13 men; the group leader and the Brigadier are members of the Ministry of Interior and are exclusively assigned to the MfS; they have a police rank and possess a service book and People's Police badge. The IM (unofficial co-workers) are also full-time MfS co-workers. A feigned employment is entered in their personal records for cover purposes only.

- g) Recruitment of Secret Co-Workers for the Observer Groups

Every co-worker of Main Department VIII is obligated to recruit new IM (recruitment quota per co-worker: 1 to 2 new co-workers per quarter). The MfS co-workers may obtain pointers as to possible recruitment candidates, in three different ways:

Through the examination of People's Police helpers records at the People's Police Offices in East Berlin;

through the examination of the records of discharged members of the NVA (National People's Army) or other "armed organizations," at the competent registration offices;

through the examination of cadre-records in "socialized enterprises";

Such record checks are made primarily with a view to ascertaining subject's political reliability, which is determined on his "social activity" and SED membership. West contacts are considered undesirable. If a candidate is found suitable, confidential investigations are made either at the subject's employing enterprise or in the neighborhood, depending on the circumstances. Only if the inquiries have brought forth no detrimental information, is the candidate approached at his home. On the occasion, the prospective co-workers basic willingness to cooperate and his suitability are determined as far as possible. The next six months are considered as a probationary period. Minor information assignments are to accustom the recruited candidate in co-operating with the MfS. The actual recruitment is preceded by a thorough background investigation of subject's entire relatives. The results of all these measures are to be laid down in a several page recruitment proposal, to be signed by the Department chief, and only then will the subject be obligated in writing. An assignment is then given to Department M for a check of all incoming and outgoing mails to ascertain whether subject has any connections which he has so far kept secret. All MfS co-workers are subsequently subjected to such mail censorship at irregular intervals,

It is often particularly difficult to inconspicuously terminate the MI's previous employment.

h) The Conducting of Observations

All operational departments of MfS are authorized to give observation assignments to Main Department VIII. There is a special card file, containing the names of FRG citizens and Berliners (West), whose observation after their entry into the Soviet Sector is considered of interest. Copies of this card file are available at all border crossing points. One or several observer groups are kept on the alert at conspirative offices in the vicinity of each border crossing point. Should a competent officer, during the pass control, notice a name of a person entering the Soviet Sector is in the observation assignment card file, he will notify an observer group, which immediately takes up the observation. The observers are merely given a personal description (if necessary also car license number) and a cover-designation; they do not learn the target person's true name. The observation is conducted uninterrupted, also at night, and does not end until target person's exit from the Soviet Sector.

The observer groups are equipped with the following aids:

passenger cars, motorcycles, bicycles, open and concealed cameras and, if necessary, Japanese walkie-talkies.

A detailed report is to be made as to each observation. Conspirative photographs of the target person and all persons with whom he was together are to be included.

As a matter of principle, the observer groups are kept ignorant of the MfS assigning department.

The MfS “Passport and Tracing” Department (APF—Abteilung “Pass und Fahndung”)

In the summer of 1962, the MfS Department “Passport and Tracing” (APF) was set up to ensure an intensified control of interzonal traffic. This department is to co-ordinate and ensure greater effectiveness of all control and tracking measures at the border crossing points to the FRG and Berlin (West).

Valuable information as to the organizational structure and working methods of this department was obtained from Heins Schneider of Harbke, County Oechersleben, a former Sub-Sergeant of the HVA—Border Command—who defected to the FRG on March 13, 1963.

Schreiber was a member of APF since its establishment on July 1, 1962 and was primarily engaged in passport control at the border control point (OP - Kontrollpaesierpunkt) Marienborn-Autobahn

An Organizational Structure and Personnel of APF

The “Passport and Tracing” Department within the Ministry for State Security is headed by Colonel Zwittala (phon.). The Chief of the State Border West of the AFP, who has his office in the building of the KPP Marienborn-Autobahn, is responsible for the entire activity of APF at the demarcation line toward the FRG. He supervises the “KPP chiefs of APF” at the Border Customs Offices (GZA—Grenzsollsetter) at the border crossing points to the FRG.

All key positions within APF are held by full-time MfS members. In part, these men were previously assigned as liaison officers to the Soviet Zone border control office, and to a considerable extent, members of the Soviet Zone Customs Administration were also recruited for the establishment of APF. As a role, customs officers were taken over as full-time MfS co-workers and given a similar rank. Middle-grade customs officials (Zollunterfuhrer) (like Schneider himself) were assigned established posts in the HVA-Border Command.

On February 1, 1963, the “Passport and Tracing” Department was subdivided into:

- a. Tracing Groups
- b. Passport Groups

both groups work independently. At the KPP Marienborn-Autobehn, at present four shifts of each group take turn at duty stations.

The duty officer (shift leader) of the Tracing group holds the dual position of “operational officer” and as such outranks the shift leader of the Passport Groups.

All members of APT perform their duties in Soviet Zone Border Troops uniforms.

- A. Working Methods of APP
 - a. The Tasks of the Passport Group

The official duties of the leaders of the Passport Group include the following tasks:

- 1. Checking of foreigners
- 2. Transit control
- 3. Checking of buses
- 4. Checking of fair visitors

In all these cases, their task is essentially confined to a passport and identity control. Fair exhibitors are subject to special handling and are given priority, whereas fair visitors are controlled with a view to ascertaining whether they were born in towns located in the present territory of the GDR. If necessary, they are questioned. Travelers who previously resided in the GDR and fled to the FRG are referred to the operational officer, who decides whether the Fair visitor may or may not proceed.

The members of the Passport Group also have instructions to examine the temporary Berlin identity card as to the occupation of the holder. Persons with “interesting” occupations are referred to the shift leader of the Passport Group for informational questioning,

- b) The Tasks of the Tracing Group

Depending on the traffic situation, besides the operational officer, the Tracing Group places 2 to 4 tracing controllers on duty; a specially secured

room at the control barracks is placed at their disposal. From the passport counter, all documents which interzonal travelers are required to submit are passed through a small wall slit into the adjoining tracing room. The tracing controllers will then check, whether the passenger's name is listed in one of the available card files. In the adjoining room, the so-called "documentation roost" there are facilities for photostating of identity documents.

Schneider stated that, according to existing directions, for example, all car license papers and identity documents of Federal Republic persons traveling by car are to be photographed.

Passengers, whose names are listed in one of the tracing card files and whose file cards do not contain a special entry (for example: "notify operational officer"), as a rule, are apprehended by members of the Tracing Group.

C APF - Card Files at the KPP Marieriborn - Autobahn, for the Control and Supervision of Interzonal Passenger Traffic

a) "Wanted Persons" Card File

The most essential aid of the Tracing Group is the "Wanted Parsons" Card File which, according to Schneider's estimates, contains at least 20,000 names. This card file is consulted for all card file and identity checks. Compared hereto, the Soviet Zone "Wanted Persons List," which contains the sane names, is rarely used in practice. The "Wanted Persons" Card File contains printed cards of a yellowish brown color also of size DIN A 6. This card file exclusively contains the names of persons incriminated or suspected in an original or political respect. In addition to the personal data of the wanted person, the cards contain entries as to the wanting authority, the nature of the offense, and directions as to the measures to be taken should the wanted person appear. The cards of "deleted" persons are provided with an appropriate note and filed separately.

b) Code Number Card File

The Code Number Card File is of special importance from the intelligence viewpoint. For internal purposes, it is also called "Agent Card File" by APF members. This card file is prepared by MfS and contains about 300 to 350 cards. Schneider believes that this card file contains the names of persons whom MfS suspects of working for a western intelligence service, but also those of MfS agents active in the FRG. Each card has a code number (Arabic figures), the personal data of the person concerned and a note as to the telephone number to be called, should the person appear. The telephone number

entered on the majority of the cards is that of the operational officer. If occasion arises, he is only to be notified as to the code number. The operational officer has a work file at his disposal, in which the code numbers are interpreted in detail.

c) Special Card File

An Automobile Card File (about 70 cards) contains certain FRG and Berlin (West) car license numbers.

A Business Card File contains data as to business firms, motorized vehicles and drivers who are involved in commercial traffic between the FRG and Berlin (West) or the Soviet Zone and pass through the OP Marienborn-Autobahn.

Other card files contain data concerning the entire Berlin traffic on certain occasions (for example, anniversary of the erection of the "Wall," meetings of Regional Associations in Berlin). However, these card files are only used upon special instructions.

c) The Soviet Intelligence Services

1. General

In 1963, 84 cases of attempted or completed recruitments for the Soviet Intelligence services (KGB and GRU) have come to notice (962: 76) About 6 percent of the total number of known recruitments were effected by the Soviet intelligence services.

Fifty-nine of the approached persons originated from the West, 25 from the Soviet Bloc's power sphere.

d) Recruiting Methods

No essential changes were noticed as to the recruiting methods of the Soviet Intelligence services. They are still largely identical to those of the Soviet Zone intelligence services. The occasions of recruitment primarily were private or business West-East contacts, immigration or emigration plans or ties of relationship to the West or East.

About 60 percent of the recruited persons actually became active in the intelligence sphere.

1) Soviet Intelligence Service Recruitment in Soviet Zone Reception Camps

In several cases, again it came to notice in which immigrants or returnees in Soviet Zone Reception Camps were approached by members of Soviet intelligence services, with a view on their intelligence recruitment. In part, suitable persons were introduced to the Soviet intelligent services by MfS. The

known cases proved that the Soviet intelligence services also increasingly endeavored (after the blocking measures of August 13, 1961) to recruit agents in the Soviet Zone Reception Camp.

Late in July 1962, the electrician Edsund T, a resident of the Ruhr area, illegally entered the Soviet Zone near Helostedt, for family reasons. During his interrogation at Camp Barby he furnished information regarding British ammunition depots in the FRG. He thereupon was introduced to three members of a Soviet Intelligence service at Camp Barby. After several interrogations, T was obligated for an intelligence cooperation by the Soviets. He was given the assignment to return to the FRG, to further procure information as to the ammunition depot, to photograph documents and to bring along only the negatives to the next meetings which would take place in Berlin (East). He was to announce the date of the meeting in a couched language to a Magdeburg cover address.

After he had received DM 90 to cover his expenses, T was deported to the FRG via Marienborn. During the check at Helaatedt, he kept his intelligence contacts secret. T then returned to his family.

Late in September 1962, he received a reminder, mailed in Berlin (West). T thereupon again entered the Soviet Zone illegally. When he was apprehended by the Soviet Zone border patrol, he requested that he again be taken to Camp Barby. There he again met the Soviet Intelligence Service co-workers who had recruited him. After having reported verbally and in writing, T was given the assignment, to return to the FRG, to look for employment and accommodation in the Brunewiok area and to keep an eye on concentrations of German and British troops in the area. If necessary, he was to announce a meeting to the Magdeburg cover-address. Future meetings were to take place in East Berlin.

T was given DM (West) 160 against a receipt, with the assistance of Soviet Zone Border Troops soldiers, the Soviets then infiltrated him back into the FRG near Luebeck.

Immediately upon his return, T disclosed his contact to the intelligence section of the Police.

In September 1962, the commercial employee Klaus M illegally entered the Soviet Zone with his 19-year-old girlfriend in order to marry there. After having crossed the demarcation line, he was questioned by Soviet Zone Border Troops officers as to police officials stationed at his hometown, as well as his brother-in-law, who served with the Police in Bonn. T answered these questions obligingly. After their assignment to the Reception Camp in Pritzier, M and his girlfriend applied for permission to return to the FRG. MfS co-workers told them that their application could only be granted if M would obligate himself to cooperate. M agreed to do so. During a subsequent meeting with an MfS member, M was introduced to

a co-worker of a Soviet intelligence service. M again expressed his willingness to cooperate in the field of intelligence to the latter and signed an obligation. The Soviet intelligence service member gave M a Magdeburg cover-address and assignment targeted against German Armed Forces installations in Lower Saxony. M was instructed to come to a meeting in East Berlin in mid-December 1962.

M was provided with R.R. tickets and traveled with his girlfriend back to Hamburg via Schwanheide.

2) Recruitment of Russian Emigrants desiring to be repatriated

The Soviet intelligence services still continue their practice of giving intelligence probation assignments to emigrants desiring to be repatriated, prior to permission for repatriation.

Late in 1959 the radio mechanic Paul S of Munich (who originated from the Soviet Union) contacted the Soviet Embassy in Bonn, with the request that he be permitted to return to his brother who lived in the Ukraine. The Soviet Embassy referred him to the “Repatriation Committee” in East Berlin. After contacts had been established in writing, S was invited to come to East-Berlin for a personal interview. After having announced his arrival in writing, in May 1962, S traveled to East Berlin. At the Friedrichstrasse R.R. Station S was being awaited by an alleged co-worker of the Repatriation Committee. During a conversation at the office of the Committee, S was questioned in detail as to his employment and friends. His question as to his repatriation was not answered. On the contrary, he was instructed to send West-German newspapers and periodicals of Russian emigrant organizations to an East Berlin private address. He also was to trace pro-communistic persons in Munich and name them on the occasion of another meeting in East Berlin. After having received a refund of his travel expenses, S traveled back to Munich.

Early in October 1962, S again traveled to East Berlin. He was again met at the Friedrichstrasse R.R. Station by an alleged member of the Committee. He was then interrogated by the Soviets as to the results of his investigations. S who had merely sent a few periodicals in the meantime, but had not taken any other steps, claimed that he had been prevented by illness. In reply to his question as to the date of his repatriation, he was told that it would take several months in the meantime he was to complete the second assignment. Upon his return to Munich S., who had been overcome by doubts meantime, disclosed the facts to the Criminal Police.

In December 1962, the 17 year-old Russian emigrant Michael S intended to return to his mother in the USSR. In 1962, S had been conscripted for work as a foreign laborer in Austria. From 1944 to war's end, he had voluntarily served with the Waffen SS. After the war, he primarily lived in the FRG.

Upon his transfer to the Soviet Zone, S was referred to a Soviet agency in Chemnitz. Members of this agency reproved him for having fought on the German side during the war and not immediately returning to his home country after the war.

The Soviets instructed S to return to the FRG where he was to procure information regarding German and Allied military units. He also was to meet persons who co-operated with Russian emigrant organizations or participated in the publication of emigrant newspapers.

S was given DM (West) 100 as an advance payment and was promised that his mother (who lived in the Ukraine) would be notified and supported.

3) Recruitment of Late Re-settlers

During the year under review (1963), information was again received, confirming that continuation of the Soviet Intelligence services previous practice, namely to approach late re-settlers with a flow to their intelligence recruitment, prior to their exit from the USSR.

Alexander U who was born in the Ukraine as the son of German parents, at war's end lived in Berlin. After the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1945 he was deported to the Soviet Union. In 1946, he was sentenced to 3 years forced labor on charges of alleged "counter-revolutionary" agitation and after completion of his sentence deported to Siberia, Where he married an Estonian. Due to an amnesty, the couple U was permitted to return to Estonia.

Ever since 1960, U endeavored to obtain permission for his repatriation to Berlin. In 1961, when he again contacted the passport office, he was approached by a KGB member named "BORIS." Thereafter, "BORIS" maintained contacts with U. The meetings, in the majority of cases, took place in hotel rooms. "BORIS" promised to meet U. In procuring an exit permit, provided he (U) would also do him a favor U agreed to do so.

He was given instructions, upon his arrival at Berlin (West), to build up a sound existence and resume his contacts with his former friends and acquaintances. "BORIS" also named some re-settlers who (as "BORIS" mentioned) had failed to maintain their contacts with the Soviet Union. U. was to trace their whereabouts in the FRG. He also was to send detailed reports as to Berlin his living conditions to his wife, who was to remain in the Soviet Union for the time being. "BORIS" would be advised accordingly, since these letters would be censored by this agency. Later-on, U would be visited by a contact-man in Berlin (West) who would give him further instructions.

Upon his arrival in Berlin (West) U disclosed his contact to the Criminal Police.

4) Recruitment of Federal Republic Citizens

Since April 1962 the chemical engineer Barbara B was employed at a construction site in the USSR on behalf of the West German firm. In November 1962, he was apprehended by the Soviet Militia while trying to purchase gold from a Soviet citizen. This deal had been arranged by a Soviet interpreter. B was interrogated by local police authorities, and threatened with an 8-year prison sentence on the grounds of an offense against the currency law. Later KGB members intervened and told him that he might evade punishment, if he would prove his “loyalty to the Soviet Union.”

B was then released to his quarters, but was instructed to again meet the KGB members the following day at a hotel. On this occasion, the Soviets tried to induce B to inform on his co-workers. When he failed to attend the subsequent meetings, the construction supervisor was notified that B was to immediately leave the Soviet Union. It is believed that, in this case, KGB tried to infiltrate B through a provocation, with a view to his intelligence recruitment.

In August 1961, 21-year-old Helke K of Frankfurt/Main accepted a position at children's nurse with an American diplomat who served with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. In Moscow, she made friends with a German couple who led a very sociable life. At their home she made the acquaintance of members of foreign diplomatic missions, as well as Soviet citizens. In November 1961, this couple introduced her to a Soviet teacher (f.) with whom she made friends in order to learn Russian. Late in June 1962, at the home of this teacher, Heike K was approached by two KGB members who accused her of being an American spy and of having conducted black-market deals with various Soviet citizens. After threatening to imprison her, because of this offense, the KGB members relented and arranged for another meeting with her on the following day. Finally, she was obligated to strict secrecy. Up to the end of July 1962, K met six times with the KGB members. The meetings and conversations took place either in the JGB members' car, in a conspirative apartment or in restaurants. K was requested to give a detailed description of her friends and acquaintances and identify persons known to her on the basis of photographs.

She also was to establish new contacts at the American Club. She was permitted to maintain her contacts with her teacher-friend and not prohibited from discussing her intelligence contacts with the latter.

When, early in August 1962, Helke K's employer returned to Moscow from a longer trip to another country, she disclosed her secret to him.

She was thereupon sent back to the FRG.

e) Command and Communication Channels

In 1963, primarily the operational offices of the Soviet Intelligence Service in East Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig and Magdeburg came to notice. The majority of all intelligence operations directed against the FRG continued to originate with the operational offices in East Berlin. In the majority of cases, meetings took place in the Soviet Sector of Berlin, whereas only individual meetings took place in the FRG or in neutral foreign countries (mainly in Vienna).

As regards the Soviet intelligence service's comparative communication methods, no changes worth mentioning were noted.

f) Intelligence Targets

In 1963, 225 intelligence assignments made by the Soviet services came to notice. The majority of all assignments known were targeted against military objects. The following is a breakdown of assignments:

a) Preparatory assignments (vetting, spotting, recruiting)	23%
b) Political espionage	16%
c) Military espionage	33%
d) Economic espionage	2%

Approximately 143 assignments (= 65%) were carried out. In order to obtain political information, the Soviet intelligence services attempted to penetrate mainly important Federal authorities. The following case is a typical example:

In the fall of 1961, the MfS contacted Karl N, a precision mechanic in East Berlin. After several meetings, the MfS member spoke of M's sister Monika who is employed by a Bonn Ministry at a subsequent meeting, besides the MfS member, a Soviet IS officer was present who then handed the case. N was ordered to write his sister in Bonn a letter inviting her to come to East Berlin, which he did. However, Monika H did not comply with this invitation.

N received an intelligence training from January until October 1962. His Soviet handling officer demanded a background report and photo of his sister.

N and his handling officer made several visits to Berlin (West) as preparation for a trip through the West, on which occasion, he was fitted out with Western clothing.

In mid-December 1962, by order of the Soviet IS, N traveled to Bonn. For this trip, his handling officer had given him a falsified Berlin (West) identity card and DM-West 700, besides, he helped him pass the Bahnhof

Friedrichstasse control point and went with him to the Bahnhof Zoo (R.R. station) where he stayed with him until the departure of the Interzonal Train.

N was to look up his sister in Bonn to establish whether she was willing to give the Soviet IS information as to her work “for the maintenance of peace.” In case of danger, she could at any time go to the Soviet Zone, Austria or Switzerland and, possibly, they would open bank accounts for her in these countries.

Monika E declined this attempted recruitment.

Offices of the Allied Forces stationed in the FRG also were targets of Soviet intelligence services.

On December 17, 1962, Georg S. teacher of language from Altenhof, county Zberswalde, disclosed at the LfV (Land Office for the Protection of the Constitution) in Stuttgart that the Soviet IS had assigned him to travel to the FRG. His interrogation produced the following facts:

D gave Russian language lessons at the Goethe School in Kharwalde. Early in 1961, he was contacted by the Soviet IS. At first he had connections with members of the Kberswalde local Soviet IS office for whom he was to carry out vetting assignments in Berlin (West) and work as informer in Eberswalde. In March 1962, Soviet IS officers from Berlin-Karlshorst took over D's handling. At a meeting in September he was ordered to travel to the FRG during the autumn vacation and meet a female person there. Last arrangements for his mission were made in a conspirative flat in Berlin-Karlshorst, D was given a Federal identity card with his photo, however, made out to

Erhard Buchta, residing in Ahlen/Westf, Humboldtstrasse 12 and DM-West 600.

Previous to this, he had been ordered to get himself new clothing in Berlin (West). D was to travel to Baden-Baden and contact Tatiana A who worked in a French office in the Hochhaus. For the time being, he was not to attempt to recruit her. D completed the trip without being molested, however, did not get into contact with Mrs A; therefore, he repeated the trip in mid-December 1962. This time, he has given more comprehensive assignments. B was to eventually go to Mrs A's flat, in an attempt to recruit her for intelligence cooperation and give her an advance payment of DM 1,000. He has to start his conversation by giving her greetings from Erich B, an acquaintance of hers.

Under the cover name Erich Jakobi in 1958 the Soviet agent Wensel Renner had come to the FRG in order to spy out French offices in Baden. Until the end of the trial, Renner denied any intelligence activity, however, due to witness statements, he was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment by

the Karlsruhe Superior Land Court on April 14, 1959 on the grounds of an offense against paragraph 100 of the Criminal Code.

In case Mrs A threatened to inform the Police, D was to point out that she had made wrong statements as witness in the penal case against “Jakobi.” The Soviets would not hesitate to inform PRG authorities on these facts:

D made the second trip to Baden-Baden on the occasion of his disclosure, since he considers this assignment too risky. He never did return to the Soviet Zone.

g) Legal Resident Agents

In 1963, numerous cases again became known, where members of the Soviet Missions in the FRG or Berlin, completed intelligence assignments, illustrated the following examples:

a) Case Nikolaev

Aleksei Dimitrijewitsch Nikolaev, 2nd secretary of the Soviet embassy at Rolandeeok, had seen in the FRG since September 1, 1960. He presumably worked in the Soviet Embassy’s Consular Affairs Section. Nikolaev held diplomatic status. Until his departure from the FRG he carried out the following intelligence assignments:

- a) On July 28, 1961, Nikolaev appeared at the flat of Hermann B, technical obermann with the Federal Agency for Military Technology and Procurement in Koblenz. N told Mrs B he wanted to reciprocate for her husband’s assistance on the occasion of a traffic accident in March 1961 near Frankfurt. Since B was not at his home, Mrs B asked N to come again in the evening. At about 1800 hours, N again was at the flat. He told B of the assistance rendered after the traffic accident occurred and that he owed his life entirely to him. N tried to give B a present, however B, who explained to N that he was not identical with the person he allegedly was looking for, refused to accept the present, and N thereupon left the flat. On August 11, 1961, N again appeared at B’s flat. He wanted to give Mrs B a flower bouquet to excuse his conduct at the last visit. He again talked about his life having been saved and feelings of gratitude and tried to press the flowers on Mrs B. who, however, refused to accept them.
- b) On October 9, 1962, Nikolaev went to the Federal Defence Ministry’s library to get the “Directives for the stipulation of the individual medical classifications of draftees.” The manager of the library

advised N to apply to the Military Medical Agency. The same afternoon N went to the Military Medical Agency and was received by Surgeon Major Dr med. Kurt P. N presented his diplomatic identification together with his visiting card. N again asked for the "Directives."

Dr P said that the regulation was not available at present and asked N to return on the morning of October 10, 1962.

On October 10, 1962, at 1100 hours, N again appeared at Dr. P.'s office and said that in a shop window he said he incidentally had seen a book by a Dr. P entitled *How Medicine Helps*, and asked whether he was the author, Dr. P confirmed this. Meantime, N obviously had vetted Dr. P. The book was published five years previously and, according to Dr P's statement, was no longer displayed.

Dr P told N that the directives he wanted were official regulations and that he could not give them to him. Despite this explanation, N tried to induce P to give him the documents, at least for half a day or some hours, since he presently had to collect all documents as to sanitation.

Dr P promised to inform N in case he found suitable material for him.

Thereupon N took leave, but was visibly disappointed. On November 26, 1962, Dr P received a letter that N had sent to his home address. The letter was mailed in Beuel, without the sender's address on it, and read as follows:

Alexei Nikolaev,
Bonn/ Venuberg
Robert-Koch-Str 16

Dear Dr P,

Having found your address in the directory, please excuse me for applying to you by mail, I choose this way so as not to bother you at your office.

My work is almost finished but one part is needed to be complete for which

I require the statements you have kindly provided.

I want to thank you in advance and will keep my promise.

Very truly yours,

(signature)

Thereupon, with the consent of the FRG Armed Forces Office of Security, Dr P sent photostat copies of medical magazines to N who then no longer contacted Dr P.

c) The FRG Armed Police soldier Wolf Ruediger H went to the Soviet Embassy at Bolandseck in mid-November 1962 in order to report there as a deserter and ask for political asylum in the USSR. After he entered the Soviet

Embassy, he was directed to meet Nikolaev. H presented his unit pass to N who made some notes. He informed him that he (B) could go to the Soviet Union, however, before this he would have to do something for him at the FRG Armed Forces, which he would pay for. He was specially interested in regulations as to combat training and use of arms. He attached great importance to obtaining regulations, classified “For Official Use Only.” B assured him he was ready to procure the information wanted. N gave him the cover name Horst Naumann and ordered him to write to the Soviet Embassy on anything special by using this cover name. B gave him a text in which he was, to put in his information in a couched language. N and H agreed to meet the following day at 1300 hours at the Fortress Ehrenbreitstein and H received DM 70 to cover his travel expenses. The meeting took place as agreed upon. H handed the FRG Armed Forces official regulations requested to who gave him further DM 40.

Since H had not been able to go to two further meetings N went to Koblenz. H then gave N a regulation as to antitank defense, for which he received DM 30. Since H wanted the regulations back shortly, they agreed to meet on January 13, 1963 at 1800 hours, in front of the firm S&A in Koblerz, N then returned the regulations to H.

In the course of further meetings which took place in Koblenz, on February 2, 3, 9 and 10, 1963, N gave H regulations on “explosions” as well as the bolt and grip of the NATO gun G3. N always returned the delivered material at the following meeting.

At the last meeting, N gave H DM 200 and ordered him to procure an anti-tank mine DM 18 and establish whether the FRG Armed Forces were using a Spanish manufactured gun.

H’s girlfriend Erika H also joined this meeting. In the course of the conversation, N pointed out to Mrs H that he also wanted to use her for his intelligence operations. He asked to see Mrs H’s identity card, noted her personal data and said that he would contact her in writing. He would use a German name as sender.

Due to the established facts, investigation proceedings were taken against H. On February 13, 1963, a warrant of arrest was issued against him.

d) William L.R., U.S. citizen, served with the U.S. Army until July 1961. Thereafter, he was owner of a financing enterprise in Darmstadt.

Late in January 1963, R made a telephone call to the Soviet Embassy. He gave his name and address and asked for a meeting with an Embassy member. In turn, the Soviet conversational partner enquired the reason for his call. R answered he was an American and could not tell anything over the phone. R. was requested to apply to the Soviet Embassy in writing.

R then wrote to the Embassy, saying he was an American and could give them interesting information about which he would like to talk with an

Embassy member. On June 27, 1963, R received a telephone call from N at his office. N stated to belong to the Soviet Embassy and mentioned that R's letter had reached them. He requested R to immediately take a train to Bonn and meet him at the news stand in the main RR station, at 1400 hours.

R did not attend the meeting, however, on January 28, 1963, R phoned N at the Soviet Embassy and excused himself for having cut the meeting.

On January 29, 1963, R received a letter from Nikolaev announcing that he would shortly visit R. On January 31, 1963, at about 1000 hours, N phoned R and informed him that he and his wife were already in Darmstadt, and that he would come to his (R's) office at about 1100 hours.

Already at 1030 hours, N appeared at the office. N showed R his official identity card, and made a note of the essential statements of R's passport. N asked R for a written report as to military personnel; his acquaintances, their work places and colleagues. He also inquired of R whether he had connections with the Heidelberg Army Headquarters. R replied that he had two or three old friends there, one of them working in the Counterintelligence Section.

N then asked R about his income and told him that he could earn double as much if he delivered suitable information. At the end of the conversation N stated he would give more detailed instructions. On February 5, 1963 already, without previous announcement, N visited R in his office. He immediately demanded a list of the names of those U.S. Army members R knew. Since R could not establish the list at short notice, N ordered him to hand it over during a meeting at the Bonn main RR station on Feb 6, 1963. R was to inform N upon his arrival in Bonn, by phone, saying "Charles had arrived." They agreed upon a further meeting in the 2nd floor of the Frankfurt Airport main building, on February 22, 1963, at 1400 hours.

Upon comprehensive preliminary investigations by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, N was stopped at this meeting and identified by officials of the Security Group and the Hesse Criminal Police.

The Foreign Office then informed the Soviet Embassy in Bonn on February 23, 1963 to recall N from the FRG within 48 hours, otherwise he would be declared a "persona non grata." On the same day, N and his wife left the FRG.

b) Attempt to contact a Russian emigrant in the FRG

The Soviet intelligence services, especially legal resident agents still continue their attempts to contact Russian emigrant living in the West, by misusing their familiar relations in the USSR, The following is a typical example:

Dr S, director of the Institute for the Research of the USSR in Munich, late in November 1962, was visited by a Russian who introduced himself as

Njerassov. The visitor conveyed greetings from a brother of Dr S who lives in the USSR and who he pretended to know very well. However, his report about their acquaintance produced contradictions. Thereupon, Dr S's wife and son assumed a threatening attitude toward the visitor who, by presenting a diplomatic pass, proved his identity as Eugeni Sinowewitech Schabardin, 2nd secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Bonn. He explained to have given a wrong name in order not to bring Dr S (in view of his position) onto an embarrassing situation.

In the further course of the conversation, the diplomat offered to re-establish the interrupted connection to the brother in the USSR by conveying a letter. By referring to the changed conditions in the USSR, he also attempted to induce Dr S to return and asked the son to visit the Soviet Union.

His proposals were declined.

h) Attempts to recruit Berlin (West) Students

In several cases, Berlin (West) students, particularly those from technical academies, were approached by members of the Berlin (East) Soviet Legal Residents with regard to intelligence operation. Typical of these approaches were the attempts to first—during a longer period—establish personal relations of trust to the recruitment candidates.

The following is an example of this:

Student Georg L of Stuttgart studied at the Technical University in Berlin in winter 1961/62 and summer 1962. In October 1961, after having attended a Bertold Brecht lecture, a Russian approached him on his way home, in the Berlin (West) Hansavertal and accompanied him to the S-Bahn RR station Bellevue. They talked about personal matters as well as about Russian and German literature. The Russian who, by presenting a visiting card, had introduced himself as GrigorI Tatarnikov, attaché of the Soviet Embassy, asked to continue the acquaintanceship.

In mid-December 1961, upon previous agreement, T visited at his accommodation (Student Home). Both met again at a lecture on the poet William Goyen in the Kongresshalle, in mid-January 1962. T was accompanied by another Russian, called Nikolai Gorbachov. Until July 1962, G and L met seven times in Berlin (West), mostly near L's home. He stated that, during these meetings, they had only discussed art, literature, theater, film, and space research problems.

L denied G's invitation to visit the Berlin Soviet Sector. He was ready to accept an invitation to go to Potsdam, provided he could bring a student along with him. At first G did not agree to this. Finally, when L reproached

him with his “secretiveness” (a West German could not understand), he gave in. Details as to the trip to Potsdam were to be discussed at a meeting to be agreed upon by telephone. The visit did not take place, since G did not contact L anymore. C is co-worker of the Soviet export Film Agency in Berlin (West), T an attaché with the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin. Both presumably are KGB members or co-workers.

According to the established facts, the above case was an unsuccessful contact attempt by a Soviet intelligence service.

i) Conspicuous contact attempts by members of Soviet foreign mission

In the course of the last year, members of the Soviet Embassy in

Calro conspicuously attempted to contact German Embassy members. Late in 1962, 2nd secretary Vladimir Lobanov without perceptible reason, appeared in the German Embassy Press Section. Lobanov’s official work has nothing to do with press affairs. He is a member of the Soviet IS. At about the same time, a 3rd secretary of the Soviet Embassy made efforts to establish connection to German Embassy members. Early in 1963, he appeared twice in the Embassy’s Political Affairs Section, in order “to introduce himself,” exchange opinion “as to the general situation and, on this occasion, brush up his German knowledge.”

Besides, a member of the Soviet Trade Mission in Cairo attempted to establish personal contact with a German Embassy member.

They all spoke of continuance of the contacts and promised private invitations. They were mainly interested in public affairs and development aid.

At the same time similar attempts by Soviet Embassy members were noticed at the Japanese Embassy in Cairo. The German Embassy in Teheran also noticed contact attempts by some Soviet Embassy members. It is assumed that members or co-workers of the Soviet intelligence service were involved in all these cases who, with their contact attempts, were carrying out intelligence missions.

j) Members of the Soviet Military Mission

In the FRG also, in 1963, were frequently noticed carrying out visual investigations. Main intelligence targets were military objects of the German and Allied Forces, in particular barracks, ammunition depots, rocket launching sites and radar installations, Soviet Military Mission members were especially often observed watching maneuvers. Only a few cases dealing with violations of forbidden zones came to notice.

k) The Polish Intelligence Services

In 1963, 59 recruitment cases of the Polish IS case to the BfV's notice so the counterintelligence result is similar to that of the previous years (1962: 57 and 1961: 65).

In 34 cases, the persons approached for purposes of espionage against the FRG lived in the Polish power sphere. 25 persons lived in the FRG or in Berlin (West) at the time of the recruitment attempt.

In all cases, the intelligence contact attempts were due to already existing West or East connections.

I Recruitment Methods

The Polish intelligence services still continued to approach persons traveling in both directions and German persons from the Polish-administered German East-territories who desired resettlement for the purposes of secretly procuring information from the FRG. Besides, they tried to recruit persons who have relatives in the FRG and in individual cases sent agents to contact the persons in question at their homes at that time in the FRG.

a. Resettling Projects

It has been one of the practices of the Polish Intelligence Service for numerous years to approach persons of German origin of Silesia, East Prussia, Pomerania, and the former provtncie Posen who wish to resettle in the Federal Republic. From statements taken from persons who were interrogated in 1963 it showed that if a person refuses to commit himself for intelligence cooperation this will often lead to a temporary rejection or at least to a considerable delay in the handling of the application for resettlement. However, later efforts were sometimes successful without the Polish Intelligence Service making another attempt.

This explains why the instances where re-settlers were approached for intelligence cooperation (which became known this year) often date back a number of years.

The re-settlers did not disclose an intelligence contact in all cases after their arrival in the Federal Republic as is shown by the following example:

A technical engineer (machine construction) of Upper Silesia had since 1956 applied for resettlement to the Federal Republic.

In September 1956, his application was rejected without giving a definite reason. Due to his protest, the Mayor of his town referred him to a SB member (SB - Polish Intelligence Service) who might be able to help him. As was expected, this person would only grant him the exit permit if he declared his willingness to be active in intelligence. The engineer agreed, all the more so since he was promised that his resettling application would be speedily

handled. Actually, in November 1958 after a short intelligence training, he and his family were able to depart. In the Federal Republic, he withheld his intelligence commitment and took up employment with a well-known electrical firm. He then wrote to a cover address in Warsaw, informing them that he had been legalized. In the Summer of 1960, he met his handling officer in Vienna, as agreed and on this occasion made a report on his employing firm and their production. Thereafter, he allegedly tried to gradually put an end to the intelligence contact. After he had been neutralized, he stated that he only wished to carry out his intelligence activity until a relative from Silesia had re-settled; he did not have enough courage to confess at a later date.

b. Trips to the Federal Republic

In 1963, a few examples also became known as to the Polish Intelligence Service methods, to assign persons within their jurisdiction who wished to travel to the West for private or occupational reasons, with certain intelligence missions.

In view of the total number of Polish national entries, the number of recognized intelligence cases was small. However, it must be remembered that it is nearly impossible to keep all Poles under surveillance, who enter the Federal Republic for a temporary stay. On the other hand, the persons concerned usually disclose their intelligence contact only if they do not intend to return to Poland. Normally, an informal intelligence approach is made when the passport is handed over before the trip. A written obligation usually was not requested. The tourists were given target assignments, sometimes, however, they were just instructed “to keep their eyes open” at their destination and upon their return, give an accurate report on their impressions.

Seamen, calling at Western ports during their trips, were often used as couriers by the Polish Intelligence Service.

c. Trips to Polish Territory

Federal Republic citizens and West Berliners who travel to Poland for private reasons, for business discussions or for occupational reasons (seamen) must be prepared for being approached by the Polish Intelligence Service. According to 1963 intelligence results, recruiters were most successful with merchants who are interested in Eastern trade.

In the past year, Polish Intelligence Service recruiting attempts of German seamen who entered Polish and German ports (under Polish occupation) were relatively numerous (especially in Stettin). At first, the persons approached were taken to the harbor police because they had either exceeded their shore leave and missed their ship, had attracted attention at a drinking bout by engaging in a fight, or had helped East Zone seamen to escape. During the interrogation by the harbor police, the Polish Intelligence Service usually

interfered, extensively questioned the person concerned, and gave further assignments (procurement of city maps and similar items). They did not commit the persons concerned in all cases.

Typical is the case of a certain sailor who was a cook on a coal transport which navigated between ports of the Federal Republic and Stettin. During a stay in Stettin, he missed his ship's departure and was taken to the Polish Intelligence Service by the harbor police. After he had been placed under pressure by threatening him with a lengthy prison term, he rendered the requested information on his ship and its crew. He also answered questions (as far as he was able to) as to the Federal and Allied Armed Forces. Finally, the Polish Intelligence Service committed him for intelligence cooperation and gave him the assignment to collect intelligence information on military coastal installations in the Federal Republic. When his ship re-entered the Stettin harbor, he was released. It had been agreed upon that the next time his ship sailed at the Stettin harbor, he was to give his assignees a report on the results of his espionage activities. The sailor disclosed his intelligence mission in the Federal Republic and meantime mustered out, thereby evading further contact with the Polish Intelligence Service.

d. Intelligence Approach in the Federal Republic

In 1963, again some cases became known where citizens of the Federal Republic or West Berlin were visited at their home by representatives of the Polish Intelligence Service and requested to become active in the intelligence field.

When verifying the statements of these persons, it was mostly found that previous intelligence contact had existed or could be assumed. In June 1963, the watchmaker Romulad W reported on such a recruitment attempt:

He was a Pole, married to a German. In 1960, upon his wife's initiative, he had filed an application for resettlement. Allegedly, he got a permission therefore under great difficulties, after paying 120,000,00 Zloty. Three days after he had paid this bribe, a member of the Polish Intelligence Service approached him and by referring to the punishable nature of his attitude, pressured him into intelligence cooperation. At a subsequent meeting in Warsaw, he signed a written declaration of commitment. He was to use his brother's address as a cover address and mark the letters for the Polish Intelligence Service by drawing wavy lines under the place of residence. He was only ordered to get accustomed to living in the Federal Republic, to build up his occupational career and keep in contact with the Polish Intelligence Service through a cover address. Berlin meetings had been scheduled at a later date, which had not yet been fixed. Resettlement was made in the fall of 1960. In the ensuing period, he held correspondence contact with the Polish Intelligence Service, as agreed, however, only reported on personal matters.

On April 21, 1965, W allegedly was visited quite unexpectedly at his home by an unknown person, who spoke Polish. The unknown man brought him presents and a letter from his brother. He then requested to have a private talk with him. He then reminded him of the bribe he had paid as well as his obligation and threatened that his brother would have difficulties if he did not fulfill his obligations. The unknown man gave him contact-paper and a cover address in Poland where he was to write within two weeks.

On May 7, 1963, W allegedly was again approached by another unknown person who reminded him of the cooperation he had promised. Three days later, in the evening, two unknown persons again approached him at his residence. One person wore police uniform. Both persons had come by a car and requested W to get in. In the car they again requested his cooperation by threatening him. He was ordered to meet another person on June 2, 1963. This meeting was held. The meeting-partner requested him to file an application for a visit to Poland at the Polish Military Mission. There, instructed by his meeting-partner, he was to undergo intelligence training.

The partner called himself chief of a section for Polish foreign espionage, also questioned him as regards possible debt and offered him DM 2,000. W allegedly refused to take the money. The man further ordered him to open a watchmaker's shop at his place of residence. He would then have to travel, a lot. His shop was to serve as a meeting-place for agents.

After this last meeting, W made a confession at the Criminal Police. He and his family had been registered at Friedland in October 1960. At that time, he had not rendered any statement as regards the bribe affair and his subsequent obligation. After he had re-settled, he had correspondence contact with his relatives (mother and brother, allegedly, an officer in the Polish Army). After his confession, he was again twice reminded of the cooperation he had provided, partly under threats.

Up to now, it was not possible to verify W's statements. Therefore, it cannot be established with certainty whether his statements are true. The contact-paper which he handed over was genuine. If his statements are true, this would be the first known case in which the Polish Intelligence Service so crudely tried to force a person to stick to their obligation.

I. Handling and Communication

The information obtained in 1963, as regards handling and communication of the Polish Intelligence Service, did not show any special characteristics in comparison with the previous years. After recruitment, which in the majority of cases was effected within the Polish sphere of power, the agent received a cover address, possibly contact-paper with the instructions to notify them after his return to the Federal Republic or after his successful resettlement.

Usually, after the “approach,” a first meeting was scheduled and planned in detail. Now as before, the meeting was the most important means of handling by the Polish Intelligence Services, at least as long as the agent had proven his suitability and the contact had become profitable for the Polish Intelligence Service. The Polish Intelligence Service, as far as possible, tried to have the meetings take place within its own sphere of power, or at least, on Eastern territory. Only then, after the reliability of the agent for the Polish Intelligence Service had become established, meetings were arranged in neutral or Eastern foreign countries. In such cases, sometimes, meetings were only held upon request of the agent or the handling office while contact mainly was maintained through one or several dead letter-drops.

Another means of contact used by the Polish Intelligence Service consisted in making use of Polish citizens’ Western contact. The Polish Intelligence Service used these contacts to request its agents in the Federal Republic in an inconspicuous way, namely by way of private letters, to observe meetings.

m. Assignment Targets

Within the reporting period, no change of previous assignment targets or new intelligence interests were established.

n. The Czech Intelligence Service

In the reporting year, in comparison with 1962, a slight decrease of recognized cases was noted. Thirty-five person were recorded (compared with 45 in 1962), who had been approached or recruited by a Czech Intelligence Service.

1 Recruitment Methods

The already known tendency of the Czech intelligence Services to approach visitors from the Federal Republic continued in 1963. Typical of this act is the following case:

In January 1963, the cabinet-maker Horst Keukhemsky of Neusattel, District of Falkenau, CSSR received summons to appear at the military office at Falkenau. There the commander (a lieutenant-colonel) introduced him to two Intelligence Service members who, after a political test conversation, requested him to visit his brother Rudolf K who lives in Kassel, on an intelligence mission. After initial reluctance, K agreed since he feared that otherwise he might suffer personal and occupational disadvantages.

On July 30, 1963, K received induction orders as a camouflage. His intelligence officer awaited him at Falkenau and went with him to a conspirative house near Bad Koenigswart. There K received about 3

weeks' intelligence training. The instructor specially informed him on the geographic, political and military conditions in the Federal Republic.

In conclusion, assignments were discussed in detail. K was to enter the Federal Republic on an accurately established route via Austria and try to recruit his brother Rudolf at Kassel, who was manager of a U.S. Club, for the Czech Intelligence Service. Through him, the Czech Service hoped to get some information on German and Allied Armed Forces united in the Kassel area. K received a falsified Federal identification in the name of

Horst Folk,
born 7 December at Bruenn,
residing in Munich,

was fitted out in Western clothing and was paid DM 800 and 450 Austrian shillings to carry out this assignment.

In the early morning of August 18, 1963, Czech intelligence officers helped K to illegally cross the Czech-Austrian border. At the barbed-wire fencing, they used a small underpass which was secured by a locked door. K traveled to Linz in compliance with orders and from there traveled on via Munich, Nuremberg, and Kassel. He informed his brother of his intelligence assignment and at the same time asked him to contact the Criminal Police.

o. Handling and Communication

The handling means of the Czech Intelligence Services did not undergo basic changes in 1963. Of all intelligence means used, the meeting still played the most important role, even though contact had been maintained for a longer period over A-3 radio traffic, dead letter-drops, or cover addresses.

As regards the establishing of meetings, no common trend was noted; meetings were held by couriers within their own jurisdiction, in neutral foreign countries, and in the Federal Republic.

It was noted that the agents' equipment was gradually improved. A number of agents were found in possession of falsified passports or identification, which were issued in the name of persons living in the Federal Republic, and had been practiced by other Eastern intelligence services. These falsifications were excellent. All agents coming from the CSSR were outfitted with Western clothes and equipment (luggage, toiletries).

Also, when using cover addressee, a certain differentiation was noted, to the effect that the agent could not write to the cover addresses according to his own discretion but had to use a certain address for a certain type of information.

In the past year, in one known case, the Czech Intelligence Service abandoned its practice of trailing agents individually, send them to the Federal Republic, and then operate there on their own.

The two Czech agents,

Georg Chmeliczky,
born 18 August 1920
at Maria-Bahn, CSSR,

and

Jan Hofmann,
born 2 June 1928
at Gablons, CSSR,

were trained together in the summer of 1963 and illegally crossed the Bavarian–Czech border to the Federal Republic on July 14, 1963. They had the assignment to survey all Danube-bridges in the Federal Republic. In addition, they were to establish hotels and inns, well suited for the over-nighting of Czech agents. Their tasks were divided insofar as CH was to photograph all important targets with a Leica and was to safe keep the films, while H was to prepare the pertinent descriptions.

Another good example for the detailed care, the Czech Intelligence Service lends to its actions is the fact that agent activities were powered by pro forma induction orders, or such, so that family members, colleagues and acquaintances do not get suspicious.

p. Assignment Targets

The evaluation of all assignments of the Czech Intelligence Service recorded in 1963 (108) showed that the main emphasis of/the hostile intelligence activity not as before is placed on the military sector. Apart from the preparatory assignments, assignments against political targets are also of some importance.

q. Yugoslav Intelligence Services

The number of recruitments by Yugoslav intelligence services established in 1963 increased to 1\$ as compared with 1962 (9). During the reporting year, no changes as to working handling methods were noted.

Also in 1963, agents were almost exclusively Yugoslav nationals, whereby in most cases approach was made on the occasion of a planned trip to the Federal Republic. As regards the assignment aim, interest in information on Yugoslav emigration is still most important. One case became known

in which the Yugoslav handling agent declined the offer to supply military information, made by an agent who was active on the emigration sector.

Apart from migration, most assignments concentrate on military and economic targets in the German Federal Republic. The above-mentioned example not only shows the strict handling of agents but also a clear division of procurement tasks at the Yugoslav Service.

In the cases which became known during the reporting year, agents were exclusively handled by members of Yugoslav missions in the Federal Republic (Yugoslav Liaison Office at the Swedish Embassy at Mehlem, Yugoslav General Consulates in Hamburg and Munich). According to the available information, no other means of handling were used (radio, dead letter-drop, invisible writings). Only in a few cases, where an intelligence activity did not come about due to a disclosure, cover addresses in Yugoslavia were stated, which, however, were only to be informed of the entry and successful legalization. It may be assumed that in these cases, future handling was to be effected by members of the missions.

In 1963, a member of the Yugoslav Liaison Office at the Swedish embassy at Mehlem was requested to leave the Federal Republic due to intelligence activities. Whenever Yugoslav nationals appeared at the Mission in order to have their passports prolonged or for some other reason, he tried to recruit them for intelligence cooperation.

r. Hungarian Intelligence Services

The number of recorded recruitments by the Hungarian Intelligence Services has remained about the same. While nine cases became known in the past year, 10 recruitments were registered in 1963.

The information obtained hereby does not indicate a change in the former working and handling methods of the Hungarian Intelligence Services. In a single case, it was striking that the opponent had permitted the contact to be inactive for a number of years.

In 1958, a former Hungarian national, who now holds German citizenship, had repeatedly been ordered by the Hungarian Intelligence Service to observe a meeting in Vienna. Although he three times traveled to Vienna to observe same, and each time had informed his handling officer of his visit in writing, no meeting came about. In the ensuing period, contact with the Bulgarian Intelligence Service came to a complete standstill. Only in April 1963 did the hostile intelligence service again make a contact.

The placed assignments were directed, almost without exception, against military targets in the Federal Republic.

s. The Romanian and Bulgarian Intelligence Services

Information which became available on the Romanian and Bulgarian Intelligence Services in 1963 was even less than in 1962. Only four recruitments by the Romanian and two by the Bulgarian Intelligence Service became known; from the assignments placed on this occasion, no conclusions can be drawn as to the afore-mentioned services' main points of interest in the intelligence field.

t. Survey on the Satellite Intelligence Services

A summarizing study of all satellite services showed 125 recruitments or recruitment attempts in comparison with 129 in 1962. This figure constitutes a 9 percent participation of Satellite Services in the recognized intelligence agencies of the Soviet Bloc.

These Services were mainly interested in getting information on the military sector.

Of the 265 registered assignments of the Satellite Service, the following breakdown of targets was established:

34%	Preparatory assignments
44%	Military espionage
16%	Political espionage
2%	Economic espionage
4%	Counterespionage

u. Valid sentences

In 1963, 269 persons were validly sentenced by FRG courts on the grounds of treasonable relations to Soviet Bloc intelligence services.

In 250 cases, persons were sentenced because of establishment or maintenance of" treasonable relations (Per 100 • StGB), in four cases because of treason (Par 100 StGB), and in seven cases because of an offense against part 7 Annex A to the Statute of Forces Agreement.

The following persons were sentenced:

- 250 persons because of treasonable relations to the Soviet Zone – IS
- 9 persons because of treasonable relations to the Soviet – IS
- 5 persons because of treasonable relations to Polish – IS
- 3 persons because of treasonable relations to CSSR – IS
- 1 person because of treasonable relations to Yugoslavian – IS
- 1 person because of treasonable relations to Hungarian – IS

Appendix 6

CIA Clandestine Service Primer on HUMINT

Cardinal considerations in placing covert personnel abroad in quasi-permanent private citizen positions.

The simplest and therefore the most used device an intelligence service has for getting its unwelcome officers overtly into other countries is to assign them to cover jobs in its government's diplomatic missions, consulates, and other official representations there. The Soviet bloc services call this "legal" cover, most Western services simply "official" cover. Aside from providing for communications home, a secure place to work, and a measure of protection from prosecution for espionage, it has the advantage that the cover duties can usually be made light enough to leave most of the officer's time free for intelligence activity. The official position also opens the way to many useful contacts, although it precludes others. It has the accompanying disadvantage that the disguise is a pretty shabby one. It requires no Herculean counterintelligence effort to determine which foreign officials probably have intelligence connections; they can be kept deniable but not really secret. Moreover, some kinds of intelligence activity cannot be carried out from an official position. It is therefore necessary to supplement the "legals" with "illegals," the intelligence officers under official cover with operatives under "deep" cover, living as legitimate private citizens with such authenticity that their intelligence sponsorship would not be disclosed even by an intensive and determined investigation. These officers are sometimes career staff employees of the intelligence service and sometimes citizens of either the sponsoring or another country with a contract or agent relationship to the service. For the sake of simplicity, we shall speak of them all as "agents," although they are in a different category from the indigenous agents recruited locally by a case officer. They do have an agent relationship to an official-cover case officer, for they must usually depend on the official-cover people—the "legal reziden-tura" in Soviet usage, the "station" in ours—for their communications and administrative support and, at least in most Western practice, for direction and operational guidance.

Nonofficial cover is sometimes used for brief ad hoc missions and fixed-term operations, but the difficulties and advantages of really deep cover are

felt most in a long-range operation of indefinite duration, one expected to continue as long as it produces useful information perhaps through the full career of the agent. Infiltration into high circles or another government, an opposition group, a military clique, or an ethnic minority, or, for a Western service, penetration into an Orbit installation or the leadership of a Communist party are types of missions for which deep cover of indefinite durability may be required. It is the principles of this kind of cover that concern us here.

PRIMACY OF THE OBJECTIVE

Because the deep-cover agent must usually devote a large share of his time to carrying on his ostensible legitimate occupation, his intelligence production is quantitatively small. He is therefore an expensive agent, justified only by the uniqueness of the information he produces or can be expected in long term to produce. The establishment of a deep-cover operation should consequently derive without exception from the objective to be achieved, not from the availability of the agent or the opportunity for cover. Although this principle should be self-evident, it is not in practice unusual that an intelligence service begins with an agent who wants a deep-cover assignment, tries various kinds of cover on him for size, and then, more or less as an afterthought, finds a plausible mission for him. Negligence of the objective through a preoccupation on the agent's part with the establishment of cover is another frequent fault. In one case of record, a young man was permitted to spend four years exclusively building cover for himself, being required only to attend a university in the target area and then establish himself as a salesman there. By the time he was in a position to start producing, he had lost interest in the intelligence objective and resigned.

Importance for Planners

Sometimes the unfailing symptoms of a big hurry to go nowhere in particular betray the fact that the planners of an operation have lost sight of its long-term objective. Some years ago, the cover specialists of an agency were asked to produce immediately a "flexible cover" that would give an agent "mobility," not much work in the way of cover duties and "a logical reason for interest in diversified local groups." It was not specified in what way the cover was supposed to flex, to what places the agent should be able to move, or in what kinds of local groups he should have an interest. There was available, however, a cover position in market research which seemed to meet these requirements and, in which the agent had had some experience; but this

would require him to take a month's training prior to departure, and it was therefore rejected. So he was put into freelance writing, although he had no experience in that field. The hope that an operation so thoroughly conditioned during its formative stage by an early departure date would somehow serve an intelligence purpose was of course a vain one: when old Mobile and Flexible came back two years later, he had produced nothing.

The rational preparation and conduct of an operation can have no other guide than its purpose, and this purpose must therefore be defined at the outset. Mobility and flexibility may indeed be required by some assignments: a scientist or labor expert, for example, whose intelligence assignment requires him to meet target colleagues at professional conferences in a number of neighboring countries needs a cover job that gives him sufficient time and a plausible reason to attend these conferences. But other intelligence missions can be fulfilled only by agents whose cover work keeps them in a certain place, and there are on record cases in which a deep-cover agent has been unable to give the necessary attention to his operations because his cover job kept him constantly moving about. The end must determine the means. The purpose should also be a worthy one. A deep-cover mission is not justified if it can do no better than wander along the fringes of an intelligence target, eliciting scraps of information and misinformation, or "collect operational information available in the normal course of cover work and spot potential agent material." It is wasteful to have a deep-cover agent doing the routine jobs that can be done just as well by an official-cover man or his ordinary local agents and informants. The targets that call for deep cover are those to which official government representatives lack access or in which they must conceal their interest or from which only an independent channel will elicit information not meant for official consumption.

The primacy of the objective is not simply that there is a rigid sequence in which cover and agent cannot even be considered until the objective has been determined. It means only that the intelligence objective should be established before the steps are taken that commit the service to the operation. The service's headquarters will have negotiated cover openings and its field stations will have spotted cover opportunities of various kinds without regard to any specific projected operations. There are also usually available some good agents for whom there is no suitable assignment at the moment. It is better that these cover openings and these agents should remain unused for the time being than be misused in the pursuit of an unworthy objective only because they are available. Experience shows that the successful operations are generally those in which the planners have arrived at a valid objective and made sure that the cover and the agent were suitable for the pursuit of that objective before going ahead with the implementation of the project.

The intelligence objective, once chosen, is of course not immutable. Constancy of purpose is of vital importance in most long-range operations but a service should be ready to make the most of any unexpected opportunity that permits it to raise its sights. In recent experience a deep-cover agent who had been sent to the field to work through locally recruited agents suddenly found himself in the entourage of a high-priority target; another, after one uneventful tour and a transfer under the same cover to another country, gained access to the inner circle of a very important target person. These agents were able to capitalize on their opportunities because their cover had been well prepared and they had been careful to preserve it during periods when operational prospects were not bright.

Nevertheless, one cannot rely on chance to provide an operation with purpose. The untimely termination of cover ventures intended to be long-range is often charged to the unsuitability of the agent or the inadequacy of his cover, but close examination may reveal that the faulty element is itself the result of an underlying failure of the planners to derive the operation from a worthy purpose clearly understood at the start by everyone concerned.

A lack of specific purpose has a very disquieting effect on agent morale. Agents sometimes express the belief that adequate thought is not given by their contact man, the field station, or headquarters to the ultimate achievement that is desired from them on their project. Their remarks are generally to the effect that there is not a consistent plan or objective, that they are given the blanket advice "to get out and see what can be developed" with regard to practically any political party or government agency, that they are seldom given the opportunity to learn how, if at all, their activities are integrated into the overall area program or objectives, and that this is not a deliberate effort on the part of the field station or their station contact to keep them compartmented but rather an indication of the nonexistence of a long-range plan. Such impressions, even if groundless, are not conducive to vigorous and purposeful activity.

The field station has an essential role to perform in determining the objective as well as the means of a deep-cover operation in its area and it must share in the early planning. Chiefs of station should keep headquarters currently informed as to which long-range intelligence objectives they and their successors will need to approach through nonofficial cover, what kinds of cover would be the most effective in reaching those objectives, and what kind of agent would be professionally and personally suited for the cover job and the operational tasks involved. Headquarters, in turn, should consult the station in the early planning of a particular long-range cover project. Although a headquarters area desk will have a greater or lesser understanding of the field situation, its information may be dated or incomplete. The field station certainly has the most intimate knowledge of the probe and in addition will

have more faith in the prospects of an operation and feel more deeply committed to its success if it has helped to shape it.

A few years ago an agent was placed under commercial cover and sent to the field “to assess the area for deep-cover and operational possibilities and to develop intelligence operations.” There was a station in the area and it should have been able to assess cover and operational possibilities, but apparently headquarters had not discussed with it what objectives needed to be pursued through nonofficial cover and what type of agent would have a good chance of attaining them; no attempt was made to define the kind of operations the agent was expected to develop or to specify the nature of the targets he was to work against. This agent had neither business nor operational experience; yet he was expected to start a business in a country that had inhibitory laws on trade and on currency exchange, to make a difficult assessment of operational possibilities and to seek out his own intelligence mission. The operation failed and was terminated after two years.

Collaboration between headquarters and the field station is needed in the early planning stage in order to bring together a broad central view of intelligence needs and an intimate knowledge of the local scene. These two complementary elements are required to give an operation a precise orientation toward a priority objective, and this objective must be determined early enough to insure that the cover and the agent are suited to it.

Preparing the Means

The period of preparation is one of commitment; it comprises a series of major steps which steer the projected operation along a course that becomes increasingly difficult to change or halt, until a point is reached where the service is committed to go ahead with whatever investment of funds and manpower may be required. These major steps have to do with the selection and preparation of the agent and his cover. Hasty preparations have no place in long-range operations. Haste is justifiable and even necessary in situations of urgency where one must work at top speed toward a short-term goal; in such cases, security and durability are knowingly sacrificed to the extent required by the pressure of circumstances. But to be durable, cover must be genuine, and to be genuine it must be prepared at a pace consonant with the normal pace of the cover pursuit itself, not according to an operational timetable. This is the only way to avoid built-in causes of failure of all sorts—morale problems, administrative snarls, unsuitable agent, thin cover, and other security hazards.

The first requisite of cover is that it should convincingly explain the agent's presence in the area. This requisite becomes increasingly stringent with time, and to endure over the years, a cover must be such as to appear logical in its

own terms. There have been too many salesmen who did not sell, students who did not study, consultants who were not consulted, some of them living on a generous scale with large families, deluding themselves that all was well until perhaps the chief of station was queried by his cover boss, "Is so-and-so one of yours? He looks as phony to me as anyone I've ever seen!"

A few years ago an agent who had medical training was sent to a city described in the project as "a historical mecca for graduate doctors." His cover occupation was the sale of medical supplies and his intelligence mission was to develop sources in the scientific field. One month after his arrival, the station estimated that his cover would be good for at least nine years. After six months, however, the station requested his transfer because the cover was wearing thin. Now it came out that the day when the historical mecca enjoyed an excellent reputation for its medical facilities had long since gone. Something had obviously gone wrong with someone's objectivity; the tendency to overstate the merits of a project is particularly strong when it is first submitted for approval.

There had been warning indicators when this cover was being negotiated: two medical supply firms that had been approached had said they would not place their own men in that area because it would not be profitable, and one of them agreed to send the agent there only because the service wanted it that way and was willing to foot the bill. When a service chooses to ignore the counsel of old-line companies whose business it is to know what works in a certain place and what does not, it should be for compelling reasons and with an appreciation of the problems ahead.

The cover with the best chance of enduring in any area is one that does not feed of the area but contributes needed skills or knowledge or a commodity that is lacking. In countries that are trying to develop economic autarchy the authorities may scrutinize the activities of foreign businessmen with severity, ruling that any foreign-owned or foreign-operated enterprise must benefit the national economic structure. Here agents involved in businesses that are not financially sound or have no significant volume of business are sadly out of place. But local firms may need citizens of another country to help them in their dealings with firms located in that country, and such employees would probably have greater freedom of movement and better access to local targets than those of the local branch of a foreign firm, as well as protection in case of expropriation or nationalization of foreign assets. Or noncommercial cover may be more desirable in some places: in newly independent countries, for instance, teachers or technicians may be more needed and welcome than business representatives, and the desire of the new governments to get them elsewhere than from the former colonial power may provide another nation with cover opportunities for its own nationals or for third-national agents.

The plan for long-range cover must take into account any likelihood of drastic changes in the area that could affect the viability of a particular type of cover. If there is such a likelihood, an agent cannot use cover whose survival depends on an indefinite continuation of the status *quo*. Aside from the hazards to commercial cover entailed in the trend toward economic autarchy, there may be political changes which would make it more difficult for Westerners, or citizens of a particular Western country, to move about. Such prospects call for timely preparations in the establishment of third-national cover agents in advance.

Finally, the most important element of cover durability is legitimacy. There are suspect covers just as there are suspect persons, and a cover cannot confer upon the agent a legitimacy it does not itself possess. A newly founded company once offered to cover any number of a service's agents as consultants in several underdeveloped countries, expecting that the service in return would subsidize its own early development. These consultants would have come under the scrutiny of the genuine foreign consultants who had been there for years, and the inevitable checks on the standing of the home office would have quickly exposed the masquerade.

Cover and the Objective

The function of explaining the agent's presence in the area, difficult though it is under unfavorable circumstances, is still only a part of what cover should do for an operation. Cover should always be considered in relation to the intelligence objective, and insofar as possible it should provide legitimate access to the targets being attacked. The ideal solution is achieved when the activities of the agent in doing his cover job provide the basis for the operational contacts desired. If this ideal arrangement is not possible, the cover should at least be compatible with the objective. Otherwise, there can be only competition and conflict between them.

One agent, married and with children, was recently reported to be working 30 hours a week for his cover firm and 40–50 hours a week for intelligence. The poor fellow was running himself ragged, neglecting his family, and even so not doing justice to either of his unrelated jobs. His cover had been chosen almost exclusively to establish him in the area, too little attention being paid to the operational opportunities it should provide. The two functions must be considered concurrently during the planning stage; if avenues to the intelligence objective are left to be improvised later, the agent's access, if he ever develops any, may be to targets already within easy reach through the official cover of the station, and his presence in the field, while adding to the station's problems, will not add to its resources.

There is also a security advantage in a close relation between cover and intelligence work. If the two occupations are unrelated, the operational comings and goings do not benefit from the protective interpretation that the known cover job should normally suggest to observers. The field station is in a position to know which specific cover pursuit can provide and explain operational contact with the target persons; in fact, the station would normally want to have an agent under cover only after finding it impossible, or unwise or inadequate, to recruit a person already in place in a similar situation.

Knowledge of the facts of the local situation will reduce the large amount of guesswork that often goes into the choice of a cover and thereby obviate the unreasonable demands that otherwise come to be placed on it. An agent was once sent to a colonial country to recruit agents within the European community but two years later it was decided that his efforts should have been directed at the native groups. His cover did not permit him to make this about-face, and so the impasse was blamed on "rigid cover." A certain amount of latitude may be desirable in some forms of cover, and this latitude can be planned at the start to serve a known operational need, but latitude or flexibility in cover should not be used as a hedge against failure to study and interpret the pertinent facts in the first place and to select a cover in the light of those facts. The factors that enter into the establishment of cover that is both durable and operationally effective are numerous and intricate, and that is why it is risky to go ahead without the best knowledge of the field situation that the station can provide.

Cover Arrangements

Cover negotiations with a business firm afford the service a valuable preview of what kind of collaboration it can expect in the joint enterprise. If the firm wants the service to pay a disproportionate share of the business expenses, it is probable that its professed desire to contribute to government aims is specious and that intelligence interests will be pushed aside. There is no need for high cost in an agreement with a company already doing business in the area in question, particularly if the agent is already in place or is destined to go there. If the company goes out of its normal way and incurs additional financial expenses and risks, the service naturally has to bear a larger share of the burden; but if the company offers to place any number of agents in all sorts of positions without regard to the facts of business, it probably envisages a quick and generous bounty from the government rather than reasonable business profits patiently earned.

The cover negotiations can of course also give the company some idea of the seriousness of the service's intentions. If the service professes to need and

want a sound and durable cover and at the same time proposes to use it to rotate a number of agents on two-year tours, the firm cannot be expected to think very highly of its long-range planning, or of its concept of cover, or of its practice of economy for that matter, and may be tempted to make the most of the opportunity for profits.

The agreements with the company should be as simple and clear as possible and understood in the same way by both parties. In addition, those arrangements that affect the agent should be clearly understood by him at the very start and be made known to the field station involved at the same time; otherwise, the station case officer's meetings with the agent and his correspondence with headquarters will be taken up for a long time by the too common three-way debate on the substance and interpretation of the cover arrangements, to the detriment of the operation.

When a cover agreement is negotiated, it should be decided early who in the company has to be made witting. If the matter is left for spot decisions to be made as arrangements develop, the number of people in the know will keep growing as one after another is brought into the picture to facilitate the solution of problems that arise. There is no assurance, of course, that the witting company people will observe the need-to-know principle, but the firm itself has an interest in keeping secret its connection with intelligence. The witting persons are more likely to maintain secrecy if they know that there are very few of them and if they realize the importance the service attaches to keeping that number small.

Experience shows that there are security problems both ways, from cutting in too many people and from not cutting in enough. The problem in both cases generally stems from a real or imagined urgency which prompts the service to interfere with the natural development of cover. For instance, it has an agent who is not very well qualified for the cover job and is not company-trained, perhaps not yet hired by the company; but he is ready to go. The personnel manager is cut in to hire him, a section chief is cut in to streamline his training, the field manager is cut in so that he will not expect too much from him, and so on. Or else the company president removes all obstacles by fiat without explaining anything to anyone; everyone is hostile and suspicious, and the operation is off to a bad start. Time is wasted in trying so desperately to save it: the agent often returns from an unworkable assignment without having done anything for the service.

Career Contract Agents

One of the most serious problems of many deep-cover agents has been the uncertainty about career that results from their dual status in the intelligence

service and in their cover; they have felt the demands of both pursuits and the reassurance of neither. Some services have tried to protect their own interests by requiring that agents going into business firms waive at the outset, when the cover arrangements are made, any right to transfer to their cover firms for some years after resigning from the service, the firms for their part agreeing not to hire them for that period. Such a provision confines the agent to his intelligence career, in which, however, he may tend to have less and less confidence, the longer he remains on the outer rim of the intelligence organization. In such circumstances, it is probably wiser for the service to permit immediate transfer to the cover firm and maintain its operational relationship with the agent by means of contract.

In one such case, a staff agent with three years of intelligence experience but still quite clean was placed in a cover job while yet young enough to be starting on a career without prior job experience. An intelligent, enterprising, and personable young man, he did excellent work for the cover firm for 28 months; he looked genuine to the general public, and his long-range intelligence prospects seemed good. But his intelligence performance, according to rigid standards mechanically applied, did not permit a promotion in the service. It was clear that he would be better off with the cover salary and allowances than with his service pay, and the discrepancy was likely to increase as time went on.

He was therefore transferred outright to the firm, which was happy to have him as a permanent employee, with a verbal assurance from the service that it would attempt to reintegrate him at a suitable grade if he should lose his job because of his intelligence association or for some other cause not of his own making. He became a contract agent of the service, paid according to his usefulness and reimbursed for expenses incurred on its behalf. The release of this agent does not mean that intelligence interests will be sacrificed or that intelligence work will be only incidental, because he is a high-caliber young man with a bent for intelligence, and his motivation lies in the very nature of the work. It is unlikely that the service will ever lose him.

It is more the manner than the fact of separation from a service that deprives it of the work of trained and experienced officers. Once a good agent has found career opportunity and security in his cover firm, it is sensible to complete the transition and put an end to his equivocal status if the transfer stands to serve the interests of all concerned. Similarly, agents can be allowed or even encouraged to develop professional or other types of self-employed cover to the point that their economic security rests principally on their cover activity, buttressed by a stipend from the service and underwritten by the understanding that, if they do well operationally, they can be assured of a career in the service in case unavoidable circumstances destroy their cover.

This kind of arrangement has two great advantages: first, the cover takes on real depth and solidity as the years go by; and second, the service is freed from innumerable administrative headaches that may otherwise plague its cover operations. One of these administrative headaches is that dependable irritant to relations with the agent, the recovery of cover payments that exceed his service entitlement. One terminated agent felt so strongly about kicking back a Christmas bonus that he wrote to headquarters, saying he was willing to return the money to the cover company but would not turn it over to the service under any circumstances. When advancement in the cover firm is rapid and the difference between cover salary and service pay gets progressively larger, the administrative tangle becomes so frustrating that there have been serious proposals to freeze the cover salaries of agents while their colleagues are being promoted. Such an expedient would violate security as well as decency, and it would be unrealistic to expect an agent in such circumstances to give the cover job a proper effort.

If in particular instances the interests of the service and the agent call for its retention on the staff although assigned to long-range cover duties, the career contract should be supplemented with special administrative provisions to assure him of service rights, benefits, and career opportunities comparable to those he would have on regular duty. The unorthodox nature of nonofficial cover requires destandardized practices and diversified personnel patterns. This diversification can be further advanced by greater use of natural cover.

Many of the problems of deep cover are avoided when a service can recruit suitable agents already embarked on legitimate careers. A company president who claimed no intelligence experience once suggested out of common sense that instead of placing its man in his firm, a service might better recruit one of his employees in the overseas branch in which it was interested. In another instance, a government which needed information on the deployment and activity of certain air forces did not have to put a man under cover because its station in the area recruited one of its own citizens who represented a gasoline company and was in constant contact with key officials of the target air forces. This agent was able to develop the needed informants in the normal course of business.

Some companies are willing to furnish information on all the young men they recruit for their foreign branches and to make those selected as potential agents available for training with reasonable assurance that they will eventually be assigned where the service wants them. Similarly, some employers are willing to furnish biographic and evaluative information on their overseas employees for assessment and possible recruitment and to arrange to bring back the recruits for a training period. The agents recruited in these ways would continue to pursue normal business careers and to expect from that

source their salaries, allowances, bonuses, and promotions, as well as their financial security and their status in the community. They would be compensated equitably for intelligence services rendered, and there should be no termination problems or dual-status administrative difficulties.

The recruitment of persons already employed or about to be hired by a firm would require fewer company employees made witting than the placing of a man from the service; normally it should be only one or two key officials. There would be none of the difficulties which the family of a converted staff employee has to face when it needs to adjust to a new mode of living. The greatest advantage of all, however, lies in the quality of the cover itself. Natural cover is the most convincing of all, and the best way to fool all the people as a cover reassignment, would there perhaps be a need to interfere discreetly with the normal course of events. The principal dangers, here as elsewhere, would be impatience and the real or fancied urgency of short-term goals.

Cover Qualifications

Once it has been decided what forms of cover can serve the intelligence objective, the task is to find an agent who has the qualifications for one of the possible cover jobs and who can, in addition, do the intelligence job that constitutes the sole reason for the undertaking. It is easy to hope for, but very difficult to find, the ideal agent who has dual qualifications. The problem, in fact, is often regarded as a dilemma: if the agent is already established in the cover company, he never really gets the feel of intelligence; if he is an intelligence officer venturing forth into the business world, he is generally unconvincing in his cover life, and his tour of duty is of short duration despite original long-term plans; in the rare cases where the experienced intelligence officer has good cover qualifications, the service risks losing him to the cover pursuit, and sometimes does. Not quite a dilemma, this is a serious problem which can be solved only by making concessions.

If a cover operation is to endure, the agent's qualifications for his cover job must be unimpeachable. These qualifications are more exacting in some pursuits than in others and the amount of expertness required may be less for a young agent than for an older man, but no agent can be expected to succeed in his cover unless his cover preparation and performance are convincing in their own terms. For this reason, when the ideal agent with dual qualifications is not available for a particular long-term cover mission, cover and durability must take precedence over intelligence training and experience. A deficiency in these is not insuperable if the agent has the necessary aptitude for intelligence work. His training will have to be highly concentrated to suit his

specific mission, and his experience will have to be gained on the job under the close direction of his case officer.

Agent Aptitude

Given a well-defined mission, a good cover and an agent capable of living his cover effectively, an operation which is successful in terms of cover will still fail if the agent lacks the ability to perform his intelligence mission. In sacrificing intelligence experience to requirements of cover, therefore, it is vital not to sacrifice on the point of the agent's native ability to do a clandestine intelligence job. Many people are fascinated by espionage and like to talk about it, even in first person, but not so many are suited by character and temperament to engage in it. There are even loyal and patriotic businessmen who question the need for the clandestine collection of information; one company president being sounded out for a cover possibility quickly put an end to the exploration when he remarked that he did not "see the need for such devious methods." This is a rather widespread attitude among businessmen, who in their own highly competitive field nevertheless appreciate the importance of obtaining and safeguarding inside information.

On the other hand, there may be indications of an agent candidate's flair for intelligence work in the amount of shrewdness and discretion he shows in the conduct of his overt affairs. In any case, he will have a lot to learn and need a lot of energy to learn it. A native ability for intelligence work entails not only the right attitude but also the necessary amount of drive; and the cover agent must possess the personal dynamism and resourcefulness needed to work effectively at the end of the line. The translation of an agent's native ability into the skills required by his mission is discussed in the next section of this chapter.

Conduct of the Operation

Living the Cover

Living one's cover is an around-the-clock job. It requires first of all that the agent in his cover work have as much competence and put out as much effort as his colleagues in comparable jobs. In certain instances, special qualifications like language skill or area familiarity may compensate for other lacks, but he must conform to whatever pattern is established. Any departure from the norm provides factual justification for the instinctive futility that rivals in a competitive field feel toward a newcomer; any special treatment obtained in order to get things done easily and quickly, such as a shortening of company training or protective intercession by the top management, will only intensify

this hostility and arouse suspicion. And, of course, the agent himself must resist the very human tendency to surround himself with the mysterious aura of one engaged in special work.

Occupational interest is an important factor in living one's cover because competence and interest go together and each helps the other. It is only natural, moreover, that the agent should be expected to show an interest in the occupation he ostensibly has chosen as a career. A hobby can therefore be an indication of an agent's suitability for a particular cover position. One man with a passion for firearms was placed under cover as the representative of a dealer in small arms; wherever he was, the conversation inevitably turned to guns, and his cover took care of itself.

There is an important corollary to the requirement for good performance on the cover job, and that is the need to live the kind of life that goes with the job. Here the demands on the agent are extended to his family, and the difficulties of living in accordance with cover status are generally greater for the family than for the agent himself. When there are young children, there may be real hardships that should be anticipated. But it should be a prerequisite for any deep-cover assignment that the agent and his family be able to adapt themselves to the living conditions and social life of people in the cover situation. The pull exerted by a privileged way of life is a constant danger among staff agents who have previously served under official cover.

No amount of cover work can hide such conspicuous breaches as access to PX supplies or a closer association with the official government colony than the cover occupation would normally bring about. Staff officers are often vehement in their professed desire to go out under nonofficial cover but, once there, unwilling to forego any of the amenities of official cover; they are probably not so much attracted by the challenge of the lone game as repelled by the regimentation at headquarters and the larger stations. A mature and stable staff officer under nonofficial cover once satisfied an almost compulsive urge to visit bowling where he knew many of his former associates would be playing in a league; when the incident was raised with him later as a probable security hazard, he ruefully admitted his imprudence but explained that he just had to see someone with whom he could identify himself.

The Right Case Officer

There is a tendency at large stations to entrust the less active operations to the less experienced case officers, and long-range cover operations are of course seldom productive immediately. Operations that have prospects of quick and valuable intelligence dividends are often run as vest-pocket affairs by a top station officer or the chief himself; those that have no prospects of quick results are often delegated far down the line. Field stations are pressed

with work and pressured to produce, but a station's chief should work out a reasonable distribution of its effort between immediate needs and long-term investment.

Nonofficial-cover operations cannot be mass produced and run by the book; each one has its own character and its own problems, and each requires the right case officer for the right agent if it is to have any real chance of success. The case officer's task is to develop and maintain the agent's effectiveness, and he cannot succeed in this task without the agent's absolute confidence in his competence and reliability. He must have the necessary experience, maturity, and personality to deal with that particular agent. He is generally the agent's sole link with the service; in fact, in the agent's mind he *is* the service, and his merits and failings are extended to the service as a whole. His whole manner with the agent must suggest that he has no duty more important than that of directing and supporting the agent in his mission. The operational practices whose importance he wants to impress upon the agent he must teach by his own example and not by precept alone. Finally, he must have a well-balanced combination of imagination and judgment in order to deal with the constant novelty of deep-cover situations and problems.

It is also important to provide for the availability of the same case officer for a relatively long period of time because nonofficial-cover operations are more vulnerable than any other kind to the disruptive effect of frequent case officer rotation. It is a frequent complaint of agents that with each change of case officer there appears to be a change in emphasis and guidance, and inasmuch as the case officer is the sole channel for the agent's direction, there is no corrective for this impression of inconsistency. When a case officer must be replaced, the transition should be planned well enough in advance not only to permit the choice of a successor well qualified professionally and personally to direct the particular agent but also to allow this successor to get the feel and tempo of the operation. The agent will not fear that the operation is apt to be swayed by the whim of his immediate handlers if the new case officer introduces any necessary changes after a smooth period of transition.

Clandestine Contact

The procedure for initial contact with the agent should be decided before he is in place, and it must be compatible with the ultimate purpose of the operation; if the agent's cover is to endure, he has to be handled as a sensitive agent from the very start. A continuous clandestine relationship is needed from the outset to condition the agent properly for his role; it will help keep his clandestine mission ever present in his mind despite the demands of cover work, and it will sustain his morale by demonstrating the importance the case officer attaches to the security of the operation. The regularity, the relative

frequency, and the average duration of case-officer contacts necessary to the successful development and maintenance of a long-term mission require that most if not all of them be clandestine meetings under safe conditions.

Whether or not there should be overt contact and what sort of overt contact would be advantageous are problems that involve a number of factors. The best bet is to keep the relationship entirely clandestine until both case officer and agent can analyze these factors and make an informed decision. It is necessary to restrain the tendency toward carelessness that often characterizes the period of cover establishment, when the agent more or less abstains from aggressive intelligence activity. The tendency to feel complacent is all the greater when the political atmosphere is relaxed, but the situation can change quickly and it may then be too late to tighten up.

The factors that should influence the decision to surface or not to surface the contact lie in the nature of the environment and of the intelligence mission itself. In areas where contact between the nationals in question or between them and local persons is commonplace, an occasional overt contact may serve to avert suspicion in case one of the clandestine contacts is accidentally exposed. Many successful operations are handled in this manner. In other areas, overt contact between case officer and agent may not be advisable. The agent's mission may be such as to make overt contact inadvisable in any circumstances, for instance, one in which he is acting the part of a political renegade.

There is another consideration that should enter into the decision whether or not to surface, even in the most favorable operational climate. Case officers under official cover who have a large number of legitimate overt contacts may feel that one more will appear equally innocent to all onlookers. But not all onlookers will add the same figures and reach the same totals, and it may be that this one relationship will arouse the curiosity of certain persons and lead them to probe beneath the surface; it is always possible to chance upon the right conclusion from a partial set of facts. There are generally valid arguments both for and against surfacing. A wise decision requires a knowledge and appraisal of the fine points involved before the irrevocable act is committed.

Once a decision to surface has been reached, the cover situation of the two principals should determine the manner of the surfacing. It should be done in such a way as to appear natural and to minimize any suspicion of contrivance. One agent and case officer who had children in the same school and participated in school support activities formed a nodding acquaintance susceptible of further development. Some agents find legitimate reason to consult the case officer in his official cover capacity. Others meet their case officers at the homes of mutual acquaintances. Still others may have to contrive a

meeting if their overt positions do not provide a ready logical justification for their encounter.

There is also the question of frequency of overt contacts. One chief of station avoids all but the rarest social contact with his covert agent because, he soundly reasons, the counterintelligence opposition, if alerted, would probably never hear the contrived explanation but only note the fact of meetings. Another case officer reports that some close friends whom he saw several times a month were wrongly suspect to the opposition, whereas his deep-cover agent, whom he very rarely saw overtly, was apparently considered clean. If these officers should relax and slide into the habit of careless contact, they might soon reach a point of no return: once government interest in an agent is suspected, the damage cannot be undone.

On-the-Job Training

It is important to maintain regular contact with the nonofficial-cover agent from the very start, even though he may not yet be fully embarked on his intelligence mission. The case officer must condition his agent to live according to his cover status, within his ostensible cover income, and be sure that he does not allow himself tell-tale benefits such as the acquisition of PX commodities to which he is not normally entitled. The period when the agent establishes his cover is the critical time when his attitude toward his twofold job takes shape. Too often an agent is allowed to occupy himself solely with cover work for a long time; afterward it is always difficult, and in some cases it is impossible, to revive his interest in intelligence. The cover job, for lack of competition, quite naturally occupies the agent's full time and interest, and the longer one waits, the more difficult it is to superimpose a second job.

Furthermore, the case officer has an operational interest in the successful establishment of cover that necessary prelude to active operations. One case of agent neglect during this early period had consequences even worse than a drift away from the intelligence objective. Two agents were placed together in the same cover office, told to build cover, and left pretty much to themselves. They developed a bitter hostility toward each other which the station was either unaware of or unconcerned about. Headquarters repeatedly heard of the flare-ups only through the company president. This very cooperative person must have gained a poor opinion of the kind of supervision exercised by the service, and the agents themselves could not have helped making the inevitable comparison between the commercial and the operational management.

The case officer's concern with the period of cover establishment is not only protective, that is, to avoid cover pitfalls and prevent the agent from losing interest in intelligence. This period must also, and principally, serve to prepare the agent for the tasks ahead. The nature and extent of the preparation

needed will vary from case to case, depending on the agent's prior experience and training and on the trade-craft and reporting demands of his intelligence mission. Formal training, valuable as it is, is only a preparation for experience, not a substitute for it, and the case officer will have to develop the results of any pertinent past training the agent may have had into practical skills.

First of all, the case officer must keep abreast of the agent's cover problems and progress in order to blend matters of operational import into his activity at the right time and in the proper gradation. At the same time, he must make sure that the agent understands his mission thoroughly, for that is the entire purpose of the operation, anything else being only a means to the end. He must see to it that the agent gets sufficient practice, to the point of perfection if necessary, in the particular tasks that his mission will require, such as observation, elicitation, and assessment, practice that can be done in the normal course of cover work. The product of these exercises should be submitted in the form of reports—biographic reports, target data, general information reports, and written assessments. The agent may need technical skills, some of which, like photography, can be practiced as a hobby and some, like secret writing, only in seclusion. Whatever skills he needs, he must master, for there should be no major deficiency in the makeup of the long-term agent. Conversely, however, his training should not be loaded with non-essentials.

The agent should regularly report his contacts, some of whom may be of interest to the station whether or not it plans for him to use them. He must be trained to transmit information accurately and completely, and he must appreciate the importance of operational data in the evaluation of his information. He must be alert to the by-products of his work toward his own objective, such as spotting information and other operational leads. He must understand the complementary purposes of cover—to protect the agent and expose the targets—and he must learn to use his own cover safely and effectively. These fundamentals will naturally have been covered in his briefing and training, but the case officer needs always to bear in mind that an agent who lives in isolation can in a surprisingly short time become oblivious of the most elementary principles of tradecraft unless they are kept constantly before him.

A long-term nonofficial-cover agent, we have noted, must have the right attitude toward clandestine work and the necessary drive to keep going without constant prodding. There is much that he can do by himself in preparing for his mission, and if he is to become conversant with all aspects of the situation related to his intelligence mission, no amount of briefing can make up for his own lack of initiative. It is up to the agent, with appropriate station support, to acquire background information and keep up with overt developments in his field of intelligence interest, so that he can recognize the

significance of his requirements and of the information he collects to fulfill them. If his objective, for instance, is the penetration of a political group, he should find information easily available on its leaders present and potential, its sources of support, its stand on important issues, its allies and enemies, its relationships abroad, the divisions within its ranks, and so on; and he must of course also be familiar with the wider national background in which the group operates.

All this information is indispensable for the agent's performance of his mission, but it is important even in the preparatory stage when he discusses with his case officer his intelligence objectives, his ideas with respect to attaining them, and his progress in working his way closer to his targets. The intelligence tasks and discussions of this early period will work toward the necessary correlation in the agent's mind of his cover occupation with his intelligence mission, and they will sharpen his alertness to possible intelligence significance whatever he hears or sees.

He should reach the point, as one officer expressed it, where he views his whole environment "through intelligence eyeglasses."

At the same time, the exercises and discussions will provide a running gauge of the agent's competence and enable the case officer to keep currently planned a workable progression of intelligence tasks. This progression should nourish the agent's confidence and self-reliance and help him advance smoothly to the point where he can develop and handle his own sources of information, the primary skill of an intelligence collection officer. There are instances where the progression of tasks does not quite achieve this desired result; in these, the case officer may further ease the agent's transition to active operations by turning over to him a secure going operation if there is a suitable one at hand in the general sector of his intelligence mission.

Intelligence Support

A long-range intelligence agent under nonofficial cover is not a lone operator, in the sense that he can be expected to work without direction. For reasons of security, he must be able to stand a considerable amount of isolation from the service, but it should be clear to him that this isolation is an operational necessity, not the result of neglect or oblivion. His morale has to be maintained over the years, and the morale of a good agent can be sustained only by the inner feeling that he is doing a valuable job as an integral part of the service.

This feeling cannot be instilled by reassuring words; it can come only from the agent's own day-to-day recognition of the value of his mission and his work in furtherance of the broader missions of the station and even of the service as a whole. An agent once pictured his uneasiness in these terms:

The rule is followed that there is no use showing the agent any material that does not concern his project. He has little opportunity to call on someone else for advice. It is unlikely that he will ever hear what happens to the information he turns in, or whether headquarters found it useful or not. He is in the unfortunate position where his shortcomings are open to almost instant scrutiny and not hidden by the mass of work in an office.

Too narrow an interpretation of the need-to-know principle can demoralize the man at the end of the line. In the interest of his effectiveness no less than of his morale, the agent must be given a sufficiently well-rounded interpretation of his progress; and it means that the case officer himself has to be well informed on the station's general operational program and performance in order to discuss the agent's work with him in its wider context. The agent should also receive currently, beyond the usual requirements and target information, any background data and any general guidance that will help him recognize operational opportunities outside of his assigned tasks and propose new approaches to his own objectives. If he receives anything less than all-out operational support, the expensive deep-cover agent will be working at a fraction of his capacity.

Furthermore, the considerable amount of time and effort required to keep a good agent primed for his best performance is not so much an operational overhead as an investment; not only should it yield a better intelligence product, but it should also develop and maintain a sound initiative in the agent and enable him to become less dependent on his case officer for day-to-day guidance. In short, nothing is more important to the agent than timely evaluations of his performance and production, and there is no better stimulus and guide for improvement. If it is at all possible, an occasional secure contact with the station chief would contribute to the agent's sense of belonging and it would be a shot-in-the-arm for him to hear from the top man a few well-informed remarks about his work and its value. The goal of intelligence support of the long-term agent is to keep him constantly oriented and inspired toward his informational objectives.

Maintenance of Purpose

We have already stressed the fact that the agent must have a clear understanding of his mission at the outset and that he and his case officer must keep it constantly in mind. Headquarters and the station must have the same understanding of the purpose of the operation, they must both agree to it, and if this purpose is a valid one, they should stick to it. The temptations to redirect cover operations are many and varied; they should be examined

thoroughly and, unless the change is unquestionably for the better, they should be resisted,

There is no surer way to bewilder the agent than to force him repeatedly to change his course, and often there is no more certain way to doom the operation. A radical change in target, as for example from one ethnic group to another, will be wholly incompatible with the pattern of activity already established by the agent, and it may be incompatible with his basic cover.

Frequent organizational and personnel changes in a service bring a succession of officers with differing views into control of cover operations, and some new officers are prone to make changes before they fully understand the intent of their predecessors. Sometimes deep-cover operations are diverted and exposed for the sake of expediency: the chronic urgencies in some unsettled areas lead, sometimes justifiably, to the commitment of cover resources to purposes for which they were not originally intended. Much less justified are those purely administrative urgencies which prompt a service to throw a nonofficial-cover agent into a routine and perhaps insecure operation because someone is needed and he happens to be at hand. Operations in which such hasty resort is made to expediency are usually characterized by general laxity: the natural limits of the cover are overstepped, the elements of risk are glossed over, and tradecraft is ignored. One long-range agent who was well established in his cover and had obtained good access to targets was assigned to replace a departing case officer in charge of an operation that was already compromised; he had to be withdrawn from the area a few months later. The agent was lost without benefit to the operation. Long-range operations demand consistency.

Progress and Production

The unorthodox nature of the deep-cover agent entails a need to judge his work by different standards from those used in evaluating the performance of persons under official cover. Even among themselves, deep-cover operations differ from one another, and their value cannot be determined by any common criteria. Some operations officers, who may complain loudly when deep-cover operations are put through the budget wringer along with the rest of the wash, are still prone to measure their value with the same yardstick that they use for other agent operations, that is, production statistics. Some officers, on the other hand, may go to the opposite extreme, treating the agents as sleepers and demanding patience and the long-range view without giving any inkling of the time and manner of the awakening.

The right view, of course, is in the happy medium, a position easier to state than to define. The long-range agent should not be pressured to produce as soon as he is in place, but except in rare cases he is not a sleeper, exempt from all operational performance. In the preceding section, we have described tasks he can perform from the very start, tasks that will contribute to his training and experience, maintain his interest and morale, and sometimes be of immediate value to the station. These tasks will also hasten the day when he becomes truly operational. If no intelligence production is expected in the early stage, there must still be progress, and the operation should be judged by the operational headway it makes toward its objective, according to an estimate of reasonable expectations outlined in advance.

A premature demand from headquarters for production may change the case officer's concern from operational progress to project justification, he may as a result direct the agent toward readily accessible targets, and the operation will have acquired a new purpose—its own survival. A long-range intelligence operation deserves headquarters' patience; but headquarters in turn is entitled to progress, and eventually to production. There is no place in a mature service for the epitaph over a terminated operation that it had been "extremely valuable as experience" although it had produced nothing for the consolatory view of a malingering agent that he is not producing but "his cover is excellent"

The goal of clandestine intelligence operations is the collection of clandestine information. If there is a major defect in an operation, that is, if it is apparent that it cannot and will not become productive, it should be terminated in order to give the case officer time to develop better operations. To the question, when should one expect production to begin? there is no single answer, because circumstances vary with the operation cannot give an approximate date it is probably not progressing toward production. There is a natural reluctance to end a going operation, even if it is not going anywhere.

It was once reported in the review of an operation that "a kind of operational inertia set in, and it was easier for all concerned to let the operation run than to terminate it and sort out the pieces." But to prolong an unsuccessful venture on mere hope or through force of habit is an expensive exercise in futility.

* * *

Long-range cover operations will always be difficult to prepare and to maintain, and there is never a certainty of success. They are always vulnerable in the sense that one weak element can nullify the excellence of all the others, and even the soundest cover operation can be destroyed by pure bad luck. But

although one can never be sure of success, the odds against it can certainly be reduced. They can be reduced by not persisting in doing things the hard way. The recruitment of suitable agents already under natural cover and the transfer to career contract agent status of staff agents who make good with a cover organization can limit the use of staff agents in long-range cover operations and spare much of the grief that stems from their morale problems and their tight-fitting, buttons-in-the-back administrative suit, with salary adjustments, bonus kickbacks, covert tax returns, and so on.

Chances of success can be improved in a more basic way by keeping in check the habits and the tempo that sometimes ooze over from official cover practices to nonofficial cover, with lamentable results. Nonofficial cover requires, not the mechanical efficiency of the assembly-line worker, but the patient inventiveness of the artisan, and an official-cover carryover is especially harmful to operations intended for long-term coverage of sensitive targets. A repetition of previous mistakes is generally the result of congenital haste and a fondness for short cuts: long-term cover operations allow few concessions to expediency.

This chapter has laid particular stress on planning and preparation because the early period is decisive; after a certain point, the die is cast and little can be done, to improve or redirect an operation and yet, though totally sterile, it may continue for years, at great expense and constituting a time-consuming treadmill for the case officer in whose lap it falls. That is why long-range cover operations require patient and painstaking effort from start to finish.

Appendix 7

CIA Report on the 1956 Hungarian Uprising

1. How the crisis was set in [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

On October 23, there was no Hungarian Operations Section in[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]and there was no Hungarian speakers among the case officers [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]. On the agent-roster, there was one [XXXXXXXXXX], before October 23 his activities were not directed toward the Hungarian target. During the months just previous to October 1956, only a small number of the total reports received by the agency on the intellectual and political ferment of Hungary originated [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]. At the outbreak of the revolution, [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] in sum was not [XXXXXXXXXX] was not facing in the direction of Ireland. [XXXXXXXXXX] The Hungarian target was relegated to the next lowest priority [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX])A Hungarian Section was finally formed [XXXXXXXXXX] December 1, 1957; [XXXXXXXXXX] putting Hungary first in priority, was revised at Headquarters in December 1957, reorganization to meet a crisis, whose exact nature, duration and final significance could not be rightly judged at any time during that period, to have taken time to reorganize would have, meant to lose time from the job of finding out what was going on. Besides, during the original crisis, there could be little concept of mission and objectives on which to base a reorganization [XXXXXXXXXX] reacted to the suddenly fluid and frenetic circumstances of the situation the only way it could, which was by throwing everyone available into the job of covering the crisis on a hit-or-miss basis, somewhat the way a newspaper office does, when suddenly confronted with a catastrophic event. In this [XXXXXXXXXX] was sorely limited from the outset (or as soon as it became apparent that the border was opening up) by [XXXXXXXXXX] prohibition on [XXXXXXXXXX] visiting the border area. The only personnel could be despatched to the border area were of whom [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] there were fortunately many [XXXXXXXXXX]'

Since none of these, except [XXXXXX], spoke Hungarian the first top priority action was to move Hungarian speaking [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] This was done with relative alacrity considering that no plan for the use of such personnel previously existed and that the magnitude and outcome of the crisis was

uncertain during the earliest days. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX]

Only Hungarian speaker, [XXXX] was naturally thrown full-time into the melee [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] Altogether by 31 October, [XXXX] had a pool of seven or so Hungarian speakers, [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] of varying capabilities and past experience none of whom belonged to [XXXXXXXXXXXX] therefore could appear to the border region— these in addition to the non-Hungarian speaking personnel [XXXXXXXXXX] who could also be used as [XXXXXX] pleased.

As far as can be ascertained there was and could have been no plan for the specific operational deployment of this personnel for the same reason that a general crisis plan or reorganization within [XXXX] was impossible—no one knew enough of what was happening to place personnel or assign tasks. The sole operating principle was to find out as much as possible and for this reason personnel were sent to the border areas and were spread out so that there was some coverage on an on-and-off basis of all points which had been reported open. There was no plan for personnel at different border points to get in touch with each other as there was no team. Each border visit was an independent probe, and the observer, in case of an operational opportunity or a piece of information, could either phone [XXXX] or return them to report.

[XXXXXXXXXXXX] succeeded, immediately after the scope of events in Hungary became apparent, in arranging [XXXXXXXXXX] to take over all off-hour duty [XXXXXX] (nights and weekends) on the assumption that by this arrangement [XXXXXXXXXXXX] would secure immediate and only access to the Hungarian freedom fighter [XXXXXXXXXX]. While this no doubt seemed to be an excellent way to assure themselves of maximum coverage in the face of the chaos of the moment, [XXXXXXXXXX] later felt that it was an unnecessary measure which succeeded in exhausting [XXXX] personnel and in rendering them less efficient and vigorous for their strenuous daytime duties without substantial benefits, [XXXXXXXXXX] Add to this the fact that the already much reiterated lack of Hungarian speakers [XXXXXXXXXXXX] made communications difficult [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] unless an interpreter was present. This is mentioned in passing, since it is a good example of the kind of well-intentioned sacrifice and hardship which personnel is ready to undertake in time of crisis, but which accomplishes little and is no substitute for the management of these elements of the situation which really count. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

The fact that staff members [XXXXXXXXXX] were prohibited from going to the border area was not so great a loss from the information-collection point-of-view (since they lacked the necessary language) but it complicated the management of the personnel who were detached to the border, most of

whom stood in need of daily guidance. Each time one of the latter returned [XXXX] to meet with someone [XXXXXXXXXX] it was necessary to make secure telephone contact to lay on foolproof meeting arrangements, to procure safe-houses, etc. Had the staff members [XXXXXX] been allowed to approach the border areas and set up field-posts as close to it as possible, they could have worked the border operators more efficiently and could have let them stay at the border, i.e. the staff members should have done the commuting and not the few agents who could be useful at the border. Thus this prohibition undoubtedly contributed further to the complicated state of affairs [XXXXXX] and to the already inherent difficulties of organizing personnel aid operations efficiently.

While a few freedom fighters with worthwhile information were seen by our personnel in Vienna [XXXXXXXXXX], the majority of contacts with persons coming out of Hungary were made at the border. (We are not speaking of refugees here, very few of whom had begun to come out at the time in question, but of persons domiciled in or near the border regions who crossed into Austria for a variety of purposes connected with the revolutionary cause and returned to the scene as quickly as possible.) In focusing on the border-contact situation, which was the heart of our operations, it should be recalled that we were only one of many parties trying to work the border among hordes of Western observers, newsmen, Austrian welfare people, tourists, agents of other intelligence services, etc., that there, was therefore competition for news, that nothing prevented an excited Hungarian looking for contacts and assistance for talking to anyone besides ourselves and telling the same story he had told us, and above all, that there was no guarantee that one would ever see the same person twice. Much of what we picked up at the border on a one-time basis was good intelligence since it came from eye-witnesses. None of what we picked up was any better or any worse than any good newsman could or did pick up, except that we had a central office [XXXXXXXXXX] with a large staff who could try to put the pieces together, compare incoming information with radio, State Department and liaison material, etc.

At no time in the period October 23 to November 4 if one looks at the situation realistically, did we have anything that could or should have been mistaken for an intelligence operation. In the case of the few contacts from inside who promised to stay in touch with us (i.e. get in touch with us when they came out again), it was naturally impossible to guarantee either when the inside man could come out again, and worse, when our man could be found again at the same place although telephone numbers were given out. It was not likely, even had the man came out again and called the number and not been waylaid by some other party on the scene, that he would have waited

around until somebody could come down to see him [XXXXXX]. In any case, this would have been no way to run efficient operations at a time like this. As it turned out, although there were plans with some contacts from inside to meet again, no repeated meetings took place, with the same person during the period October 23 to November 4.

During the period in question, personnel [XXXXXXXXX] working in the border area had made contact with and picked up information from various persons from west Hungarian towns, many of whom claimed to be members of the local revolutionary councils or to have close contact to such. Most of these could give eyewitness accounts of the revolutionary take-over in their own and nearby communities of the activity or lack of it of Soviet troops stationed in their region, of the political intentions of the revolution as seen from where they stood. In some cases (depending upon the date), they desired medical supplies or weapons or radio equipment. In some cases, they had been sent out by their councils to give the news to the West. In the few outstanding cases they had reliable news from other sectors (received via telegraph), particularly on new movements of Soviet troops into Hungary. What they did not have was any reliable news as to what was happening in Budapest (and they were as anxious to find this out as we were).

The information which came from these people made up the bulk of our cabled intelligence on the Hungarian revolution and, what is more interesting, directly or indirectly influenced policy and planning messages sent [XXXXXX] to headquarters, (see below). The fact that we were not getting news from the storm center of the revolution at Budapest or on a country-wide basis meant not only that our intelligence was one-sided but also that much of our planning, which was based on this intelligence, was one-sided.

For the record, our main contacts were with people picked up at various border points from the following places: KOESZAG, SZENTGOTTHARD, SOPRON, GYOR and VESZPREM. The four or five contacts in question here not only delivered hard intelligence but were all momentarily engaged with us in some operational plan (however impromptu) which involved future contact and action. The first three towns are all immediately adjacent to the Austrian border; Gyor is about 50 kilometers from the border and Veszprem about 100 kilometers. These operational contacts, most of which took place between October 30 and November 3, came up with the following propositions:

- a) request for radios, and arms (if possible) (Gyor, Sopron)
- b) request that a powerful transmitter at the Austrian border rebroadcast and monitor resistance radios, so that each town would know what the other was doing (Gyor)

- c) return to Koeszeg and bring back members of district council.
- d) send out trained signals man for briefing by us (Tesspren)

Although journalists from all over Europe streamed down to Budapest soon after the revolution broke out (and their reports were the only information received from there), it is noteworthy that in the period under consideration very few people came up from Budapest to the border or to Vienna, except for occasional truck drivers who had been sent for supplies and who were naturally in a great hurry to return. Everyone else in Budapest was much too busy or too keen on watching developments to bother about the outside world or even to bother to any extent about what was going on in other parts of Hungary. What little information on the massive and confused events in Budapest did trickle out via hurried truck drivers or official travelers was of little use. A typical instance took place on October 30 when two officers of the American Legation in Budapest arrived in Vienna and stated that at 10.00 a.m. that morning, when they had left, there was no fighting in Budapest and all was quiet. A Hungarian truck driver who came out the same day stated that at 10.00 a.m. there was fighting in various parts of the city and went on to describe some specific incidents. During the period October 26 to November 4 two contract agents of the Agency did go into Hungary, both of them [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] who took a spin around Hungary and came out and wrote an excellent report on what he had seen. He had no operational mission and little intelligence briefing except of the most general sort. His experience showed how easy it was for someone, who had partial use of the language and sufficient courage and imagination, to get around even in chaotic times, and to make contacts without difficulty, especially under fair [XXXXXXX]. \ The other was [XXXX] who visited his mother in Hungary during the early days of the uprising and later went in again to [XXXX] to see what was going on among the students who were playing a prominent part on the local revolutionary scene. He was still there when the Russians re-entered, but succeeded, in returning to Austria safely.

The issue of dispatching trained personnel of many possible kinds into the revolutionary area is, of .course, the key to the problem here under consideration and will be analyzed in great detail in a later section. Suffice it to say at this point, that the experience of our operations people at the border and of the few who went inside, and the whole picture we now have of the mentality of the revolutionaries shows that almost anyone from the West of whatever nationality, color or purpose would have been received with open arms by any of the revolutionary councils in the cities and of Hungary during the period in question.

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Two pages redacted XXXXXXXXXXXX]

The other of the two elements with which [XXXX] had to contend was the U.S. military. This is naturally a big subject, since the whole problem of agreed activities is behind it. There is no intention of analyzing it here. In principle, one can say that if we were in no position to act efficiently and according to plan with well-placed assets on the spot the military is, was, and always will be even worse off if for no other reason than its inherent structural inability to maneuver rapidly in intelligence matters. In the instance under consideration, a special situation obtained which I hope need never be considered again, if the Agency plans properly before the next crisis looms, the army [XXXXXXXX]. The lesson learned during the Hungarian revolution is that if we do not have our own assets and our own plan, no one else's assets or intentions will serve us. On the negative side of the ledger, the responsibilities during a time of crisis, with or without a plan are so great that all other parties, who are always going to want to get into the act, must be kept at arm's length, from the main operating personnel of our bases, if their energies are not to be diverted from the main task. A single liaison officer with no other major responsibilities should be assigned liaison with the military in time of crisis to keep them happy and do for them or get out of them whatever is possible. There is no doubt that the time [XXXXX] to waste on conferences with ranking military intelligence people during the Hungarian revolution was a sizeable additional strain on his already strained services to the rest of his [XXXX].

1. Specific action and planning as the crisis developed [XXXXX] headquarters.

The purpose of this section is to show, especially in the light of the foregoing, what are the chief observations, hopes, and intentions of [XXXXX] and headquarters during the period October 23 to November 4 and on what these were based. The material which follows immediately below is taken almost entirely from cable traffic between [XXXXXX] headquarters. The further purpose of this section is to compare or contrast, as the instance may warrant, what we were thinking and planning, or in some cases doing, with the true state of affairs, and to point up some of the opportunities for possible action which we might have taken, had we been differently informed and better organized. (In the items below, certain statements are underlined which constitute the crucial points in headquarters thinking and which bear the brunt of later comment.)

Between 21 and 26 October, headquarters sent three cables to [XXXX] (one each day) asking for a report on the Hungarian situation, since [XXXX] had not been heard from throughout the opening phase of the crisis. On

October 27, [XXXX] sent two cables which reported fully on the situation to date as far as it was known. Previous to this, they had had no information which was not likewise available in the United States through radio and newspapers and had been engaged in marshaling their forces and attempting to orient themselves to a situation for which, as has already been pointed out, they were completely unprepared.

XXXXX] cables of October 27 informed headquarters of the various local arrangements mentioned in the previous section (off-hour duty [XXXX] personnel, [XXXXX] personnel [XXXXX] restrictions on personnel movement, etc. intention to dispatch [XXXX] personnel to the border). They contained the information that the cities in Northern Hungary seemed to be in the hands of the rebels, who had taken over the local radio stations at Gyor and Miskolc. They further stated that [XXXX] would try to identify the leaders of the revolutionary action [XXXX] and asked for headquarters' advice on what action the station should take, on U.S. policy, particularly in regard to sending arms and ammunition shipments into Hungary. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

In answer to this, headquarters replied briefly on the following day, October 28, that we must restrict ourselves to information collection only that agents sent to the border and must not get involved in anything that would reveal U.S. interest or give cause to claim intervention that [XXXX] should try to get the identities of activists, and that there might be the possibility of passing in radio equipment a little later.

On October 29, [XXXX] had no new plans or thoughts but observed that the revolution, judging by border reports and broadcasts from the border towns, was tending far from communism. [XXX] also deplored the lack of action or the taking of any stand on the part of the U.S. government.

Headquarters on October 27 gave further answer to [XXXX] cable of October 27 emphasizing the need to find out about leading personalities in the revolution and stating that the idea of using [XXXX] to support resistance elements inside Hungary was good but, that it was not permitted to send U.S. weapons in. (At this date, no one had enquired precisely on the exact location and nature of U.S. or other weapons available to CIA. This was done finally in early December.) Headquarters said further that it was reviewing the rosters of dropped agents from old operations who had W/T training who were located both in both Europe and the United States (Among others headquarters attempted to find the exact address of a former [XXXX] agent who had been resettled, it was thought [XXXXX]. This was a little like the scene in an old comedy where in the frantic search for a missing person, people begin to ransack the bureau drawers.

By October 30, [XXXX] had begun to collect and transmit some of the intelligence garnered from border contacts described in the foregoing section.

On the basis of this and other material available [XXXX] broadcasts of local rebel radios and rumors trickling up from Budapest, [XXXX] sent two think-pieces on October 30 and October 31 which deplored the lack of unified leadership in the revolution, debated whether the Soviets would or would not interfere with what was going on in Hungary, stated that the revolution was losing momentum, that Imre Nagy was discredited as a future leader and proposed that a national leader must come forth around whom the whole revolutionary movement and its gains could be solidified. [XXXX] warily suggested that [XXXX] might be the right man and raised the question of getting in touch with him. [XXX] further pointed out that the Northern Hungarian border cities represented a more or less unified bloc in their demands and in their disagreements with Budapest but were not really unified otherwise (i.e., organizationally).

By this date (31 October) Imre Nagy had publicly announced the formation of a cabinet to include the leaders of the most prominent outlawed Hungarian political parties, and each of these leaders had already (30 October) spoken over the Budapest radio to announce the reformation of his party. Tildy (Smallholders), Erdei (Feasants), Bela Kovacs did not speak on the radio but was interviewed by a reporter in Pecs, which was written up in the Hungarian papers on October 31. By this time also the news had come out in Budapest that Heledus and not Imre Nagy had called in the Russians the first time, and that Nagy was daily gaining in stature and was acceding in giant steps to the increasingly radical demands of the various councils and committees who were sending representatives to him. Mindszenty had been released and had already made a public statement. At the same time, the first ominous-sounding reports of the apparent re-entry of fresh Soviet troops on Hungarian soil were being received.

On the same date as the second of these two think-pieces (31 October), [XXXX] sent another cable obviously based on information and requests picked up from a border contact which emphasized the lack of communications between free cities in North Hungary and proposed that a transmitter be brought up to the border to rebroadcast the transmissions of the radio stations in revolutionary hands so that by this means they could stay in touch with each other. This notion obviously suggested a topic which [XXX] had raised earlier and which it now reiterated more specifically in the form of a proposal to send in [XXXX] for rebel use so that we could be kept informed of the latest developments from the centers of action. [XXXX] pointed out here for the first time that its only information came from travellers, border contacts and the press. [XXX] stated it was screening border contacts for use as W/T operators and requested policy clearance, and dispatch to Vienna of signal plans and of a W/T trainer.

On the same date (31 October), a cable from headquarters crossed the above [XXXX] and was concerned chiefly with the frantic attempt to create communications with people inside Hungary. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] headquarters also seconded a script 3 which had shortly before come out of [XXXX] and which proposed that certain defectors who had volunteered to go back into Hungary be allowed to go, especially those with W/T experience. In this same vein, headquarters suggested that [XXXX] screen their contacts in the rebels for possible W/T types.

By November 1 and 2, while events were actually moving in many disparate directions at ones, the world, for that short period, was given the impression that the Hungarian Revolution was over and had succeeded in its major aims. Nagy had made his declaration of neutrality; he was negotiating with the Russians for the withdrawal of troops, etc.. This breath-taking and undreamed-of state-of-affairs not only caught many Hungarians off guard, it also caught us off-guard, for which we can hardly be blamed since we had no inside information, little outside information, and could not read the Russians' minds.

On November 1, [XXXX] in its main cable of that day, took up the problem of new relations with the kind of government which might now come forth in Hungary and considered at some length the necessary revision, in the light of recent events, of the Agency's whole program for the European satellites. On the same day, headquarters, which had not quite settled down to the new Hungary, was collecting and restating objectives in its daily cable [XXXX] collect intelligence, use the fluid border situation to lay on support mechanisms for future operations, [XXXXXXXX] establish contact with rebel leaders in the interior closing with the usual ukase: BUT NOTHING MUST HAPPEN WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY CHARGE OF INTERVENTION,

During the few remaining days (1–4 November) of partial euphoria over the unexpected accomplishments of a revolutionary mob and partial confusion over reports that the Russians were agreeing to leave, on the one hand, and sending in fresh troops, on the other, the major [XXX] cable traffic was directed to [XXXX] rather than to headquarters and was concerned with proposals for the setting up of a coalition—government for Hungary, and with the position and disposition of Ferenc Nagy who was at that time in Paris trying to get into Austria.

There is no serious warning in [XXXXXXXX] cables of these days as to the imminence of the second Russian intervention, although certain reports transmitted [XXX] gave clear indication of what might be coming. [XXX] personnel reported verbally at a later date that until the night of November 3 none of their contacts had predicted this intervention. On that night, one

border contact stated his conviction that the Russians were ready to attack. By early morning of November 4, this was already a fact and was known to the world. On November 4, headquarters cabled [XXXX] that it should try to line up escaping resistance leaders for appearance before the UN and that measures would be taken to hasten the entry of such into the United States. On November 6, we were already talking about the mechanics and methods of exploiting refugees. And that was that.

2. Reporting during the Hungarian Revolution

A listing and analysis of Sources of reports on the Hungarian situation during the period covered by this paper (23 October to 4 November) shows at a glance the relative uselessness of conventional clandestine sources as against unusual and unconventional sources in a crisis period.

Main sources [XXXXX]

1. Freedom fighters, revolutionary council, members, etc. coming to the border (in a few instances to [XXXX]. These constituted the most numerous and in most cases the most reliable sources for the areas in question.
2. [XXXXXX] For the most part came likewise from border contacts and therefore represented further coverage of the kind received under 1 above. [XXXXXX] was obviously capable of wider and easier access to such sources than we were. For further special [XXXXXX] coverage, see below.
3. Other [XXXX] persons or organizations using the same methods and contacts as ourselves (border contact) but having the advantage of being on home territory and having legitimate reason for closer contact than we did.
4. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] Many persons engaged in official [XXXX] action and also volunteer managed to enter and leave Hungary without difficulty during the period in question. By chance, chiefly, we were able to talk to a few such at the border.

Travellers (legal), diplomats (American and other), and journalist (American and other). These were the people who went down to and came out from Budapest. We had next to no contacts to the journalists, but some American diplomats who came out.

Secondary sources:

1. Hungarian Railroad station personnel using teletype, Hungarian rail-
roaders all over the country, without any apparent organizational

direction, but simply on their own initiative, teletyped information, especially on Russian troop movements and local hostilities in round-robin fashion to various revolutionary centers and in so doing inadvertently constituted the one systematic combination of intelligence observer and communications facility available during the whole period. Some of the people we talked to at the border brought with them reports received in their towns via railroad teletype from other areas. [XXXXXX] likewise picked up numerous reports received in this manner.

2. [XXXXXX] monitoring of Soviet troop units [XXXX] was monitoring Soviet [XXXXX] in Hungary. The latter in their haste and disorganization frequently [XXXXXX] and thus revealed movements, positions, morale, etc. The major collection of such material took place, however, chiefly after November 4.
3. Reporting sources used in other areas RFE [XXXX] RFE with its highly efficient and technically superb radio-monitoring service was able to pick up, record and analyze and quickly put into reporting channels the material broadcast by the various rebel radio stations. For the record, it should be stated that this was the only source of intelligence reports put out by RFE during the time of the revolution proper. RFE also rebroadcast the transmissions it had picked up in an attempt to keep the various, disconnected components of the Revolution informed, a service which some of the people who came to the border from Győr had requested and which was the subject of one [XXXX] cable. (see 5)

However, RFE needed no prompting to do this. While the reports put out on the basis of radio monitoring were of value in Washington, and were in many instances cabled to [XXXX], it is clear that our competence to judge the course of the revolution and to plan expeditious and alacritous moves would have been greatly advanced if the radio-monitoring capability had been in the same hands at the operational capability.

Liaisons: In a time of crisis, neutrals play or can play as in time of war, a most outstanding part as reporting sources in that their political neutrality, and their traditional engagement in warfare and medical actions allows them to remain on the scene, more or less respected and needed by both sides during hostilities.

It is no surprise that during the crisis period, reports came to us from both [XXXXXXXX] both through their diplomats and [XXX] organizations and more or less unsolicited. While the reports themselves in the large melee of information accruing from all sides during the Hungarian revolution were of no great importance, they point up the potential of such liaison sources and the fact that an action plan for crisis periods should call for the attempt at least in neutral countries for the local station to put all possible pressure on liaison

for reports from the disturbed area, which in many cases will be less biased, than those coming in from participants in an insurrection and cooler and less hysterical than those from Western diplomats and journalists.

Their coverage was negligible and as shown in [XXXXXXX] they were in the same proportion as ourselves as a result of the lack of previous planning. Their few representatives in [XXXXXXX] contributed correspondingly less information than our own.

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] with a radio and for a time managed to send out eyewitness reports of the situation in Budapest. (This kind of action will be further discussed in Section IV.)

4. Reporting from Budapest itself consisted of telegrams from the American Legation (which was interrupted for a considerable period during the most exciting days at the end of the revolutionary period by a communications failure), reports from journalists, American, British and other, and reports from persons going from Budapest to Vienna. The latter for reasons already put forth were of little value. Between the American Legation and the journalists, the latter understandably takes the prize, although in many instances the receipt of their reports was delayed. While both Legation personnel and journalists braved the city fighting to find out what was going on, the latter did and could do something of great importance which was denied the former and that was to see and interview all kinds of persons taking part in the revolution from freedom fighters on the streets to rebel leaders and politicians. Some persons actively engaged in the revolution did come into the American Legation and tell their stories, but these were naturally not of our choosing and in many cases were justifiably open to some suspicion. Reporting from the American Legation was at best sporadic and laced with premature analysis and assumptions (of the sort that diplomats feel their government stands in need of).

[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]

However, even if the coverage of the American Legation had been a hundred times better than it was, future planning for a crisis can and should not by any means include the American diplomatic installation as a basepoint, since it will always be impossible to predict what the situation of that Mission will be, what its chief officer will impose upon his subordinates, etc.

5. Other sources [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] the case. It was noted during the Poznan uprisings, which in no way disrupted the basic function of the central government of Poland, that the Foreign

Office staff was either much too busy trying to figure out what was going on and what stand the government was going to take, or simply see no reason to brief its bureaucrats in foreign places. Whichever, certain Polish foreign installations had little to go on but the same rumors everyone else in the outside world was receiving. While it was interesting to note what stand the various diplomatic officers took toward the events at home (for the sake of possible future approaches and the like) this did not constitute intelligence on the situation at home. During the Hungarian crisis, the Foreign Ministry was severely disrupted and was for long periods of time in no physical communication with its installations, or when it was, had little time to give news reports on events. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] During any widespread insurrection it would seem logical to expect this generally to be the case, and there is some question whether such reports, usually of disproportionate length (station analyses tending to fill the information gaps) should be permitted to have priority precedence and clog up communication channels to the detriment of the expedient passage of other more urgent information.

The breakdown of significant subject-matter on the Hungarian revolution can be expressed as follows:

1. Progress of revolutionary fighting.
 1. Budapest
 2. Provinces
 3. Consolidation of the revolution in political and governmental measures,
 - a) a Budapest
 - b) b Provinces

Warning of and progress of the second Russian intervention [XXXXXX] be credited with having picked a fair view of 1-b and 2-b above, and dealing with the provinces. They did not realize the degree of latent and in some cases actual working solidarity which had come about in some Transdanubian areas in a miraculously short time or the relation between these areas and Budapest, e.g., that the province of Borso had sent a delegation to Imre Nagy to see whether he would accept their demands. He did, and they agreed to drop any ideas of an independent government. They had no solid information on either 1-a or 2-a (Budapest) except for the generally confused material belatedly trickling out. Their views on the Hungarian revolution, their reporting on it, the actions they proposed and their whole posture during this period was influenced by certain chance contacts with persons from the border towns. As

for 3, it can be said that no-one in Hungary or elsewhere (except perhaps the Russians themselves) had a clear composite view of the movements of Russian troops which were gradually deploying into positions of attack and siege all over Hungary. At many points, especially Miskolo, where the most blatant and courageous of the free revolutionary radios was located, the coming treachery of the Russians seemed to be foreseen. All in all, there were many isolated indications and many cries for help in advance of the need. While [XXXX] only picked up a few such reports, these happened to be among the most clearly indicative of what was likely to come and were based on eyewitness observation and sent by reliable communications. As early as 9 o'clock an [XXXX] working with [XXX] told [XXXX] who passed it on to us that a radio operation in Sopron (near the border) reported he had picked up the rebel radio at Nyiregyhaza (Northeast Hungary) calling for help against the Third Soviet Army which had crossed the Soviet-Hungarian border at 0123 hours on October 29 at Zahony. (Nota bene: We picked this up fourth-hand. Good radio monitoring [XXXX] could have picked up a broadcast from Nyiregy as easily as someone in Sopron could. On October 30 and 31, revolutionaries from Gyor reported to [XXXX] at the border extensive information on Russian railway movements in the Northeast corridor of Hungary (Zahony-Nyiregyhaza) which had been received at Gyor via the railway teletype system from the stationmaster at ZAHONY, NYIRHGTHAZA, and other towns in that area. These described in exact numbers and exact directions the movements of Russian troops, leaving little doubt of what was about to happen. To have believed at the time of these reports that the Russians were merely safeguarding their lines or preparing to aid the evacuation of their previously damaged troops and material seems now, on looking back, the extreme of wishful blindness. In the days following these reports we were, however, dickering in rather long cables on this proposed make-up of a coalition government and were revising our program for the satellites. In summary, our reporting was good on local events in West Hungary and on the atmosphere and make-up of the local Revolutionary councils in that area. We knew little of what was happening in Budapest or of the encircling movements of Soviet troops, and we had no composite picture of the status of the Revolution in the period between its first victory and its suppression by the Russians. We did not have the kind of information on which quick, deft moves of our own could have been based, either in the nature of support to the revolution or of improved intelligence coverage.

Appendix 8

CIA Report into Operations in Lithuania

Joint CIA/SIS Inquiry into Security of Existing Operations in Lithuania

1. The object of this inquiry is to present a picture of the security position of current operations in Lithuania, with a view to affording guidance to those conducting any future Joint CIA/SIS operations in that country. It has been necessary not only to study the developments surrounding the important MGB offensive against networks in the field (December 1952–January 1953) and subsequent use thereof but also to make a retrospective examination of the security of those networks in the hope of discovering whether any of them was compromised before the said offensive took place. This has involved a considerable exchange of information between the two Services including traffic from the following:
 1. DEKSNYS (Swedish and SIS traffic)
 2. DRAMBLYS
 3. SERAJUNAS
 4. JACK
2. Although the inquiry is confined to purely operational questions and is not aimed in any way at presenting a verdict on the political controversies dividing the different emigre organizations from which operational staff has been recruited, it has nevertheless been necessary to study the relations between these organizations and to determine to what extent they may have affected the security position in the field. It has also been found necessary to study the traffic from all the networks in order to consider the possibility, in the event of hostile control, of the said controversies being exploited in order to maintain and even exacerbate existing divisions among the emigre organizations.
3. For the sake of clarity, the present report is divided into chapters on the four networks referred to in Paragraph 1 above (with appendices as required), followed by conclusions and recommendations for subsequent Joint operations.

Chapter 2

1. DEKSNYS, Jonas has a long record of anti-Russian activities. During the war, he worked against the Germans and was imprisoned by them. He was liberated by the American forces in 1945 and managed to get himself repatriated to Poland with another Lithuanian named BRUNIUS (a former Polish national from one of the Lithuanian districts). After that, his record is chronologically as follows:
September 1945 - Crossed the frontier to Lithuania.
December 1945 - Came out illegally via Poland and travelled overland with one VALIULIS to Western Germany.
1.5.46 - Returned to Lithuania in the guise once more of a repatriate to Poland. He was sponsored by SIS and was accompanied by a certain STANEVICIUS, now known as STANEIKA, who is at present in Sweden.
September 1946 = Came out again illegally from Lithuania to Poland and then arrived in Sweden as a stowaway. STANEIKA had preceded him by the same route.
Spring 1947 - Left Sweden clandestinely in a Polish ship and landed in Poland. There he met SKRAJUNAS and RIMVIDAS (reported dead in Poland in 1949–50). He returned to Sweden from Poland as a stowaway in a Swedish ship, helped by a Lithuanian member of the crew who was organizing such traffic.
22.8. 1947 - Reported to have attended a meeting in Switzerland to meet a Minister, LOZORAITIS, in that country, and from there to have returned to Sweden.
March 1948 - Left again for Poland in the same Swedish ship and brought out SKRAJUNAS and AUDRONIS, who had been waiting for him there. All these arrived safely in Sweden.
April 1949 - Unsuccessful attempt to land in Lithuania in Swedish speedboat.
1.5. 1949 - Safely landed in Lithuania with five others. He has remained there ever since.
2. DEKSNYS' infiltration was a Swedish operation which used SIS transport facilities, and DEKSNYS was accompanied by UOSIS and AUDRONIS. UOSIS had with him two W/T sets for transmitting to the Swedish Intelligence Service. In August 1949, a Lithuanian traitor named PESSECKAS revealed to the Russians in Stockholm that DEKSNYS, UOSIS, and AUDRONIS were operating in the Baltic States, and identified a photograph of DEKSNYS which was shown to him by the Russians.

1. Before DEKSNYS was successfully re-infiltrated into Lithuania, he had had serious quarrels with both AUBRONIS and SKRAJUNAS on the subject, of political affiliations. These differences possibly originated in a mandate given to SKRAJUNAS and AUDRONIS when they left Lithuania to operate a check on DEKSNYS' resistance activities. At the time of embarkation, SKJUUTJHAS and AUDRONIS, on the one hand, and BEKSMB, on the other hand, were already making accusations and counter-accusations one against the other. On landing in Lithuania, AUDRONIS immediately left the remainder of the party and made his way independently to join the Tauras partisans, while DEKSNYS appears to have taken up his quarters in Kaunas. DEKSNYS' brief was to organize passive resistance in Lithuania as opposed to the more violent method in favor with the partisans; meanwhile, SKRAJUNAS had remained in the West and had a link with AUDRONIS by correspondence in innocent code.
2. There is no reason to suppose that at the time of his landing, in Lithuania, DEKSNYS was not a perfectly free agent, and the first suggestion of his being under control came in a communication from AUDRONIS of June 22, 1949 sent in SIS S/I to a post box in Sweden. This letter referred to the suspicion that DEKSNYS had fallen into the hands of "provocateurs" shortly after AUDRONIS broke contact with DEKSNYS. The gist of this communication was passed on to SERAJUNAS (who was then in France) by the post box in question. As far as is known, however, there is no actual contact between DEKSNYS and AUDRONIS after they separated. DEKSNYS did not in fact, refer to AUDRONIS in his messages until January 1951 after the Swedes had asked him (in December 1950) for news of AUDRONIS. His reply was merely to the effect that AUDRONIS had been expelled from the DEKSNYS organization but no date was given for this expulsion.
3. The operation under which CEXSNXS was infiltrated was a Swedish one utilizing SIS facilities. Apart from AUDRONIS, DEKSNYS was accompanied by a W/T operator known as "UOSIS" who was to transmit to the Swedish Service. Included in the party were also one agent due to join a Latvian network and two others to operate in Estonia. DEKSNYS intended to organize a direct link with SIS and utilized for this purpose one of the W/T sets which he took in with him. This necessitated his recruiting locally a volunteer to operate the set, and the first message received from this channel

was in November 1950. No information was given to DEKSNYS regarding the identity of this W/T operator known, under the pseudonym of “ANTANAS”. ANTANAS began with slow and defective transmission which improved progressively, and he went on sending messages until the beginning of 1953.

4. SARAJUNAS was infiltrated into Lithuania in early October 1950 under CIA auspices. He was in communication with CIA by W/T between November 16, 1950, and December 8, 1950, and he and ALFONSAS, a team mate, sent a certain number of S/W letters between November 1, 1950, and January 14, 1951. By W/T on November 24, 1950, he sent a message consisting of the words “DEKSNYS in hands of MGB, AUDRONIS perished.” No amplification of these messages or indication as to the origin of the information was ever received. According to information received at a later date from JACK, SKRAJUNAS perished in an ambush in the autumn of 1951 when he had gone to meet VARAGAS. There is nothing to explain the lack of communication from SKRAJUNAS between January 1951 and the presumed date of his liquidation, his only relevant message being to the effect that his transformer was working defectively and that he would use his W/T facilities to a lesser degree because the MGB were conducting searches.
5. It was decided by SIS in the Spring of 1952 to infiltrate a W/T operator to join DEKSNYS. MIKE was recruited in the United Kingdom, trained and duly infiltrated in April 1952. He took with him a W/T set. The reception arrangements were in the hands of a Latvian network which later helped MIKE to reach Lithuania, where he eventually made contact with DEKSNYS in June 1952. MIKE sent a few messages by W/T until September 13, 1952, when his set appears to have broken down. He acknowledged signals until November 17, 1952 since when he has been silent. There is evidence however, that MIKE had received broadcasts up to December 1952, as certain of these broadcasts we acknowledged by DEKSNYS and replied to through ANTANAS.
6. DEKSNYS reported by S/W in September 1952 that he was setting up “DSOSIS” independently for continuing W/T contact with the Swedes at his own discretion. On 22–24 January “DUOSIS” sent messages which, while denouncing DEKSNYS as an imposter who was spending operational money for his own benefit, launched into a pro-Soviet tirade using the phraseology employed currently in Soviet propaganda. Since that date, no news whatever has been

received from DEKSNYS or from any persons connected with his organization.

Chapter 2

Comments

1. The joint examination of the case of DEKSNYS has been directed toward ascertaining
 - a) Whether he is at present eliminated or under control;
 - b) if he has in the past been under MGB control, and the date at which this control started
 - c) The implications of his conflict with AtJDRONIS and SKRAJUNAS.
2. As regards (a), both CIA and SIS are convinced that there are strong grounds for suspecting that DEKSNYS is, if he has survived, not a free agent at the present time. This conclusion is based primarily on the messages of January 22–24, 1953, from UOSIS referred to above which can be interpreted only as showing that UOSIS himself is under Russian control and suggesting that he must have revealed to the MGB enough about DEKSNYS to make the situation of the last named practically untenable. The subsequent silence of DEKSNYS, MIKE, and ANTMAS tends to confirm this conclusion.
3. Long before January 1953 the MGB must have been in a favorable position for discovering the whereabouts of DEKSNYS. There is evidence that they possessed the full description and photograph in 1949 when they interrogated PESSHJCKAS. Examination of the DEKSNYS traffic both to SIS and the Swedes does not permit a definite conclusion that his messages were sent under control, but a number of inconsistencies in his attitude leave a certain amount of suspicion attached to him. In order to convey an impression of the complexity of this problem, it was decided that the SIS delegate should draw up a list of points tending to show that DEKSNYS might have been in enemy hands sometime between his landing and January 1953, and the SIS delegate drew up a corresponding number of points tending to disprove this. The two lists were appended to the present report and it is now agreed that the problem remains an open one.
4. A certain amount of mystery surrounds the traffic from ANTANAS and MIKE. The slowness of the former's transmission exposed him to Russian D/Fing, and the theory that his gradual progress was engineered by the MGB should not be entirely excluded. If this theory is accepted, the appearance of MIKE, followed by his early elimination as a W/T operator, with ANTANAS continuing his transmissions on the old set, could

be considered as possible supporting evidence. Nevertheless, in order to carry out a plan of deception, it would appear that the MGB would have had every advantage from utilizing MIKE's superior transmission, under their control.

5. The question of how the MGB intended to take advantage of that possibility if they managed to get DEKSNYS under their control has also been carefully examined. The only possible advantage which can be seen clearly is that they may have endeavored to utilize him to maintain dissensions among Lithuanian resistance leaders and provoke further ones. In spite of the unfortunate attempts of DEKSNYS to discredit resistance workers, such as AUDRONIS and SKRAJUNAS, there is evidence that toward the end of 1952 he did endeavor to preach union between the different factions. DEKSNYS in his traffic could justifiably be accused of complicating the situation in regard to the unanimity of Lithuanian resistance but no very clear picture emerges of a consistent enemy plan of disruption. While the SIS delegate suggests that the Lithuanian emigre organizations require very little outside aid to fan the flames of their internecine conflicts, the CIA delegate makes the reservation that the Russians had every interest in controlling an infiltrated network not only to widen the breach between rival Lithuanian groups but to learn of future Western operational plans and possibly to provoke the disclosure of information regarding parallel networks in the field.
6. Careful examination has also been given to the suggestion by AUDRONIS and the accusation from SKRAJUNAS that DEKSNYS was in MGB hands in 1949 or 1950. The suggestion made by AUDRONIS in June 1949 is not a conclusive one, and unfortunately the short statements made later by SKRAJUNAS were not substantiated with any detailed evidence. Moreover, the SKRAJUNAS traffic broke off suddenly before it could be questioned *acres* closely on this subject by CIA. It is certain that DEKSNYS, AUDRONIS and SKRAJUNAS were engaged in a bitter conflict on the subject of political loyalties before the first two were infiltrated. Both CIA and SIS consider it regrettable that DEKSNYS should have denied the well-proven patriotism of AUDRONIS AND SKRAJUNAS. On the other hand, while it is possible that the accusation by SKRAJUNAS that DEKSNYS was in MGB hands may have been a counter-accusation due to political feeling, there is no available evidence to support this theory.
7. Appendix C which is attached gives a historical survey of the careers of both AUDRONIS and SKRAJUNAS as coordinated from SIS and CIA records.

APPENDIX A to CHAPTER 2

Point in Favor of DEKSNYS

1. The infiltration party in May 1949 consisted of six persons. All of these can be accounted for and contact is still being maintained, as far as we knew, between the Swedes and one Latvian and one Estonian to this day.
2. Before the infiltration of May 1949 there was an open quarrel between DEKSNYS and AUDRONIS//SKRAJUNAS on grounds of political loyalties. Each side was already making accusations against the other, and it does not seem unreasonable to balance the accusation relating to DEKSNYS being in MGB hands against that relating to alleged faulty resistance credentials held by AUDRONIS/SKRAJUNAS.
3. No details were given by either AUDRONIS or SKRAJUNAS to explain their bare statement that DEKSNYS was in MGB hands nor is there any clue as to how they acquired such knowledge.
4. Although links existed which might have led DEKSNYS to have knowledge of movements in the DRAMBLYS group (notably the safe house in Poland used by ARUNAS), there is no evidence whatever to show that the MGB did any harm to the DRAMBLYS group as a result of these links.
5. The recruitment by DEKSNYS of a local volunteer to operate W/T for SIS under his (DEKSNYS's) instructions gave poor results at first, which could hardly have served MGB plans, and the subsequent progressive improvement took place in a perfectly normal manner. On the other hand, the successful infiltration of a trained W/T operator (MIKE) in June 1952 could hardly have been taken proper advantage of, by the MGB, as MIKE'S transmissions broke down, apparently for technical reasons, in September 1952.
6. In a SIS telegram of March 27, 1952, to DEKSNYS, the name was mentioned of a little girl of whom he had been very fond during his stay in the West. DEKSNYS's reply mentioned the Christian name of the mother of this child and he signed his message with a boyhood nickname which was known only to one of his Lithuanian friends in the West.
7. The only suggested use that the MGB could have made of a control of DEKSNYS and his group was to pursue a policy of deception with a view to splitting Lithuanian resistance still farther and to fostering the dissensions created within the different sections of the resistance. Two S/W letters of December 1952, one from DEKSNYS and another from one of the leading members of the LOKYS group, preach unity among

the different resistance groups and do not fit in at all with the Russian policy referred to above.

8. The recent betrayal of the Partisans appears to be the work of VANAGAS, who was not connected with DEKSNYS. Incidentally, the complete black-out of the DEKSNYS organization dates approximately from the round-up of the Partisans. It is possible, therefore, that it was an all-out offensive on the part of the MGB which led to their uncovering DEKSNYS and that he was not in their hands before them.
9. The messages from UOSIS of 22–24 January 1953 were clearly Soviet-inspired. While they accused DEKSNYS of being an impostor, they did not convey any suggestion that he was controlled. We assume that UOSIS was in a position to put the MGB on the track of DEKSNYS, and it is notable that the last message received from the latter was dated January 22, 1953. It does not, therefore, seem unreasonable to place the arrest or liquidation of DEKSNYS at some time in January 1953

APPENDIX B to CHAPTER 2

Point Not in Favor of DEKSNYS

1. DEKSNYS's operation was compromised by a dropped team member, PESSECKAS, who defected to the Soviets in Stockholm in August 1949. PESSECKAS identified DEKSNYS's photograph to the Soviets.
2. Although DEKSNYS was to stay only a year, it is difficult to understand why he made no effort to exfiltrate by requesting exfiltration. Instead he has remained in the area since 1949 which may be considered a little strange for a man who had been most active in the past and who had gone in and out of the area three times previously.
3. SKRAJUNAS and DEKSNYS did have differences. SKRAJUNAS was not returning to carry on activities against DEKSNYS but was to reach agreement with DEKSNYS. It seems incredible that SKRAJUNAS should fabricate the message that DEKSNYS and BRISEDIS were in enemy hands and AUDRONIS was dead, simply to discredit DEKSNYS. While details would be valuable it should be pointed out that the SKRAJUNAS report was not accepted by SIS and that no independent effort seems to have been made to check on this report. Therefore, it is doubtful whether a report giving place and date of the assumed capture of DEKSNYS and BRIEDIS would have been more convincing.
4. Since DEKSNYS himself passed copies in 1948 of SKRAJUNAS' resistance documents (which incidentally gave DEKSNYS authorization to work in the resistance's behalf) the subsequent attempts of DEKSNYS

- to discredit SKRAJUNAS' credentials with the resistance could fit in with the MGB tactics for creating doubt and confusion as to the real status of a bona fide underground member like SKRAJUNAS.
5. DEKSYN's traffic is most unsatisfactory. Operational intelligence is lacking, whereas the intelligence which he procured from the area prior to his last infiltration was evaluated as good. This information consisted of such items as Soviet OB, etc.
 6. Resistance information is lacking. Although briefed to set up a passive resistance organization no information appears to be known about his friends or those comprising his organization, the VKLT V. Information is lacking on RAMUNAS, BALKONIS and BUKAS. It is felt that the identity of RAMUNAS after his assumed arrest in March 1951 should have been reported. There would be no security risk involved once the man had been arrested. Information exists that BUKAS in 1947 and 1948 was in hiding as the leader of the Zenaitija partisans but there appears to be no evidence that BUKAS is really a part of the DEKSNYS organization, apart from the fact that he was a signatory of a 7KLT V letter which was lost en route in 1950.
 7. Although it is presumed that DEKSNYS is in Kaunas, no information exists on his location or area of operation. Could DEKSNYS's organization be located if DEKSNYS were to die?
 8. NERIS, a Swedish Lithuanian infiltrate of 150 was to go to DEKSNYS. NERIS was reported killed on the shore but it is presumed that DEKSNYS received the help that NERIS was to bring to him. Since no independent information of this incident has been received, it is conceivable that NERIS was captured by the MGB.
 9. It is open to doubt whether a bona fide man would hesitate to reveal the identity or some background information about his local W/T operator. It is true that a name in itself is of little significance, but it seems logical to think that he would inform his controlling base of his operator's occupation or something other than "trustworthy".
 10. It is remarkable that DEKSNYS's old set has been of service to him from 1949 to 1952 (taking into consideration a possible resupply of crystals), and more amazing that Soviet D/Fing has not picked up the local W/T operator who has been slow at sending (20 letters, not groups, per minute), while MIKE was well trained and couldn't make contact because of "technical difficulties", and although heard, has noticeably disappeared. This date is prior to the mass arrests reported in December. What could be the safest, most logical way of explaining the non-communicative ability of an agent by the MGB than to say that the agent's radio is not working while leaving room for the receipt of messages from the West?

11. There is no explanation to account for MIKE's lack of S/W from June to January 1953, for it is assumed that MIKE had independent S/E. It would be natural for MIKE to wish to send a greeting if his radio set had broken down to indicate that he was all right.
12. Use of a local man would be a clever method of operation and an ideal situation for an MGB officer. Since DEKSNYS was required to report something to the Swedes via the UOSIS link, utilization of a slow operator would not require great intelligence demands.
13. It may well be that DEKSNYS sent S/W letters that urged unity. However, these letters were sent in late 1952. DEKSNYS in the Swedish traffic breeds disagreement among the political groups. Clever Soviet propaganda is known to unite and divide; it does not evenly divide.
14. With regard to mention of a name used by DEKSNYS when he was a boy, it appears quite natural that an MGB interrogator would attempt to procure all the names used by an individual during his life time. DEKSNYS might have given a lot of innocuous information when interrogated to fill in the gaps under pressure of interrogation. What would be more natural than for the Soviets to take a childhood name for authenticity? If the Soviets already had DEKSNYS's picture, one may assume that they know a great deal about his activities in Stockholm, including his habits, friends, etc.
15. Accusations against KUBLICKAS by DEKSNYS create suspicion KUBLICKAS had been assessed and proven as a bona fide individual. Here again may we suggest a pattern of confusion.
16. Soon after the KUBLICKAS messages, DEKSNYS in his message of January 10, 1953 requests material support and "considerable financial support" although MIKE brought him a sufficient amount of roubles in June 1952.

APPENDIX C to Chapter 2

AUDONIS comes from a family of Lithuanian government officials. He was one of the most distinguished underground fighters and has been decorated with the Underground's highest order Uz Drama (for bravery). He was wounded five times and participated in 22 major engagements with MVD troops. He is personally credited with killing some 60 MGB/MVD officials.

August 1944 – CIA:

Joined Lithuanian underground. Became Chief of an operational group in the Jezras-Darsunisski-Kruonis-Silavotas area.

November 1944 – CIA:

Adjutant to the Commander of a partisan detachment and served on staffs of two other detachments.

October 1947 – CIA:

Orders to proceed to the West as BDPS's special delegate.

December 1947 – CIA:

Crossed over into Poland with SKRAJUNAS and four others who were killed during the border crossing.

January 1948 – CIA:

Arrived with SKRAJUNAS in Warsaw and met in Gefynla tar DEKS-NYS. Taken to Sweden and handed over to the Swedish Intelligence Service.

May 1948 – SIS:

Made an unsuccessful Swedish sponsored attest to land in Estonia with others including UOSIS.

June 1948 – CIA:

Travelled with DEKSNYS and SKRAJUNAS to Germany for political training.

July 4, 1948 – SIS:

Received a letter from Lithuania saying his return would be welcome.

December 7 – SIS:

Reported to have made two unsuccessful attempts to leave Sweden for Germany. Out of favor with ZILINSKAS group.

May 1, 1949 – SIS:

Landed in Lithuania as Swedish agent with DEKSNYS, UOSIS, and others

September 1949 – CIA:

Letter on this date arrived in West to SKRAJUNAS from partisan leader stating AUDRONIS is with him and not in contact with DEKS-NYS or BRIEDIS. Added he is worried about the latter two.

October 1949 – CIA:

Letter by SKRAJUNAS to AUDRONIS requesting new mail drops inside the Iron Curtain.

February 7, 1950 CIA:

AUDRONIS reported through a mail drop he is alive and well.

March 1950 – CIA:

A letter to SKRAJUNAS from mail drop stating that AUDRONIS died April 15, 1950 – CIA:

Letter mailed by soil drop from Kaunas. Confirms AUDRONIS's death.

November 1, 1950 – CIA:

S/W letter this date from SKRAJUNAS group stating AUDRONIS has perished.

November 24, 1950 – CIA:

W/T message from SKAJUNAS group reporting AUDRONIS had perished.

January 5, 1951 – SIS:

Message from DEKSNYS to Swedes reporting that because of false bluffs and void promises “we have released **him** from his functions”

January 1947 – CIA:

Commander of a 300-man illegal underground group.

April 1947 – CIA:

Received order to go to Poland for purpose of establishing contact with Lithuanian organizations outside Iron Curtain.

May 1947 – CIA & SIS:

Met DEKSNYS in Gdynia.

July 1947 – CIA:

Returned to Kaunas, Lithuania, after an exchange of information with him.

August 1947 – CIA:

Chief intelligence officer for Kaunas district. Chosen to sit as seventh member of the BDPS Presidium, in DEKSNYS’s absence.

October 1947 – CIA:

Received orders to proceed to the West as BDPS’s special plenipotentiary.

December 1947 – CIA:

Crossed over into Poland with AUDRONIS and four others who were killed during the border crossing.

January 1948 – CIA & SIS

Arrived with AUDONIS in Warsaw then went to Gdynia where they were met by DEKSNYS. Boarded a ship for Trelleborg, Sweden, and handed over to the Swedish Intelligence Service.

June 1948 – CIA & SIS

Flew with DEKSNYS to Paris on way to VLIK meeting at Baden-Baden.

May 31, 1949 – CIA

Received a letter from AUDRONIS.

September 10, 1949 – CIA:

Letter to him from a partisan leader stating AUDRONIS was with him and not in contact with either DEKSNYS or BRIEDIS. The leader was concerned about them.

October, 1949 – CIA:

Wrote AUDRONIS requesting new mail drops.

December 1949 – SIS:

According to SIS information, he was informed about message AUDRONIS (who had been infiltrated into Lithuania with DEKSNYS on May 1, 1949) that DEKSNYS may have fallen in with provocateurs.

February 7, 1950 – CIA:

Mail drop in Lithuania reports that AUDRONIS is alive and well

March 1950 – CIA:

Received letter from contacts in Lithuania announcing AUDRONIS's death.

April 15, 1950 – CIA:

Letter from Kaunas confirming AUDONIS's death.

October 1950 – CIA:

Parachuted into Lithuania by CIA.

November 1, 1950 – CIA:

S/W letter received from his group this date stating that "DEKSNYS and BRIEDIS are in the hands of the MGB. AUBRONIS perished."

November 24, 1950 – CIA:

W/T message received this date from his group stating "DEKSNYS in hands of MGB. AUDRONIS perished."

December 8, 1950 – CIA:

Last W/T message.

January 10, 1951 – CIA:

Last S/W message.

February 1951 – CIA:

Reported by CIA agent JACK in June 1951 to be working in LLKS Headquarters this date.

August 14, 1951 – CIA:

Agent JACK reported by W/T that he was making every effort to get in touch with SKRAJUNAS,

October 13, 1952 – CIA:

Further message from JACK that SKRAJUNAS was killed "during the autumn of 1951"

November 26, 1952 – CIA:

W/T message from CIA agent JACK stating SKRAJUNAS was summoned for visit in September 1951 by LLKS leader, VANAGAS, on the way, ambushed by the MGB and killed.

Chapter 3.

DRAMBLYS GROUP

1. DRAMBLYS is the pseudonym of an apparently prominent Lithuanian living overtly who has not left Lithuania since the end of the war. Being a patriot and wishing to join in resistance work, *he* sent out a delegate

team as *ARONAS* on July 25, 1950, in order to endeavor to make contact with Lithuanian resistance leaders in the west. *ARONAS* managed to cross the Lithuanian–Polish frontier twice clandestinely and was exfiltrated from Poland on his second journey, finally *resetting* the United Kingdom. He reported on conditions in Lithuania and was re-infiltrated on December 19, 1950, with two W/T operators and sets with instructions to join *DRAMBLYS* and to assure communications *between* the latter and *SIS*. The W/T operators, Peter and Anton, had regular communications with *SIS*, and later another friend of *DRAMBLYS* known as *EDMONDUS* was exfiltrated from Lithuania by *SIS* in April 1952. He was re-infiltrated into Latvia on October 25, 1952, with a W/T operator known as *CONRAD*. After a successful landing in Latvia, he left the landing party on October 28, 1952, and made arrangements to collect *CONRAD* on December 15, 1952. *MAKSIS*, the head of the Latvian network, confirmed the departure of *EDMONDAS* and *CONRAD* on the two dates in question. *CONRAD* took in a W/T but did not enter into communication with *SIS* within several months of his arrival. A ciphered message dated November 26, 1952, written by *EDMUNDA* in S/W in his own code, was forwarded to *SIS* through the intermediary of *DRAMBLYS*. The letter explained that owing to important D/Fing activities, he had been obliged to hold up W/T communications from *CONRAD* until he could transfer him to a safer place. Shortly thereafter, *DRAMBLYS* reported farther that he had met *DRAMBLYS* who had delivered to him all the mail, money, etc. sent to him by *SIS*.

2. *PETER* was last on the air on January 16, 1953, when he reported that *ANTON* (who had not been heard of since July 1952) had fallen into MGB hands at a date presumed by *SIS* to be between November 26, 1952, and the date of *PETER*'s message, *PETER*'s message also reported the arrests in Kaunas of several members of the *DRAMBLYS* organization without giving names.
3. Since *PETER*'s last message and the complete subsequent silence of *DRAMBLYS*, three S/W letters have been received from *EDMUNDAS*. The first dated January 27, 1953, stated that *EDMUNDAS* had no news of *DRAMBLYS* and his assistant, *RUOINIS*. He added that it is possible that they have perished or fallen into enemy hands. He referred also to the liquidation of the *BDPS* organization in Kaunas, i.e., the *DRAMBLYS* group, and added that, according to rumors, members of several resistance groups not belonging to the said organization had been arrested including active resistance members. The second letter dated March 19, 1953, referred to *BRAMBLYS* and *RUOINIS* as having vanished and to news from a "contact man" that *DRAMBLYS* had certainly

been arrested. In each letter EDMUNDAS stated that he and CONRAD were in hiding and had buried their W/T equipment. He asked for advice and help and gave local safe addresses for communications. A third letter from EDMUNDAS dated May 10, 1953, confirmed his previous letters and announced that CONRAD would try to start contact from the beginning of June 1953. On June 9, 1953, a W/T message was received from EDMUNDAS via CONRAD stating that he had written three letters and asking if they had been received.

4. A letter dated 25 April 1953 has been received from PETER which did not reach SIS until June 15, 1953, owing to the departure of the post boat to a foreign country and the forwarding of PETER's letter to that post box abroad. PETER stated in his letter that he had lost contact with the DRAMBLYS organization since January 1953 and had heard nothing about it since. He had been informed by a DRAMBLYS courier in January 1953 that ANTON and several members of the organization had been arrested. After sending a W/T message to this effect, he had for security reasons broken contact completely with the DRAMBLYS organization and was then in hiding at a safehouse. He added that he was in a position to listen to broadcasts and asked for instructions.

Chapter 3

Comments

1. In examining the security of the DRAMBLYS organization from July 1950, when ARUNAS was exfiltrated, until January 1953 when EDMUNDAS wrote his first letter referring to the reported arrest of DRAMBLIS, it is necessary to consider known links between the DEKSNYS and the BRAMBLYS groups in order to envisage the possibility of the hostile control of the former having led to the uncovering of the latter. These links certainly existed, notably in the common knowledge of a safe-house in Poland utilized by ARUNAS, in the use of a dead letter box for depositing supplies from base received by one group for the other, and in various references in W/T traffic suggesting that each organization was aware of the parallel activities of the other. In view, however, of the impossibility of reaching a definite conclusion regarding the fate of the DEKSNYS organization prior to January 1953 that of the DRAMBLYS organization must remain equally problematic. There is no evidence to show that DRAMBLYS was not a genuine resistance leader with a certain number of followers, and nothing in his traffic points clearly to MGB control. The first certain evidence of the

breaking-up of the BRAMBLYS group came with the report of the arrest of ANTON, and although it is assessed that this took place between November 26, 1952, and January 16, 1953, it is possible that ANTON was captured at an earlier date without the knowledge of BRAMBLYS (i.e., some time after his last W/T message of July 30, 1952).

2. An important gap in W/T traffic from both DEKSNYS and BRAMBLYS occurred at about the same time, i.e.:

DEKSNYS, between October 5, 1952 and December 12, 1952
 DRAMBLYS, between October 24, 1952 and January 16, 1953

It may be recalled that MIKE was infiltrated to DEKSNYS in June 1952 and EDMUNDAS to BRAMBLYS in October–November 1952. While this gap in the traffic would not explain completely MGB tactics employed with the knowledge of MIKE's infiltration and of the impending arrival of EDMUNDAS, the dates are sufficiently significant to merit recording in case there should occur later a possibility of checking events in the field during the period in question.

3. The question of the present situation of BRAMBLYS cannot be solved without a definite conclusion as to that of EDMUNDAS. S/W communications from the latter show undeniable suspect features, such as a mistake in one security check and an enigmatic confusion of dates in one overt text. If EDMUNDAS wrote his three letters under control, his categorical statement that DRAMBLYS had fallen into MGB hands might indicate that DRAMBLYS had escaped and was in hiding; on the other hand, if EDMUNDAS is a free agent and reporting genuine information, DRAMBLYS must be considered as lost. The survival of PETER presents a somewhat similar problem.
4. It can serve little purpose at present to speculate on whether the destruction of the BRAMBLYS organization had any relation to the round-up of Partisans reported by JACK in January 1953. There were x links between RUGINIS of the DRAMBLYS organization and VANAGAS, accused by JACK of having betrayed the Partisans, but the beginning of the disintegration of the DRAMBLYS group seems to be situated at an earlier date, i.e., that of the arrest of ANTON.
5. To sum up, while there is no positive evidence to show that DRAMBLYS and his organization were in MGB hands before the latter part of 1953, it is reasonable to suggest that hostile penetration of some level had been successful before the arrest of ANTON. The only hope of learning the real facts of the case would be if PETER could be exfiltrated and interrogated professionally.

6. From the political point of view, it is to be regretted that DRAMBLYS adopted the appellation BDPS, for his organization, which has led to some confusion with a former organization bearing the same name. This does not suggest, however, that DRAMBLYS deliberately provoked such confusion or that his political action was dictated by the MGB.

CHAPTER 4.

SKRAJUNAS

1. 1.The early history of SKRAJUNAS is covered by the chapter on DEKSNYS. It is therefore proposed to deal with his short career from the time he was reinfiltrated under CIA auspices in October 1950 until the presumed date of his death in the Autumn 1951 as reported later by JACK. SKRAJUNAS was sent on a mission to report on resistance activities and eventually to set up an intelligence network. He intended to join the Resistance group which had sent him to the West, and he reported after arrival that he had made the desired contacts and was installed at LLKS headquarters and working with the organized active resistance. SKRAJUNAS was accompanied by two W/T operators known as JOHN and ALFONSAS. They took in two W/T sets. The container in which one of the sets was included was subsequently reported as lost. All three were equipped with S/W material. SKRAJUNAS sent only 11 W/T messages and it is supposed that he went off the air after December 8, 1950, on account of MOB activity and possibly as a result of a technical breakdown in his equipment. He and ALFONSAS continued sending S/W messages but the last one received was dated January 14, 1951. SKRAJUNAS pointed out that JOHN was not corresponding by S/W as he had forgotten his security check.
2. No other news was received of SKRAJUNAS until JACK was infiltrated in April 1951 and referred in his W/T traffic on June 26, 1951, to news that SKRAJUNAS was alive and working at LLKS Headquarters from the beginning of February 1951. JACK stated on August 14, 1951, that he was making every effort to get in touch with SKRAJUNAS. In various later messages JACK referred to SKRAJUNAS and his two operators but he finally reported on October 13, 1952, and November 26, 1952, that SKRAJUNAS had been killed in September 1951, while ALFONSAS perished in February 1951. He added that JOHN was alive and was with a partisan unit of which he was the leader.

3. it is agreed that there is a mysterious gap in the career of SKRAJUNAS between his last S/W message in January 1951 and the claim by JACK that he did not perish until the autumn of 1951. While the assumed death of ALFONSAS and the report that JOHN had forgotten his security check might account for the absence of S/W communications from these two, this would not account for the silence of SKRAJUNAS himself. This point will be discussed more fully in the examination of JACK's traffic in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 5.

JACK

1. In April 1951, CIA infiltrated a team of two men by parachute, HENRY and JACK, into Lithuania. They were briefed to report on military and political information as well as information on the resistance. Also they were to organize intelligence nets. HENRY was the leader of the team. Both men were trained in W/T and were equipped with two W/T sets and W/T material. The first message received from the team was on June 18, 1951, and informed CIA that they had arrived safely, had reached their contact point, and had only made contact with the partisans on May 8. Because of uncertain conditions, HENRY and JACK separated on May 19, 1951, at which time HENRY left to make contact with the Partisan Headquarters of the Tauras region from where he hoped to make contact with the LLKS Headquarters. JACK reported that contacts between the Tauras region and the LLKS had broken down in February 1951. He was remaining in place with a partisan detachment.
2. On June 26, 1951 JACK, who had set SKRAJUNAS in the West, reported that in February 1951 SKRAJUNAS was alive and working at LLKS Headquarters and that the fate of SKRAJUNAS's team mates, JOHN and ALFONSAS, was not known definitely. On August 14, he stated that he was making every effort to get in touch with SKRAJUNAS and had sent him a letter through contact men. On August 5, 1951, JACK informed CIA that a contact man arrived with word that HENRY had been killed and upon request for details reported in October 1951 that HENRY had been killed in a farmhouse which was surrounded by MGB forces while he was meeting with a partisan detachment leader.
3. JACK continued sending messages, answering queries put to him. While preparing a reception for a future team, he went off the air in November 1951. His last W/T contact was November 27, 1951 and JACK did not return on the air again until April 6, 1952. He reported that he could

not maintain contact because of a faulty generator which was still acting sporadically. The second generator and W/T apparatus could not be found in the place where JACK and his companion had buried it after landing. JACK asked whether CIA had received two letters which he sent in the early and latter parts of December 1951 and a third letter in the middle of March 1952. In fact, none of these letters were received. Subsequent messages reported that the MGB were carrying out heavy round-ups but that he was safe and had moved into a bunker of a partisan detachment chief with his radio. JACK was on the air regularly until December 1952.

4. When pressed to legalize himself, he stated he was investigating possibilities and that one of the legalized contacts had promised to provide various identification and secondary documents through acquaintances in Kaunas. He reported that a considerable amount of money was necessary for legalization and that some of his fellow partisans viewed the idea of legalization negatively, whereas others considered it to be abandoning the common cause.
5. On October 13, 1952, JACK stated that after a long time he had been successful in making contact with the leader of the Tauras region and had met him personally. During the meeting, he learned that SKRAJUNAS had been killed in the Autumn of 1951 and that ALFONSAS had been killed in February 1951. JOHN was alive and was leader of a partisan unit but contact had been lost with him. JACK hoped to contact JOHN through the efforts of DEMONAS, the leader of the LLKS partisans. DEMONAS had contact with the LLKS Headquarters and leaders of ether Tauras detachments but this was of slight effectiveness since enemy sweeps were very active in the area. The partisan leader with whom JACK was staying was brought into the full scope of JACK's activities, and JACK was teaching him W/T at CIA's direction.
6. When pressed for more information on SKRAJUNAS' death, JACK reported that on the basis of DEMONAS' information, SERAJONAS was killed in September 1951 when he set out to meet the leaders of the LLKS. VANAGAS. It appears that he was ambushed by the enemy patrols but that two of his companions managed to escape. JACK reported further that ALFONSAS and the other fighters were found dead in a bunker and that DEMONAS was of the opinion that they had been murdered by local inhabitants because it is unusual for the militia to leave behind bodies of resistance men.
7. The next news received from JACK was in the form of a letter reporting that the leader of the LLKS Armed Forces had called out the Tauras partisans for a parley and had appeared himself at the head of a military unit.

A battle ensued in which JACK and a friend named AZUOLAS were rounded. Besides these two, the above-mentioned partisan leader with whom JACK had been staying, and a few others, managed to escape.

8. Two further letters from the partisan leader in question, both dated January 13, 1953 gave particulars of the treason of the LLKS Presidium members, VANAGAS, ZEMMATIS, LITAS, and MIRAINIS, who had been under enemy control for some time. The writer added that a certain number of Tauras partisans managed to break through the encirclement but that many of the survivors were either finished off or betrayed by the local inhabitants. The second letter from the partisan leader reported that AZUOLAS died from injuries, and of the entire detachment, he and JACK were the only survivors. JACK's wound was festering, and the letter contained an urgent request for penicillin and money to buy food since it was dangerous to apply to the local farmers.

CHAPTER 5

Comments

1. On examination of JACK'S career since infiltration, both the SIS and CIA delegates have expressed the opinion that from examination of JACK's W/T and S/W traffic there is no clear evidence that would indicate that JACK has not been hitherto a free agent. It has been pointed out that one of the security checks given him for his W/T traffic has been answered correctly and those of his S/W letters have contained the correct security checks. However, at the same time, the CIA delegate has signaled the following points which may tend cumulatively to indicate a possibility of JACK'S having been under control. These points are as follows;
 - a) JACK was landed in April 1951 but did not make contact with the base until June 15, 1951.
 - b) JACK, in a message sent on September 10, 1951, asked for one or two reinforcements to aid him in propaganda activities although he had been opposed before infiltration to carrying out such activity in Lithuania for security reasons. He suggested in this message a man whom he indicated by a pseudonym which turned out upon investigation to be possibly that of JACK himself. However, there is room for speculation, in this matter, for if JACK really wanted to draw the base's attention to this individual, the use of his own pseudonym known only to the latter may have been his only means of pinpointing the said individual.

- c) In November 1951 and in April 1952, CIA sent two W/T messages to JACK containing a security check. On each occasion, JACK, somewhat contrary to his habit, asked for a repeat of the message, and he did not later answer the check. However, there is some doubt as to whether the check was contained in the repeating messages.
 - d) One of the LLKS Presidium members mentioned in the S/W letter of January 13, 1953, namely ZEMAITIS, has a record with CIA which indicates that it would be unlikely that ZEMAITIS would take part in the betrayal of the Partisans.
 - e) The statement in the same letter of January 13, 1953 to the effect that Partisans were “finished off” or betrayed to the enemy by local inhabitants is not considered consistent with information received previously on the attitude of the Lithuanian rural population, and the statement by JACK in his W/T message of December 9, 1952 that local inhabitants may have killed ALFONSAS and two other partisans in their bunker might be viewed with similar skepticism.
2. These points have been discussed between the SIS and CIA delegates. While the SIS delegate does not wish to rule out the possibility that JACK is, at least at present, under control, he does not consider that those points constitute a sufficient mass of evidence to place JACK under very grave suspicion. Notably, as regards Point B, he does not take it to be out of the question that Lithuanian peasants sympathetic to the Soviets would refrain from aiding the latter against Partisans who had possibly made armed attacks against farms. The CIA delegate agrees with this reasoning on point e, and there is general agreement that JACK’s present situation cannot be cleared up on available evidence. The considerable mystery surrounding the security aspect of the Partisan organization could be dispelled only if it became possible to exfiltrate JACK and to submit him to a comprehensive examination.

Conclusions and Recommendations

1. The security of each of the networks examined has been discussed under their respective chapters, and it is agreed that the three which were apparently active at the end of 1952 became seriously compromised and at least completely disorganized by January 1953. Whether this state of affairs resulted entirely from the large-scale round-up of the Partisans by the MGB as reported by JACK and EDMUNDAS or was brought about partly through other means remains an unsolved problem, but it is plausible that a general co-ordinated MGB offensive against all resistance networks in Lithuania took place in December 1952–January 1953 with

the object of smashing those networks effectively, thus cutting off all communication between them and their Western controllers. That there should have been a few dispersed survivors was only to be expected, and three of these have already sent messages:

- (a) EDMUNDAS/KONRAD, of the DRAMBLYS organization! by three S/W letters and a W/T message;
- (b) PETER, of the DRAMBLYS organization, by one S/W letter;
- (c) JACK, the CIA agent with the Partisans, by three S/W letters

These messages must be considered as a possible MGB operation to leave correspondence channels open with a view to learning whether the Western Services have any further plans for re-establishing networks in Lithuania, and although the evidence in support of this theory cannot be regarded as conclusive, a period of observation during which only strictly noncommittal communications to the field is recommended. It would also be helpful for the clarification of the future situation in Lithuania if SIS and CIA continued to exchange information on all developments regarding these putative survivors.

2. The intrusion of political controversy among emigre groups into these field operations is greatly to be deplored, as it has tended to obscure the issue in the course of this joint enquiry into the security situation. Both CA and SIS delegates have endeavored to remain completely objective as to the merits of the different groups and individuals involved in these controversies, but it is recommended that in future the two services should combine to keep all operational details completely secret from emigre organizations. Although no evidence in the past of leakage of such details to the enemy has ever been established, any leakage to persons outside of the two services must be considered as potentially dangerous. It is realized that agents for infiltration and exfiltration can be recruited on ideological grounds only and may naturally resent being cut off from their political friends during periods of training or when awaiting the launching of their operations. It is felt, however, that an attempt to persuade both agents and emigre organizations that security measures are aimed at preserving the personal safety of the former and the eventual progress of the latter is well worth attempting as a systematic program.

June 25, 1953

Appendix 9

CIA Report on Penkovsky's Legacy, 1971

Why do we in the Directorate of Intelligence continue to research the documentary material Colonel Penkovsky photographed in the early 1960s with his Minox cameras?

For one thing, we have concluded that most Soviet military practices and strategic theories are slow to change. We have, therefore, found it useful to identify as many of these practices and concepts as possible, because this helps us in analyzing genuinely new Soviet strategic doctrines, and in evaluating how the Soviets are reacting or might react to particular political and military events.

Second, the development of some key weapons systems requires long lead-times. For many weapons in the Soviet Navy, as an example, the average is about ten years. Furthermore, additional time is required to work out the operational concepts for the use of some new weaponry. As a result, the discussions of some new systems in IRONBARK—the code name for the bulk of Colonel Penkovsky's photographs—retained usefulness for strategic researchers through the late 1960s and early 1970s. A large number of hardware developments observed in the last several years of the last decade can be traced to discussions in the IRONBARK documents.

A third reason for repeated immersion in the thousands of pages of IRONBARK, even though much of it is now ten years old, is realistic training for intelligence analysts. A survey conducted by the Office of National Estimates in 1970 concluded that several offices in the Central Intelligence Agency continue to value the collection, particularly as an aid in the training of new researchers. The ONE poll concluded that there is no better source from which to gain a basic insight into the way the Soviets think about military philosophy and doctrine.

So, for all these reasons, it is rather evident *why* we still value the Penkovsky material as a solid reference aid. *How* we use it is a more complex question to answer. I will address that question by examining five general research areas in which the IRONBARK proved to be a coup of the first magnitude. These five main areas, in which it is still quite useful as a checkpoint, are: first and foremost, *military doctrine*—in particular, the IRONBARK is critical

background for our current research on Soviet perceptions of the nature of an East-West war in Europe; second, *military organization*—a research area which particularly involves the subjects of combat readiness, reinforcement, and mobilization in the Soviet Ground Forces; third, *hardware*—our research on this currently centers on the characteristics of antiballistic missiles (ABMs) and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and anti-submarine and anti-carrier weapons, the need for which were outlined or hinted at in the IRONBARK; fourth, the Penkovsky material is useful for research on *bureaucratic behavior*, an analytical field which involves a combination of our research on doctrine, organization, and hardware; fifth and last, the IRONBARK remains useful in researching the rather exotic field of Soviet procedures for maintaining control of their nuclear weapons. In the popular literature, this is called “fail-safe,” but it really ought to be called “*positive control*,” and toward the end of the chapter, I will examine the question of who pushes the button.

ONE: DOCTRINE

Several months ago, a document on Soviet offensive operations in the European theater came across my desk. I was, at that time, responding to a request from the Pentagon to prepare a memorandum on the significance of one of the earliest IRONBARK documents, which also examined Soviet offensive operations in the European theater. The two documents on my desk were not only dated a decade apart, but they advocated sharply different approaches on the proper manner to wage a European war. Thus, my analytical task became an effort to assess which one more closely reflected current accepted Soviet military thinking on this important matter.

And here is a good example, I think, of the current value of understanding the totality of the Penkovsky reports. By studying *all* the documents in the IRONBARK series, we and our counterparts in British Intelligence were able, in the early and mid-1960s, to identify a number of *patterns* and signs of evolution in the doctrinal discussions. The identified patterns, in turn, have helped us to evaluate the reports that we have received *singly* from other sources since Penkovsky was apprehended in 1962.

Some of the IRONBARK material which Penkovsky passed to us in 1961 and 1962 revealed a sharp military debate concerning Soviet military concepts and organization needed for nuclear warfare. There was general agreement in the writings that the existing doctrine and organization were obsolete and inadequate for the era of modern nuclear weapons. But there was wide disagreement on what changes were necessary and how best to accomplish them. The central issue in the IRONBARK debate in the early 1960s was the

force structure question of whether nuclear weapons should support massive conventional combat operations in Europe or replace them.

The IRONBARK document that the Pentagon wanted our comments on called for forces which could practically vaporize NATO countries—their national command centers, economic and strategic targets, and armed forces—by nuclear strikes carried out by the Strategic Rocket Forces. This strategy gave the Soviet Ground Forces the subordinate task of marching through the rubble. No “battle” was to take place, and there was little indication that a systematic conquest of NATO Europe was conceived, not any attempt to exploit its resources in the interests of the Soviet Union. (The cold calculation, presumably, was that ashes were not really worth occupying.) This theory, which we dubbed the “more rubble for the ruble” strategy of former party leader Khrushchev, was endorsed by only two other military writers in the IRONBARK collection.

The Khrushchevian conclusion that nuclear weapons would replace massive conventional combat operations in Europe promptly provoked a sharp reaction from a wide variety of senior professional Soviet officers. These officers proceeded to lay out the main themes of their more orthodox, traditionalist line in subsequent issues of the IRONBARK material. The more orthodox writers argued that the indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons in the European Theater was wrong (one general rebutted that such saturation strikes do not “conform with Marxist dialectics”³), that nuclear-missile weapons should be used only within the limits of expediency and that the selection of enemy objectives to be destroyed in the tactical and operational zones is the prerogative of the troops of the Front, *not* the Strategic Rocket Forces.

In the view of the orthodox camp, sufficient reason remained to draw up conventional plans to blitz to the Rhine and beyond. These plans were based firmly on the traditional judgment that a land battle would be fought in Europe which would require adequate ground and air forces. One traditionalist writer argued that “the *dominant* role in an operational-tactical plan will quite often belong to the Ground Forces.”

The weight of this orthodox counter-barrage was so heavy that the very radical, Khrushchev-like views practically disappeared from the IRONBARK debate. As a result, Khrushchev initially failed to sustain an imaginative airing of military arguments in favor of his defensive policy in the published material supplied by Penkovsky.

At this point, the singular nature of some of the IRONBARK, particularly the *Special Collection of Articles of the Journal Military Thought*, merits some explanation. The Soviets classified the documents top secret, but, most significantly, they were in fact unofficial. The unusual nature of the *Special Collection* arose from the fact that it was established, in early 1960, as an

ad hoc forum for the airing of frank, controversial, and far-ranging views of senior military officers. According to an editorial note, the articles expressed only the opinions of the authors.

The articles selected for publication in the *Special Collection* were evidently regarded as too sensitive for publication in the secret *Collections of Military Thought* articles or in the more widely circulated monthly *Military Thought*. The circulation of the *Special Collection* was limited to army commanders and higher. The contributing writers, for the most part, were drawn from the same small circle of military elites. Numbered among the contributors were the Minister of Defense, the deputy ministers of defense, military district commanders, senior staff officers, chiefs and officials of military directorates, and military academy heads and theorists.

Since the *Special Collection* constituted a forum principally for the exchange of unofficial or individually held viewpoints, the materials contained numerous recommendations for the planning and conduct of strategic and front operations in a future general war. And the articles varied in quality. Some were distinguished for the care and thoroughness exercised in their preparation. Other articles were disjointed, naive, incomplete, extreme.

The very extreme nature of the views put forward in the IRONBARK document on my desk (the one the Defense Department had requested more information on) was probably part of the reason for the failure of Khrushchev's attempt to gain many adherents for the foundations underlying the logic in his military philosophy. His premises were that, first, any direct confrontation in Europe over vital interests would quickly escalate into an all-out nuclear exchange that, second, would leave little room for a land battle and, therefore (to repeat), little need for a massive, multimillion man conventional force.

The fireball philosophy of Khrushchev—and this appears to be the salient point—involved much more than military strategy. It was closely tied to his long-term program for domestic economic development. His program required increased resources for domestic investment and consumer goods, which he hoped to obtain in large measure through economies in the military. At the expense of conventional capabilities, he advocated a military policy based on a minimal nuclear deterrent. His strategic policy was in part dependent on deceptive statements and Soviet secrecy, in the sense that it rested at that time largely on the U.S. intelligence community's inflated assessment of the numbers of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

In brief, Khrushchev's considerations on the nature of a future war were simple and cheap. The bulk of the professional Soviet military's arguments in the *Special Collection*, by comparison, was costly and complex.

The outcome of the debate exposed in the IRONBARK was greatly influenced by two developments: the introduction of U.S. satellite photography, which subsequently exposed Khrushchev's missile gap deception, and the failure of Khrushchev's last "cheap" attempt to employ the strategic threat for policy gain by trying to position medium range missiles in Cuba in 1962. The post-Khrushchev leaders apparently concluded that past deficiencies in strategic power were in part responsible for foreign policy fumbles, and that a policy of minimal deterrence was too risky for the Soviet Union. In other words, the new leadership decided to purchase the security—in both the strategic and conventional forces—that Khrushchev tried to finesse.

In this sober vein, the theoretical pitch of that new document (the one which I was contrasting with the 10-year-old IRONBARK article) reflected the orthodox consideration that in order to strengthen and make the Soviet deterrent more effective, the Soviet Union must make serious and costly efforts to prepare for all kinds of threats. This view was central to other post-Khrushchev classified articles which discussed offensive operations in the general vein of the more traditional advocates in the 1960–62 IRONBARK *Special Collection* series.

TWO: ORGANIZATION

The knowledge of the doctrinal debate in the IRONBARK turned out to be doubly important, because the various articles on the subject also provided considerable new insight into the key subjects of combat readiness and mobilization.

The IRONBARK evidence on combat readiness indicated that in peacetime Soviet authorities viewed most of their divisions as generally falling into three classes, based on level of strength and availability for use. The first class consisted of units "in a full state of combat readiness" and available for immediate use. The second class of units were frequently termed "of increased combat readiness" requiring a "short mobilization period" and capable of being moved to the theater of operations "within hours" or up to "several days." The strength and availability of the third class were the least clearly defined in the documents. The third class units were described as either "at reduced strength" or "in cadre status," and their availability was expressed in days or (sometimes) weeks.

Evidence over the last 10 years, supports this three-way breakdown. The only refinement some of us would make would be the addition of a fourth class of division, one in skeleton form.

Most of the IRONBARK writers who wrote on combat readiness were in agreement that at least three classes of divisions were expected to participate in the hypothetical campaign to seize Western Europe. And most Soviet authorities in the early 1960s considered that the campaign would be finished in about two to three weeks. In the schemes of the General Staffers, the campaign was to end with the arrival of Soviet forces at the English Channel within 10–20 days. On the timetable issue, we have evidence that the Soviets' current planning for the blitzkrieg campaign against Western Europe is essentially as ambitious as it was at the time the IRONBARK documents were published, including both timing and composition of the Warsaw Pact forces to be involved.

The capability to accomplish such a dazzling deployment depends in large part on the effectiveness of the mobilization system. In this connection, information on the Soviet system and its capabilities generally echoes assertions in a 1961 IRONBARK article which maintained that large units from the western part of the Soviet Union could complete their mobilization and reinforcement in about 10–12 days. For example, in the case of their performance during the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis, when the Soviets could set the pace themselves, a partial mobilization and reinforcement was accomplished in about two-and-a-half weeks.

THREE: HARDWARE

A third research area where the IRONBARK remained valuable for many years was in the identification and analysis of some of the characteristics of several new weapon systems. At the outset, however, it may be helpful to highlight the critical information provided by Penkovsky on the fairly old medium-range and short-range ballistic missiles. This information helped us to evaluate readiness conditions. For example, it enabled us to inform the intelligence community that at least part of the medium range (MRBM) force was in an increased state of readiness during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, when other sources indicated that crews working on the SS-4 were performing certain critical work revealed in the Penkovsky material.

Significantly, other intelligence sources helped us determine at an early stage of the Soviet buildup of forces along Czech borders that this deployment of forces was *not* directed against NATO. In other words, the increased state of readiness of some of the Soviet MRBM force was a precautionary move—part of a contingency plan against the rather remote contingency that the invasion of Czechoslovakia would spark a general European war.

How has the IRONBARK helped us in our research on new strategic defensive weapon systems—ABMs and SAMs?

Two articles published in the IRONBARK series in early 1962 reflected Soviet consideration of low altitude intercept of ballistic missile re-entry vehicles. Both articles rejected the concept of using atmospheric sorting as a means of identifying the re-entry vehicle prior to its engagement and destruction. The engagement phase of the Soviet ABM system should take place in outer space, not in the atmosphere.

The two articles in the IRONBARK recognized the need for sorting, but one discarded the atmospheric approach on the basis of the limited reaction time available after target identification (and in fact it *is* literally counted in seconds). The other IRONBARK article, warned of the risks to ground targets if ICBMs and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) were allowed to penetrate to altitudes below 40–50 kilometers before attempting intercepts. When the first-generation Soviet ABM system was deployed around Moscow, technical analysis of the system by CIA's Science and Technology Directorate was consistent with the IRONBARK exoatmospheric conclusion. Subsequent U.S. progress with endoatmospheric interception (with the Sprint missile) alerted us to look for any possible evidence that the Soviets were reconsidering their earlier rejection of atmospheric intercepts.

Another 1962 IRONBARK article cited the chief of Soviet strategic air defense (*PVO Strany*) on the need for a long-range surface-to-air missile system. Such a system would permit a change in the Soviet organization of air (*not* missile) defense from defense of *points* to defense of *zones*. This, of course, alerted us to look for the development of a long-range SAM. When one appeared with characteristics which seemed to fulfill the zonal requirement, the IRONBARK statement formed part of the evidence used in assessing the role of this new SAM system.

Several articles discussed the problems of air defense for the ground forces. These stressed a need for highly maneuverable weapons which existing Soviet strategic SAM systems (SA-1, SA-2, SA-3) could not provide. This alerted us to watch for development of mobile SAMs, which we first saw in 1964. The IRONBARK articles also indicated that the Soviets probably would not deploy large numbers of their SA-2 and SA-3 systems with tactical forces, and they have not.

Another important field of weapons development discussed in the IRONBARK dealt with the Soviet Navy. However, IRONBARK was not clear regarding the role of Soviet ballistic missile submarines. Apparently, the small force then in existence was targeted against naval bases and ports and not on cities or military targets farther inland. The best deduction is that the role and future of the ballistic missile submarine were under debate in

1960–62, but at the highest level and was too sensitive a topic to be within IRONBARK material.

With the exception of this gap in the IRONBARK, the material helped us to understand at least two important missions of the Soviet Navy—the anti-carrier mission and the anti-Polaris mission.

The IRONBARK admirals saw the U.S. attack carrier as the greatest strategic threat at that time. New anti-carrier equipment was entering the Soviet fleets but major problems of its strategic and tactical employment remained to be solved. And the cruise missile, delivered by aircraft and submarines, clearly emerged in the Penkovsky papers as the primary anti-carrier weapon. This knowledge helped U.S. intelligence discern the purpose of the SS-N-3 and other missiles, a navy bomber, and two classes of cruise missile submarines. All of these weapons were exercised in the annual Norwegian Sea exercises during the 1960s. These exercises have continued into this decade and have followed the strategic and tactical lines set out in one of the *Military Thought* articles.

This article and other IRONBARK papers were our principal guide for interpreting these important exercises and establishing the estimate of the SS-N-3 missile as, primarily, an anti-ship weapon—not a weapon intended for strategic attacks on bases and other targets ashore.

The IRONBARK admirals, exhorted to look ahead, foresaw that the Polaris submarine would replace U.S. attack carriers well before 1971 as the primary strategic threat from the sea. One admiral revealed that the Soviet Navy was assigned its anti-Polaris mission in 1957 and another outlined a rather comprehensive anti-Polaris program. In retrospect, it is clear that many essentials of the plans in the IRONBARK were accepted. Due to the long lead-time required for development of many anti-submarine warfare (ASW) systems, some of these just recently showed up in operational versions. This is a case in which the hardware value of IRONBARK is particularly relevant to today's strategic researchers.

The IRONBARK admirals, however, were divided on the proper direction for the submarine mission. One admiral advocated multipurpose submarines for anti-ship as well as anti-Polaris mission, while another argued for several classes of specialized submarines with designs optimized for specific tasks. Consequently IRONBARK, while suggestive, is not a definitive aid in sorting out several new classes of attack submarines now under construction. There was general agreement, however, in the Penkovsky papers on the value of nuclear propulsion for submarines and for the priority development of better sonar and torpedos.

The total impression given by IRONBARK was that, while anti-Polaris killer submarines held the greatest promise, aircraft and surface ships had

crucial stalking roles to play. For example, one paragraph in a *Special Collection* essay assisted in our early (1967) assessment of the *Moskva* helicopter cruiser as an anti-submarine warfare ship. Other admirals advocated ASW cruisers and destroyers with strong air defense armament to protect them while hunting Polaris far at sea. We believe this concept is behind the appearance of surface-to-air missiles on the *Moskva* and on five other classes of ships whose NATO designations all begin with “K”: the *Kresta*, *Kashin*, *Kanin*, *Kotlin*, and *Krivak* classes. The joint SAM–ASW concept may also be behind additional new classes of major combatants under construction.

In the main, the ASW aircraft force, with its improved detection and weapons systems, developed along the lines laid out in IRONBARK. In fact, the increasing emphasis to the ASW mission in naval aviation, like the use of the helicopters on the deck of the *Moskva* helicopter cruiser, was foreshadowed in the *Military Thought* articles.

FOUR: BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR

Another current research area in which we still use the IRONBARK involves a combination of the three subjects just discussed—doctrine, organization, and hardware.

We call this research on bureaucratic behavior, and the Penkovsky material is extra rich because several critical features relating to doctrine, organization, and hardware were all in sharp focus by 1960. In addition, a number of important decisions were begging for resolution, such as the proper role of armor in a nuclear war.

Thirteen articles appearing in the IRONBARK’s *Special Collection* constituted the main vehicle for an intramilitary assessment of the armor question. The authors of these articles ranged from technical specialists who detailed fine points of tank design and troop organization, through senior branch-level officers who dealt with more comprehensive concepts, up to the Minister of Defense, who summarized the course and content of the professional military’s discussions. The Minister of Defense (Marshal Malinovsky at that time) also indicated the main directions he thought worth pursuing in the armor field.

For a strategic intelligence researcher, these articles—which span practically the whole period embraced by the Penkovsky material—are engrossing, because their contents testify to a vigorous exchange of views and an examination of alternative choices.

One choice that the Soviets made resulted in the machine which they call the Infantry Combat Vehicle, or ICV. The guidelines for the ICV were set

out in considerable detail in one of the articles on the tank debate.²² This advanced weapon was first seen in the Moscow parade in November 1967, and when analysts in the Intelligence Directorate began to study its characteristics, they were already on first base, thanks to the 1961 guidelines in this one IRONBARK article. The guidelines called for an amphibious, lightweight, low silhouette vehicle mounting a turreted cannon and an antitank guided missile. The guidelines added that the vehicle was to carry a squad of men and provide hatches at the rear of the vehicle for safe entry and exit under fire. The Infantry Combat Vehicle meets all these requirements.

Interestingly, from a bureaucratic point of view, one choice that the Soviets apparently did *not* make was a super-sophisticated tank described in the IRONBARK by the top man in the Soviet military, Defense Minister Malinovsky.

The *Special Collection* materials on the role of armor, supplemented by Soviet open press writings and by our own esoteric communication analysis, enable the researcher to reconstruct, practically blow-by-blow, the institutional, bureaucratic realities in which some major Soviet decisions were actually made.

Another subject in which research on bureaucratic behavior is currently making use of the Penkovsky papers concerns the organization of the Strategic Rocket Forces. The SRF was established only a few months before Colonel Penkovsky made his first contact with us. And the key fact about the SRF in the 1960 to 1961 period was that it was still in the process of formation: jurisdictional responsibilities were being defined and redefined, relationships with the General Staff were being determined, personnel acquired, and major directorates being transferred to the SRF.

On the subject of the SRF's organization, the researcher can set aside the IRONBARK volumes and make use of the colorful CHICKADEE series. CHICKADEE is the codename for the tape recordings Penkovsky made and the reports he himself wrote.

One of the particularly interesting series of CHICKADEE reports concerned a dispute between two important rocketry officials in the Soviet military, Marshals Varentsov and Moskalenko. Penkovsky reported that beginning in early 1961 there were rumors at responsible levels of the Soviet General Staff that the strategic missile command under Moskalenko (then Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces) would be combined under a new command headed by Varentsov, a close associate of Penkovsky. Varentsov, then responsible for tactical missiles, had openly referred to his rival, Moskalenko, as a "stupid old sheep." Agitation for the incorporation of Moskalenko's strategic missiles under Varentsov's command apparently existed throughout 1961, but by January 1962, Penkovsky reported that the

final decision on this matter had been taken in Moskalenko's favor. But in the Intelligence Directorate, the reasons behind Moskalenko's success and Var-entsov's disappointment in early 1962 remain another mystery of Moscow's byzantine-style politics.

Politburo-level politics and policies, and particularly those dealing with research on the highest level military decision-making bodies in the Soviet Union, constitute another research target in which the Penkovsky material retains value. Here the CHICKADEE series provides useful background on the rough-and-tumble way Khrushchev ran his Higher Military Council—the rough equivalent of our National Security Council. These reports also provide a useful contrast with the comparatively phlegmatic management style of the current party *boss*, Brezhnev. Penkovsky's tape recording sessions also provided another chapter on the energetic style of the present Defense Minister, Grechko.

In short, the IRONBARK and CHICKADEE material have been invaluable in our research on bureaucratic behavior. This material, in part, helped us modify the simplistic Cold War notion of the Soviet Union as a monolithic system directed by a unified central power.

FIVE: POSITIVE CONTROL

A fifth current research area concerns the sensitive subject of Soviet procedures for maintaining control over their strategic nuclear weaponry.

Here it is important to emphasize that the IRONBARK and CHICKADEE provided a wealth of essential information, previously unknown and unavailable to us through other collection efforts, concerning Soviet strategic missiles. Through another IRONBARK series—the Top Secret *Information Bulletin of the Missile Troops*—we saw for the first time how the Soviet strategic missile units were organized and structured, what the functions of the various staffs in each unit were, how these units were linked through the chain of command to the military high command in Moscow, and what the activities of missile units were at the different levels of combat readiness. Through the CHICKADEE series, we received for the first time detailed technical data on the missiles themselves, on the yields of their warheads, on the method by which the missiles were oriented toward their targets, and on the types of priority targets to be attacked by strategic missiles, that is, military targets, industrial and administrative centers, and the like.

But regarding all this data, there are analysts in the intelligence Directorate who now maintain that the Penkovsky material and ancient history are

beginning to have much in common. Indeed, the IRONBARK is aging, particularly in light of the stunning changes in the makeup of the Soviet strategic missile force since the last of the Penkovsky papers were acquired in 1962. For example, the force of Penkovsky's time was composed almost entirely of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. The Soviets in the past few years have begun to deactivate these missiles. Only a handful of intercontinental missiles were available when the IRONBARK documents were written, and these were located at vulnerable soft sites (i.e., above ground level). Since then, well over 1,000 ICBMs have been deployed, principally in single, dispersed, hardened silos. Advanced systems for command and control of the force have, according to Soviet sources, been put into use in the same period to centralize control of all strategic weapons. In addition, multiple warheads are now being introduced into the force, and production of Polaris-type submarines has been underway for more than five years.

Nevertheless, some of the information in the Penkovsky material continues to be pertinent to intelligence research being undertaken today in the Office of Strategic Research. And a prime example is in the area of research on Soviet measures for control of strategic offensive weapons.

This research examines measures the Soviets have taken to achieve what is called "positive control"—preventing accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons while maintaining a capability for quick, measured nuclear strikes. It also examines questions about Soviet awareness of the need for such control and the evolution and present status of the Soviet national command mechanism; who in the Soviet hierarchy gives the order to launch a nuclear attack? How is an order communicated to the launch sites? This research draws upon open Soviet sources. A wide variety of technical collection systems are also used. But the contribution from the Penkovsky material remains conspicuous and significant.

Unexpectedly, it is not always what the Penkovsky documents *say* that is important for our detective work in this research area but what they *do not* say.

Until quite recently, there was evidently a prohibition against discussing in the Soviet open press the dangers of unauthorized or accidental use of *Soviet* nuclear weapons. Significantly, the Penkovsky papers did not discuss this issue, which indicated that the blackout extended even to classified military publications. The chief reasons for the blackout might have been Soviet super-sensitivity toward the subject—that is, security concerns may have outweighed other important considerations, including that of keeping foreign governments informed about the adequacy of Soviet precautions. The IRONBARK editors may also have believed that the more one can learn about Soviet safety precautions, the more one can infer about Soviet preparedness

and capabilities—and in the early 1960s, unlike the early 1970s, the Soviets had little of either preparedness or capabilities in the strategic-missile field.

It is also possible to reinterpret and gain new clues from the Penkovsky material on the basis of what we have subsequently learned about the Soviet command network from other sources. In this connection, some of the IRON-BARK documents addressed the need to make greater use of computers and automation in the command and control process as well as in the actual firing of missiles. Although these particular documents did not describe the computer and automation systems needed to do the job, they did reveal the types of command and control problems the Soviets were experiencing in 1960, 1961, and 1962, and the types of proposals they were considering to correct these problems.

The documents indicated that the Soviets would seek, through improvements in communications technology, automation, and data processing, to reduce the reaction time of their strategic forces and increase the versatility and reliability of their strategic command and controls systems. Knowing these were the Soviet goals, we are placed in a better position to evaluate the present state of the Soviet strategic command and control network.

THE UTILITY OF THE PENKOVSKY REPORTS IN THE 1970S

Several intelligence researchers maintain that the evolution of Soviet strategic forces, combined with the inflow of technical and documentary evidence during the last few years, has converted the Penkovsky papers into “just historical” documents, with no lasting relevance to the situation in the mid or late 1970s. Regarding documentary material, and aware of the “apples and oranges” situation, some believe that the Soviet statements at the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (even though they are skewed by the multilateral arena in which they are voiced) have developed into a collection of evidence on Soviet strategic thinking more valuable than major parts of the Penkovsky collection (prepared for a far different audience and not reflecting in all cases the agreed upon, prevailing doctrine). Other contributors to *Studies* have highlighted the kinds of detailed information we have received over the last 10 years and can expect from technical collection systems in the 1970s. So, with the premise and prognosis of my colleagues that the IRONBARK will continue to be buried by a flood of high quality technical and documentary strategic information, I will conclude with a few words on the tremendous analytical mileage which has accrued from the Penkovsky contribution.

The 10-year-old IRONBARK information stands as one of the most valuable collections in the history of strategic intelligence.

The IRONBARK documents covered a period when the Soviets were preparing for a major revision in the three key areas touched on in this *Studies* article—Soviet military doctrine, organization, and weaponry. The documents were composed at a time when the last major revolution was taking place regarding Soviet perceptions on the nature of a future war, and on the type of weapons and command and control procedures needed to wage that hypothetical conflict.

This period represented a major watershed in the transformation of Soviet military thinking away from the Stalinist preference for massive conventional forces, to new patterns of thinking, calling for brand new forces equipped with highly sophisticated, modern weaponry.

Much of the revolutionary IRONBARK material grappled with concepts which the Soviets did not begin to implement until the mid or late 1960s. A lot of what has taken place in Soviet military doctrine in recent years has only been a footnote to the intense debates in the information provided by Colonel Penkovsky. Thus, while the 10-year-old material has less value than it did when it was 10 months old, its continuing utility as a checkpoint for our current research is clear.

In sum, it is probably going to require another revolution in Soviet military thinking to reverse the present situation, reduce the IRONBARK itself to footnotes, and relegate the Colonel's legacy to "just historical" documents.

Appendix 10

NATO Threat Assessment, April 1983

A. THE WEST VERSUS THE EAST IN AFRICA

1. The threat of Communist penetration in Africa persists and will continue in the foreseeable future. Our current assessment ranges from the restrained conclusion that there has been no worsening of the situation as far as the West is concerned to the majority's more optimistic view that the evolution of the political situation in Africa and in the world during the last six months has contributed to a reinforcement of Western positions in Africa and has raised new difficulties for Soviet penetration.
2. Within Africa, the end of the Katanga secession may be considered as a step, toward the stabilization and economic viability of the Congo despite all that remains to be done including the assurance of law and order and the adoption of a constitution.
3. The Casablanca Group has failed to develop into an effective force and, in fact, shows signs of disintegration, while the influence of the moderate groupings' increases and Guinea and Mali draw closer to their neighbors.
4. Turning to the debit side of the internal situation, we must take note of certain endemic conditions in the new African states which may be exploited by the Communists. Among these are African impatience for the millennium following independence, dissatisfaction with administrative inefficiency and corruption, the gap between, living standards of the new elite and those whose material life has not been improved by political change, regional and tribal disputes and the pressure of a new generation eager to replace present African leaders.
5. There is also the threat of spreading inter-racial violence now openly; advocated by the pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and South Africa (PAFMECSA) and bloc representatives, at the Afro-Asian people's Solidarity Conference (AAPSO) in Tanganyika in February. The frustration of the political ambitions of Africans in

Southern Africa, particularly in South Africa, offer opportunities for Communist penetration and is a major embarrassment in relations between the West and the independent African states.

6. African leaders and their representatives in the United Nations and elsewhere have been impressed by the West's confrontation of the Soviet move in Cuba, the Sino-Indian conflict, the Sino-Soviet ideological quarrel, and the treatment of African students in Bulgaria.

B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Western Assistance to and Consultation on Africa

1. The position of the West in Africa will be determined by developments throughout the continent, including for example the extent to which the newly independent states are able to create viable political systems to satisfy at least the minimal demands of their populations. Economic and technical assistance by NATO members to the new states thus strengthens the position of the West in general.
2. The position of the West in Africa will also be decided in important measure by the nature of the West's response to the problems arising in the White-controlled territories of Southern Africa. This challenge points out the need for continuing exchanges of views and consultation among NATO member countries as appropriate on trends throughout the area. Some experts feel that, if hope for ultimate self-government were held out to the native populations, it might be easier to direct African aspirations into constructive channels.

Countering Soviet Bloc Civil Aviation Activity

3. We urge that this activity, outlined in more detail in Part III of this chapter, be kept under review by NATO members. In some cases, Bloc action could be headed off by expanding Western services, in others, further consideration might be given to assisting the local and regional expansion of indigenous African airlines. There is room for limited action in the area of education and admonition of African states concerning the dangers of Bloc activities. Unless great care is taken, however, this approach could easily be considered by the African states as an affront rather than a friendly warning. The exchange of information between Western countries should be continued and made as effective as possible.

Departure of African Students from Bulgaria

4. The co-operation between NATO partners in accepting African students from communist countries, which had already been suggested

in the last Experts Report, has proved its worth in this case also and should be continued. But efforts should be made to avoid the appearance of concerted NATO action in this field which would be resented by Africans as an attempt to make the plight of these students a cold war issue. The enlightenment about Communism from African sources, such as returning students, should be encouraged by suitable means.

Education in Africa

5. In the long run, the creation in Africa of new universities and other educational establishments would doubtless solve, at least in part, the problem raised by the departure of African students from Communist countries.

The First International Congress of Africanists

6. The First International Congress of Africanists, which was held in Accra in December 1962, highlighted the new interest taken, in African studies in Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia, Poland). Owing to the importance both scientific and political (USSR) attaching to the proceedings of the Congress, the Western powers should endeavor to co-ordinate their action in the interval between plenary sessions of the Congress.

PART II

The African Situation

African Groupings

7. The most important recent developments have been the failure of attempts to reactivate the Casablanca Group: the strengthening of the moderate U&M and Monrovia Groups: the adoption by EAF-MECSA of, an, activist role and the decision to hold a Heads of State Meeting in Addis Ababa in May.
8. The decline of the importance of the Casablanca Group has been caused, in general, by personal rivalries between Heads of State, the widening gap between North and Black Africa and differences of economic structure. More particular causes are the set-back to Egyptian efforts; the defection of Ghana: the rapprochement of Guinea and Mali with the *Etats de l'Entente*, Senegal and Mauritania, and the new orientation of Moroccan policy.
9. The Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM, which Ruanda has just joined, remains the most cohesive and effective African grouping. But the more broadly based Inter-African and Malagasy States Organization (IAMSO)—the Monrovia Group—somewhat strengthened its position with the initialing last December of the Lagos Charter by 17 members, IAMSO has, however, failed so far

to organize a permanent secretariat and has felt the divisive, effects, both of the divergent outlooks and backgrounds of English and French-speaking Africans and of the division between states associated and not associated with the European Economic Community.

10. About 30 African Heads of State are due to attend a "Summit Conference" which is to open in Addis Ababa on May 23, 1963. This meeting could have an important impact on the future of existing African groupings. Meanwhile, rivalries between the various groups are restrained by their unwillingness to seek, tactical advantage at the expense of African "unity."
11. Most African countries set high hopes on laying the foundations at Addis Ababa for greater inter-African co-operation.
12. PAFMECSA has recently developed a stronger sense of regional solidarity, and it assumed an active role at the Leopoldville meeting last December in the movement to "liberate" East, Central and Southern Africa. At the same time, Dar-es-Salaam has acquired increased importance as a center of pan-African activities, though. Tanganyika has held herself aloof from both the Monrovia and the Casablanca groups.
13. African solidarity need not necessarily work against Western interests; and it is likely in any case to go through considerable further development before it achieves an effective organizational structure and political force.

African Trade Unions

14. The Trade Unions are, to some degree, called upon to play a political role since they often constitute the best organized pressure groups in the African States. Since independence, Trade Union tasks proper are, however, gradually coming to the fore once again.
15. The Unions' main aims are, apart from the achievement of African unity, rapid industrialization, a planned economy, the phasing-out of the traditional social structures.

Africa and the United Nations

16. African countries support the United Nations from which they hope to gain political and economic advantages. The United Nations provides Africans with an ideal forum. Although African members of the United Nations are not a cohesive voting bloc, except on colonial and related issues, they displayed somewhat greater agreement at the 17th General Assembly than at previous sessions.
17. The Committee of Twenty-Four (formerly the Committee of Seventeen) has become the Assembly's major instrument for dealing with colonialism. The Committee has inter alia:

- 1) recommended that the United Kingdom set aside the 1961 Southern Rhodesian constitution and call a new constitutional conference with full representation from African political parties;
 - 2) urged that the United Nations apply sanctions against Portugal, including an arms embargo, if Portugal continued to ignore previous United Nations resolutions calling for self-determination and independence for its territories; and
 - 3) reaffirmed the right of the peoples of South West Africa and the United Kingdom High Commission Territories to self-determination and independence.
18. The 17th General Assembly, in addition to adopting resolutions containing all of the principal recommendations made by the Committee, recommended a broad range of diplomatic, economic, and commercial sanctions against South Africa and called upon the Security Council to take any necessary action including sanctions to bring an end to apartheid.
 19. The resolutions recommending sanctions against South Africa and Portugal (which were opposed by most NATO Members) were in direct contrast to those of the 16th General Assembly. At that session, resolutions on South Africa and Portugal avoided reference to sanctions and were worded so way as to obtain the support of most-NATO United Nations members. Among the reasons for this difference is the increasing impatience of the 32 African members.
 20. Nonetheless, in recent weeks, the Committee has assumed a somewhat more moderate approach, particularly on the question of Portuguese Africa. Some members of this Committee have indicated a desire to revive the idea of a United Nations “rapporteur” to visit the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique. Lisbon, in turn, has indicated possible willingness to cooperate with a reasonable plan. It is expected that Southern Rhodesia will be placed on the Agenda of the Special General Assembly Session to be held in May.
 21. With Katanga’s secession presumably at an end, the United Nations is planning a major cut-back in UNOC military forces and, in view of its serious, financial position the organization might be forced to a gradual reduction of its civilian activities . Most experts believe that if the United Nations reduces its forces in the Congo below a level desirable for security purposes before adequate reorganization of the National Congolese Army (ANC), a dangerous situation might arise.

Africa and the West

1) Africa and the EEC

22. On gaining their independence, the African countries which maintained special relations with the six confirmed the importance they attached to their association with the Common Market and urged its continuance.
23. Last year, negotiations were opened to determine the new conditions of association.
24. An agreement to this end was initialed on December 20 last and will be signed at the earliest possible moment.
25. During the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the EEC, agreement was reached to make an offer on the possible future association of African countries of the Commonwealth with the EEC, but it was refused by all interested parties, except Sierra Leone and the Rhodesias. This would have levelled off differences in treatment between the Associated states and Commonwealth countries and territories accepting association.
26. Since then, further discussions among the Six have led to an agreement on the way open to states which have an economic structure and production comparable to those of associated countries to enter into relationship with the EEC.
27. Several African countries of the Commonwealth have recently shown themselves interested in entering into special arrangements with the EEC.

(ii) Africa and International crises

28. The U.S.–USSR confrontation over Cuba clearly had a sobering effect on many African delegations at the United Nations, who witnessed Soviet duplicity at first hand. It is difficult to estimate how much positive African support the West would have received had resolutions on the Cuban crisis been considered in the Assembly or had Soviet aircraft carrying military equipment actually requested overflight or landing rights in Africa.

However, a goodly number of African states indicated that they would not permit Soviet overflights.

29. The Chinese attack on India, by showing Africans that neutrality does not, of itself, afford protection against external threats, and that they too cannot consider themselves safe from external aggression had led them to make a reappraisal of Communist policy to the benefit of Western interests.

Countries and Territories of particular interest

(iii) Congo

30. The re-integration of Katanga in the Congo Republic has removed one of the obstacles to normalization of the situation in the Republic. However, this event in itself has not overcome all the problems which beset the Congo, and the rest must still make a special effort to secure the political and economic stability of the Republic.
 31. This stability will only be achieved if the Central government is given the means of maintaining law and order throughout the length and breadth of the Republic so that bodies may be set up to inject new life into the Congolese economy.
 32. With a view to giving the Central Government the means to maintain law and order, certain Western powers as well as countries of the Afro-Asian group are thinking of taking part in the reorganization of the Congolese national army in conjunction with the United Nations.
 33. Furthermore, some Western powers might be called upon to collaborate with the Republic of the Congo in setting up an effective administrative and supervisory body to co-ordinate technical, financial, and personnel assistance with the Western powers; would be associated certain international organizations, such as the United Nations and the Common Market.
- (iv) The Togo Problem
34. The military coup d'état which cost President Olympio his life has created a domestic and an inter-African problem.
 35. Under the presidency of Mr. Grunitzky, a provisional government has been formed with members of all the Togolese political parties. This government's aim is to bring about reconciliation and national unity by a policy of appeasement pending the emergence of a constituent assembly from the free elections which are to be held on 5th May. The future president is to be chosen by referendum.
 36. At the inter-African level, the most difficult question is the attitude to be observed toward the provisional Togolese government. The States of the Monrovia Group, meeting in Lagos on 29th January to define their position in this matter, adopted resolutions condemning the assassination of President Olympio and decided to submit a draft mutual security treaty to the next Conference of Heads of State of the Monrovia Group. This move which, moreover, is in line with the concern felt in Guinea and Mali reflects the almost general determination to prevent further armed revolts inspired by the Togolese precedent, particularly as certain disturbing signs were appearing in a number of States in the area. Furthermore, the States of the African and Malagasy Union, meeting in March at Ouagadougou

decided, without committing themselves with regard to the recognition of the provisional government, to leave it to the president of Dahomey to keep the situation in Togo under review.

37. So far, only two African states, Ghana and Senegal, have granted Mr. Grunitzky's government "de jure" recognition.

Ghana

38. Ghana has become increasingly isolated from the other African states during the past year. Its relations even with fellow members of the Casablanca Group have been strained. Other countries, in particular Nigeria, have been offended by Nkrumah's encouragement of subversive activities against their governments. Although Ghana appears not to have been involved in the assassination of President Olympio, other African states have warned Ghana against taking advantage of the situation in Togo. Even at the United Nations, where the Ghanaian Delegation strives to play an active and aggressive role in anti-colonial matters. Ghana has lost some of its former position of leadership Nkrumah and continues to maintain close ties with the Soviet Union and with Communist China, whose position he, favored in the Sino-Indian dispute, through recent disappointments have led Ghana lately to a more balanced attitude towards the West.
39. Internally, Nkrumah has strengthened his personal control at the expense of his popularity with the people. A number of his former chief lieutenants have been arrested; the powers of the party and of the trade-unions have been reduced and Nkrumah has come to rely more on his senior civil servants and on a few close personal advisers. Despite its political turmoil, Ghana remains a relatively well organized and well-administered country with reasonable hopes for continued economic progress.
- (ii) The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
40. Since last December, there has been a radical change in the situation in the Federation which will have far-reaching consequences in that area. In Southern Rhodesia, the government of Sir Edgar Whitehead, which had been advocating a policy of gradual concessions to the African majority, was defeated by the Rhodesian Front led by Mr. Winston Field and favoring the firm retention of white control. On December 19, 1962, the British Government announced that Nyasaland had been granted the right to secede from the Federation. In February 1963, Nyasaland obtained full internal self-government, the final step before independence with the appointment of Dr. Banda as prime minister.
41. Talks in London led to the announcement by the British Government on 1st April that any territory which so-wished (i.e., Northern

Rhodesia) would be allowed to secede and that further discussions will be held in Africa on the transitional arrangements and to work out the terms of a new relationship between the territories. The situation has been complicated by the demand made by Mr. Winston Field that Southern Rhodesia be granted independence in the near future under its present constitution.

42. Although Mr. Field has belittled the possibility of serious internal disorder in Southern Rhodesia, this cannot lightly be dismissed. Frustration on the part of Southern Rhodesian Africans would seem bound to increase as the political ambitions of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian Africans move towards complete fulfillment.

(vi) The Somali Question

43. The decision of the Somali Government to break off relations with the United Kingdom, following the creation in Kenya, of a new North-Frontier region, has provoked a potentially dangerous situation in East Africa.
44. The territorial claims of Somalia were inspired by a strong "Greater Somalia" nationalism. These aspirations may be difficult to contain and will continue to exist even if they find little or no support on the part of the great majority of other African states since they are based on ethnic, religious, cultural and economic factors.
45. Somalia's claims on the Northern Frontier area have caused a further deterioration in Somali-Ethiopian relations. From the point-of view of Western interests, this may give rise to dangerous instability in the Horn of Africa, and strengthen those anti-Western and xenophobic tendencies which are already apparent in certain sections of the population.
46. Consequently, both the USSR and Communist China have shown an increasing interest in Somalia. The Soviet Bloc is making efforts to speed up the implementation of a number of projects, already programmed for the economic development of Somalia. More than 100 Soviet experts are reported to have arrived in Somalia since last December, and Moscow is pressing for an air agreement.

(vii) Algeria

47. Since independence, Algeria has chosen the course of non-alignment in its foreign policy.
48. The Algerian government has adopted a definitely "anti-colonialist" attitude and is giving material aid to the subversive Angola MPLA and the UPA movements.
49. While remaining a member of the Casablanca Group, Algeria seems rather to give priority to problems specifically affecting North Africa over and above those of the Arab world.

50. In its domestic policy, the Algerian Government is having to grapple with a serious economic situation, which it believes can correct by resorting to a system of state-planning on socialist lines.

(viii) Angola

51. Since the last meeting, there has been some improvement in the general situation in Angola. Rebel activities are confined to sporadic attacks against the armed forces in a more limited area than previously and can be contained by local action. Implementation of the important reforms introduced in the economic and political fields has also helped to normalize the internal situation. Nevertheless, African states have thus far been unwilling to accept an impartial investigation of the situation in Angola without imposing conditions unacceptable to the Portuguese Government, and they are likely to increase their pressure against Portugal to obtain the latter's compliance with United Nations resolution. Subversive movements like the MPLA and the UPA may well increase their activities as a result of the material aid given them by Algeria, Ghana and countries of the Soviet Bloc and the facilities provided by the Congolese Government in the Republic of the Congo, including Katanga.

(ix) Mozambique

52. The economic situation has shown a marked improvement and calm continues to prevail throughout Mozambique. However, thanks to the material aid provided by African countries such as Algeria, Ghana and especially Tanganyika, subversive movements based in the latter will undoubtedly try to create unrest in the border areas.

(x) South Africa

53. Tensions have increased markedly in South Africa. The African terrorist organization, POQO, has begun a campaign of racial violence which could lead to even harsher repressive, countermeasures by the South African Government. At the same time, South Africa is pressing ahead with its plan for limited African self-government in the Transkei-in the face of opposition from some indigenous tribal leaders, the "white" opposition parties, and the African nationalist organizations. Strict adherence to United Nations-approved anti-South African measures, e.g. sanctions, will be more vigorously called for by African states.

PART III

COMMUNIST PENETRATION Indigenous Communist Movements

...

54. The principal recent development affecting African Communist Parties was the proscription of the Communist Party and its

- publications in Algeria (November 1962) and Tunisia (January 1963)
55. In South Africa, the Congress of Democrats, a Communist front, and the weekly *New Age* a Communist publication were banned shortly before the end of 1962. Last February, South African security police raided and shut down the newspaper *Spark* which had succeeded *New Age* in December 1962.
 56. Communist-line publications are condemning the Pan-Africanist Congress, as bourgeois, anti-Communist, and racist and point to Spear of the Nation, the militant arm of the African National Congress (ANC), as the vanguard in the struggle. They support sabotage and cadre training for guerrilla warfare by Spear of the Nation and direct readers to Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban works on guerrilla, warfare in the hope of spreading revolutionary violence in South Africa. Although there is Communist penetration of the ANC, it is not a Communist organization.
 57. Basutoland has increasingly been used by the South African Communist Party, which this January in London published a new program emphasizing violent action against the South African government.

Communist Activity in Africa

(i) General

58. During the period under review, Soviet efforts at penetration of Africa have not scored any important successes largely because of the strong feelings of independence and Pan-Africanism prevailing in the newly emerging African states. Even in the so-called "African socialist states," ruling circles were inspired by local conditions rather than Marxist principles. Consequently, Soviet long-term planning seems to concentrate not on the formation of Communist Parties in Africa but on infiltration of existing political parties, trade unions, and youth organizations.
59. Soviet caution in Africa is probably due to their fear that open intervention on their part may provoke strong reactions. Events in the Congo have shown the Russians that they should not act too precipitately. However, this policy does not mean that the Soviet Union intends to remain a mere observer of political developments in Africa.

Communist Front Organizations

Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference (AAPSG)

60. The Third Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference (February 1963, in Moshi, Tanganyika) was meant to test the cohesiveness

and strength of the “Afro-Asian Peoples’ Front” in Africa and to set the main lines of its action within the framework of the “struggle against imperialism and colonialism”.

61. However, the Moshi Conference was dominated by the Sino-Indian conflict over the frontiers of Tibet and by the Soviet-Chinese ideological crisis, and this clearly brought home to moderate Africans that they were merely the tools of Communist propaganda, for it proved impossible to make any serious headway with the problems of Africa which are of most concern to them.
62. The preponderant influence which the Chinese People’s Republic seems to exert over the administrative and executive organs of the AAPSC could, moreover, lead to a loss of members in future. Nevertheless, the Chinese, by their aggressive attitude and drive at Moshi, managed to win the sympathy of many African nationalist movements to which they promised full assistance.

In contrast, the Soviet Delegation, which concentrated on extolling peaceful coexistence, was forced to give ground and adopt a defensive attitude in the face of the Chinese accusations of “white racialism.”

63. The resolutions adopted at Moshi mainly highlighted the need to exploit the new concept of neo-colonialism, to step up action against the United States and the British Commonwealth, to denounce Israel as an “instrument of imperialism” and to provide active and effective assistance for African liberation movements.
64. The AAPSC, weighed down by its enormous size (255 delegates at Moshi), weakened by internal divisions and compromised in the eyes of many Africans by the Communist influence to which it is subject, is to all intents and purposes reduced to disseminating propaganda and fomenting unrest. It could run into increasing difficulties in Africa as new territories become independent.

Cultural Activities

The First International Congress of Africanists

65. Culturally, one of the most important events of recent months has been the meeting in Accra in December last of the First International Congress of Africanists which was attended by many African delegations as well as representatives of the USSR, the Chinese People’s Republic, European countries, and several Western countries.
66. Despite the general technical quality of the work, little was to be expected, from the scientific standpoint of the Congress the main value of which was to foster contacts.

67. Politically, the efforts of the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic to introduce Cold War themes into the discussion met with failure, owing to the determination of the majority of African delegations to keep the meeting technical. Africans showed themselves alive to their responsibilities and prepared to co-operate freely with foreign countries. The definition given of the character of the Congress was that it should be international and embrace all branches of knowledge.
68. It was decided that plenary sessions would be held every three years in different cities (the USSR had suggested that the permanent headquarters should be in Accra) and administrative organs were set up. The 1965 session will be held in Dakar.
- (xi) Installation of diplomatic missions
69. Soviet bloc states have continued to develop their network of diplomatic missions in African states. A detailed list of these missions will be found at

Annex III.

(xii) Military aid

70. Soviet arms deliveries to the newly independent African states do not seem to have increased during the period under review. In general, Africans appear to favor economic assistance they can put to immediate use rather than purely military aid.
71. The quantities of arms which continue to be delivered by the Soviets to subversive movements active in Southern Africa are difficult to determine.
72. It is, however, interesting to note that, 50 or so future Algerian Air Force officers were recently sent to the Soviet Union for training at Russian Air Force schools.
73. An approximate list of the war material delivered by the Soviet Bloc to African states and to the subversive movements in certain territories in Africa is given at Annex IV to this report.

(xii) Trade and Technical Assistance

74. Trade between the Soviet Union and the newly independent African states does not amount to very much, although it has increased slightly. The Soviets are trying to create trade links of every kind with African states, but they have not managed to acquire stable economic positions in these countries and to establish with them firm patterns of trade. Trade between the Western powers and Africa has not been affected by Soviet efforts and continues to expand.

75. Technical assistance from the Eastern Bloc to African states continues to be ineffective. Only a very small proportion of the credits granted by the Bloc has really been taken up.
76. It is worth noting that the work carried out by the Soviets in Africa has not always given satisfaction from the standpoint of quality and delivery dates. The professional competence and the behavior of the technicians put at the disposal of Africans and defects in equipment and consumer goods made in Russia seem to have caused some disappointment among the recipients of such aid.

(vii) Propaganda

77. Sino-Soviet news services to Africa increased from 18 to 30 in 1962. Their broadcasting hours to Africa (excluding Arabic services) increased by 95 to a total of 295 hours weekly. There are four Communist periodicals geared to African readership currently circulating in Africa Communist countries which have also been active in making cultural gifts and in establishing libraries specializing in Bloc publications. In all these activities, the Chinese have played an increasing part. Anti-Western Communist propaganda themes have undergone little change.

Civil Air Activities.

78. The Bloc has achieved appreciable success in its civil aviation activities during the past year. In so doing, it is (1) increasing its ability to mount major airlifts to critical African areas, (2) improving its capability to collaborate with indigenous African airlines, and (3) acquiring a means of generating more passenger traffic between Africa and the USSR.
79. At present, Soviet Aeroflot has two regular, weekly routes, one to Khartoum via Cairo and the other to Accra via Belgrade, Rabat, and Conakry. Czechoslovak Airlines (CSA) flies weekly to Conakry via Marseille, Rabat, and Dakar and to Bamako via Zurich, Rabat, and Dakar.
80. The Soviet Bloc has recently been attempting to expand and link these air routes. An agreement on 1st February gave CSA the right to fly through Tunis on a route extending from Moscow via Warsaw and Prague to Accra and Lagos. The possibility of CSA expansion into Ghana and Nigeria is indicated by the Czechoslovak air agreement with Ghana in 1961 and the Nigerian grant last summer of a provisional license to CSA for flights to Lagos via Tunis and Accra, Mid-Mareh talks in Prague by a Sudanese delegation on an air transport agreement indicating a probable Czechoslovak intent to begin 1963 service to Sudan and possibly beyond.

81. Formal Soviet requests to Ethiopia and the Somali Republic in late 1962 for overflight and landing privileges constitute an attempt to establish more of a projected route from Khartoum into eastern Africa and Soviet efforts to obtain a transverse route across the continent were revealed by reports in February of requests to Chad and Nigeria for rights of overflight by twice-weekly flights from Moscow to Accra via Cairo and Khartoum.
82. An additional air link between West Africa and the USSR was established in February, when Air Ghana began a twice monthly service to Moscow via Tunis and Zurich, IL-18 aircraft and Soviet crews are used on the flight.
83. Algeria and Tunisia may sign civil aviation agreements with Bulgaria in March.
- (xiii) The African Students Affair in Bulgaria
84. The exodus of 78 African students from Sofia constitutes an asset for the West. The following accusations against the Bulgarians were brought to the notice of African governments by their respective students:
 - a) ban on the establishment of an All-African students' union in Bulgaria;
 - b) Communist indoctrination;
 - c) hostility and racial prejudice;
 - d) agitation against their own governments and against the West;
 - e) low standard of education and of living.

Yugoslavia

85. During the last six months, Yugoslav activity in Africa, while still intensive, has not made any appreciable headway.
86. The policy of giving economic aid to African states, hampered by the Yugoslav Government's policy of cutting down on expenditure in all spheres, is more than ever dependent on the assistance which Belgrade receives from Western countries and Moscow.
87. For all this, Yugoslavia is making a considerable and determined effort in Africa. Generally speaking, the Belgrade Government has succeeded in consolidating its political prestige and promoting its economic interests even though Yugoslav trade with African states is still very limited.
88. At the present time, there are 14 Yugoslav diplomatic missions in Africa (Algeria, Congo (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, United Arab Republic, Senegal, Sudan, Tanganyika, Tunisia).

DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS OF THE SOVIET BLOC IN AFRICA

Algeria Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Red China:

Ethiopia: Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Hungary, Romania, Albania

Burundi: Soviet Union, Poland,

Congo (Leopoldville): Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Bulgaria, Red China

Dahomey: Hungary

Ghana: Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Red China

Guinea: Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Red China, North Korea, North Viet-Nam, Mongolian People's Republic

Libya: Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Red China, North Korea, North Viet-Nam, Mongolian People's Republic

Mali: Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Red China, North Viet-Nam, Morocco: Soviet Union, CSR, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Red China, North Viet-Nam

Nigeria: Soviet Union

Senegal: Soviet Union

Sierra Leone: Soviet Union, CSR, Bulgaria, Somalia: Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Red China Sudan: Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania Red China

Tanganyika: Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Red China

Togo: Soviet Union, CSR

Tunisia: Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Bulgaria

Uganda: Red China

Central African Republic: Soviet Union

The Soviet-occupied zone of Germany has trade representations in the following African countries: Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the Sudan, Hungary.

Bibliography

CONTENTS

1. General and Background
2. British Cold War Intelligence Operations
3. United States Cold War Intelligence Operations
4. Soviet Cold War Intelligence Operations
5. Soviet Bloc Cold War Defectors
6. VENONA

The literature recording the Cold War falls neatly into two categories, the books published before the Soviet collapse, and those that were released afterwards, with the benefit of access to the American, British and Russian archives. In particular, the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Center for the Study of Intelligence has declassified a wealth of memoranda, reports, cables, estimates and monographs relevant to operations conducted during the Cold War, on such diverse subjects as *The A-12 OXCART program*; *The Berlin Wall Collection*; *Analysis of the Soviet Navy*; *Analysis of Warsaw Pact forces*; *the 1957 launch of Sputnik*; *The Korean War*; *Martial Law and Ryszard Kuklinski*; *The Missile Gap*; and the *1968 Czech Invasion*. These documents represent a far more authentic view of the CIA's activities than most of the external historiographies purporting to describe the CIA's operations and written chiefly by journalists on the basis of public domain material that, inevitably, tended to give a misleading picture of the Agency as successful operations were rarely trumpeted, whereas the not infrequent missteps made headline news.

In Moscow, after a brief period in the early 1990s when the Cambridge historian John Costello collaborated with the KGB's Oleg Tsarev to pioneer access to the KGB's files, the doors to many of the Communist-era archives slammed shut, apparently permanently. However, in that short moment of opportunity several distinguished western scholars, among them Allen Weinstein, David Murphy, John Earl Haines, Harvey Klehr and Tim Naftali, paired up with Alexander Vassiliev, Sergei Kondrshhev and Aleksandr Fursenko to

publish a series of books based on documents released under the sponsorship of the genial Vadim Kirpichenko and supervised by the irrepressible Yuri Kobaladze. This breakthrough represented an unprecedented glimpse into the KGB, but the changing political climate in Moscow ensured that the supply would run dry. Nevertheless, two additional sources turned up unexpectedly, and both would shed new light on Soviet intelligence operations. The first disclosure was a consequence of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's pressure on Bill Clinton's administration to declassify the VENONA decrypts, an event of lasting historic significance, identifying hundreds of hitherto undiscovered NKVD agents across the globe, and confirming the guilt of some controversial figures, among them Alger Hiss, Morton Sobell, Theodore Hall and Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. Initially the Russian government and its intelligence agency, the SVR, condemned the VENONA messages as fakes, apparently unaware that many of the counterpart correspondence was available for scrutiny in the seldom-visited Central Committee archive.

The second major disclosure of the era followed the unpublicized defection in 1991 of a KGB clerk, Vasili Mitrokhin, to Riga in March 1992. Mitrokhin had retired in 1984, having spent years accumulating his own private hoard of documents copied from inside the First Chief Directorate's registry. After his safe arrival in England with his family, his cache was recovered from milk churns buried under his Moscow dacha, and released in September 1999 in a project sponsored by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). Together, the Kirpichenko series, VENONA and Mitrokhin meant that the KGB and its predecessor, the NKVD, had been laid bare, ironically destroying the chances of the release of an English language edition of the KGB's own rather too anodyne official history.

Although the British intelligence community had been exempted from any obligations under Freedom of Information legislation, the appointment of Stephen Lander as MI5's director general in 1995 marked a turning-point in attitudes within Whitehall to secrecy. A professional historian when he joined MI5 in 1975, with a Cambridge doctorate, Lander embraced a change in government policy, known as the Waldegrave initiative after the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in John Major's Cabinet, and authorized the declassification of thousands of redundant files and commissioned an authorized historian, Christopher Andrew, to complete the organization's history to mark its centenary in 2009. This was followed the next year by Keith Jeffery's account of the first fifty years of SIS; in 2004 by Michael Goodman's *Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee*; and a Canadian academic, John Ferris, was selected to write an account of Government Communications Headquarters released in 2020.

Although the majority of MI5 files released thus far cover operations conducted before and during World War II, a fair proportion deal with the Cold

War, and this includes the daily journal maintained by the postwar deputy director-general, Guy Liddell, who retired in March 1953.

This new commitment to openness, with thousands of files available online and even more for inspection at the National Archives in Kew, has not extended to SIS, in adherence to the promises of permanent secrecy that were made to human sources, although assiduous researchers can find many of its documents buried in the records of other departments.

Dire predictions that these books would undermine the operational effectiveness of the agencies proved unfounded, and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, encouraged by the British experience, commissioned a history of its first fifty years, in three volumes.

In the United States, where the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson in July 1966, the expectation of governmental transparency is considerable, and has been consolidated by other statutes, including the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act passed in 1998 which required all federal authorities, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to disclose documents relating to war criminals and war crimes committed during World War II. An internal review of CIA records revealed that 114,200 pages were relevant as many suspected war criminals, especially from eastern Europe, had been supported during the Cold War in the struggle against Communism. This material, together with FOIA releases, amounts to a huge treasure trove of documents charting the early days of the Cold War, and doubtless will inspire many new titles. Thus far, relatively few authors have taken advantage of this rich resource, but even the most cursory inspection shows that history has not been well served by the journalists and historiographers who, in the absence of declassified evidence, have opted for conjecture instead of verifiable fact. For example, the Allied personnel who participated in Cold War operations in the Soviet Baltic states often have been portrayed as incompetents who were routinely duped by the KGB. However, the truth as it emerges from the CIA and the National Archive, is that the agent handlers were very well aware of the dangers of hostile penetration by double agents, and accepted those risks as professionals who acknowledged the hazards of their occupation.

Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has embraced the FOIA spirit by digitalizing 6,700 separate files, including many in the secret Foreign Counterintelligence category which were assembled at a time when there was no expectation of external scrutiny or Congressional oversight. Although the media has tended to focus on FBI files maintained on such celebrities as John Lennon, Dr Martin Luther King and even Elvis Presley, the totality of the holdings reveal a less sensationalist approach to counter-subversion and counterespionage.

GENERAL AND BACKGROUND

- Aid, Matthew M. *The Secret Sentry*. London: Bloomsbury, 2009.
- Aldrich, Richard J., Rory Cormac, and Michael Goodman. *Spying on the World*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014.
- Arnold, Anthony. *The Fateful Pebble*. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993.
- Bamford, James. *Body of Secrets*. London: Century, 2001.
- Barrass, Gordon S. *The Great Cold War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Blaxland, John. *The Protest Years, ASIO 1963–1975*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2014.
- Blaxland, John, and Rhys Crawley. *The Secret Cold War: ASIO 1975–1989*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2016.
- Burrows, William E. *By Any Means Necessary*. London: Hutchison, 2001.
- Cistello, John, and Oleg Tsarev. *Deadly Illusions*. New York: Crown, 1993.
- Downing, Taylor. *1983: The World at the Brink*. London: Little, Brown, 2018.
- Epstein, Edward Jay. *Deception*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989.
- Haynes, John Earl, and Harvey Klehr. *Spies: The Rise and Fallof the KGB in America*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010.
- Horner, David. *The Spycatchers, ASIO 1949–1963*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2014.
- Knightley, Philip. *The Second Oldest Profession*. London: André Deutsch, 1986.
- Madrell, Paul. *Spy Chiefs*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018.
- Miller, David. *The Cold War: A Military History*. London: John Murray, 1998.
- Minnick, Wendell. *Spies and Provocateurs*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1992.
- Moran, Christopher. *Spy Chiefs*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018.
- Murphy, David, and Sergei Kondrashev. *Battleground Berlin*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.
- Naftali, Tim, and Aleksandr Fursenko. *One Hell of a Gamble*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001.
- Rocca, Raymond G., and John J. Dziak. *Bibliography on Soviet intelligence and Security Services*. London: Westview Press, 1985.
- Smith, Joseph, and Simon Davis. *Historical Dictionary of the Cold War*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2000.
- Smith, Michael. *The Anatomy of a Traitor*. London: Aurum Press, 2017.
- Sontag, Sherry, and Christopher Drew. *Blind Man's Bluff*. New York: Public Affairs, 1998.
- Tarr, Larry, and Robert Keefe. *The Price of Vigilance*. New York: Battantine, 2001.
- Trahair, Richard, and Robert Miller. *Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage*. New York: Enigma, 2009.
- Weinstein, Harvey, and Alexander Vassiliev. *Haunted Wood*. New York: Random House, 2000.
- West, Nigel. *Cold War Spymaster*. London: Frontline, 2018.
- Wiel, Jerome Aan de. *East German Intelligence and Ireland 1949–90*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014.

BRITISH COLD WAR OPERATIONS

- Aldrich, Richard J. *The Hidden Hand*. London: John Murray, 2001.
- . *GCHQ*. London: Harper Collins, 2010.
- Blake, George. *No Other Choice*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1990.
- Bloch, Jonathan, and Patrick Fitzgerald. *British Intelligence and Covert Action*. London: Junction Books, 1983.
- Bower, Tom. *The Perfect English Spy*. London: Heinemann, 1995.
- Cavendish, Anthony. *Inside Intelligence*. London: Collins, 1990.
- Cecil, Robert. *A Divided Life*. London: Bodley Head, 1988.
- Cockerill, A. W. *Sir Percy Sillitoe*. London: W.H. Allen, 1975.
- Colvin, John. *Twice Around the World*. London: Leo Cooper, 1991.
- Cookridge, E. H. *Secrets of the British Secret Service*. London: Sampson, Low, 1947.
- . *The Third Man*. London: Arthur Barker, 1968.
- Corera, Gordon. *The Art of Betrayal*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2011.
- Costello, John. *Mask of Treachery*. New York: William Morrow, 1988.
- Deacon, Richard. *A History of the British Secret Service*. London: Frederick Muller, 1969.
- . *The British Connection: Russia's Manipulation of British Individuals and Institutions*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979.
- Dorril, Stephen. *MI6*. London: Fourth Estate, 2000.
- Dorril, Stephen, and Robin Ramsay. *SMEAR: Wilson and the Secret State*. London: Fourth Estate, 1991.
- Driberg, Tom. *Guy Burgess*. London: Weidenfeld, 1956.
- Elliott, Nicholas. *Never Judge a Man by His Umbrella*. Stroud, Wiltshire: Michael Russell, 1991.
- Glees, Anthony. *Secrets of the Service*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1987.
- Hennessy, Peter. *The Secret State*. London: Penguin, 2002.
- Leigh, David. *The Frontiers of Secrecy*. London: Junction, 1980.
- Milne, Seamus. *The Enemy Within*. London: Verso, 1994.
- Paine, Luran. *Britain's Intelligence Service*. London: Robert Hale, 1979.
- Penrose, Barrie, and Simon Freeman. *Conspiracy of Silence*. London: Grafton Books, 1986.
- Philby, H. A. R. Kim. *My Silent War*. London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1968.
- Philby, Rufina, and Hayden Peake. *The Private Life of Kim Philby*. London: St. Ermin's Press, 1999.
- Pincher, Chapman. *Their Trade Is Treachery*. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1981.
- Porter, Bernard. *Plots and Paranoia*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1980.
- Rees, Goronwy. *A Chapter of Accidents*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1972.
- Summers, Anthony, and Stephen Dorril. *Honeytrap*. London: Weidenfeld, 1987.
- Thomas, Rosamund. *Espionage and Secrecy: The Official Secrets Acts 1911–1989 of the United Kingdom*. London: Routledge, 1991.
- Thurloe, Richard. *The Secret State*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994.
- Trevor Roper, Hugh. *The Philby Affair*. London: William Kimber, 1968.

- Urban, Mark. *UK Eyes Alpha*. London: Faber & Faber, 1996.
- Verrier, Anthony. *Through the Looking-Glass*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1983.
- Walton, Calder. *Empire of Secrets*. London: Harper Press, 2013.
- West, Nigel. *Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2014.
- West, Rebecca. *The New Meaning of Treason*. New York: Viking Press, 1967.
- Wright, Peter. *The Encyclopedia of Espionage*. London: Heinemann, 1990.
- Wynne, Greville. *The Man from Moscow*. London: Hutchinson, 1967.
- Young, George K. *Who Is My Liege?* London: Gentry Books, 1972. ———. *Subversion and the British Riposte*. London: Ossian, 1984.
- Younger, Kenneth. *Changing Perspectives in British Foreign Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964.

UNITED STATES COLD WAR OPERATIONS

- Barron, John. *Operation SOLO*. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1998.
- Bearden, Milton, and Jim Risen. *The Main Enemy*. New York: Random House, 2004.
- Callanan, James. *Covert Action in the Cold War*. New York: I.M. Tauris, 2010.
- Corson, William, and Susan Trento. *Widows*. New York: Crown Publishers, 1989.
- Crosswell, D. K. R. *Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith*. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2010.
- Gorse, Peter. *Operation Rollback*. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000.
- Hack, Richard. *Puppetmaster*. Beverley Hills, CA: New Millenium Press, 2004.
- Herrington, Stuart. *Traitors Among Us*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1999.
- Hoffman, David E. *The Billion Dollar Spy*. London: Icon, 2017.
- Prados, John. *The Family Jewels*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2013.
- . *The Ghosts of Langley*. Stroud, Glos: Amberley, 2017.
- Sullivan, William J. *The Bureau*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1979.
- Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes*. London: Allen Lane, 2005.
- Weiner, Tim, David Johnston, and Neil Lewis. *Betrayal*. New York: Random House, 2003.
- Westerfield, H. Bradford. *Inside the CIA's Private World*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
- Wise, David A. *The Bureau and the Mole*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2002.
- Woodward, Bob. *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981–87*. London: Simon & Schuster, 1987.

SOVIET COLD WAR OPERATIONS

- Bower, Tom. *Red Web*. London: Aurum Press, 1989.
- Cherkashin, Victor, and Gregory Feifer. *Spy Handler*. New York: Perseus Books, 2005.

- Dallin, David. *Soviet Espionage*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1955.
- Donovan, James B. *Strangers on a Bridge*. New York: Atheneum, 1964.
- Foote, Alexander. *Handbook for Spies*. London: Museum Press, 1964.
- Haslam, Jonathan. *Near and Distant Neighbors*. New York: Farrar, Struass & Giroux, 2016.
- Holmes, Robert. *A Spy Like No Other*. London: Biteback, 2012.
- Modin, Yuri. *My Five Cambridge Friends*. London: Hodder Headline, 1995.
- Nechiporenko, Oleg. *Passport to Assassination*. New York: Birch Lane Press, 1993.
- Plokhyy, Serhii. *The Man with the Poison Gun*. London: Oneworld, 2016.
- Schecter, Jerrold. *The Spy Who Saved the World*. New York: Charles Scribner's, 2002.
- Stafford, David. *Spies Beneath Berlin*. London: John Murray, 2002.
- Sudoplatov, Pavel. *Special Tasks*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1994.

SOVIET BLOC COLD WAR DEFECTORS

- August, Frantisek. *Red Star Over Prague*. London: Sherwood Press, 1984.
- Bakhlanov, Boris. *The Nights Are Longest There*. London: Hutchinson, 1972.
- Barron, John. *MiG Pilot*. New York: Avon Books, 1980.
- Bittman, Ladislav. *The Deception Game*. London; Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1972.
- Davies, John, and Alexander Kent. *The Red Atlas*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2017.
- Deriabin, Piotr. *The Secret World*. New York: Doubleday, 1959.
- Dzhirkvelov, Ilya. *Secret Servant*. London: Collins, 1987.
- Frolik, Jozef. *The Frolik Defection*. London: Leo Cooper, 1975.
- Golitsyn, Anatoli. *New Lies for Old*. London: Bodley Head, 1984.
- Gordievsky, Oleg. *Last Stop Execution*. London: Macmillan, 1995.
- Gouzenko, Igor. *This Was My Choice*. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948.
- Granovsky, Anatoli. *I Was an NKVD Agent*. New York: Devlin-Adair, 1962.
- Hidalgo, Orlando. *A Spy for Fidel*. London: E.A. Seaman, 1972.
- John, Otto. *Twice Through the Lines*. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
- Kaznacheev, Alexander. *Inside a Soviet Embassy*. New York: Lippincott, 1962.
- Khokhlov, Nikolai. *In the Name of Conscience*. New York: David McKay, 1959.
- Kravchenko, Viktor. *I Chose Justice*. New York: Scribner's, 1950.
- . *I Chose Freedom*. London: Robert Hale, 1951.
- Krotkov, Yuri. *The Angry Exile*. London: Heinemann, 1967.
- Kuzichkin, Vladimir. *Inside the KGB*. London: André Deutsch, 1990.
- Levchenko, Stanislav. *On the Wrong Side*. New York: Pergamon Brassey, 1972.
- Lunev, Stanislas, and Ira Winkler. *Through the Eyes of the Enemy*. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1998.
- Mitrokhin, Vasili. *The Mitrokhin Archive*. London: Penguin, 1999.
- Monat, Pawel. *Double Eagle*. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

- Myagkov, Aleksei. *Inside the KGB*. New York: Foreign Affairs Publishing, 1976.
- Pacepa, Ion. *Red Horizons*. Washington, DC: Regnery, 1987.
- Petrov, Vladimir. *Empire of Fear*. New York: Praeger, 1956.
- Rezun, Vladimir. *The Aquarium*. London: Macmillan, 1984.
- Sakharov, Vladimir. *High Treason*. New York: Putnam's, 1980.
- Sejna, Jan. *We Will Bury You*. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984.
- Shainberg, Maurice. *Breaking from the KGB*. New York: Shapolsky Publishing, 1986.
- Shevchenko, Arkadi. *Breaking with Moscow*. New York: Ballantine, 1985.
- Sigl, Rupert. *In the Claws of the KGB*. New York: Dorrance, 1978.
- Stiller, Werner. *Beyond the Wall*. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1983.
- Tokaev, Grigori. *Comrade X*. New York: Harville, 1956.

VENONA

- Albright, Joseph, and Marcia Kunstel. *Bombshell*. New York: Random House, 1997.
- Bamford, James. *The Puzzle Palace*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1982.
- Belfrage, Cedric. *The Frightened Giant*. London: Secker & Warburg, 1957.
- . *The American Inquisition*. New York: Bobbs-Merill, 1973.
- . *Something to Guard*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.
- Benson, Robert Louis, and Michael Warner. *Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response 1939–1957*. Washington, DC: National Security Agency, 1996.
- Bentley, Elizabeth. *Out of Bondage*. New York: Devin-Adair, 1951.
- Bernikow, Louise. *Abel*. New York: Trident, 1970.
- Bly, Herman O. *Communism: The Cold War and the FBI Connection*. New York: Huntingdon House, 1998.
- Clubb, O. Edmund. *The Witness and I*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.
- Huss, Pierre J., and George Carpozi. *Red Spies in the UN*. New York: Coward-McCann, 1965.
- Kahn, David. *The Codebreakers*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966.
- Kalugin, Oleg. *The First Directorate*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- Klehr, Harvey. *The Secret World of American Communism*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
- Klehr, Harvey, and Ronald Radosh. *The Amerasia Spy Case*. Charlotte: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
- Kuczynski, Ruth. *Sonia's Report*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1991.
- Lamphere, Robert. *The CIA-KGB War*. New York: Random House, 1986.
- Martin, David C. *Wilderness of Mirrors*. New York: Harper & Row, 1980.
- Moorhead, Alan. *The Traitors*. London: Harper & Row, 1952.
- Peake, Hayden. OSS and the Venona Decrypts. *Intelligence & National Security*, Vol. 12, No. 3.
- Radosh, Ronald, and Joyce Milton. *The Rosenberg File*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1983.

- Rees, David. *Harry Dexter White*. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1973.
- Report of the Royal Commission, Australia, 1956.
- Report of the Royal Commission, Canada, 1946.
- Whitaker, Paul, and Louis Kruh. From Bletchley Park to Berchtesgaden. *Cryptologia*, Vol. XI, No. 3.
- Wright, Peter. *Spycatcher*. New York: Viking Penguin, 1987.

Index

- 1/8 Groupe de Chasse, 279
3rd Department of the NKVD's First Directorate, 328
3rd Fighter Wing, 279
4th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, 125
6th Directorate GRU, 283
6th Submarine Squadron, Halifax, 94
8th Department (*vos'myorka*), 282
8th Infantry Division, 180
9th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, 13
10th Section of the Fifth Department, 327
11th Reconnaissance Squadron, 70
16th Department (KGB), 141, 282–83
32nd Army, 184
38th Army, xvii
38th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, 125
51st Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, 260
56th Field Artillery Brigade, 245
69th Submarine Brigade, 94
91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, 13
459th Signal Battalion, 179
513rd Military Intelligence Brigade, 165
699th U.S. Air Force Security Service, 259
766th Military Intelligence Detachment, 165
4204 Labor Service Company, 214
4477th Test & Evaluation Squadron, 21
6091st Reconnaissance Squadron, Yokota, Japan, 15
6988th Security Squadron, 17
7407th Support Squadron, 125
Abdoolcader, Sirioj, 215
ABLE ARCHER, xxi
ABM. *See* Anti-Ballistic missile
Abramtchik, Mikola, 74
Acoustic Intelligence, 7–12
ACRP. *See* Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Program
Adenauer, Konrad, 57, 130
Admiralty Underwater Weapons Research Establishment, Portland, 7
Advanced RHYOLITE, 223
AE/ACRE, 261
AE/AERODYNAMIC, 313
AE/BASIN, 104, 108
AE/BATH, 313
AE/CAHBISTA, 74
AE/CAMPOSANTO, 74
AE/CARTHAGE, 313
AE/CHAMP, 205
AE/COB, 200
AEDINASAUR, 96
AEQUOR, 74
AE/DOGMA, 313
AE/FLAG, 204
AE/FREEMAN, 204
AE/GEAN, 206
AE/LUNG, 98, 108
AE/NOTE, 110
AE/PALM, 110
AE/POT, 204
AE/PRIMER, 74
AERONAUT, 206

- AE/SKIP, 110
 AE/STEM, 110
 AE/TAXI, 110
 AETENURE, 313
 AE/TICKLE, 31
 AEWIRELESS, 140
 Afghan intelligence service. *See*
 Khadamete Artia-ate Dawlati
 Afghanistan, xx, xxi, 13–14, 238,
 276–78, 314
 Afghan Task Force, 238; Head of. *See*
 Alan Fiers; Howard Hunt; Jack
 Devine; Milt Bearden; Phil Pieckney
 AFSA. *See* U.S. Armed Forces Security
 Agency
 AFSS. *See* Air Force Security Service
 Agabekov, George, 413
 AGAT (1979), 13
 Agee, Gen, Sam W., 15
 Agee, Philip, 14
 AGER. *See* Auxiliary General
 Environmental Research
 AGER-2, 251
 Agha, Ali, xxi
 AGI. *See* Auxiliary General Intelligence
 Agranyants, Andrei, 91
 Ahmedov, Ismail, 413
 Airborne Communications
 Reconnaissance Program (ACRP), 15
 Air Force Security Service (AFSS), 15,
 17
 Albania, 24–30
 Alderney, HMS, 94
 Aleksandrov, Aleksandr M., 36
 Aleksandrovsk, SS, 93
 Alexeev, Kiril, 413
 Ali, Ghulam, 237
 Alidada, 301
 Allami Vedélmí Hatóság (AVH), 175,
 179
 Allen, C.C.A., 35
 Allen, Michael H., 296
 Allen, Nelson, 296
 Allende, Salvador, xx
 Almon, Tom, 307
 ALPHA submarine surveillance patrol,
 7
 Altus AFB, Oklahoma, 221
Amerasia, 218
 Ames, Aldrich, 15, 30, 33
 Amiel, Xavier, 316
Ampermetr, 301
 Amtorg, 328
 ANADYR, 93
 ANDERS, 300
 Anderson, Helen, 131
 Andersson, Ernst Hilding, 103
 Andrew, Christopher, 560
 Andreyev, Nikolai, 282–83
 AN/DROGEN, 313
 Andropov, Yuri, 193
 Andropov Institute, 32
 Androsev, Stanislav, 30
Aneroid, 301
 Angleton, James, xx
 Angola, 13
 ANTEY, 308
 Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, 74
 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), 12,
 337, 542
 Antonov, Nikolai, 247
 Apollo lunar project, 306
Applied Nuclear Physics (Pollard and
 Davidson), 329
 Apresyan, Stepan, 89
 AQUACADE, 223
 AQUATONE overflight, xviii, 33
 Argentine Intelligence Service. *See*
 Secretariat Inteligencia del Estado
 ARGON (KH-11), 223
 ARGOS, 223
 Arlington Hall, 67, 322
 Armed Forces Security Agency
 (AFSA), xvii, 323
 Army Security Agency (ASA), xvii, 322
 Artamonov, Nikolai F., x, 33
Arthur Jackson, USS, 319
 ARTISTE, 119

ASA. *See* U.S. Army Security Agency
 ASIO. *See* Australian Security
 Intelligence Organization
 Astimiev, Stefan, 296
Astute, HMS, 94
 Atlas, 2
 Atsugi, Japan, 18, 44–45, 49, 67, 234
 Attlee, Clement, 36
 Auchinlek, Sir Claude, 237
 Australia, 34–40
 Australian Joint Intelligence
 Organisation, 36
 Australian Security Intelligence
 Organization (ASIO), 36; Directors
 of. *See* Charles Spry; Geoffrey Reed
 Auxiliary General Environmental
 Research (AGER), 52
 Auxiliary General Intelligence (AGI),
 301
 AVH. *See* Allami Vedélmi Hatóság
 Avlomra (Vlone), Albanian Air Force
 Base, 27
 Avlonya. Albanian naval base, 27
 Avlorya naval base, Albania, 27
 AVO. *See* Allam Vedélmi Ostztály
 (Hungarian Intelligence Service)
 Ayer, A.J., 96
 AZORIAN, xix, xx, 40

 B-17, xvii
 B-29 Superfortress, xvii, 299
 B-36, 93
 B-59, 93
 B-75, 94
 B-130, 93
 BACKHAND, 237
Badger. *See* Tu-16
 Bad Oeynhausen., 138
 Baeva, Aza, 302
 Baghdad Pact (1955), 237
 Bahadur, Malik Sher, 238
 Baikonur Cosmodrome, 280
 Bajraktari, Mark, 23
 Bajraktari, Ndue, 23

Baker, Dr. James G., 312
 Balli, Kombetar, 22
Balzam, 301
 Bandera, Stefa, 313
Banner, USS, 258
 Baranov, Sergei, 91
 Baranov, Vyacheslav, 91, 192
 Barclay, Christopher F.R., 181
 Barker, Thomas C., 181
 Barkovsky, Vladimir B., 327
 Barmin, Aleksandr, 413
 Barnes, Tracey, 176
 Barnett, David H., xx, 32
Barograf, 301
Barometer, 301
 Barr, Joel, 209
 Batenin, Gelii, 245
 B Atlas xviii
 Bay of Pigs ((1961), xviii, 43
 BBC. *See* British Broadcasting
 Corporation
 BCCA. *See* British Control Commission
 for Austria
 BCCG. *See* British Control Commission
 for Germany
 BDPS. *See* Lithuanian General
 Democratic Resistance Movement
 Be-12 *Mail*, 349
Beagle. *See* Il-28
Bear. *See* Tu-142
 Bearden, Milton, 31
 Beaulieu, Didier Faure, 126
 Beaulieu, Dr, 168
Before Igor (Gouzenko), 142
 BEGGAR SHADOW Elint flights,
 18–19
 Belenko, Viktor, xx, 53
 Belgian Air Force, 61
 Belic, George N., 262
 Belitsky, Boris, 140
 Bell, Walter, 238
 Bellin, Paul, 33
 BEN, 38
 Ben Jima fortress, Malta, 22

- Berger, Helge, 131
Beria, Lavrenti, 328
Berlin blockade (1948), xvii
Berlin Operations Base (BOB), 54, 262
Berlin Tunnel. *See* GOLD
Berlin Tunnel Report, 391–412
Berlin Wall, xxi, 4, 5, 54–60, 84, 133, 285–94, 451
Bernie, Frances, 97
Bernstein, Joseph M., 218
BERTIL, 297
Bertrand, René (alias “Colonel Beaumont”), 126
Bessedovski, Grigori, 413
Bessie, Alvah, 87
Bestie, Capt., 448
Betrayal of an Ideal (Tokaev), 181, 305
Bettaney, Michael, xxi, 141
Bevin, Ernest, 181
BfV. *See* Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
BG/FIEND, 22, 24, 325
Bialoguski, Michael, 97
Biberman, Herbert, 87
Bib Mirakaj, Pal, 23
Bib Vokri, Mark, 23
Biedenkopf, Kurt, 132
Binae, Albanian Air Force Base, 27
Binet, Guy, xxi, 3, 61
Binnenlandse Veiligheldsdienst (BVD), 204
BIOGRAPH flights, xvii, 124
Bishop, Maurice, 143
Bismarck Kaserne, Schawbisch Gmund, 245
Bissell, Richard, 43
BKI. *See* National Independent Bloc
Black, Mervyn, 142
Black Friday, 280–81, 323
Blake, Gen. Gordon A., 15
Blake, George, xix
BLUE, 63
BLUE SKY aerial VHF intercept program, 15
Blunt, Anthony, xx
BND. *See* Bundesnachrichtendienst
Board of Economic Warfare, 218
BOB. *See* Berlin Operations Base
Bogaty, Anatoli, 91
BÖHMERWALD exercise, 184
Bokhan, Sergei, 31, 91
Bolshakov, Georgi, 95
Bonsall, Arthur, 64
BOOMERANG, 34
Boone, David, 15
BOOT, 5
BORDEAUX, 214
Border Troops Directorate (UGV), 70
Borodin, Vladimir, 167
Bosch, Heinrich, 130
BOURBON intercept program, 62
Bourne, Kenneth, 238
Bowen, Ann-Christine, 130
Boyce, Christopher, xx
Brandt, Willi, xx, 154
Branting, Georg, 3, 69
BRAVO submarine surveillance patrol, 7
Brecht, Bertolt, 87
Brezhnev, Leonid, xx, 264
Brezniak, Hyman, 97
Bringle, Adm. William F., 18
Bringle, Willaim, 18
British Control Commission for Germany (BCCG), 5, 138
British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), 5, 74, 131, 283, 298, 325
British Security Service (MI5), xxi, 1, 3, 34, 36, 69, 91, 98, 116, 121, 170, 172, 175, 187, 197–98, 214–15, 238, 302, 304, 413–25, 526; deputy director-general. *See* Guy Liddell; director-general. *See* Percy Sillitoe; Roger Hollis. *See also* Security Liaison Officer
British-United States SIGINT Agreement (BRUSA), 66–67
Britten, Douglas, 175

Broda, Engelbert, 87, 329
 Broda, Melita, 87
 Brook, Robin, 304
 Brooks, Cyrus, 304
 Brooks, Tony, 215
 Broszey, Christel, 132
 Browder, Earl, 86
 Bruce Lockhart, John, 302
 BRUSA. *See* British-United States
 SIGINT agreement
 Bucher, Lloyd M., 52, 251
 Budenz, Louis, 217
Bug, 301
 Bulgaria, 66, 70–74
 Bulgarian Intelligence Service. *See*
 Darzhavna Sigarnost
 Bulik, Joe, 243
Bull. *See* Tu-4
 BULLFINCH submarine detection
 apparatus, 8
 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
 (BfV), 129–33, 138–39, 150, 167,
 174
 Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), xxi,
 129–30, 138
 Burgess, Guy xvii, xx
 Burlutsky, Grigori, 91
 Busch, Dr. Heinz, 131, 273
 Butenas, Julihonas, 214
 BVD. *See* Binnenlandse
 Veiligheldsdienst
 Byelorussia, 74
 Byelorussia (AEQUOR), 261
 Byelorussia National Council (BNR), 74
 Byelorussian Liberation Movement, 74

 C. *See* Chief of the Secret Intelligence
 Service
 C-130, 16
 C-130B, 16
 C-47, 13, 15
 CAESAR, 83Cairncross, John, 327
 Callaghan, James, 131

Canadian, American, New Zealand,
 Australian & British counter-
 intelligence liaison (CAZAB), 91
 CAP. *See* Combat Air Patrol
 Cape Zdngaetta Albanian naval base, 27
 CAPSTAN, 206
 CAPULET, 303
 Caraman, Mikai, 262
 CARTEL, 313
 Carter, Marshall, 257
 Casey, Bill, 13
 Castro, Fidel, xviii
 CATTRANSIT, 133–37
 Cawthorn, Walter, 237
 CAZAB. *See*, Canadian, American,
 New Zealand, Australian & British
 counter-intelligence liaison
 CCF. *See* Congress for Cultural
 Freedom
 CCP. *See* Consolidated Cryptologic
 Program
 Ceausescu, Nicolae, 263
 Ceder, Lilian, 103
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), xvii,
 4; Director of. *See* Allen Dulles; Bill
 Casey; Bill Colby. *See also* Berlin
 Operations Base; Counterintelligence
 Staff; Deputy Director of operations;
 Directorate of Intelligence;
 Directorate of Operations; Munich
 Operations Base
 Central Intelligence Group (CIG), xvii
 CEREUS, 325
 Chadwick, James, 328
 CHALET, 223
 Chalet, Marcel, 126
 Chambers, Whittaker, 217
 Chang Pen, Piotr, 91
Chazma missile recovery vessel, 41
 Chebotarev, Anatoli, 91
 CHICKADEE, 244
 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
 23

- Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (C), 187
- Chifley, Ben, 36
- Childs, Morris, 88
- Chilton, Frederick, 36
- Chinese nuclear weapons program, xviii
- Christiansen, Wilbur N., 114
- Churchill, Winston S., 4
- CIA. *See* Central Intelligence Agency
- The CIA and Strategic Warning: The 1968 Soviet-Led Invasion of Czechoslovakia*, 183
- The CIA and the U-2*, 309
- CIA Country Plan for Albania*, 375–90
- CIG. *See* Central Intelligence Group
- CIG. *See* Current Intelligence Group
- CINCPAC. *See* Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
- CK/BEEP, 250
- Clark, James M., 101, 284
- Clay, Gen. Lucius, 304
- Clayton, Walter, 35
- Clem, Stanley A., 303
- Clemens, Hans, 130, 138
- Clinton, Bill, 1
- Clinton, Frederick, 36
- Clive, Nigel D., 181
- CNO. *See* Chief of Naval Operations
- COBRA JUDY, 300
- Cohen, Leontina, 330
- Cohen, Morris, 330
- COLDFEET, xix, 85
- Cole, Lester, 87
- COLOSSUS submarine detection apparatus, 8
- Combat Air Patrol (CAP), 49
- Cominform, xvii
- Comintern (Communist International), 85
- Commandviii in Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), 17
- Communist Information Bureau, 85
- Communist Party of Australia (CPA), 38, 84, 97; Control Commission, 38
- Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) 3, 328–29
- Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA), 3
- Comodoro Py*, ASA, 123
- Company 4000, 22
- Comrade X* (Tokae), 305
- Congress for Cultural Freedom, (CCF), 96
- Conqueror*, HMS, 123
- Conrad, Clyde L., xxi, 32
- Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), 15
- CONSTANT PEG, xx, 21
- Continental News Service, 96
- COOKEE, 206
- Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), 217
- CORONA reconnaissance satellite, 222
- Cosmos-7*, 335
- Costa Rica, 13
- Costello, John, 559
- Costi, Kyriacos, 215
- Cot, Pierre, 3, 88
- Counterintelligence branch, Office of Strategic Services (X-2), 83, 182, 325
- Counterintelligence Staff, 32
- Covert Action Information Bulletin*, 14
- CPA. *See* Communist Party of Australia
- CPGB. *See* Communist Party of Great Britain
- CPSU. *See* Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- CPUSA. *See* Communist Party of the United States of America
- Crabb, Lionel (Buster), xviii
- Critical Intelligence Communications Network (CRITIC), 50–51
- CRONIN, 30
- Crook, Kenneth R., 181
- Cuba, xviii, xix, xx, 2, 13, 14, 16, 43–44, 92–96, 99, 143–54, 162, 173, 241, 244, 283–85, 296, 309, 539, 550, 554, 559

- Cuban Intelligence Service. *See*
 Dirección General de Inteligencia
 Cuban missile crisis (1962) 4, 92
 Current Intelligence Group (CIG), 127
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia
 (1950), 331
 Currie, Lauchlin, 217
 Curtis, Francis, C., 35
 Czech Intelligence Service. *See* Statni
 Bezpecnost
 Czechoslovakia, xix
- DAEDALUS, 88
Daily Worker, Louis, 217
 Daladier, Edouard, 88
 Dalrymple, John, 142
 Dalziel, Allan, 3
 Da Nang, 259
 DANIEL, 195
 Danilevich, Andrian, 233
 Danish Security Service. *See* Politiets
 Efterretningstjeneste
 DARIO, 141
 Darzhavna Sigarnost (DS), 70; Chief of.
See Stoyan Savov
 DDO. *See* Deputy Director for
 Operations
 Dean, Patrick L., 177
 Debré, Michel, 127
 Declassification Center, 1
 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 16;
 Foreign Technology Division, 21
Deflektor, 301
 Deksnys, Jonas, 214
 Delabarelen, Dan, 177
 de la Salle, Charles, 263
 Delhi Intelligence Bureau (DIB), 237
 Del Vino Albanian Air Force Base, 27
 Democratic Republic of Vietnam
 (DRV), xix, xx, 155–64
 Denisov, Mikhail, 413
 Departmentul de Informatii Externe
 (DIE), 262, 324; Chief of. *See* Ion
 Pacepa
 Department V, 215
 Deputy Director for Operations (DDO),
 1, 30–32
 Deriabin, Piotr, 91
 DeSOTO, 156
 Devine, Jack, 238
 Devoli, Albanian Air Force Base, 27
 Dew, Det. Insp., 305
 Dewavrin, André, 89
 DGI. *See* Dirección General de
 Inteligencia
 DGSE. *See* Direction Générale de
 Sécurité Extérieure
 DGSS. *See* Director-General of the
 Security Service
 DIA. *See* Defense Intelligence Agency
 DIAMOND, 317
 DIAS. *See* Defence Intelligence
 Analysis Staff
 DIE. *See* Departmentul de Informatii
 Externe
 Dillon, Paul L., 250
 Dimmer, John, 54
 DIMSM. *See* Direcția de Informatii a
 Marelui Stat Major
 Dirección General de Inteligencia
 (DGI), xx
 Direcția de Informatii a Marelui Stat
 Major (DIMSM), 263
 Direction de la Surveillance du
 Territoire (DST), 4, 126–27, 296,
 315–17
 Directorate K, 14, 92
 Directorate of Intelligence, 1
 Directorate of Operations (DO), 1, 130
 Director-General of the Security Service
 (DGSS), 91, 302, 567
 DIS. *See* Defence Intelligence Staff
 Djilas, Milovan, 204
 DMI. *See* Director of Military
 Intelligence
 Dmytryk, Edward, 87
 DNESTR, 263
 DO. *See* Directorate of Operations

- DONALD, 249
 Donovan, Bill, 217
 DOUBLE QUICK, 237
 Doustin, Daniel, 126
 DRAGON RETURN, 98
Dreadnought, HMS, xviii
 Droujinsky, Dmitri, 62
 Drummond, Nelson, 296
 DRV. *See* Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Dr Zhivago (Pasternak), 96
 DS. *See* Darzhavna Sigarnost
 DSO. *See* Defence Security Officer
 DST. *See* Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire
 Dubrova, Maria, 43
 Dubuvoi, Petr I., 302
 Duggan, Laurence, 217
 Dulles, Allen W., 220
 Durrani, Assad, 238
 Dutch Intelligence Service. *See* Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst
 Dyess AFB, Texas, 221
- EA-3B, 259
 Eastcote, 67
 East German Foreign Intelligence Service. *See* Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung
 East German State Security. *See* Staatssicherheit
 EB-17E, 300
 EC-121, 358
 EC-121M, xix, 17, 18
 Eden, Anthony, 284
 Edenski, Sergei A., 323
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 2, 43, 179, 221, 325
Ekholot, 301
 Elming, Albert, 296
 El Salvador, 13
 Enbom, Fritof, xviii, 103, 296–97
Encounter, xix, 96
 ENORMOZ, 328
 Enzies, Sir Robert, 40
- Ergiri (Gjinokaster), Albanian Air Force Base, 27
 ERIC, 328
 ERIK, 296
 Eriksson, Bertil, 296
 Eriksson, Signe, 297
 Eriksson, Ture Georg, 297
 Ermarth, Fritz, 276
 Estonia, 103–14
 Estonia (Projects AEROOT/AEBASIN), 261
 Ethiopia, 14
 Evatt, Dr Herbert, 37
Evatt the Enigma, 97
 EXCISE, 304
 Executive Order 13526 (1995), 1
- F-4 Phantom, 21
 F-16, 61
 F-101 Voodoo, 92
 F-117 Nighthawk fighter, 289
Facing Reality (Meyer), 178
 Fadeykin, Ivan, 178
 Fahy, Jack, 218
 Fairchild AFB, Washington, 221
 Falkland Islands, xxi, 123–24
 Falklands Conflict (1982), 123
 FALLEX, 239
Fall of a Titan (Gouzenko), 142
 FAMILY, 285
Far Eastern New Letter, 218
 FAREWELL, 316
 Farmakowsky, Olga, 91
 Farnborough Air Show, 61
 Farouk, King, xviii
 FBI. *See* Federal Bureau of Investigation
 FBIS. *See* Foreign Broadcast Information Service
 FCA. *See* U.S. Army Foreign Counterintelligence Activity
 FCD. *See* First Chief Directorate
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), xix, 1, 30, 33, 43, 61, 87–88, 90–91, 99, 100–101, 116, 118, 165, 171–

- 72, 179–80, 204–5, 249–50, 284,
286–87, 307, 320–21, 323, 329,
561; Behavioral Analysis Program,
288
- Federal German Intelligence Service.
See Bundesnachrichtendienst
- Federal German Security Service. *See*
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
- Federal Republic of Germany (FRG),
129–39, 154–55, 265–70, 289, 429
- Fedorenko, Sergei, 30
- Fedotov, Feodor, 250
- Fedotov, Petr V., 118, 178
- Feklisov, Aleksandr (alias Fomin), 95
- Felfe, Heinz, 130
- FELIX, 130
- Ferrant, Patrick, 316
- Ferret Flights, 30
- Ferris, John, 560
- FERRO, 118
- Field Service Regulations of the Armed
Forces of the USSR*, 251
- Fiers, Alan, 13
- Fifth Advanced Squadron, 17
- Fifth Air Force, 15
- Fingal Larsson, Leo, 103
- First Chief Directorate (FCD), 92, 95,
168, 171; Chief of. *See* Vladimir
Kryuchkov
- The First Directorate* (Kalugin), 205
- First Main Directorate (PGU), 70–73
- Fishbed*, 21
- Fisher, Willie, xviii, xix
- Fitin, Pavel, 328
- Five-Eyes, 280
- Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron VQ-
1, 18–19
- Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron
VQ-2, 18
- FLORDORA, 280
- Foccart, Jacques, 125
- Focke-Wulf, 302
- Fodor, Eugene, 96
- FOOT, xix
- Forbes AFB, Kansas, 221
- Forden, David W., 195
- Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS), 51
- Foreign Instrumentation Signals
Intelligence (FISINT), 300
- Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
58, 276
- Formenko, Pavel, 296
- Forsvarets Radioanstalt (FRA), 6, 296
- Fort Bragg, 171
- Fort Devens, Massachusetts, 165
- Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 165
- Fort Meade, 19
- Fort Monmouth, 165
- Fort Still, Oklahoma, 165
- Foxtrot* diesel-electric submarine, 93
- FRA. *See* Forsvarets Radioanstalt
- France, xix
- Franklin D. Roosevelt*, USS, 5
- Frantzen, Karl, 296, 297
- FRED, 297
- Free French, 89
- French intelligence Service. *See*
Direction Générale de Sécurité
Extérieure
- French Security Service. *See* Direction
de la Surveillance du Territoire
- FRG. *See* Federal Republic of Germany
- Frisch, Dr. Peter, 167
- Frog-7*, 93
- Frog* missiles, 93
- Frunze Naval Academy, 33
- Fuchs, Klaus, 329
- Fursenko, Aleksandr, 559
- Fylingdales early warning radar, 215
- Gabor, Peter, 179
- Gals*, 301
- GAMBIT, 7, 223
- GANBIT, 29, 223
- Gandt, Roland, 131
- Garbe, Ingrid, 129, 214
- Garcia, Wilfredo, 296
- Gardner, Meredith, 322
- Gaspari Alcide de, 183

- Gast, Gabrielle, xxi, 3, 129
 Gaulle, Charles de, 88
 GCHQ. *See* Government Communications Headquarters
 GDR. *See* German Democratic Republic
General H.H. Arnold, USS, 300
 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 155
 GEORG, 155
 George, Clair, 31–32
 Georgi, Otto, 137
 Gerber, Burton, 31
 German Democratic Republic (GDR), 129–38, 155, 447, 451
 Gersowold, Hugo, 103
 Ghadaffi, Muammar, xix
 Gibney, Frank, 244
Gidrofon, 301
Gidrorulevoy, 301
 Giola del Colle, 70
 GIRLFRIEND, 118
Giroskp, 301
 Gittner, Capt., 447
 Glavnoe Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenie (GRU), xxi, 3, 13, 31–32, 34, 36, 43, 61, 91, 95, 103, 141, 161, 171, 174–75, 179–80, 191–92, 197, 217–18, 221, 243–45, 249–50, 264, 370, 279–83, 295–97, 315, 321, 323, 327, 329–30, 453
 Glennon, Barbara, 307
 Glennon Jim, 307
 Globke, Hans, 130
Glomar Explorer, xx, 41
 GOLD (Berlin tunnel), 53
 Gold, Harry, 87, 329–30
 GOLDENROD, 99
 GOLDFINCH, 215
 Goleniewski, Michal, 91
 Golf-II diesel-electric submarine, 40
 Golitsyn, Anatoli, xix
 Goodman, Michael, 560
 Gorbachev, Mikhail, xxi
 Gorbatenko, Aleksei, 177
 Gordievsky, Oleg, xx, xxi, 3, 14–15, 31
 Gorsky, Anatoli V., 327
 Goslar, Peter, 131
 Gouzenko, Igor, xvii, 3, 4
 Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), xviii
 GRAB satellite, 300
 Graur, Andre, 328
 Graver, Bill, 54
 Greenglass, David, 87, 330
 Gregg, Joseph, 218
 Gregory, Jeffrey E., 180
 Grenada, 13
Grenada: The Cuban Factor, 143–54
 Grenada's People's Revolutionary Army, 143
 Grimes, Sandy, 33
Grisha class sub-chaser, 349
 Gromov, Boris, 13
 Gromyko, Andrei, 189
 Grossmann, Karl-Christoph, 130, 245
 Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), 403–7
 GRU. *See* Glavnoe Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenie
GS-34, 301
GS-36, 301
GS-41, 301
GS-43, 301
GS-46, 301
GS-47, 301
GS-55, 301
GS-59, 301
GS-239, 301
GS-242, 301
GS-242, 301
 GSFG. *See* Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
 GT/ACCORD, 32
 GT/BACKBEND, 31
 GT/COWL, 32
 GT/EASTBOUND, 32
 GT/GLAZING, 31
 GT/GLAZING, 31
 GT/JOGGER, 32
 GT/MEDIAN, 32
 GT/TAME, 31

- GT/TICKLE, 140
 GT/TWINE, 32
 GT/VEST, 31
 GT/VILLAGE, 31–32
 GUDRUN, 130
Guideline. See SA-2
 Guillaume, Gunter, xx, 3, 154
 Guillaume, Christel, 155
 Guilsher, John, 306
 Gul, Hamid, 238
 Gulf of Tonkin incident (1964), xix
 GULL, 195
 Gundarev, Viktor, 91
 Gushchin, Pyotr, 298
 GUSTAV, 296
 Guxsov, Gen., 178
 Gyepes-Gilbert, Otto Atilla, 180

 Hagelin B-311, 64
 Haines, John Earl, 559
Halbiut, USS, 41
 Hall, Gus, 87
 Hall, James, xxi
 Hall, Ted, 87
 Hambleton, Bessie, 168
 Hambleton, Hugh, xx, 2
 Hambleton, Therese, 168
 Hamid, Sayed, 237
 Hammarskjöld, Dag, xviii
 Hansen-Nygaard, Robert, 297
 Hanssen, Robert, xx, 15
 HARDBALL, 300
 Harris, Kitty, 87
 Hart, Howard, 238
 Harvey, Bill, 54
 Harwell, 31
 Hashemi, Jamshid, 5
 Hathaway Gus, 31–32
 Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA),
 xix, xxi, 100, 129–31, 154–56, 167,
 175, 182, 214, 224, 245, 263, 282–
 86, 289, 445, 450; director of. *See*
 Markus Wolf
 HAVE DOUGHNUT, 21
 HAVE DRILL, 21

 Havers, Sir Michael, 123
 Hayhanen, Reino, 91
 Hayter, William, 305
 Heath, A.M. & Co., 304
 Helfand, Leon, 413
 Helmich, Joseph G., xix, 171
 Hemblys-Scales, Robert, 36
Hemisphere, 217
 Henze, Hans-Jurgen Henze, 130–31
Hercules, ASA, 123
 Hervé, Jacques, 126
 HEXAGON (KH-9), 223
 Heyser, Steve, 173
 Highes, Howard, 41
 Hill, Jim, 31
 Hiss, Alger, 217
 Hiss, Donald, 217
 Hiss, Priscilla, 217
*History of the Office of Special
 Activities (OSA) From Inception to
 1969*, 309
 Hjelman, Martin, 297
 Ho Chi Minh trail, 219
 Hofer, Gydrun, 138
 Hofmann, Robert, 137
 Höfs, Ursula, 132
 Hohenschoenhausen Stasi prison, 137
 Hoke, Margarete, 130
 Holdeme, Arthur W, 49
 Hollis, Roger, 34, 36, 38
 Hollisday, William, 41
 Honduras, 13
 Hong Kong, 63
 Hood, Bill, 251
 Hopson, Donald C., 181
 Houghton, Harry, xviii, 2, 172
 House Armed Services Committee,
 257
 House Committee on Un-American
 Activities (HCUA), 33
 HOUSE PARTY, 303
 Hovnesian, Artudh, 91
 Howard, Edward Lee, 15, 31
 Hoxha, Enver, 23
 Hughes, Alfred T., 38–39

- Hungarian Intelligence Service. *See*
 Allami Vedélmí Hatosag
 Hungarian Military Intelligence Service
 (MNVK/2), 179
*The Hungarian Revolution and Future
 Planning*, 178
 Hungarian Uprising (1956), xviii
 Hungary, xvii, 21, 32, 175, 177–80,
 321, 325, 333, 416, 421, 499–502,
 564
 Hunt, Jim, 126
 Hussain, Riaz, 238
 Hussein, Mirza Hamid, 238
 HVA. *See* Hauptverwaltung
 Aufklärung

 Iacobescu, Ion, xix, 262
 ICBM. *See* Inter-Continental Ballistic
 Missile
 Identification Friend or Foe, 21
 Idris, King, xix
 Ignaste, Vladimir, 91
 Il-16, 82, 224
 Il-28 *Beagle*, 93
 Il-38 *May* patrol aircraft, 347
 Il-76 *Mainstay*
*Implications of Recent Soviet Military-
 Political Activities* (1984), 265–76
 IMPULSE, 282
 Imre, Nahit, 175
Indigurka, SS, 93
*Information Bulletin of the Missile
 Troops*, 545
 Information Research Department
 (IRD), xvii
 INR. *See* State Department Bureau of
 Intelligence and Research
Inside The Company: A CIA Diary
 (Agee), 14
 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
 (ICBM), xviii, 2, 4, 95, 98, 173,
 220–21, 225, 246, 284, 289, 300,
 538, 541, 546
 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
 (IRBM), xix, 93, 299

 International Confederation of Free
 Trade Unions, 182
 International Organisations Division, 96
 Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate
 (ISI), 237
 Invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968), ix,
 xix, 183–86, 262, 321–22, 540
 Iran, xviii, 14, 297, 299
 Iraq, xxi, 21, 63, 101
 IRBM. *See* Intermediate Range Ballistic
 Missile
 IRD. *See* Information Research
 Department
The Iron Curtain (Gouzenko), 142
 IRON WORK, 300
 Italian general election (1948), xvii, 182
Izmeritel, 301
Izvalta, 301
 JACK, 206

 JACK STRONG, 195
 Jacquinot, Louis, 224
 Jaffe, Philip, 218
 Jamaica, 13
 Jarrell, Howard R., 299
 Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 233
 JB/CLOUD, 199
 JCS. *See* Joint Chiefs of Staff
 JEDBURGH, 262
 Jeffery, Keith, 560
 JENNIFER, 40
 JEROME, 197
 JEZEBEL, 94
 JIC. *See* Joint Intelligence Committee
 JIM, 296
 JOE-1, xvii
 John, Otto, 138
 John Paul II, Pope, xxi
 Johnson, Lyndon B., 155
 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 17, 324
 Joint Chiefs of Staff Intelligence
 Objectives Agency, 324
 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 7
 JULIE sonobuoy, 94
 JUNIOR, 285

Jupiter medium-range missile, 30, 95
JURACHOV, 413

K-129, xix, 4, 40–41

K-14, 8

KA-25 *Hormone* helicopter, 346

Kadena, Okinawa, 17

Kahlig-Scheffler, Dagmar, 131

Kallu, Shamsur Rahman, 238

KAMA, 93

Kamiseya, Japan, 251

Kampiles, William, 91

Kanin, 543

Kapustin Yar, 284

Kara class, 348

Karamessines, Tom, 173

Karlow, Peter, 91

Karlskrna naval base, 298

Karlsson, Artur, 103

Kart, Lennart, 297

Kasmin, Vasili, 192

Kasrils, Ronnie, 101

Katek, Charles, 262

Katona, Geza, 176

Kavkaz, 301

Kaznacheev, Aleksandr, 91

Kearn, Bruce L, 296

Kekkonen, Urho, 3, 189

Kennedy, John F., xix

Kercsik, Dr Sandor, 32

Kercsik, Imre, 32

KEYHOLE (KH-1), 223

KGB. *See* Komitei Gosudarstvennoi
Bezopasnosti

KH-4B satellite, 185

KH-7 camera, 223

KH-8, 223

KH-11, 175

KHAD. *See* Khadamete Artia-ate
Dawlati

Khadamete Artia-ate Dawlati (KHAD),
14

Khan, Akbar, 237

Khan, Ghulam Jilani, 238

Khan, Mohamed Hyat, 238

Khan, Mohammad Akbar, 238

Khersones, 301

Khokhlov, Nikolai, 91

Khrushchev, Nikita, xviii, 93

Killian, James, 58

Kim, Robert J., 296

King, Andrew, 91

King, Martin Luther, 561

Kirpichenko, Vadim, 92, 560

Kiselnikova, Raya, 91

Kisevalter, George, 33

Kislitsyn, Filipp, 247

KL-7 cipher machine, 171

KL-47 cipher machine, 320

Klarin, Pavel, 322

Klehr, Harvey, 559

Klimov RD-45, 299

KLOD, 35

Kobaladze, Yuri, 560

Koecher, Karl, 91

Koestler, Arthur, 96

Kola, Bilal, 23

Komar patrol vessel, 93

KOMETA, 335

Komitei Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti
(KGB):Chairman of. *See* Ivan
Serov; Yuri Andropov. *See also* 16th
Department; First Chief Directorate;
Line F; Line KR; Line Sk; Line X;
Second Chief Directorate

Kondrshev, Sergei, 559

KONSUL, 308

Kontraobveščevalna Služba (KOS), 170,
331

Korean Airlines flight 007, xxi, 192

Korean People's Army, 252

Koriakov, Michel, 413

Korotkov, Aleksandr M., 55, 250

Korzhan, Michael, 313

KOS. *See* Kontraobveščevalna Služba

Kosmos, 7, 280

Kovaliev, Viktor, 247

Kravchenko, Victor, 413

Krenometr, 301

Krepkogorsky, Col., 14

- Kresta II* class, 348, 543
 Krichbaum, Wilhelm, 138
 Krichbaum, Willi, 130
 Kriegsmarine, 7
Krivak class destroyer, 348
Krivak destroyers, 343
Krograf, 301
 Krokhin, Aleksei, 55
 Krotkov, Yuri, 91
Krym, 301
 Kryuchkov, Vladimir, xxi, 4
 Kudriashev, Valentin, 283
 KU/FIRE, 75
 Kukauskas-Kukis, Jonas (JACK), 214
 Kuklinski, Boguslaw, xx, 192–95
 Kuklinski, Waldemar, 195
 Kunkle, Craig, xxi
 Kuron, Klaus, 130
Kurs, 301
 Kushel, Francis, 74
 Kuwait, xxi, 101
 Kuzichkin, Vladimir, xxi
 Kvasnikov, Leonid R., 327
 KW-7 cipher machine, xix, 257
 KWR-37 copher machine, 257
 KY-8 cipher machine, 319
- La-11 *Fang*, 13
 Labarthe, ndre, 3, 197
 Lackey, Lester L., 125
 LACROSSE, 223
Ladoga, 301
 Land, Dr. Edwin H., 310
 Lander, Stephen, 560
 Langelle, Russell, 251
 Langner, Karl-Heinz, 443
 LANYARD (KH-6), 223
 Laos, 13
 Lardner Jr., Ring, 87
Larga-class trawler, 301
 Larsen, Emmanuel S., 218
 Latvia, 199–204
 Latvia (AECOB), 261
 Launags, Fred (alias Cleveland O. Hahn), 199
- Lawson, John Howard, 87
 LCI/HOMELY, 104, 109
 LC/OUTBOUND, 313
 Leber, Georg, 155
 Lebig, Margarete, xxi
 Lecoutre, Alta, 197
 Ledbetter, Gary L., 296
 Lee, Andrew, xx
 Lee, Duncan, 217
 Legaede Kaserne, Bamberg, 214
Legia, 195
 Lehman, John, 123
 Lennon, John, 561
 LeShack, Leonard A., 85
 Lesnoy/Sverdlovsk-45, 222
 Levchenko, Stanislav, 91
 Levenson, Arhtur, 19
 Libya, xix, 13–14, 22, 146, 563–64
 Liddell, Guy, 302–3
 Lincoln AFB, Nebraska, 221
 Lindeer, Maj., 448
 Line F, 215
 Line KR (“*kontazvedka*”), 92
 Line SK (“*Soviet Kolony*”), 92
 Line X scientific intelligence, 4, 32, 316
 LINK, 322
 Linkov, Yuri, 320
Linza, 301
 Lipka, Robert, xix, xx
 Lithuania (Projects AEGEAN/AECHAMP), 261
 Lithuanian Fighters for Freedom (LLKS), 211, 525, 529
 Lithuanian General Democratic Resistance Movement (BDPS), 523–29
 LIVE OAK, 55
 LLKS. *See* Lithuanian Fighters for Freedom
 Lloyd, Selwyn, 177
 Lockwood, Rupert, 97
 Lop Nor, Xinjiang Province, 237
 Lorenzen, Ursel, 130, 175
 Los Alamos, 330
Los Angeles Times, 41

- Lotlin*, 301
 Lourdes, Cuba, 245, 283
 Lubig, Margarete, 131
 Luksa, Jaczas, 214
 Lukyanov, Pavel P., 168
 Lumumba, Patrice, xviii
 Lunet de la Malene, Christian, 127
 Lunev, Stanislav, 91
 Lyalin, Oleg, xix, 3
 Lyalin, Seraphim, 282
 Lyubimov, Viktor, 171

 M1/A1 Abrams tank, 100
 Mabey, John, 249
 Maclean, Donald, xvii, 4, 315
Maddox, USS, 155–56
 Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD), 344
Mainstay. *See* II-76
 Major, John, 560
 Makarov, Semen I., 34
 Makarov, Viktor, xxi, 283
 Makarvov, Semen, 34
 Malta, 22
 Maltz, Albert, 87
 Manhattan project, 3
 Manson, Grant C., 67
 Marenches, Alexandre de, 126
 MARKIZ, 308
 Markov, Georgi, xx
 MARQUIS, 218
 Marr-Johnson, Patrick, 67
 Marshall, George, 325
 MARTHA, 197
 Martianon, Constantinos, 215
 Martynov, Valeri F., 31
 MARY, 132
 Maslov, Igor V., 283
 MASTERCRAFTSMAN, 114
 Matviyeyko, Myron, 262
 Maury, Jack, 262
 MAX, 296
 MAXWELL, 218
 May, Alan Nunn, xvii

May. *See* II-38
Mayak, 301
Mayakovskiy-class, 301
 Mayhew, Christopher, 305
 McCarthy, Joseph, 218
 McCoy, Leonard, 234
 McGraw Kaserne, Munich, 262
 McKechnie, Laurie, 142
 McNamara, Robert S., 16
 Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), 219–20
 Melnik, Constantin, 127
 Melnik, Michel, 127
 Melyshi Bajraktari, Mark, 23
 Merkulov, Vsevolod N., 328
 Meyer, Cord, 178
 MFA. *See* Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 MfS. *See* Ministerium für Staatssicherheit
 MGB. *See* Soviet Ministry of the Interior
 MHDOWEL, 313
 MI-4 *Hound* helicopter, 349
 MI5. *See* British Security Service
 MI6. *See* British Secret Intelligence Service
 Michalek, Karl-Henz, 132
 Michiels, Eugene, 263
 MiG-15 *Fagot*, xx, 299
 MiG-17 *Fresco*, 13, 21
 MiG-21 *Fishbed*, xix, 21
 MiG-23 *Flogger*, 21
 MiG-25, xx
 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*, 21
 Mil-24 *Hind-D* helicopter gunship, 13
Military Thought, 251
 Miller, Gerry, 5, 182
 Miller, Robert T., 217–18
 Milne, Tony, 91
 Milner, Ted, 115
 Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), 129, 138, 443, 445 450
 Minter, U.S. Charge in Canberra, 36

- Minuteman missile, 246
 Mirakaj, Ndoc, 23
 Missile gap, 220–22
 Mitchell, Graham, 91
 Mitrokhin, Vasili, 14
 Mitterand, Francois, 316
Mius, 301
 MNVK/2. *See* Hungarian Military Intelligence Service
 MOB. *See* Munich Operations Base
 Modrzinskaya, Yelena, 328
 Mohring, Hans, 137
 Mokras, Lydia, 97
Mole (Hood), 251
 MON, 218
 MONGOOSE, 173
 Montes, Ana, 44
 Montgomery, Bernard, 303
 Moorer, Thomas, 16
 Mortati, Tommaso, 180
 MOSEDL, 214
Moskva, 347
 Mossadegh, Mohammed, xviii
 Motorin, Sergei M., 31
 Moulin, Jean, 88
 Moynahan, Daniel Patrick, 560
 Mozambique, 14
 MRBM. *See* Medium Range Ballistic Missile
 Mujahadeen, 238
 Munich Operations Base (MOB), 206
 MURAL (KH-4), 223
 MURAT, 279
 Murphy, David, 54
 Murphy, James K., 171
 Murray, Ralph H., 181, 305
 Muselier, Adm. Emile, 197
 Mutlangen, 245
 MVD. *See* Soviet Interior Ministry
 Myagkov, Aleksei, 91
 Myers, Kendall, xx, 44

 Nadirashvili, Konstantin, 91
 Naftali, Tim, 559

 Narodni Kommissariat Vnutrennih Dei (NKVD), 3, 34, 36–37, 65–66, 69, 84, 88, 97, 141, 217–18, 246–50, 280–82, 302, 315, 323, 327, 330, 366, 560; head of. *See* Vsevolod Merkulov
 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, xviii, xix
 National Committee for Free Albanina (NCFA), 22
 National Council for Free Albania (NCFA), 24
 National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), 15
 National Independent Bloc (BKI), 22
 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), 58, 163, 220, 289, 321, 331
 National People's Army (NVA), 137
 National Photographic Interpretation Center, 172
 National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), 1, 223
 National Security Act (1947), xvii
 National Security Agency (NSA), 1, 15
The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown, (1989), 45
 National Security Council Intelligence Decision (NSCID), 17, 19
 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD), xxi
 National Security Planning Group, 14
 National Student Association, 96
 National Technical Processing Center, 300
 NATO. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 NATO Clandestine Planning Committee, 298
NATO Gambles with Nuclear War, 130
 Nau-Ulm, 245
 Naval Security Group (NSG), 19, 251
 NCFA. *See* National Council for Free Albania
 Nechiporenko, Oleg, 235

- Neckarsulm, 245
- NEEDLE, 323
- Nellis AFB, Nevada, 21
- The New Class* (Djilas), 204
- New South Wales Council of Churches, 97
- New York Field Office, 249
- New York Times*, 41
- NFIP. *See* National Foreign Intelligence Program
- Nha Trang, 259
- Niagara Falls*, USS, 319
- Nicaragua, 7, 14, 148–49, 153–54
- Nichiporenko, Oleg, 14
- Nicholson, Arthur, 166
- Nicholson, Harold, 15
- NIE. *See* National Intelligence Estimate
- NIEMEN: exercise, 184
- Nikitin, Sergei, 100
- Nimitz*, USS, 320–21
- Nitze, Paul H, 52
- Nixon, Richard M., xix, xx, 2, 7
- Nizhi Novgorod, 222
- NKAF. *See* North Korean Air Force
- NKVD. *See* Narodni Kommisariat Vnutrennih Dei
- Nollau, Gunter, 155
- Noringa*, 301
- NORMA, 130
- Norraskensflamman*, 103
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), xvii
- North Korean Air Force (NKAF), 53
- North Vietnamese Army (NVA), 449
- Norwood, Melita, 87
- Nosenko, Yuri, xix, 4, 91
- Nosov, Fedor A. (TECHNICIAN), 40
- November class submarine, 8
- Novosibirsk, 222
- Novouralsk/Sverdlovsk-44, 222
- NRO. *See* National Reconnaissance Office
- NSA. *See* National Security Agency
- NSCID. *See* National Security Council Intelligence Decision
- NSDD. *See* National Security Decision Directive
- Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, xix, 220
- NVA. *See* North Vietnamese Army
- Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security* (1948), 225–32
- Obnaruhenia Kilvatemovo Sleda* (SOKS), 8
- Observation Island*, USS, 300
- Office of Current Intelligence, 55
- Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), 33
- Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), xvii
- Office of Special Operations (OSO), xvii
- Office of Strategic Research (OSR), 184
- Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 83, 96, 182, 217, 325; head of. *See* Bill Donovan
- Office of Technical Services, 306
- Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee* (Goodman), 560
- Offutt AFB, Nebraska, 221
- Ogarkov, Nikolai, 174
- Ogorodnik, Aleksandr, xx, 4, 14–15, 30, 234
- Ogranisation Armée Secrete, 126
- Okean-class, 301
- Oko satellite, 246
- Op:20:G, 66
- OPC. *See* Office of Policy Coordination
- Ordzhonikdze*, xviii
- Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), 313
- Ornitz, Samuel, 87
- Osan Air Base, Korea, 17
- Osiris*, HMS, 301
- OSO. *See* Office of Special Operations
- OSS. *See* Office of Strategic Services
- Osterreider, Gerda, 132
- Oswald, Lee Harvey, 234
- Oswald, Marina, 234
- Ovakimyan, Gaik, 328

- Overstreet, James H., 44
 Owen, David, 181
 OXCART, 309
Oxford, USS, 92
 Ozersk/Chelyabinsk-65, 222
- P12 SPOON REST radar, 263
 P2V-3W Neptune, xvii, 13
 P2V-5 Neptune, xviii
 Pacepa, Ion, xx, 262
 Pakhomov, Ivan, 97, 247
 PAPERCLIP, 324
 Papushin, Sergei, 91
 Paques, George, 2, 126
 Park, William Z., 218
Particulars of War Vessels/British Commonwealth of Nations, 172
 Pashaliman naval base, Albania, 23
 Pasko, Georgi G., 218
 PASSIONATE flights, xvii, 124
 Passy, Col. (André Dewavrin), 89
 Pasternak, Brois, 96
 Patin, Ferret, 126
 Patrick AiFB, 245
 Pavlov, Nikolai, 141
 PB/JOINTLY, xviii, 391, 403, 406, 420
 PB/PRIME, 79–81
 Peck John H., 181
 Pelton, Ronald, 15
 Penkovsky, Oleg, xix, 4, 14
The Penkovsky Papers (Penkovsky), 244
Penkovsky's Legacy and Strategic Research, 244
 Penza-19/Zarechny-25, 222
 People's Republic of China (PRC), xix, xx, 193–94, 237, 247, 251, 257, 269, 277, 299, 314, 417, 556–57, 562, 564
 Perlaki, Lajos, 179
 Perlo, Victor, 217
 Perm-35, xxi, 283
 PERPIGNAN, 127
 Pershing Ia, 244
 Pershing II MRBM, 131, 244
 PET. *See* Politiets Efterretningstjeneste
- Petersen, Arne, 141
 Peterson, Martha, 234
 Petrov, Evdokia, xviii, 3, 249
 Petrov, Nikolai, 91
 Petrov, Stanislav, 246
 Petrov, Vladimir, xvii, xviii, 3, 40, 91, 97–98, 114, 116, 118, 246–49
 PGU. *See* First Main Directorate
 Phastron, 306
 Philby, H.A.R. (Kim), xix
 PHYLLIS ANN, 259
 Pickering, Jeffrey L., 296
 PIDE. *See* Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado
 Pieckney, Phil, 238
 Pik, Eugene, 413
 Pike, Otis, 257
 PIMLICO, xxi
 Plasch, Maj., 448
 Platkais, Janic, 247
 Plattsburgh AFB, New York, 221
 Pleiku, 259
 Plesetsk SS-8 site, 223
 Point Salines Airfield, Grenada, 143
 Polaris ICBM, xviii, 2, 340
 Poleshuk, Leonid, 31
 Polgar, Tom, 54
 Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado (PIDE), 251
 Polish Intelligence Service. *See* Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa; Urzad Bezpieczenstwa
 Political and Psychological Staff, 314
 Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET), 204
 POLO, 84
 Polokov, Anatoli, 91
Poltava, 95–96
 Polyakov, Dmitri, xix, xx, 14
 Pompidou, Georges, 243
 Popov, Piotr, 13–14, 250
 POPPY satellite, 300
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 181

- Portugal, xx, 553, 558
 Portuguese intelligence service. *See*
 Policia Internacional de Defesa do
 Estado
Poseidon, missile, 337
 Post Office Research Station, Dollis
 Hill, 54
 Potushov, Vladimir V., 32
 Powers, F, Gary, xviii, xix
 Poyapova, Yelena M., 328
 Praeger, Frederck, 96
 Prater, Donald, 91
Pravda, 74
 Pravdin, Vladimir, 88
 Preka, Zef, 23
 Presley, Elvis, 561
 Pretzler, Werner, 445
 Price, Douglas, 85
 Prichard, Katherine, 117
 Prime, Geoffrey, 141
Primorye, 301
Primor'ye class, 301
 PRINCE, 54
 PRKINSON, Len, 244
The Problem of Discovering
 Preparation for a Nuclear Missile
 Attack on the USSR, 265, 269
 PROFESSOR, 118
 PROJEKT HERMES, 98
 Prolog Research & Publishing Co., 313
Prospects for Soviet Success in
 Improving Detection of Submarines
 in Open Ocean Areas (1974), 9
Protraktor, 301
 PT-76 amphibious light tank, 251
Pueblo, USS, xix, 19, 117, 251
 PVO. *See* Soviet anti-aircraft defense
 organisation

 QR/PLUMB, 313
 QUEEN BEE / CHARLIE, 259
 QUEEN BEE / DELTA, 259

 R-7 ICBM, xviii

 Rabinstein, Wolfgang, 138
 Radar Mapping, 261
 Radio Free Europe (RFE), 178
 Radio Nacional, Madrid, 204
 Radio Tirana, 22
 RAF Brawdy, 8
 RAF Fairford, 261
 RAF Lakenheath, 284
 RAF Mildenhall, 125
 RAF Molesworth, 125
 RAF Northolt, 302
 RAF Wyton, 125
 Rahman, Akhtar Abdur, 238
Ramparts, 313
 Ramsay, Roderick J., 180
Randolph, USS, 93
 Ranković, Aleksandar, 331
 Ras-el-Ghareb, 263
 Rastvorov, Yuri, xviii, 91
 RATTAN, 62
 Rawalpindi conspiracy, 237
Razorback, USS, 319
 Razuznavatelno Uptavlenie na
 Ministerstvoto na (RUMNO), 70
 RB-29, xviii, 13, 15
 RB-47E, xviii
 RB-47H Stratojet, 125
 RB-50G, 13, 15
 RB-57, xix
 RB-57E Stratojet, 259
 RC-135, 16
 RC-135M, 16
 RC-140, 259
 RCMP. *See* Royal Canadian Mounted
 Police
 Reagan, Ronald, xxi, 13
 Red Banner Baltic Fleet, 4
 Red Banner Baltic Fleet at Kaliningrad,
 295
 Red Banner Black Sea Fleet at
 Sevastapol, 295
 Red Banner Northern Fleet, xix
 Red Banner Northern Fleet at
 Severomorsk, 295

- Red Banner Pacific Fleet at
Vladivostok, 295
- Red Banner submarine fleet, 295
- Redfa, Munir, 21
- Redmont, Bernard, 218
- REDSKIN, 313
- REDSOX, 74
- Reduktor*, 301
- Reed, Geoffrey, 36
- Remington, William, 296
- Rennie, John O., 181
- RESURS-F, 335
- REVERBERATE, 172
- Révész, Geza, 179
- Reynaud, Paul, 88
- RFE. *See* Radio Free Europe
- RHYOLITE satellite, xx, 175, 223
- Riaz, Muhammad, 238
- Richards, Ron, 247
- Richardson, Daniel, 100
- Richardson, Marie, 215
- Risks Worth Taking: The Odyssey of a Foreign Correspondent* (Redmont), 218
- RISSMAN, 300
- RIVET JOINT, 13
- RN/CHANGE, 110
- ROAM, 249
- Rochford, Mike, 33
- Rockefeller, Nelson, 218
- Rödiger, Helga, 132
- Rogovoy, Vladimir, 283
- Rolls-Royce Nene jet engine, 299
- Romanian military intelligence. *See*
Direcția de Informații a Marelui Stat
Major
- Romanian Security Service. *See*
Departamentul de Informații Externe
- Romke, Col., 30, 35
- Rondeau, Jeffrey S., 180
- ROOSTER-53, 263
- ROSE, 55
- Rose, Fred, 141
- Rosenberg, Ethel, xviii
- Rosenberg, Julius, xviii
- Rositzke, Harry A., 262
- Roussilhe, Francois, 175
- Roussillat, Robert, 125
- Rowlett, Frank, 66
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP), 142, 167, 170
- Royal Commission on Espionage
(Australia), xviii
- Royal Commission on Espionage
(Canada), xviii
- Ruby, Jack, 235
- RUMNO. *See* Razuznavatelno
Uptavlenie na Ministerstvoto na
Runge, Evgenni, 91
- Rupp, Anne, 263
- Rupp, Rainer, xix, 3
- Russell, Bertrand, 96
- Russia (AESAURUS/AENOBLE), 261
- Russian Exports from the Occupied
Territories* (1945), 65
- Russia Today*, 305
- Rust, Mathias, xxi
- RYAN (*Raketno Yadernoe Napadenie*),
71, 264
- Rydman, Hans-Erik, 297
- Rydstedt, Sven, 296
- S (Unidentified Soviet defector), 413
- S-363*, xxi, 298
- SA-2 *Guideline* anti-aircraft missile, 93
- Saar-Demichel, Francois, xix, 3, 126–27
- SACEUR. *See* Supreme Allied
Commander Europe
- Sadat, Anwar, xix, xx
- Sadovnikov, Valentin, 97
- Sakerhetspolisen (SAPO), 103, 296–97
- Sakharov, Vladimir, 91
- Salle, Charles de la, xix
- SALT 1 Agreement (1971), xx, 300
- SALT II Treaty (1979), 300
- SAMOS, 223
- SAND DOLLAR, 41
- SANDBAG, 237

- Sänger, Eugen, 302
SAPO. *See* Sakerhetspolisen
SAPPHIRES network., 126
Sarant, Al, 299
Sarov/Arzamas-16 warhead research facility, 222
Sasson, Molly, 302
SAVIN, 252
Savin, Vladislav, 215
Savov, Stoyan, 70
SB. *See* Sluzba Bezpieczestwa
SB-10, 41
SCA. *See* Service Cryptologic Agencies
SCD. *See* Second Chief Directorate
SCH, Helga, 442
SCH, Klaus-Peter, 442
Scheeberg, 165
Schiller, Hans, 138
Schilling AFB, Kansas, 221
Schlesinger Jnr, Arthur, 96
Schmidt, Helmut, 131
Schneider, Karl-Heinz, 129
Schöter, Herbert, 132
Schubert, Fred, 448
Schumacher, Diermar, 131
Scott, Adrian, 87
Scranage, Sharon, 91
SDECE. *See* Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage
SDI. *See* Strategic Defense Initiative
SEAL Special Forces, 143
Second Chief Directorate (SCD), 90, 178
Second Main Directorate (VGU), 74
Secretariat Inteligencia del Estado (SIDE), 204
Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). *See* British Secret Intelligence Service
The Secret World (Deriabin), 244
Sécurité d'Etat, 61
Security Liaison Officer (SLO), 90, 178
Seigrist, Connie, 85
Sekstan, 301
Sellers, Michael, 32
Semipalatinsk, xvii, 237
Semolka, Janos, 179
Semyonov, Semyon, 329
SENATOR, 69
Senkin, Anatoli B., 250
Serov, Ivan, 178
Serpukhov, 246
Service, John S., 217
Service Cryptologic Agencies, 17
Service d'Action, 125
Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage (SDECE), 126–27
Severomorsk, 93
Seversk/Tomsk-7, 222
SG/PSALM, 199
Shadrin, Nikolai, 34
SHAH, 172
SHAPE. *See* Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SHAPEX, 239
Sharandak, Vasili, 413
SHARK GILL, 99
Shcherbakov, Aleksei, 33, 171
Sheck, Eugene, 18
Shedden, Sir Frederick, 36
Sheldija, Martin, 23
Shergold, Harold, 243
Shevchenko, Arkadi, 8, 30
Sheymov, Viktor, xx, 91
Shitov, Eleksandr (alias Alekseev), 95
Shkvaa, 95
Shumaev, Mikhail M., 323
Sichel, Peter, 54
SIDE. *See* Secretariat Inteligencia del Estado
Sigl, Rupert, 91
Signals Security Agency (SSA), 322
Sigurimi, 22
Silbermaster, Nathan Gregory, 217
Silkworm missile, xxi, 5
Sillitoe, Sir Percy, 34
Silvermaster, Helen, 217
Silverwood-Cope, Machlachlan, 176
Simon Bolivar, USS, 319

- Sino-Soviet split, xviii
 SIOP. *See* Single Integrated Operational Plan
 Siruys, Klementas, 214
 SIS. *See* Secret Intelligence Service
 SISTER, 119
 Sites, Erik, 32
 Six Day War (1967), xix
 SK-111 *Fagot*, xvii, 13
 Skal-KS sonar, 99
 Slean IRBM, 93
Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery 2 – 4 August 1964, 156
 Sky-Hook, 85
 SKYSHIELD: exercise, 184
 SLO. *See* Security Liaison Officer
 Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa (SB), 172
 SMERSH, 66
 Smetanin, Gennadi, 31
 Smetanin, Svetlana, 31
 Smith Act, 87
 Smith, Edward Ellis, 91
 Smith, James, 85
 Smith, Norman, 237
 Snegirev, Vladimir, 127
 Snezhinsk/Chelyabinsk-70, 222
 SNIE. *See* Special National Intelligence Estimate
 SOFT TOUCH, 98
 Sokoli, Nik, 23
 Sokolov, Alexandre, 250
 Sokolovsky, Vasili, 302
 Solidarity trade union, 5
 SOLO, 88
 Solomatin, Boris, 320
 Somalia, 14
 Sorokin, Evgeni, 91
 Sosnovski, Lev V., 250
 SOSUS. *See* Sound Surveillance System under the Sea
 Soubrier, Jacques, 127
 Sound Surveillance System under the Sea (SOSUS), 2, 7, 40–41
 Soustelle, Jacques, 125
 South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), 237
 Souther, Glen, 296
 South Korea, xvii
 Soviet anti-aircraft defense organisation (PVO), 67, 541
 Soviet anti-submarine warfare, 8
Soviet Antisubmarine Warfare: Current Capabilities and Priorities, 8
 Soviet Ant-Submarine Warfare, 337–74
The Soviet ICBM Program, 173
 Soviet Intelligence Service. *See* Komitei Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti
 Soviet Military Intelligence Service. *See* Glavnoe Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenie
 Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 4
 Soviet Ministry of the Interior (MGB), 210
Soviet Reactions to Stealth (1985), 289–94
The Soviet War Scare (Stewart), 276
 Spanish civil war, 69
Spartan, HMS, 123
 Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), 220, 276, 278, 289
 Special Procedures Group, 232
 Special Programs Office, 232
Special Report on BOURBON Cryptography, 66
 Special United Kingdom Liaison Officer (SUKLO), 67
 Special United States Liaison Officer (SUSLO), 64, 67, 69
 SPHERE, 306
Splendid, HMS, 123
 Springhall, Douglas, 328
 Spry, Sir Charles, 40
Sputnik, xviii, 221
 Squillacote, Theresa, xx
 SRF. *See* Strategic Rocket Forces
 SS-4 *Sandal*, 4, 93

- SS-5, 4
- SS-6, 221
- SS-7, 221
- SS-8, 221
- SS-9, 221
- SS-20 *Saber* IRBM, 245
- Staatssicherheit (Stasi), 137–38
- Stalin, Josef, xviii, 3, 118, 305, 327, 411, 414, 423, 435, 548
- Stand, Kurt, xx, 101, 284–89
- Stand, Maximillian, 284
- Stashinsky, Bogdan, 55, 313
- Stasi. *See* Staatssicherheit
- State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), 44, 147–48, 150
- Statni Bezpecnost (StB), 471
- StB. *See* Statni Bezpecnost
- Stein, John, 32
- Stewart, Nina J., 276
- Stockman, Hervey, 284
- Stöhler, Hans, 130
- STONEHOUSE, 300
- STORK, 302
- Strand, Anton, 296
- Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 289
- Strategy of Deep Operations (Global and Theatre)* (Danilevich), 233
- Strela-3* electronic counter-measures, 53
- Stremitelniy*, 33
- STUDENT, 167
- Su-15, xxi
- Su-15 *Flagon*, 192
- Su-22 *Fitter*, 21
- Su-24 *Fencer*, 264
- Su-27 *Flanker*, 21
- Suchasnist*, 313
- Suemihl, Igor, 101
- SUKLO. *See* Special United Kingdom Liaison Officer
- SUMAVAexercise, 184
- Summa Corporation, 41
- SUN VALLEY signals intelligence collection mission, 125
- Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), 239
- Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania, 205
- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), xxi, 131, 239
- Susemihl, Igor, 308
- SUSLO. *See* Special United States Liaison Officer
- SVANTE, 296–97
- Svetlana, Gouzenko, 141
- Swedish Security Police. *See* Sakerhetspolisen
- Swedish Signals Intelligence Agency. *See* Forsvarets Radioanstalt
- Symington, Stuart, 220
- Szabo, Zoltan, xix, 32, 175
- Szmolka, Mihaly, 179
- Szymonczyk, Stanislas, 197
- T-5 nuclear-tipped torpedo, 93
- T-10 heavy tank, 251
- T-72 main battle tank, 5
- Tairova, Margarit, 249
- Takacs, Vera, 413
- Tamir*, 94
- Tank, Kurt, 302
- TANTE, 285
- TAPER, 63
- Target Identification Committee (TICOM), 63
- Tartus, Syria, 283
- Tasoev, Yuri, 91, 303
- TASS News Agency, 31
- Tattersell, Herbert W., 119
- Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT), 300
- TELINT, 300
- TELLMAN, 300
- Teodolit*, 301
- Terek*, 95
- Tet Offensive (1968), xix
- Teufelsberg, Berlin, 165
- TG/TWINE, 32
- Thatcher, Margaret, xx, 276

- This was my Choice* (Gouzenko), 142
Thomson, Robert G., xix, 58
Thomson-CSF, 316
Thor intermediate-range missile 2, 95
Throssel, Hugh, 117
Throssel, Ric, 115
Thwaites, Michael, 247
Thyraud de Vosjoli, Philippe, 126
TICOM. *See* Target Intelligence Committee
Tiedge, Hans-Joachim, 130
Tilranova, Albanian Air Force Base, 27
Time, 217
Tito, Josef, xx
Titov, Gennadi, 307
Tofte, Ornulfe, 307
Tokaev, Bella, 302
Tokaev, Grigori, xvii, 3, 301
Tolkachev, Adolf, xx, 4, 14–15, 31
Tolstoy, Leo, 142
Tonopah Test Range, 21
TOPAZ, 130
TOPHAT, 249
TOPLEV, 88
TOUCAN submarine detection apparatus, 8
TOURIST, 118
Towed-array passive sonar, 7
TP/STALL, 199
Traverz, 301
Treholt, Arne, xxi, 3
Trekhgomy, Zlatoust-36, 222
Trevor Roper, Hugh, 96
TRIGON, 234
Trimouille Island, Australia, xviii
TRINE, 252
Trofimoff, George, 100, 307
TROSTNIK, 283
Trotsky, Leon, 302
Truman, Harry S., xvii, 3, 4, 193
Trumbo, Dalton, 87
Trumpis, Benediktas, 214
Tsarev, Oleg, 559
T Tu-4 (*Bull*) bomber, xvii
Tu-16 (*Badger*), 349
Tu-95 *Bear* heavy bomber, 349
Tucker, USS, 51
Tudor Hart, Edith, 87
Tuomi, Kaarlo, 91
Tupolev-4, 299
Turner Joy, USS, 155
TURQUOISE, 130
Tweedy, Bronson, 176
Twining, Gen. Nathan, 221
Type-2001 sonar, xviii, 8
Type-XXI U-boat, 7
Tyuratam, 237, 284

U-2, xviii, 4, 32, 92, 173, 221–22, 239, 241, 279, 283–84, 308–13
Ubelacker, Renate, 132
U-boat, 7
UGV. *See* Border Troops Directorate Ukraine (AERODYNAMIC), 261
Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, 313
Ukrainische Gesellschaft fur Auslandstudien, 313
Ulmer, Al, 54
Underwater Weapons Research Establishment, Portland, 8
UNESCO, 262
Uniform class submarine, 10
United Nations Refugee Relief Agency, 90
United Sates Intelligence Board (USIB), 17
U'ren, Bill, 238
URGENT FURY, 143
USAFSS. *See* U.S. Air Force Security Service
U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS), 15, 17, 45, 49, 237
U.S. Army Foreign Counterintelligence Activity (FCA), 165, 561
USIB. *See* United Sates Intelligence Board
Usikov, G.A., 282

U.S. Relations with the USSR (NSDD-75), 299

Ustinov, Dmitri F., 328

V-1, 18

V-2, 18

V-2 rocket, 98

Valiant, HMS, 123

VALUABLE, 22, 24

Vandenberg AFB. California, 221

van de Wiele, Robert, 175

VANQUISH, 53, 306

Varenik, Gennadi, xxi, 31

Varentsov, Sergei, 57

Vasilev, Vladimir M., xxi, 32–33

Vasilevsky, Lev, 328

Vassall, John, xx, 99

Vassilenko, Gennadi, 33

Vassiliev, Alexander, 559

Vata, Gjergj, 23

V Committee, 190

Vdokhnovenie, 51

VENONA, xvii, xx, 34

Verrept, Imelda, 130, 175

Vertefeuille, Jeanne, 33

Vetrov, Vladimir, xxi, 4, 34

VGU. *See* Second Main Directorate

Victor class submarine, 9, 10

Vilkuna, Prof. Kustaa, 190

Vinogradov, V.V., 191

Vishnya class, 301

Vito, Carmine, 284

Vizir, 301

Vlassov, Vasili, 224

Vorontsov, Sergei, 32

VORTEX, 223

W-36 warhead, 244

Waldegrave, William, 560

Walker, Arthur, 319

Walker, Barbara, 319

Walker, John, xix, 2, 12, 15, 30, 319

Walker, New Mexico, 221

Walker, Rita, 319

Walsh, Robert, 303

Warburton, P., 35

Warrayat, Jamal Mohamed, 101

Warren AFB, Wyoming, 221

Warsaw Pact, xviii, xix, xx, xxi, 2, 5, 30, 60, 70, 124, 174, 176, 183, 185–86, 196, 233, 262, 280, 308, 321–22, 411, 540, 559

Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO (1979), 321

Washington, USS, xix

Weinstein, Allen, 559

Weisband, Harold, 322

Weisband, Isadore, 322

Weisband, Mark, 322

Weisband, (Volodya) William, xvii, 174, 322

Wenger, Joseph N., 62

Wennerstrom, Stig, 297

Whalen, Bernardine, 323

Whalen, Kathy, 323

Whalen, William, xviii, xix, 2

Wharton, Harry, 215

Whiskey class submarine, xxi, 30

WHISPER, 172

White, Harry Dexter, 217

Whitlam, Gough, 40

Whitney, Ray, 181

Whitworth, Jerry A., 296

Wiele, Roberto van de, xix

Wiess, Gus W., 316

Wiggins, Betty, 303

Wiik, Ragnhild, 297

Will, Dieter, 214

Winterbotham, Fred, 302

Wisner, Frank, 183

Wivegh, John, 297

Wolf, Markus, xxi, 129

Wollweber, Ernst, 296

Wolność i Niezawisłość (Freedom and Independence movement, WIN), 233

World News, 218

Wormwood Scrubs prison, xix

- WUBONBON, 96
 WU/HUSTLER, 96
 Wyatt, Mark, 182
 Wynne, Greville, 243

 X-2. *See* Counterintelligence branch,
 Office of Strategic Services
 XY, 327

 Yak-3 fighter, 278
 Yakota AFB, 17
 Yakskov, Anatoli, alias Yakovlev, 330
 Yarotsky, 302
 Yates, Robert, 125
 Yekaterinburg, 222
 Yemokhonov, Nikolai, 282
 Yezhov, Igor, 127
 Yildirim, Huseyin, 165
 Yom Kippur War (1973), xx
 York, Jones Orin, 323
 Young, Courtenay, 36
 Young Communist League, 215
 Younger, Kenneth, 304
 Younis, Fawaz, 99
 Yugoslav intelligence service. *See*
 Kontraobveščevalna Služba

 Yurchenko, Vitali, 91
 Yurya, SS-8 site, 223
 Yuzhin, Boris, xxi, 32

 Zabotin, Nikolai, 329
 Zahirudin, Mohammed, 237
 Zaitsev, Viktor S, 34
Zakarpartye, 301
 ZAPAD-81, 234
 Zaporovhsky, Aleksandr, 33
Zaporozye, 301
 Zelenogorsk/Krasnoyarsk-45, 222
 Zemenek, Ludek, 91
Zenit, xix, 280, 335
Zenit 4M, 280
 Zhenikhov, Vladimir, 189
 Zhizhin, Vladimir, 307
 Zhukovsky Military Air Academy, 301
 Zierner, Lothar, 284
 Zimmermann, Kurt, 447
 Zog, King, 22
Zond, 301
 ZP/UHVR, 313
 ZR/LYNCH, 200
 Zubilin, Vasili, 88
Zulu class submarine, 95

About the Author

Nigel West was born in London and educated at a Benedictine monastery before reading English at London University. He is a military historian specializing in intelligence and security issues and while still at university he worked as a researcher for two authors: Ronald Seth, who had been parachuted into Silesia by SOE, and Richard Deacon, formerly the Foreign Editor of *The Sunday Times*. He later joined BBC TV's General Features Department to work on the *SPY!* and *ESCAPE* series.

West's first book, coauthored with Richard Deacon in 1980 for BBC Publications, was the book of the *SPY!* series, and it was followed by other non-fiction: *British Security Service Operations 1909–45* (1981); *A Matter of Trust: MI5 1945–72* (1982); *MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909–45* (1983); *The Branch: A History of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch* (1983); *Unreliable Witness: Espionage Myths of the Second World War* (1984); *GARBO* (coauthored with Juan Pujol, (1985); *GCHQ: The Secret Wireless War* (1986); *Molehunt* (1987); *The Friends* (1988); *Games of Intelligence* (1989); *Seven Spies Who Changed the World* (1991); *Secret War: The Story of SOE* (1992); *The Faber Book of Espionage* (Faber & Faber, 1993); *The Illegals* (1993) *The Faber Book of Treachery* (1995); *The Secret War for the Falklands* (1997); *Counterfeit Spies* (1998); *Crown Jewels: The Secrets at the Heart of the KGB's Archives* (1998); *VENONA: The Cold War's Greatest Secret* (1999); *The Third Secret* (2000); *Mortal Crimes* (2004); *The Guy Liddell Diaries* (2005); *MASK* (2005); *Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence* (2005); *The Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence* (2006); *On Her Majesty's Secret Service* (2006); *TRIPLEX* (2009); *Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence* (2007); *Historical Dictionary of World War II Intelligence* (2008); *Historical Dictionary of Sexspionage* (2009); *Historical Dictionary of Ian Fleming's James Bond* (2009); *SNOW* (2011); *Historical Dictionary of Naval Intelligence* (2013) *World War I Intelligence* (2014); *MI5 in the Great War* (2015); *Double Cross in Cairo* (2015); *Cold War Counterfeit Spies* (2016); *Spycraft Secrets* (2017); *Churchill's Spy Files* (2018); *Cold War Spymaster* (2018); *Codeword OVERLORD* (2019)

The Sunday Times has commented: “His information is so precise that many people believe he is the unofficial historian of the secret services. West’s sources are undoubtedly excellent. His books are peppered with deliberate clues to potential front-page stories.” In 1989, he was voted The Experts’ Expert by a panel of spy writers selected by the *Observer*. He is currently the European Editor of the Washington DC-based *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*; the Reviews Editor of *The World Intelligence Review* and was lecturer at the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies.

In October 2003, he was awarded the U.S. Association of Former Intelligence Officers’ first Lifetime Literature Achievement Award.